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Among French sovereigns, few have ex­
erted more fascination through the years than 
the Sun King, Louis XIV, whose long reign 
(1661-1715) marked the apogee of absolut­
ism in monarchical government. 
Hailed at his birth by a joyous populace 
as he Dieudonne — "the God-given" — his 
death was greeted with unconcealed rejoicing. 
His critics have claimed that Louis was pre­
occupied with his gloire, and that he pursued 
it relentlessly at home and abroad in a series 
of diplomatic and military adventures that 
impoverished France and earned Louis the 
hatred and distrust of Europe. Yet to many 
throughout the realm, to some members of 
the clergy, to the wealthier bourgeois, to 
merchants, intellectuals, and the well-to-do 
peasants, he was a rot d'aujourdhui—an agent 
of stability whose personal struggle was their 
struggle, and whose goal it was to contain the 
crises of the age. 
It is to the paradox of Louis that the origi­
nal essays in this collection are addressed. 
They are: "Louis XIV: Roi-Bureaucrate," by 
John C. Rule; "The Formation of a King," 
by John B. Wolf; "The Medical History of 
Louis XIV: Intimations of Mortality," by 
C. D. O'Malley; "Louis XIV and His Fellow 
Monarchs," by R. M. Hatton; "Louis XIV, 
Soldier-King," by John B. Wolf; "Law and 
Justice under Louis XIV," by A. Lloyd Moote; 
"Louis XIV and the Church," by H. G. Judge; 
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PREFACE

T HIS book was born of a conference on the reign of Louis XIV held at the Ohio State University in December, 1964. At that 
time papers were read by Professors Ragnhild Hatton of the London 
School of Economics, University of London; Paul W. Bamford of the 
University of Minnesota; A. Lloyd Moote of the University of South­
ern California; Herbert H. Rowen of Rutgers University; Orest 
Ranum of Columbia University; and John B. Wolf, now of the 
University of Illinois, Chicago Circle. The editor is indebted to the 
participants of that conference for their stimulating discussions, and 
he is grateful to Dean Richard Armitage of the Graduate School of 
the Ohio State University for the generous support that made the 
colloquium possible. 
For purposes of publication a few more papers were solicited that 
were felt to complement those presented at the conference, and an 
introductory first chapter and a bibliographical essay were prepared 
by the editor. 
These papers offer an introduction to some of the historiographical 
problems of Louis XIV's reign and also a re-evaluation of many of the 
current historical interpretations of that period. Each contributor was 
urged to present his own assessment; and although a surprising con­
sensus emerges from these essays, the editor has not attempted to 
reconcile points of view when there is a clash of interpretation. 
J. C. R. 
January, 1969 
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Louis XIV, RorBureaucrate

JOHN C. RULE 
T HIS first essay, which serves as an introduction to the reign of Louis XIV, is divided into three sections. The first reviews the 
political and diplomatic legacies left to the young king by the cardinal-
ministers, Richelieu and Mazarin. The second treats the domestic 
policies of Louis XI Vs personal reign (after 1661), presenting an 
overview of French governmental structure and the accomplishments 
of those great architects of stability Jean-Baptiste Colbert, the Le 
Telliers father and son, and their associates. The last section deals 
with the administration of the foreign office, the evolution of French 
foreign policy, and the crises in Louis XIVs government in the 
middle and later years of the reign. 
THE BEGINNINGS, 1 6 3 5 - 5 9  : THE TWENTY-FOUR YEARS* WAR 
AND THE FRONDES 
On September 5, 1638, in the palace of St. Germain-en-Laye, 
Anne of Austria, wife of Louis XIII of France, gave birth to a male 
child, Louis. He was quickly acclaimed by a grateful French nation 
as Le Dieudonne—the God-given—and would in four years and eight 
months become the fourteenth king of his name. In the weeks that 
followed the young prince's birth, the court, Paris, and the provinces 
gave themselves over to ecstatic celebrations. From the European 
capitals plenipotentiaries came to congratulate the king of France; 
and in Rome, Pope Urban VIII celebrated a pontifical high mass in 
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honor of "Le Dauphin" Louis. But in all Europe no one expressed 
greater satisfaction at the birth of the crown prince than did France's 
principal minister, Cardinal Richelieu, who, in the official Gazette, 
noted that "between the father and the mother, lay that admirable 
child, the object of their desires and the last expression of their happi­
ness."1 Two years later, with the birth of a second son, Philippe, 
the Bourbon succession seemed at last secure. 
The celebrations that attended the birth of future king Louis XIV 
were held against the grim backdrop of war and threatened invasion. 
France had for nearly twenty years prior to 1635 eschewed open 
military intervention in the Thirty Years' War. By the early 1630's, 
however, the drift toward war had become irreversible. It was then 
that Richelieu ordered French troops to reinforce the border garrisons 
at Metz, Toul, and Verdun and to occupy the strategic posts within 
the duchy of Lorraine of Bar-le-Duc, Stenay, and Suze. During the 
same years Richelieu's agents in The Hague, Turin, and Hamburg 
launched a series of diplomatic demarches that led in 1635 to the 
signing of defensive alliances with the Dutch, the duke of Savoy, 
and the Swedes. The denouement of the combined French military 
and diplomatic maneuvers came in May, 1635, with a formal declara­
tion of war on Spain, followed in early 1636 by a declaration of war 
against the Emperor Ferdinand II. 
If 1635 was a year of diplomatic triumph, 1636 was one of near 
military disaster. Cardinal Richelieu and his advisers had not reckoned 
on the military prowess of the seasoned Hapsburg armies, who in 
the spring of 1636 drove scattered French forces before them as 
they advanced in three columns along a front extending from Grave-
lines on the Channel to the valley of the Somme, and from the rich, 
rolling farmland of Burgundy to the Belfort gap. In August, 1636, the 
town of Corbie, some seventy miles north of Paris, fell to Spanish 
forces headed by Philip IV's brother, the Cardinal-Infant. As in 
similar crises in 1709-10, 1792, 1870, 1914, and 1940, cautious 
ministers of state in Paris advised the government to flee southward 
to the Loire valley. Louis XIII, however, in a beau geste worthy of 
his father, Henri IV, announced that he would in person lead a 
counterattack against the Spanish forces. In the ensuing weeks French­
men rallied to the royal banner, and in the autumn of 1636 a French 
army led by the king and his minister recaptured Corbie. Once the 
tide of invasion was stemmed, it ebbed slowly in favor of France.2 
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In the winter of 1636-37, as French armies advanced into Picardy 
and Artois to the north of Paris, Richelieu, with the aid of his able 
secretary of war, Francois de Sublet de Noyers, and their agents, the 
intendants de Varmee, recruited mercenary troops from among the 
Walloons, the Germans, and the Swiss. By the winter of 1637 the 
French military establishment numbered over 100,000. To head the 
important Army of the Rhine, Richelieu hired the services of one 
of the last of the great condottieri, Bernard of Saxe-Weimar. At the 
cardinal's behest, Saxe-Weimar initiated a campaign in 1637 against 
the Imperial fortresses that guarded Spanish supply routes along the 
upper reaches of the Rhine river. By 1638 Saxe-Weimar's troops 
had swept the upper valley nearly clean of Imperials and had invested 
the important fortress of Breisach in Alsace, securing that bridgehead 
over the Rhine. A jubilant Richelieu announced in December, 1638, 
to one of the architects of his German policy, Father Joseph, that 
Breisach "est a nous!" In a few days his prophecy became fact.3 
Richelieu's and Sublet de Noyers's adroitness in starling and sup­
plying the armies insured France of continued success in the military 
campaigns of 1639 and 1640. Even with Saxe-Weimar's death in 
July, 1639, Richelieu was able, by means of generous gifts to the 
garrison commanders in Breisach, to secure that strategic fortress for 
France and with it the key to Alsace. In 1640 Arras in the north and 
Turin in Savoy fell to French forces; and in the same year France's 
most formidable foe, Spain, became embroiled in civil wars in 
Catalonia and in Portugal. Emboldened by Spanish misfortunes, 
France seized Perpignan and then the province of Roussillon, which 
lay under the shadow of the Pyrenees. Thus by the time of his death 
in 1642 Richelieu's dream of French ascendancy seemed close to 
realization: Artois, Alsace, and Roussillon were within France's 
grasp, and with them gateways were opened to Flanders, to the 
Germanies, and to Catalonia. 
In late November, 1642, Richelieu, exhausted by the political 
carnival over which he had so long and so masterfully presided, fell 
ill at his Paris residence, where he died on December 4. Louis XIII, 
who survived his principal minister scarcely six months, succumbed 
to a fever on the fourteenth of May, 1643. With his death, Dauphin 
Louis, a boy of four years and eight months, became king of France 
under the title of Louis XIV, and his mother, Anne of Austria, be­
came queen regent. 
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RICHELIEU'S LEGACY: FOREIGN POLICY 
In foreign affairs Richelieu had committed France to a policy of 
expansion along the northern and northeastern borders. With the 
seizure of Breisach (1638) and Arras (1640), the French became 
further entangled in the fate of the Burgundian and Lortharingian 
(Lorraine) inheritances. Since 1477 France had been vitally con­
cerned with the partitions of the Middle Kingdom, that is, the dispo­
sition of the great Burgundian lands that extended from the ports 
of Antwerp and Ostend to the county of Luxembourg, thence to the 
rich valleys of the Franche-Comte at the base of the Jura mountains. 
These areas, though interrupted by lands of the bishop of Liege and 
by Imperial and German fiefs, seemed relatively secure in the late 
sixteenth century, guarded by Spanish troops ensconced in strongly 
fortified cities that lay strewn along the borders. As the French 
knew, these fortresses gave the Imperial and Spanish Hapsburgs 
advance bases from which to launch attacks on the northern heart­
land—le cceur—of France. The specter of invasion haunted France 
throughout the era of the ancien regime, but at no time in this 
period did the threat loom more ominously than it did in the later 
years of the Thirty Years' War. 
By Richelieu's day France had—by right of a century of military 
occupation—a claim over the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Ver­
dun, which nestled on the periphery of Burgundy and Lorraine. In 
the early 1630's French troops moved from these fortresses into the 
duchy of Lorraine, driving the reigning duke into exile. To protect 
the new conquests from counterattack either through the Franche-
Comte, the Belfort gap (appropriately named the Porte-de-Bour­
gogne), or over the Alsatian bridgeheads, Richelieu had encouraged 
Saxe-Weimar's campaign along the Rhine valley into Alsace. In 
later years Louis XIV and his advisers continued and extended 
Richelieu's policy by annexing further lands in Alsace, the city of 
Strasbourg, and the Franche-Comte.4 
The struggle for the Burgundian and Lortharingian lands points 
up another problem entailed by Richelieu to Louis XIV, that of 
natural frontiers. It seems certain—as Gaston Zeller demonstrated a 
generation ago5—that neither Richelieu nor Louis XIV was seeking 
so-called natural frontiers of France nor, for that matter, the ancient 
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boundaries of Gaul. Their aim in Lorraine and Alsace was to establish 
advanced bases, variously termed passages, entrees, tetes de pont, 
portes, from which to repulse an enemy attack or launch one of their 
own.6 Richelieu asserted in L'Avis an Rot apres le siege de La Rochelle 
(1629), "I believe that we must fortify Metz and advance as far as 
Strasbourg, if possible, in order to acquire 'une entree into Ger­
many." 7 These bases often protected great water routes that led into 
northern and northeastern Europe, e.g., as with Menin and Armen­
tieres on the Lys; Valenciennes and Tournai on the Scheldt; Charle­
ville, Sedan, Stenay, Dunn, Verdun on the Meuse; Thionville and 
Mont Royal on the Moselle; and Fort Louis, Strasbourg, and Breisach 
on the Rhine. An extension of this concept of portes or entrees can be 
found in the fortresses at Belfort on the Porte-de-Bourgogne, and in 
Pignerol and Casale that guard the Maritime Alps of Italy. Where no 
natural protection existed—no forest, promontory, or river bend—the 
engineers of Richelieu and Louis XIV (chief among them Clerville, 
Vauban, and Chamlay), designed a barriere or frontiere de fer: a 
frontier or wall of iron made up of fortified towns, often linked 
together by canals or dikes that could be opened to permit the 
flooding of the surrounding territory. Such a frontier was perfected 
in the later years of Louis XIV's reign by the genius of the Marquis 
de Vauban, whose great fortresses were scattered along the northern 
and northeastern border like a necklace of iron and stone. The strategy 
of the portes or the barriere emerged as one of the idees mattresses 
of military and diplomatic planning in the age of Louis XIV. 
In the field of foreign policy Richelieu left several dreams unful­
filled. One of the most important of these was the so-called Italian 
adventure, or the grande entreprise italienne. Richelieu in his early 
career admitted that he believed Italy to be le cceur du monde, the 
heart of the world. He spoke with the fervor of a late Renaissance 
man, whose eyes turned naturally to the glory of Florence, Rome, and 
Venice, where, surrounded by the splendor of the baroque, lived 
men of science and letters, architects, painters, and poets of renown. 
Like the Renaissance princes Charles VIII and Francis I, Richelieu 
and Louis XIII ordered French armies over the Alps into the fertile 
plains of Lombardy; but like these Frenchmen of an earlier day, they 
had to retreat before the superior strength of the Hapsburgs, holding 
only the mountain passes at Pignerol. Richelieu's successor, Cardinal 
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Mazarin, was likewise enamored of the Italian dream: he, too, inter­
fered in Italian affairs when he launched an ill-fated expedition to aid 
the Neapolitan rebels in 1647-48. Louis XIV himself felt occasionally 
the lure of the Italian will-o'-the-wisp, as witness the French invasions 
of Italy in the late 1680's, again in the 1690's, and in 1701-6; but 
Louis's troops were not more successful than were those of his prede­
cessors. Only in 1797—98 did French Republican armies under Napo­
leon succeed in a military sense where the Bourbons had failed. Yet, in 
reality, the Italian dream had died in the seventeenth century, and 
neither Napoleon I nor Napoleon III could revive it. It died because 
the French became increasingly involved in the fate of the Burgundian 
inheritance; and with the shift in emphasis—only barely begun in 
Richelieu's day—the great balance of European power tilted north­
ward and found its axis in the lines that cross from north to south 
and east to west somewhere near the mouth of the Rhine river, a 
focal point for the power struggle among the Dutch Netherlands, 
England, France, and the Germanies. For the next century and a 
half the fate of Europe was in part decided on the battlefields of 
those Burgundian lands. 
RICHELIEU S LEGACY: THE BUREAUCRATIC IMPULSE 
In implementing his domestic policy of centralization of power in 
the crown, Richelieu faced determined foes among members of the 
royal family; among the great nobles, les grands or les importants; in 
the Roman Catholic church, where Jesuits and Jansenists quarreled 
incessantly; among the Protestants, whom Richelieu robbed of their 
political benefits under the Edict of Nantes; in the municipal govern­
ments, which resisted reformation; in the great law courts, the parle­
ments, which guarded their prerogatives with tenacity worthy of the 
great Parliament in London across the channel; and among the 
peasantry, who, racked by taxes and condemned to a life of poverty, 
protested in the only way they knew how, through the ententes, or 
uprisings. These same forces, often selfish and shortsighted, or simply 
misguided, remained the chief enemies of Louis XIV's government. 
Richelieu, in countering these divisive forces within the realm, 
assembled allies closest at hand, his family and their clients, or crea­
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tures. He placed his nephews, grandnephews, and his cousins in 
positions of trust both in the military and civil services. By 1640 his 
relatives, the Du Plessis and the De la Portes, held the posts of 
marshal of France, the intendant-general of the marine, general of 
the galleys and master of navigation, and grand master of artillery; 
in addition the cardinal's nieces contracted marriage alliances with 
several of the great families of France.8 Although the use of nepotism 
was as old as politics itself, the refinement of this practice reached 
its consummation under Louis XIV. Ministers and secretaries of state 
established dynasties of administrators. The Phelypeaux (who were 
important civil servants as early as the sixteenth century), the 
Colberts, the Le Telliers, the D'Aguesseaus, D'Argensons, and 
Lamoignons, some of whom had been Richelieu's creatures or those 
of his family, became entrenched in the civil service during the 
seventeenth century. Many of these families had risen from the 
nobility of the robe or from the lesser country nobility, what would 
in England of the time have been termed gentry. Others had been 
royal bailiffs, or seneschals, who had built their property holdings 
on the patronage of the royal government. Richelieu, as did Louis 
XIV, employed an increasing number of this class as administrators 
in the central or provincial governments. From this class, who were 
sometimes known as the gens de la plume, Richelieu drew such 
excellent administrators as Claude and Leon le Bouthillier, who 
were related to the Lamoignon and Phelypeaux clans. Richelieu also 
employed Abel Servien and his nephew Hugues de Lionne, both 
future ministers in Louis XIV's government; and Pierre Seguier, 
keeper of the seals and then chancellor of France from 1635 to his 
death in 1672. Through these men and their clients in the courts, 
commissions, and committees, Richelieu fashioned a bureaucratic 
machine that Louis XIV inherited and exploited. 
An important aspect of this seventeenth-century bureaucracy was 
the emergence of ministerial departments. By 1642, as Orest Ranum 
has pointed out in his book Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis 
XIII,9 there had appeared at least two departments of government, 
those of war and foreign affairs. The secretaries of state for these 
departments, along with other secretaries of state and their premiers 
commis, or heads of bureaus, became the chief conduit through 
which information was channeled from the provincial officials to the 
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central administration. Moreover, the secretaries and their bureaus 
represented continuity in government. As Claude le Bouthellier 
observed: 
. .  . It is necessary in the king's affairs to keep a continuity which is 
formed by dispatches of ambassadors, who should never fail to 
make them very ample, to Monsieur the Secretary of State. . . . 10 
This continuity in government was also preserved by the purchase 
of the office of secretary of state, which allowed the secretary to hold 
the post en survivance for a son or nephew or cousin. 
By the 1660's the gens de la plume had emerged as a powerful 
subgroup within the nobility, bitterly hated by the older nobility 
of the sword, whose spokesman, the Due de Saint-Simon, described 
them as vile bourgeois, a misnomer that has stuck. The words of a 
polemicist should not becloud the fact that these "new bureaucrats"— 
these king's men whose place in the French government had been 
increasing in importance since Philip the Fair's day—were fashioning 
the pen into a more powerful weapon than the sword. Thus one of 
Richelieu's most important legacies was the impetus he gave to 
bureaucratic centralization, the very stuff of which so-called seven­
teenth-century absolutism was made. 
Of all the legacies left by Richelieu to Louis XIV, none was more 
immediate in its impact than his choice of a successor as principal 
minister, Jules, Cardinal Mazarin. Born in Rome in 1602, Guilio 
Mazarini, later gallicized as Jules Mazarin, began his political life 
as a diplomat in the service of the papal curia. In 1631 he led a 
successful deputation to settle peace terms over the disputed succes­
sion to the duchy of Mantua. It was then that he attracted the 
favorable notice of Cardinal Richelieu, who later in the 1630's 
induced Mazarin to enter the French diplomatic service. After Father 
Joseph's death in 1638, Mazarin came increasingly to serve as 
Richelieu's diplomatic troubleshooter, and by the time of Richelieu's 
death in late 1642 it had become apparent to the court that he had 
selected Mazarin to succeed to his mantle as principal minister.11 
Mazarin, as his portraits reveal, was a small, pudgily handsome 
man, with large eyes, delicate hands, and a graceful carriage. 
His manner, as one contemporary observed, was "charmant, . . . 
agreable, gracieux, agile, vif, aimable, poli. . . .  "1  2 Beneath this 
patina of politesse lay a mixture of cynicism, detachment, and self-
knowledge that made Mazarin every bit as formidable a minister as 
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ever was Richelieu. For example, during the worst days of the French 
civil war—the Fronde—at a time when he was publicly reviled, his 
personal life satirized, and he himself driven into exile, Mazarin 
began collecting the savage lampoons of his person and policies 
known as the Mazarinades; he had them bound, read aloud for his 
own amusement, and later he sold some of the sets for considerable 
profit. Thus in one gesture he displayed a cynicism, detachment, and, 
further, a desire for financial gain that typifies his whole life. 
Mazarin served the crown with as great a loyalty and devotion as 
had Richelieu. Indeed, so marked were Mazarin's gallantries to the 
regent Anne of Austria that rumor, then and now, has linked Mazarin 
and Anne in secret marriage. There is no proof to support this allega­
tion; we can only note that their relationship was cordial beyond 
pleasantry and tender beyond friendship. The root of such friend­
ship and devotion is not hard to find. They were both foreigners 
caught in an alien land, surrounded by a hostile nobility. Together 
they formed an alliance of necessity anchored in mutual esteem 
and affection. 
Anne of Austria, who became queen regent at the time of Louis 
XIII's death in 1643, was a phlegmatic, plump, slightly dowdy 
dowager, who devoted much of her time to prayer and good works. 
Her political prowess should, however, not be underestimated. She 
was tenacious in the struggle to preserve her infant son's royal pre­
rogatives and the image of his gloire. In her quest for political 
stability she leaned heavily on the advice of her astute cardinal-
minister. Mazarin, in his turn, was able to reinforce the queen 
mother's devotion to her son and to relieve her of the tedium of 
routine decision-making. But it would be an error to say that the 
government of the regency was run solely by the cardinal; it was 
a government conducted in tandem, with Mazarin supplying the 
creative energy and Anne the prestige of office and certainty of pur­
pose. It was an alliance surprisingly like that which had existed 
between Richelieu and Louis XIII.13 
MAZARIN AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
As principal minister, Mazarin's greatest and most lasting accom­
plishment lay in the field of foreign affairs. One of the most important 
diplomatists of his age, he combined the statesmanlike qualities of 
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his predecessor with an inimitable shrewdness of his own. Fortune 
favored Mazarin's diplomatic odyssey in the early 1640's. Europe was 
wearied of war. Spain, plagued by domestic upheavals in Andalusia, 
Catalonia, and Portugal, had suffered defeat at the hands of the 
French at the battle of Rocroi in 1643 and seemed exhausted by 
her military intervention in the Thirty Years' War. England too was 
convulsed by civil war, one of the worst in her history. The Emperor 
Ferdinand III, uncertain of the Northern War, feared yet another 
Swedish invasion of the Germanies, as did many of the princes of 
the Empire. At the same time, in Stockholm, young Queen Christina 
begged her councilors to heed the populace's cries for peace. It was 
at this moment that Mazarin seized the opportunity to appoint a 
distinguished peace embassy, headed by the king's cousin, the Due 
de Longueville, assisted by the astute diplomats Abel Servien and 
the Comte d'Avaux. It took some years and many sessions meeting 
at the German cities of Miinster and Osnabriick for the French 
embassy and their allies, the Swedes, to negotiate a definitive peace 
settlement. The French cause was forwarded, however, by the spec­
tacular French victories on the battlefields of Gravelines (1644), 
Mardyck (1645), Nordlingen (1645), and Lens (1648).14 
Mazarin's policies differed from Richelieu's, particularly as they 
concerned the questions of the Spanish Low Countries and Alsace. 
In writing to the French plenipotentiaries at the congress of Miinster, 
Mazarin spoke of "le coeur de la France," saying that this heart­
land could be protected only when the borders of France had been 
extended to Holland and the Rhine Qcote de VAllemagne) and 
included the provinces of Lorraine and Alsace. Thus, like Richelieu, 
Mazarin posited the existence of a northern heartland—the coeur— 
and understood the importance of guarding that heartland. But 
whereas Richelieu had advocated the cantoning of the Spanish Neth­
erlands and the establishment of steppingstones to the Rhine, Mazarin 
sought outright annexation of the "Pays-Bas" and the cote de 
VAllemagne, that is, Alsace. The French threat was not lost on the 
Dutch statesmen, who in January, 1648, made their separate peace 
with the Spanish in the first Treaty of Miinster.15 Shortly thereafter, 
Spain withdrew from the congress, refusing to sign a peace settle­
ment with France. Cheated of annexations in the Spanish Nether­
lands, Mazarin turned his full attention to completing an agreement 
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with the emperor, which was signed on October 24, 1648, in the 
second Treaty of Miinster. By Franco-Imperial accord France gained 
legal title to the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, leaving 
it to the lawyers to determine the exact boundaries of those three 
dioceses. As to Alsace, Article LXXIV stated: 
The Emperor, as well as in his own behalf as the behalf of the 
whole Most Serene House of Austria, as also of the Empire, resigns 
all Rights, Properties, Domains, Possessions, and Jurisdictions which 
have hitherto belonged either to him, or the Empire, and the family 
of Austria, on the City of Brisac, the Landgraveship of Upper and 
Lower Alsatia, Suntgau, and the Provincial Lordship of Ten Imperial 
Cities. . . . 16 
Thus in one article the emperor ceded outright the Sundgau, a 
compact area in upper Alsace held by the house of Hapsburg as 
a hereditary possession; he countenanced the right of garrison to the 
city of Breisach; he relinquished to France his claims (rights) to 
the ten imperial cities (the Decapole) and recognized French title 
to the landgraviate of Upper and Lower Alsace. 
Mazarin's legacy to the age of Louis XIV, as seen in the Treaty 
of Miinster, was marred by ambiguities and unfulfilled pledges. First 
of all, French claims to the Burgundian and Lotharingian lands were 
unfulfilled. Article IV of the second Treaty of Miinster stated "that 
the Circle of Burgundy shall be and continue a member of the 
Empire. . . . "1T But the authors of this clause presumed that the 
war between France and Spain would be terminated in 1648 rather 
than in 1659. The question of the border between France and the 
Spanish Low Countries was thus left undetermined, pending the 
final peace settlement with Spain at the Pyrenees eleven years later. 
Second, the actual disposition of the Spanish Low Countries them­
selves was left open to arbitration. Mazarin had suggested that France 
to assure the safety of her capital might have to extend her boundaries 
to the Dutch border. But his assertion of French sovereignty over the 
Southern Netherlands was not acceptable to the Dutch. All told, 
four possible solutions to the problem of the Southern or Spanish 
Low Countries were debated during Louis XIV's reign. First, there 
was the idea of cantoning or partitioning the Southern Netherlands 
as proposed by Richelieu and the Dutch as early as 1635; second, 
Mazarin's plan for French annexation; third, the suggestion that the 
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government of the Spanish Netherlands be placed in the hands of 
a so-called neutral party; fourth, that the Burgundian lands located 
in the area of the Low Countries be ceded to the emperor. In 1648 
the final solution had yet to be worked out, and it was a full sixty-
five years before a viable compromise emerged. 
A third problem posed at Miinster concerned the disposition of 
Alsatian lands; on this question Mazarin's diplomacy achieved a 
dubious victory. The emperor, it is true, resigned his rights in that 
province to France, but he bequeathed to the French a heritage of 
ambiguity. Did the emperor have the legal authority to give away 
what he did? What were the rights of "immediacy," and what was 
meant by the term "full sovereignty"? Some historians have criticized 
Mazarin and his agents for not clearing up these ambiguities; others, 
the historian Paul Vaucher among them, have countered by saying 
that "the idea which seems to have guided Mazarin, and the concept 
that later guided France, was that the French government became 
the guarantor of the treaties of Westphalia [i.e., Miinster and Osna­
briick] . . . "; from the position of arbiter France could then safe­
guard her own interests in the Rhine valley.18 
THE FRONDES 
Mazarin faced even graver difficulties in his domestic policies than 
he did in his foreign. Louis XIV's reign opened with great expecta­
tions on the part of nobleman and commoner alike. It was hoped 
that an era of good times had begun, and when the queen regent 
appeared with her infant son before the Parlement of Paris on May 
18, 1643, four days after the death of Louis XIII, the great magis­
trates and princes hastily set aside Louis XIII's will, hoping by the 
revision of the act of regency to solicit royal grace and favor. But 
both the magistrates and the nobles were to be sorely disappointed. 
Anne was not a woman to be frightened or cajoled. Far from jetti­
soning the policies of the late Cardinal Richelieu, she continued and 
reinforced them by retaining Jules Mazarin, Richelieu's "shade," as 
her principal minister and personal confidant. Les grands, finding 
themselves thus snubbed, plotted Mazarin's overthrow in the so-called 
cabale des importants (1643); but like so many misadventures of the 
former reign, this one, too, was wrecked on the shoals of jealousies 
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and mistrust. Informed by his spies of their activities, Mazarin exiled 
the leaders of the cabal to their estates, leaving his position supreme 
in the council.19 The defeat of the cabale was made an even greater 
victory because Mazarin had not resorted to bloodshed, as Richelieu 
had often been forced to do on similar occasions. 
The critical problems in the years 1644 to 1648 were, however, 
not political but economic. The receipts of the state were encumbered 
for two or three years in advance of the actual collection of taxes. 
In order to ease financial strain on the treasury, Mazarin called 
in an expert, Particelli d'Emery, as superintendent of finances. To 
increase state revenue, Particelli proposed two new taxes, the toise 
and the aises, the first being a tax on real estate and the second an 
income tax that fell heavily on the rich.20 The Parlement of Paris, 
as it would do again in the period of the Fronde and in the eighteenth 
century, adopted the tactics of delay. After a lit de justice, held on 
Louis XI Vs seventh birthday, September 5, 1645, the parlement 
finally agreed to a compromise measure in which a tax on corporations 
was substituted for heavier real estate and income taxes. Yet even 
with this concession, discontent grew. Murmurs of protest were 
heard in the law courts and in the streets of Paris. Voices called for 
Mazarin's dismissal. 
The hostility shown the government by the populace and the 
parlements was aggravated by a general European crisis in which 
the English revolution, in particular, served as the model for the 
French jurists, who hoped, like their brethren in Parliament at 
Westminster, to become arbiters of state policy, the balance wheel 
between the great lords and the monarchy. In the spring of 1648 
the Parlement of Paris met in the Chambre de Saint-Louis, where 
they drew up the Twenty-Seven Articles calling for, among other 
things, the suppression of the office of intendant, the establishment 
of the right of habeas corpus, and recognition of the right of consent 
in matters of taxation Qconsentement a Vimpot). So outspoken became 
the opposition to the government that earlier in the year Omer Talon, 
one of the chief judges of the parlement, had cried out, "It is impor­
tant to Your Majesty that we become free men, not slaves."21 The 
ermine glove had been cast at Mazarin's feet, but he hesitated before 
accepting the challenge. 
Finally, in August of 1648, the ministry, wearied by the continual 
harassment from the law courts and heartened by French military 
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victories over the Spanish, openly attacked parlementary pretentions 
to power by ordering the arrest of several of their leaders. From that 
month until the summer of 1653 there was no peace in France. A 
civil war ensued, which historians have called the Fronde—or more 
properly, the Frondes—the name coming from a slingshot used by 
street urchins, symbolizing the resistance of the Parisian populace 
to the so-called tyranny of the foreigners, Mazarin and Anne of 
Austria. The Frondes may conveniently be divided into three upris­
ings: that period beginning in August, 1648, and lasting until March, 
1649, known as the Parlementary or Old Fronde; the period follow­
ing it and extending to February, 1651, in which the interests of the 
nobility of the robe and sword were joined, and known as the Princely 
or New Fronde; and the last period, from February, 1651, to 1653, 
marking the years of desultory fighting and known as the Condean 
Fronde, named after its principal leader, the Prince de Conde.22 
The chief events of the period are quickly told. After the arrest 
of the men of the parlement, Paris, as it has so many times before 
and since, threw up barricades and challenged the power of the cen­
tral government. Sporadic fighting continued until Anne of Austria 
gave way to pressure from the streets and granted a number of the 
demands enumerated in the Twenty-Seven Articles. Anne, however, 
was playing for time; indeed, she never forgave the parlementarians 
for the peremptory tone of their petitions; and in January, 1649, she, 
Mazarin, and the young king rode out of Paris secretly and sought 
shelter in the palace of St. Germain-en-Laye. There followed a siege 
of Paris by royal troops, led by the Prince de Conde, who had pledged 
his support to the queen mother. In late March, 1649, the parlemen­
tary forces in their turn bowed to a force majeure and signed a treaty 
at Rueil, which assured an amnesty to them and to their followers. 
An uneasy truce followed the treaty of Rueil, made more uneasy by 
continued parlementary opposition to the crown, which was encour­
aged by the coadjutor of the archdiocese of Paris, Paul Gondi, and 
by groups of dissident bourgeois. As the number of Mazarinades, 
those violent pamphlet attacks on the cardinal, increased, so did the 
restiveness of the Parisians. At court, Louis II de Bourbon, prince de 
Conde, the victor of Rocroi and Lens, strutted about the Louvre, a 
veritable "peacock of pride." Although his advice was solicited by 
the queen regent and his vanity fed by Mazarin, Conde's ambitions 
seemed unbounded. When these ambitions were frustrated, he plotted 
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with other princes of the blood and great nobles and with the Paris 
Parlement to overthrow Mazarin. Richelieu's worst fears had come 
to pass: an alliance had been formed between the princes of the 
blood, the great nobles, and the robe. 
Anne of Austria, waving aside Mazarin's pleas for caution, had, 
in what was tantamount to a coup d'etat, the princes of Conde, 
Conti, and Longueville arrested and imprisoned, first at Vincennes 
and then at Le Havre. She justified her move by saying that "the 
royal authority will be entirely overthrown by the attacks of these 
Princes. . . . "2  3 Their arrests touched off frenzied reactions at 
court and in Paris. Many nobles left Paris for their estates, among 
them the great general Turenne. An added threat came from external 
force as the Spanish troops launched an attack on the northern 
frontiers. Fearing they would once again be trapped in the cul-de-sac 
of the Louvre, the court began its wanderings across France. "We 
have," as Mme de Motteville testified, "been in a wretched condi­
tion." 2i The household budget was exhausted, the crown jewels were 
pawned, and many of the great officials had been left unpaid. As the 
Duke of York, then in France, reported: "Nothing was so rare as 
money. The French Court was in very great straits, . . . the Crown 
was reduced to a most deplorable condition." 25 
In early 1651 the insistent demands of the parlements and les 
grands forced Anne to release the princes. The Parisians, delirious 
with the thought of their heroes' return, heaped their scorn on 
Mazarin, singing, among other ditties, the one beginning: 
Voicy une Harpie, habile en Cardinal! 
Qu'on depend le copie pour prendre l'original.26 
"Here is a Harpy, dressed as a cardinal! 
We'll have to do with the copy until we can get the original." 
Mazarin, aware of the danger to himself and to the royal family if 
he remained, fled France for the safety of a castle near Cologne, from 
where he collected funds and troops, corresponded with the foreign 
princes, and advised the queen as to what course of action she should 
pursue. Conde, self-styled savior of the monarchy, once again strutted 
about the court as if he were already named regent. His insatiable 
appetite for offices and for the advancement of his creatures led him 
to renewed conflict with Anne, who, as the duke of York noted at 
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the time, "was difficult to frighten and whose courage was daunt­
less. . . . " 27 The pattern of the previous year was re-enacted: Conde 
again broke with the queen regent, leading his followers into open 
revolt and invasion of the southern provinces. Repeatedly in the fall 
of 1651, Anne begged Mazarin to return to court, which, after some 
hesitation, he did in January, 1652, bringing with him some 7,000 
troops. At the same time Turenne cast his lot with the royal family. 
A campaign of march and countermarch developed—a great chess 
game between the two great commanders of the day, Turenne and 
Conde, culminating in a brief encounter in early July, 1652, at the 
gates of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine. Conde was saved from defeat 
by the artillery barrage from the Bastille, whose guns were fired 
by order of La Grande Mademoiselle, the king's cousin. But as 
Conde's right hand grasped at victory, the left hand threw it away. 
The prince's arrogance alienated the Parisians, who in October, 1652, 
were only too happy to welcome Their Majesties to the capital. 
Wisely, Mazarin refrained from returning to Paris until February of 
1653. With the cardinal's triumphal entry into the city, the Parle­
mentary and Princely Frondes may be said to have come to an end.28 
Yet, for the next six years intermittent fighting continued along 
the northern and northeastern borders. Conde, fleeing to the Spanish 
Netherlands, carried on his private Fronde under Spanish colors, and 
once again the dual of titans ensued, with Turenne leading a French 
army against Conde's Spanish forces. While battles on the borders 
continued, Mazarin strove to establish order within France. Work­
ing with his councilors, the "faithful"—Michel Le Tellier, Nicolas 
Fouquet, Abel Servien, and Hugues de Lionne—Mazarin brought 
a semblance of order in the realm of finance and of direction in 
the reorganization of the army. In the field of diplomacy Hugues de 
Lionne, an ambassador-on-mission first in Spain and then in Italy 
and the Germanies, helped frame the League of the Rhine, signed 
in August, 1658, with the archbishops of Mainz, Trier, and Cologne, 
by which a "bonne amitie" was established between those princes 
and the French crown. France was a guarantor of the lihertes ger­
maniques against aggressors, be they Spanish or Imperial.29 The seed 
planted at the congress of Miinster had begun to take root. 
Another of Mazarin's diplomatic coups was the alliance concluded 
in March, 1657, with England, which brought 6,000 English troops 
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to the Continent in support of Turenne's campaign against the Span­
ish in the Low Countries. Oliver Cromwell, England's protector, 
demanded as a quid pro quo the strategically important town of 
Dunkirk, which was handed over to the English commander fol­
lowing the great Anglo-French victory at the Battle of the Dunes in 
June, 1658.30 
As these events unfolded, and as Spain made faint noises concern­
ing a peace parley, Mazarin turned his attention increasingly to a 
problem that was to become one of the leitmotivs of Louis XIV's 
reign: that of the Spanish succession. Castilian law, unlike French, 
did not prohibit a woman from inheriting the throne in her right. 
Thus the marriage of Philip IV's daughters became a matter of 
anxious discussion in the courts of Europe. Louis XIV's mother, 
Anne, after the disturbances of the Fronde had passed, desired noth­
ing more in this life than to see her son wedded to a Spanish infanta, 
and she thought it fitting that Louis should marry the eldest daughter, 
Maria Theresa. Louis, in 1657 a young man of nineteen, had already 
formed a romantic attachment with Mazarin's niece, Marie Mancini; 
but raison d'etat and motherly admonitions overruled the youthful 
affaire de coeur. In 1658 Philip IV consented to the marriage of his 
daughter, and peace negotiations began in Paris early the next year.31 
Mazarin's last and perhaps greatest contribution to the stability of 
the grand siecle was the negotiation of the Peace of the Pyrenees. 
Pourparlers initiated in January, 1659, lasted into the fall of that 
year, when Mazarin and the Spanish prime minister Luis de Haro 
met in person at the foot of the Pyrenees. The treaty was signed 
on November 7, 1659, and included five main provisions: (1) A 
settlement of the Prince de Conde's affairs, which included his 
reinstatement at court and the return of his estates. Such acts of 
reconciliation and oblivion, medieval remnants, were still an impor­
tant aspect of the "character" of seventeenth-century kingship. In a 
more modern vein, the negotiators agreed that (2) Artois, with Arras, 
was deemed forfeit to France, as were the fortresses along the Belgian 
border and Luxembourg border of Gravelines, Quesnoy, Landrecies 
and Thionville. (3) Roussillon and Cerdagne, in "the Pyrenean moun­
tains which anciently had divided the Gauls from Spain, should also 
make henceforth the Division of the said Kingdom." (4) The duke 
of the "Marches of Lorraine" agreed in return for his duchy not to 
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bear arms against France and to cede a half-dozen fortified towns 
on the French border, including Stenay, Dunn, and Clermont-en-
Argonne. The French obtained the right of passage for their troops. 
Lastly, (5) Philip agreed to the marriage of Maria Theresa to Louis 
XIV. The famous marriage clause, the moyennant, was drawn up 
by Lionne, whose talents as a diplomatist were never better dis­
played. The moyennant required that a dowry of 500,000 ecus must 
be paid to France within eighteen months in order for Maria Theresa's 
renunciation of the Spanish throne to be valid. Since neither Lionne 
nor Mazarin anticipated a miracle by which the Spanish treasury 
would become filled, it appeared that Lionne had goaded Philip IV's 
ministers into granting France a lien on the Spanish inheritance.32 
The Peace of the Pyrenees was Mazarin's final will and testament 
to the young king. It was at once a coda of the Treaty of Miinster 
and an overture to the diplomacy of the next generation. By this 
peace settlement France extended its borders to the Pyrenees, gained 
its buffer marshland of the cote d'Espagne, and assured itself a new 
line of fortresses along the Flanders border—the future barriere de fer 
of Vauban, in which Gravelines, Arras, Quesnoy, Landrecies, and 
Thionville played an important strategic role. Lastly, Lorraine was 
dismembered and dissected. The diplomatic specters that Richelieu 
and Mazarin had evoked were those with which Louis XIV wrestled 
for the rest of his life. 
LOUIS 
As the 1650's drew to a close, the court and country looked increas­
ingly to the young king, Louis XIV, for signs of leadership. What 
manner of man was this fourteenth Louis? Would he resemble his 
timid, socially inept father, Louis XIII? Would he take after his 
gregarious, hearty grandfather, Henri IV? Or would he indeed mani­
fest the obstinacy of his great-grandfather, Philip II of Spain? These 
are questions posed not only by the generation of the 1650^ but by 
that of the 1970's. 
It is a commonplace to assert that the Frondes provided the young 
Louis with his best lessons in practical education. We should ask, 
rather, what character traits in the young king were nurtured by the 
Frondes, and how circumstances molded them? The young prince 
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had, contrary to legends current in his day, received exceptional train­
ing for his kingly role. His mother had inculcated in him a sense 
of majesty of office, had deepened his feeling of divine mission.33 
Mazarin had reinforced her words by insisting that he take lessons 
in the political responsibilities of being king. Louis, under the car­
dinal's guidance, attended council meetings, heard the reading of 
important dispatches, and actually oversaw the writing of some diplo­
matic instructions. Both the regent and minister also encouraged the 
young king in cultural pursuits. Anne fostered an appreciation of 
music, religious and secular; and Mazarin introduced Louis to Italian 
comedy, to the opera, and to the ballet. The regent imparted to him 
a speaking knowledge of the Spanish language; Mazarin, of the 
Italian. From Louis's tutor, Hardouin de Perefixe, Louis acquired a 
taste for history, particularly for accounts of his grandfather, Henri 
IV, who epitomized in Louis's mind the man of war, the builder of 
monuments—a true king, the opposite of a roi faineant. But above 
all, his mother, his principal minister, and his tutor allowed him 
freedom to play with his friends and his brother, Philippe, and time 
to indulge his childish fantasies. Play-acting may have allowed the 
young king to escape some of the tendencies toward morbid intro­
spection that were so pronounced in the character of Louis XIII.34 
Louis, fortunately for France of the 1650's, survived his childhood 
diseases, including smallpox, and grew into a serious, self-possessed 
youth who, even at an early age, "was prudent enough to say nothing 
for fear of not speaking well."35 As he grew older, observers noted 
that Louis was by nature a rather passive individual, an excellent 
listener, a person who weighed experience and kept his own counsel. 
This passivity and secretiveness seem to have been born in part of 
fear of his father and mother. "His Royal Highness, the little Dauphin 
was barely three years old," Mme de Motteville noted, "when he 
appeared to be a source of vexation and resentment to the King 
[Louis XIII] who complained bitterly to the Queen . . . accusing 
her of encouraging his son to hate him. . . . "3  6 In later life Louis 
seldom spoke of his father; instead, he showed a marked preference 
for the memory of his grandfather Henri IV. But his conduct was 
governed not only by fear of his father but by resistance to the dic­
tates of a possessive mother. Anne lavished on her sons the love that 
had for years found no outlet. Although Louis seems to have fought 
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her dominance with greater tenacity and temerity than did his brother 
Philippe, yet his opposition to his mother never led to an open break. 
In fact, they seldom openly disagreed; and when they did, it was a 
painful experience for them both. As a result, Louis from an early 
age avoided—indeed, abhorred—family quarrels and kept rigid con­
trol over his emotions. The advent of the Frondes heightened in the 
young king the sense of isolation and dramatized the need for secrecy. 
An aura of cloak and dagger pervaded the palace. Surrounded as he 
was by hostile and overbearing nobles, Louis witnessed frequent con­
frontations between his close advisers and haughty courtiers. These 
quarrels implicated members of his own family, his overbearing cousin 
Conde, his supercilious and malevolent uncle Gaston d'Orleans. 
Even in council Louis and his chief minister Mazarin were spied 
upon by agents of the Fronde. These confrontations and betrayals 
of confidence served as practical lessons in statecraft. From Mazarin 
Louis learned the stratagems of defense: silence and secretive­
ness, the art of watchful waiting. It was Mazarin who in 1650 
cajoled the insufferable Conde; it was Mazarin who, disregarding 
the snide remarks of the Mazarinades, had bargained with the 
"men of law" in 1652; it was Mazarin who had delayed his return 
to Paris until the right moment in 1653; it was Mazarin who gave 
way to Anne's insistence on a Spanish alliance in 1658. "Time 
and I shall conquer," wrote the cardinal. Louis's variation of this 
theme was "Je verrai"—"I shall see."3T 
From this constellation of basic character traits, spawned in the 
nursery of his father's hate and of his mother's love, nurtured by 
the troubled times and reinforced by the wisdom of his principal 
minister,38 there developed a cluster of related behavior patterns and 
responses that dominated Louis XIV's life. They are so closely tied, 
so inextricably bound together, that it is hard to separate them. They 
include Louis's sense of politesse, of fastidiousness, and of order; his 
intense dislike of disorder and of dissent; his passion for deliberation 
in council; his fear of betrayal; his devotion to his office; his search 
for la gloire, that is, the aggrandizement of the state and of his reputa­
tion; his absorption in the mechanics of military campaigns, in the 
movement and deployment of armies. 
This innate sense of tidiness and order was not only characteristic 
of the man but of the age. The "Formal French,"39 W. L. Wiley 
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calls them. The mechanisms of order were omnipresent: the ritual 
levee, or arising of the king in the morning; his couche, or retirement 
in the evening; the ceremonies attendant on the lit de justice, when 
the king in full regalia addressed the great judges of his Parlement 
of Paris, his dukes and peers, the great officers of the state; the formal 
entree of an ambassador into a city or a procession of officials to the 
sovereign court or to the estates. Adumbration of such events filled 
hundreds of pages in the chronicles of the day. Even in death the 
"formal French" could not escape the pompes funebres of the state 
funeral. This emphasis on order and ceremony heightened in Louis 
a craving for decorum and hastened the ritualization of kingship. In 
this guise Louis was a supreme classicist; and when Bossuet later 
spoke of the king's greatness, it was to praise the "discipline in his 
armies" and the "order in his household." Repeatedly, Racine's plays 
celebrate the triumph of moral and political order over the forces 
and the agents of violence and rebellion. Versailles itself was a monu­
ment to order and ritual in life; and as Professor Whitman has 
pointed out, the very symbolism of the Latona Fountain cried out 
against the disorders of the Fronde. 
This man of order, as one can easily imagine, disliked dissent and 
dissenters, whether they were ultramontanes or Jesuits, Huguenots 
or Quietists, aristocrats or republicans. To Louis they were all tarred 
with the brush of treason, and Frondeurs were not to be abided. It 
was the memory of the men of the Fronde that haunted his youthful 
dreams, they who had caused him and his family to flee from one 
town to another, who had frightened his mother, exiled his principal 
minister, emptied his treasury and questioned his authority. Louis 
never forgave them, but with characteristic caution he dissembled: 
with honeyed words he greeted his cousin Conde on his return from 
Spain, and with careful attention he listened to Turenne's advice; 
but both men were kept under surveillance by spies from the war 
office or by the army intendants. Louis's use of the so-called sur­
veillance system curtailed the seditious activity of his over-mighty 
subjects, causing noble dissent to go far underground. 
A corollary to Louis's passion for secrecy and caution was his 
reliance on the judgment of a few close advisers whose trustworthi­
ness was well recognized. Mazarin had termed these men "the faith­
ful" because of their devotion to the king's cause during the terrible 
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years of 1650-53. Louis, like Mazarin, entrusted his government to 
these creatures of the crown. He protected them, suffered their incom­
petence, as in the case of Louvois's son Barbezieux, or their medi­
ocrity, as in the cases of Michel Chamillart and Claude Le Peletier. 
What he could not forgive was a hint of disloyalty, and Louis kept up 
his guard even with his trusted servants. In council he matched them 
one against another, listened to their opinions, their arguments, reserv­
ing final judgment for himself. As one minister later complained, 
nineteen times out of twenty the king agreed with his ministers, but 
on the twentieth time he might override their opinion. 
Caution and secretiveness, however, often led Louis into the serious 
fault of procrastination. It is true that some problems can lessen or 
disappear entirely with the passage of time. But at critical moments 
decisions, good or bad, have to be made. It was at these critical junc­
tures that Louis sometimes faltered: we find him hesitant in 1672 
to accept Dutch offers of peace; hesitant in 1688 to move against 
William III; hesitant in 1700 to accept Carlos II's will, or in 1709-10 
to negotiate a peace settlement. 
Yet despite all his doubts and hesitations Louis found the kingly 
craft to his taste: "Le metier de Roi est grand, noble, delicieux."40 
For Louis the chief ingredient of the art of kingship seems to have 
been a dogged devotion to the task of "being king," an absorption 
in the metier du roi. After fifty-five years of active personal rule, Louis 
worked until the day of his death, hedged to the last by formalism 
and detachment. 
By 1661, then, we may say that Louis XIV had become a "man of 
parts"; and it was at that moment that Mazarin chose, most appropri­
ately, to exit from the political stage. "En France," La Rochefoucauld 
reflected, "tout arrive."41 
THE QUEST FOR STABILITY: IN POLITICS, IN THE FINE AND

LITERARY ARTS AND SCIENCES, IN THE ART OF WAR

Leisurely in all matters, Mazarin took a month to die. On February 
9, 1661, he became too ill to carry on state business and retired to 
the chateau of Vincennes, where he died of cancer on March 9. The 
king, upon hearing the news, was reported to have said to his friend 
Grammont, "We have lost, you and I, a good friend." Yet for Louis 
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the cardinal's death was at once a sorrow and a release. As Louis him­
self described the scene, he was so overwhelmed by emotion that he 
retired to a small chamber next to the cardinal's bedroom, where he 
remained in seclusion for several hours. Following his first depres­
sion, he felt an exhilaration, or, as he later expressed it, a delicious 
sense of freedom. When he emerged from his seclusion, he at once 
embarked on a course of action that he appears to have been contem­
plating for some time. He announced to his startled courtiers that 
henceforth they could address their petitions to him, that he would 
serve as his own first minister.42 Brave words. But there were many 
obstacles yet to overcome, the major one being Nicolas Fouquet, the 
superintendent of finances, who expected to be named principal 
minister after Mazarin died. 
Fouquet was a scion of an important robe family, a brilliant, 
ambitious politician, and at the same time a man of incomparable 
taste in the arts, a modern Maecenas, in whose service were employed 
some of the greatest artists of the age: Le Notre, Le Vau, Le Brun, 
and Moliere. As superintendent of the king's finances, he had proved 
himself to be a supple financier and a shrewd state banker. His posi­
tion seemed unassailable.43 Louis, however, feared him both as a 
dishonest man of affairs and as a potential focus for political discon­
tent, a symbol for future Frondeurs. Why, then, did he retain him 
in office for six months before arresting him? An explanation was 
later offered by Louis to his son: "Some may find it strange that I 
should have him serve me, when it is known that at that time his 
peculations were known to me . .  . but I was convinced that he 
possessed some talents, and had a great knowledge of domestic affairs 
[and that] . .  . he might render me essential service."44 Yet ulti­
mately, Louis's fear of the esprit frondeur outweighed his respect for 
Fouquet's talents. In the months between March and September, 
1661, Louis plotted Fouquet's disgrace. As the king listened to reports 
of the financial state of the kingdom read to him by Colbert from 
the registre des recettes, it became apparent to both the king and his 
informant that Fouquet was not only withholding information about 
finances but might be plotting against the king himself. Colbert no 
doubt exaggerated the dangers, but the king was more than willing 
to listen. Colbert thus became Louis's instrument of liberation from 
what the king considered to be the threat of an over-mighty minister. 
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As Mazarin himself had on his deathbed reportedly said to Louis: 
"I am acquitting myself of some of that debt [I owe] to your majesty 
in giving you Colbert." 
On September 5, 1661, Fouquet was arrested and at once arraigned 
before a chambre de justice. This kind of coup de theatre, beloved 
of Louis, was a splendid birthday gift to the king, who could now 
indeed call himself first minister. 
In the following months and years Louis carefully reorganized 
the central government, emulating the pattern already suggested by 
Richelieu's and Mazarin's conseil etroit. As early as March, 1661, 
Louis limited active participation in his council to three men: Michel 
Le Tellier, Hugues de Lionne, Fouquet, and, after September, 1661, 
Jean-Baptiste Colbert. These men were technically the king's minis­
ters, and through the long reign only those men who regularly partici­
pated en conseil were considered of that rank. This first ministry was 
given the name of the "Triade," the "Image de la celeste Trinite." 
From time to time other members of the government were called for 
consultation: the chancellor, the secretary of state for the king's 
households, the members of the council of conscience, and in times 
of grave emergency, the marshals of France; but for affaires ordinaires, 
as Conde called them, only the ministers spoke. In the 1670's the 
membership of the conseil des trois was expanded to four, and 
observers, as they had in the 1640's, referred to the king's council 
as the conseil d'en haut, or the high council. After 1690 the 
number of ministers increased to five, and that number remained 
constant until 1714, when it returned to three.45 
Louis selected his ministers not because of their hereditary office 
at court, nor their rank in the aristocracy, nor their position in the 
army or navy, nor their eminence in the legal system; his two criteria 
for selection were that his advisers be dedicated to his service and 
that they be useful. He found these qualities most often in men of 
the civil service, who were not the "vile bourgeois" that Saint-Simon 
speaks of but members of the noblesse de la plume, the administrative 
nobility, experts in their field who had usually long served the king 
in one of his larger councils or in the royal provincial administration. 
If these men proved not to have the probity, suppleness, and self-
effacing qualities that Louis demanded, they were either relieved of 
most of their duties or excluded from the council altogether. Such 
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was the case in the 1660's of the older and younger Brienne, whose 
charge of secretary of state for foreign affairs was purchased by 
Lionne; of Seguier, who was considered to be too infirm; of Pom­
ponne, too lethargic and too closely allied to the Jansenists; of 
Barbezieux, who led a dissolute life; of Le Peletier and Chamillart, 
for whom the task of being controller-general of finances became 
too onerous. 
Louis called only seventeen ministers to his conseil d'en haut in his 
fifty-five years of personal reign: they included a great noble, the 
Due de Beauvillier (who served from 1691 to 1712), and two mar­
shals of France, the Villerois, who were nominally ministers because 
of their close personal relation to the king but who took little part 
in the actual government of the state. The remainder were nohlesse 
de la plume, drawn in large part from three families: the Colberts, 
the Le Telliers, and the Phelypeaux. All told there were five Colbert 
ministers: Jean-Baptiste, known as the Great Colbert (who served 
from September, 1661, to September, 1683); his brother Croissy 
(November, 1679, to July, 1696); the former's son Seignelay (Octo­
ber, 1689, to November, 1690); Croissy's son Torcy (January, 1699, 
to September, 1715); and the Great Colbert's nephew Nicolas Des­
maretz (1709 to 1715). There were three Le Telliers: Michel (who 
served from March, 1661, to October 30, 1685); Louvois (January, 
1672, to July, 1691); and a cousin, Le Peletier (September, 1683, to 
September, 1697). One minister was a member of the Phelypeaux 
family: Louis Phelypeaux de Pontchartrain (November, 1690, to 
July, 1714); his son Jerome served as secretary of state from 1699 to 
1715, but not as a minister. Born outside the circle of the three fam­
ilies were two foreign ministers, Hugues de Lionne (March, 1661, to 
September, 1671), and Simon Arnauld de Pomponne (1671—79 and 
1691-99), and two war ministers, Michel Chamillart (November, 
1700, to June, 1709) and Daniel-Frangois Voysin (June, 1709, to 
1715), and a superintendent of finances, Nicolas Fouquet (March-
June, 1661). There were also five important secretaries of state: 
Barbezieux, Louvois's son (1691-1701); and four Phelypeaux: Jerome 
de Pontchartrain at the marine (1699 to 1715), and the two La 
Vrillieres and Chateauneuf as secretaries in charge of the royal house­
hold and of religious affairs. Two men closely associated with the coun­
cil as advisers were the Due de Chevreuse and the Due d'Harcourt, 
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neither of whom seems to have been appointed as minister en litre. 
Louis allowed the office of secretary of state to be purchased and held 
en survivance for a relative, but he never permitted venality of office 
to infect the council. Selection was on merit alone. Regarding conciliar 
matters, Louis was an iconoclast. In 1661, he excluded not only the 
chancellor and marshals of France but his mother, brother, princes of 
the blood, and, interestingly, all churchmen. In the case of the 
"Children of France" (the heirs apparent and presumptive), he suf­
fered their presence, but seldom allowed them an active part in 
debates. Bitter complaints about the selection of ministers came from 
the nobility. As one courtier wrote: "The Great men of the Court, 
among others, M. de Turenne, were strongly dissatisfied and asked 
the king if he were going to give to three bourgeois the principal place 
in the government of the State."46 But Turenne's complaint made 
little impression on Louis. His trust was placed in "the faithful" who 
had served Mazarin so well and who he hoped would serve him with 
equal devotion. It is not that Louis altogether excluded "others"—les 
autres—from his council. When he needed the advice of experts 
in war or diplomacy—particularly of men like Turenne, or later, 
Chamlay, Tourville, or Harcourt—he would summon them to sit 
with his ministers. Yet, for affaires ordinaires Saint-Simon was essen­
tially correct when he later called the ministers the "Five Kings 
of France." 
Of all the subjects that the ministers discussed, foreign affairs held 
the most prominent place on the agenda. Usually, the secretary of 
state for foreign affairs sat immediately to the left of the king and 
read excerpts from letters sent to him from French ambassadors and 
foreign ministers across Europe. Policy decisions were then debated, 
and the foreign secretary made notes of the replies that were to be 
made to the ambassadors; later, he submitted a draft of the important 
letters to the king (routine correspondence the secretary answered). 
Other major topics most often discussed in council were religious 
policies, reforms of the law, appointments to high office, and, during 
wartime, military strategy. Conciliar decisions were codified in a 
profusion of new ordinances, edicts, regulations of existing ordinances; 
of edicts in the form of declarations, commands to the secretaries 
of state, orders to the governors of provinces; of lettres de cachet, 
usually to the intendants or to a minister; arrets du conseil, that is, 
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a type of executive order; and letters of commission to armed forces 
and memoirs to aid the king's executive officers. The actual letters, 
instructions, arrets, and edicts were not drafted in council but in 
the bureaus of the individual ministries or by the staff secretaries 
attached to the large conseil d'etat prive on des parties. To expedite 
the flow of orders to the conseil d'etat and to the ministries, the high 
council met frequently, often as many as five or six times a week.47 
Of the scanty records we have of these council meetings those of 
Memoriaux de Conseil de 1661,48 edited in three volumes by Jean 
de Boislisle, are perhaps the most important. From notes of the meet­
ings later transcribed by Boislisle we know the council met 119 days 
out of 179 from March to September, 1661, or on the average of 
twenty times a month or five times a week. The largest number of 
consecutive meetings was from May 2 to May 13. The council did 
not meet at all between August 21 and September 2 (immediately 
before Fouquet's arrest). At these council sessions the king was 
usually assisted by one of his secretaries de la plume, a trusted official 
of his cabinet who could forge his signature and who kept notes 
for the king's use. The most famous of these secretaries who held 
the prerogative de la main was Toussaint Rose, seigneur de Coye 
(1615-1701). 
After the mid-1660's Louis tended to relegate routinefinancial and 
administrative matters to meetings of the council of finances and to 
the council of dispatches. In the latter council letters from the inten­
dants in the provinces were discussed by the four secretaries of state, 
two or three ministers, and the chancellor. The council of dispatches 
declined in importance, however, during the latter half of the reign. 
By 1690 it met but twice a month and by 1714 but twice a year. 
As the importance of the council of dispatches waned—and with it 
the influence of the council of finances—the power of the individual 
secretaries of state and of their bureaus increased. By 1712, for 
instance, the marine boasted ten bureaus, the war department, eight, 
and foreign affairs, eleven. These ministries contained their own 
archives, training schools, and hosts of agents, avowed and secret. 
Moreover, the marine and war departments controlled dozens of 
intendants who served with the armies, in the chief ports, and in 
the colonies. The foreign office was responsible for the direction of 
over forty chiefs of missions abroad. In 1715 France boasted the 
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largest diplomatic corps in Europe, with fifteen ambassadors, fifteen 
envoys, and consuls in Cairo, Smyrna, Seide, and other places in the 
Levant. Thus in his own lifetime Louis XIV was witness to, and a 
moving force in, the bureaucratization of the French government. 
Indeed, one of his chief claims to prominence as a practitioner of 
the kingly craft was his willing espousal of the role of roi-bureaucrate. 
The king's ministers divided among themselves the responsibility 
of corresponding with royal officials in the provinces and the munici­
palities. Their task was greatly facilitated by the presence in many 
of the provincial capitals of royal intendants, who were often chosen 
from among the maitres des requites (consulting lawyers) of the 
conseil d'etat Qprive ou des forties'). Cardinal Richelieu had employed 
royal intendants as tax inspectors and as organizers of the war effort 
(after 1635) on the provincial and local level. At the time of the 
Fronde in 1648-49 the intendant's office was suppressed; but Mazarin, 
on his return to Paris in 1653, reinstated the royal provincial inten­
dant and augmented his powers. It was not, however, until the late 
1660's and the 1670's that these officials took up permanent resi­
dence in the provinces. The presence of this powerful royal official 
aroused a storm of protest from the provincial authorities. Jealous 
of their prerogatives, the municipal councilors, the syndics of the 
towns, the local judges and the judges of the parlements, the military 
governors, and many of the local nobility, singly or assembled in their 
estates, often challenged the authority of the "king's man," or, what 
was in many instances more effective, ignored his decrees. But, by 
the dawn of the eighteenth century, the intendants, and their assis­
tants, the subdelegates, had become so integral a part of local admin­
istration that in many parts of France they were often regarded as 
allies rather than enemies. Thus one of the great accomplishments 
of the roi-hureaucrate was the establishment of the royal provincial 
intendant on a permanent footing. 
As one critic, Georges Pages, has pointed out, Louis was well 
suited for his task as roi-bureaucrate.i9 Blessed by nature with the 
gift of good health, his attendance at the council wras for fifty-five 
years unbroken. He told his son: "I made it a rule to work regularly 
two or three hours each sitting . . . and at any other time to what­
ever might rise unexpectedly."50 Louis built his life on a devo­
tion to a schedule from which he seldom strayed. As Saint-Simon 
observed: "Naturally fond of trifles, he unceasingly occupied himself 
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with the most petty details of his troops, his household, his palaces, 
his table expenses."51 
All three ministers of the "Triade" shared Louis's own passion for 
work, but the man perhaps best known to us today as the prototype 
homme-hureaucrate was Jean-Baptiste Colbert, who was born in 1619 
at Rheims, son of Nicolas Colbert.52 Nicolas, an improvident busi­
nessman, turned to the civil service as a conseiller d'etat at the Hotel 
de Ville. Like his father, Colbert exchanged the life of a businessman 
for the royal service and through a family connection solicited a job 
in the office of Michel Le Tellier, the secretary of state for war. In 
1651, having managed several of Cardinal Mazarin's private business 
ventures with astuteness, Mazarin entrusted Colbert with the gov­
ernance of his household affairs, giving him the imposing title of 
Intendant of the House of Monseigneur le Cardinal. In this post 
Colbert gained invaluable knowledge of the world of business and 
commerce. With the cardinal to support him, Colbert soon amassed 
a fortune of his own and founded a bureaucratic dynasty whose 
members included, as we have noted, five ministers of state during 
Louis's reign; also among his family were an archbishop, two bishops, 
intendants of the police and of the marine, and three generals of the 
army. His daughters all married dukes, two of whom became min­
isters to Louis. It was a remarkable family, whose members were 
among the ruling elite throughout the ancien regime. 
Colbert spent most of his waking moments at his desk directing 
multifarious matters of state. In 1661 he was called to the conseil 
des trois as minister; in 1664 he became superintendant of the king's 
buildings QSurintendant des Bailments'); in 1665, controller-general 
of finances; and in 1669, the secretary of state for the marine. In time 
he became the very image of the harassed executive, so impatient of 
his time that Madame de Sevigne likened him to the bitter wind, 
"Le Nord." One observer saw him as an image of marble; another, 
in a moment of exasperation, called out to him, "Monseigneur, 
at least make me a sign that you are listening."53 The great artist 
Bernini, who disliked Colbert, sketched the minister with "sly, 
busy eyes; his mouth . . . energetic but with rather fat and unmolded 
features. . . . "5  4 But in one thing all his critics agreed: "He 
executes his duties despotically and crushes all opposition." In the 
king's presence, however, Colbert became the suppliant and Louis 
the "monseigneur." Louis enjoyed chiding his minister in a friendly 
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fashion by saying, "Colbert, here, is going to say to us again, 'Sire, 
the great Cardinal de Richelieu, etc. . . . '"S 5 Indeed, as Charles 
Wilson has aptly observed, Colbert played "Pooh-Bah to Louis."56 
On occasion the king became exasperated by his minister's single­
mindedness, as he did in 1671 when he reminded Colbert: 
I was master enough of myself, day before yesterday, to conceal 
from you the sorrow I felt at hearing a man whom I have over­
whelmed with benefits, as I have you, talk to me in the fashion 
you did. . .  . It is the memory of services that you have rendered 
me, and my friendship, which caused me to do so. Profit thereby, 
and do not risk vexing me again because after I have heard your 
arguments and those of your colleagues, and have given my opinion 
on all your claims, I do not ever wish to hear further talk about it.57 
Except for such occasional clashes of will, however, Louis and Colbert 
worked together in harmony, and theirs was a fruitful relationship.58 
Colbert inaugurated his service to the king in 1661-62 by estab­
lishing in Paris the chambre de justice to investigate the activities, 
financial and otherwise, of Fouquet and his associates. Once the 
former finance minister and his henchmen had been arraigned, 
Colbert and the members of the chambre extended their activities 
to include an investigation of the entire financial community. As 
Colbert remarked: "It was necessary to disentangle a machine that 
the cleverest men in the kingdom . . . had snarled up so as to 
make of it a science that they alone knew, so that they might be 
essential."59 But with persistence Colbert unraveled the financial 
skein and in the process recovered for the state some 100,000,000 
livres in back taxes and misappropriated funds. By 1664 he extended 
his reforms to encompass the entire field of state taxation and by the 
1680's, despite two wars and opposition of provincial officials, doubled 
the tax revenues, increasing the aides (indirect taxes) from 5,000,000 
livres to 22,000,000 livres; the gabelle (salt tax) from 14,750,000 
to over 18,000,000 livres; the tobacco monopoly from 300,000 to 
600,000 livres; the receipts of the royal forests from 168,000 to 
1,000,000 livres and the royal domain from 80,000 to 5,500,000 livres. 
It was a spectacular achievement.60 
Investigations of the chambre in the 1660's also led Colbert to 
request that the king appoint a council of justice to effect a reform 
of the law codes. The king's servants, masters of request and coun­
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cilors of state, and the king's own representatives sat for over fifteen 
years in the Herculean task of cleansing the Augean stables of the 
French law. In 1667 a civil code was issued; in 1669 a criminal 
code; the commercial code, or the Code Savary, in 1673; the Ordon­
nance for the Marine in 1681; and the Code Noir, concerning slave 
ownership, in 1685, two years after Colbert's death. Under the aegis 
of king and minister the impetus toward legal uniformity appeared 
a century and a quarter before the codifications and revisions of the 
Napoleonic period. 
Other of the Colbertian reforms embraced the department of the 
marine. So obsessed did Colbert become in the 1660's with fostering 
the growth of the navy that Louis had to warn Colbert, in an ironic 
aside, that "if the marine does not suit you; if it is not to your taste, 
if you would prefer something else, speak freely. . . .  " 6  1 Louis was 
thus reminding his minister that if he continued to press the case 
for the marine too strongly, he would be relieved of his job. Colbert 
no doubt toned down his requests; but his accomplishments, despite 
Louis's reticence, were impressive. Colbert's goal, as it had been in 
the realm of finance and law, was to establish order. In Mazarin's 
day the navy had been in complete disarray. The cardinal reported 
in 1651 that he could command only six warships in His Majesty's 
service; in 1656, 3,000,000 livres were expended on the navy, less 
than had been allocated ten years before. In the early 1660's Colbert 
reported to the king that "for ten years not more than two or three 
French war vessels have been seen on the sea; all the arsenals of the 
navy are completely empty . . . the total number of vessels has 
been reduced to twenty or twenty-two. . . .  "6  2 Colbert set about to 
rectify this national disgrace. Working nominally through Hugues de 
Lionne, who had charge of the navy department until Colbert reor­
ganized it in 1669, Colbert ordered the recruiting for the royal navy 
on a rotary basis, with the gens de mer, i.e., the able bodied seaman, 
serving once every three years in the royal navy.63 He refurbished 
the hotels des invalides—the hospitals—in the major ports. He rebuilt 
the arsenals at Toulon and Rochefort, and increased the size of the 
navy from between nineteen to twenty-five ships in 1661 to 140 ships 
in 1677, among them twelve of the first rank and twenty-six of the 
second, with a galley fleet of thirty-four vessels. Further, the minister 
established schools of marine engineering and of hydrography and 
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cartography that became world-famous by the late seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. 
To support his grand designs for the navy, Colbert, like his col­
leagues in the departments of war and foreign affairs, established 
the panoply of administrators, ranging from the first secretaries of 
the bureaux des marines in Paris to the intendants and their dele­
gates, the commis aux classes, in the port cities. From the ranks of 
the naval officers Colbert recruited some of the French navy's most 
renowned commanders, including Abraham Duquesne and Anne-
Hilarion de Cotentin de Tourville. Duquesne, of whom Colbert 
complained that he had "an unaccommodating disposition," was a 
brilliant line officer, the victor of the battles of Messina and Augusta 
off the coasts of Sicily in 1676.64 His reputation "in the service" was 
matched only by De Tourville, called "the greatest seaman of the 
century," at once an inspired commander and elegant courtier, under 
whose guidance the navy won the battle of Beachy Head in 1690 
and seized part of the Smyrna fleet in 1693.65 He also presided over 
the major defeat of French seapower at La Hougue in 1692, a defeat 
from which France had difficulty recovering in the following years. 
However, even with Anglo-Dutch naval ascendancy at the turn of 
the eighteenth century, the marine under the ministerial leadership 
of Louis Phelypeaux de Pontchartrain and Jerome de Pontchartrain 
never fell to the levels of the pre-Colbertian days. The two Pontchar­
trains managed to keep a navy "in being" of between sixty-six and 
seventy-two major ships.66 
Louis himself, guided by the principles of Realpolitik that called 
for a land frontier against the armies of the emperor and his allies, 
appeared to be less interested in the fortunes of the navy than in 
those of his armies. In 1680, however, Colbert's efforts were praised 
in a letter sent by Louis to his minister: 
I was very pleased with the works of the port [Dunkirk], and from 
now on I will understand the letters on the navy much better than 
I used to, because I saw a vessel from every point of view and 
saw it make all maneuvers both for fighting and sailing. . . . The 
maritime works are surprising and I have not visualized things as 
they were. In fact, I am very satisfied. My trip will have cost me 
something, but my money will have been well spent.67 
The late seventeenth century marks no less the heroic age of the 
French navy than it marks a similar age for the French colonies. Like 
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Colbert's policies of the marine, those that governed the empire rested 
on the concept of extreme bureaucratic paternalism and economic pro­
tectionism (the term Exclusif was used in the colonies). Colbert and 
his successors, Seignelay and the Pontchartrains, fought hard to wrest 
control over foreign trade and over the colonies from the secretaries 
of war and foreign affairs. With Louis's consent Colbert in 1669 
incorporated under the ministry of the marine the bureau of the 
Ponant, which oversaw the administration of Canada and Senegal, 
and the bureau of the Levant, which controlled the administration 
of the West Indies. In the following years Colbert created the depart­
mental archives for the marine and the colonies, one of the first of 
its kind in the world, and Colbert's son, the Marquis de Seignelay, 
established a bureau to examine the financial accounts of the colonies. 
Between 1690 and 1694 Louis Phelypeaux de Pontchartrain created 
four new departments within the ministry. When Jerome Phelypeaux 
de Pontchartrain officially assumed the secretaryship of the marine 
(1699), he and his father forced the controller-general to relinquish 
much of his power over the colonial office, making it for the first 
time truly autonomous. French colonial administration thus developed 
along Weberian lines, with an ever-increasing bureaucracy and bureau­
cratic controls.68 
How did this minister-centered, bureaucrat-centered imperial gov­
ernment enforce its will in the colonies? Confronted with adminis­
trative confusion, Louis XIV, Colbert, and his successors imposed 
upon the colonies five overlapping layers of authority: at the base 
of the pyramid they re-established—particularly in New France—a 
somewhat antiquated seigneurial regime that fitted perfectly into the 
Colbertian pattern of paternalism Qetatisme or Golhertisme). Above 
the seigneurs the ministers established in each colony a sovereign 
court, whose chief duty was to hear petitions and to serve as a judi­
cial review board. Associated with the court was a governor, who 
represented the majesty of the king and the power of the military 
establishment. Sharing pride of place with the governor was the 
intendant, whose duty it was, as in France, to curb the power of the 
corporations, supervise the economic and legal affairs of the colony, 
and serve as the minister's eyes and ears. Finally, above these offi­
cials was a corps of inspectors, who, unlike their counterparts in the 
Spanish Empire, visited the colonies infrequently and were a symbol 
of the king's and minister's power of coercion, remote but powerful. 
36 LOUIS XIV AND THE CRAFT OF KINGSHIP 
It is interesting that Louis XIV and Colbert's institution of hier­
archy of offices fostered colonial regimes built upon suspicion rather 
than mutual confidence and represented Louis's theory of check and 
balance in an extreme form. The ministry in Paris constantly set one 
faction in the colonies against the other, constantly encouraged rival 
groups to appeal to Paris. So highly paternal did the system become 
that a river frozen over, a ship wrecked by a storm or seized by 
raiders, or a courier detained in port might cause the entire chain of 
command temporarily to collapse. 
What did Louis and Colbert hope to gain from an overseas empire? 
The king wanted to create a France d'Outre mer, that is, to establish 
French provinces on the shores of the St. Lawrence and on the isles 
of the Antilles, with a panoply of parishes, seigneuries, syndics, courts 
of the prevote, captains of the militia, and intendants—all the symbols 
of authority they would find at home. Colbert expresed this point well 
when he wrote to the intendant Jean Talon in the early 1670's that 
"the king, in considering all his Canadian subjects from the first to 
the last almost as if they were his own children, wishes to fulfill his 
obligations to make them feel the sweet tranquility and happiness of 
his reign as much as those who are in the middle of France. . . .  "69 
The governor and the intendant stood in loco tenens for the king 
and his minister, and like their confreres in France the colons not 
only looked to the metropole for guidance but were actually urged 
to set up a bit of France in the New World.70 
Louis XIV and Colbert were concerned not only with the develop­
ment of the marine, industry, commerce, and the colonies but with 
the renewal of the fine arts, literature, and sciences. In 1662-63 
Colbert solicited the help of men of letters and scientists, preparatory 
to establishing royal academies of sciences, beaux-arts, and architec­
ture. The year 1662 was an auspicious one for the minister to under­
take such ventures. An intellectual renascence of the first magnitude 
had for over a decade stirred Paris and the provinces; it included 
among its leaders men of science such as Gassendi, Roberval, and 
Mersenne, and men of letters such as Pierre Corneille, and in the 
1660's Boileau, Racine, and Moliere. To give voice to this renascence, 
a spate of private academies had arisen in the late 1640's and 1650^. 
Among the more celebrated were those that met at the homes of the 
Due de Luynes, at Roberval's, and at the Academie de Mortmor. 
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These gatherings attracted many distinguished foreign guests, such as 
the Dutch mathematician Christiaan Huygens, and Nicolas Steno, 
the Danish anatomist. By the early 1660's several new academies were 
added to the list, including Thevenot's established in 1661 and the 
Petite Academie in 1663.71 
From this potpourri of academies, salons, societies, and debating 
groups, Colbert assembled a few members to meet with him in his 
house on the Rue Vivienne and to advise him on policy decisions 
in the arts and sciences. Included in Colbert's circle were Charles 
Perrault, the astronomer Chapelain, and the mathematician and physi­
cist Huygens. Chapelain, acting as secretary to the group, drew up a 
list of scientists he believed worthy of state support; he supplied the 
minister brief sketches of these men that Colbert could read to Louis 
in council. As the proceedings chez Colbert became known to the 
intellectual community generally, letters and memoirs arrived on the 
minister's desk, appealing for aid. An important suggestion came 
from Melchisedec Thevenot, former French ambassador to Rome, 
who outlined his plan: 
On my return to Paris [ca. 1660], I gathered around me a company 
of men known to be very able, of whom Mm. Frenicle and Steno 
were lodged in my house. In a house joined to mine I maintained 
another person for experiments of chemistry, but the cost of these 
experiments, observations, and anatomies greatly exceeded my 
revenue. . .  . I [then] suggested to M. Colbert that it be given 
a more lasting form under the approval of the king.72 
"Truly," observed another man of science, Samuel Sorbiere, "only 
Kings and wealthy Sovereigns, or a few wise and prosperous Republics 
[thinking of Venice] can undertake to set up a physical academy 
where everything would pass in continual experiment. . . .  " 7  3 
Both men sought "princes who have a taste for science." In Louis 
XIV they found a sovereign dedicated to the extension of state power, 
and, as Colbert reminded them, a prince who would not only be a 
"titular but an effectual influence upon his royal academy." In 1666, 
after consultation with Louis, Colbert appointed, under the benevo­
lence of royal patronage, fifteen scientists to serve as fellows of an 
Academie Royale des Sciences, with a pension of 1500 livres per 
annum. Among the first fellows "pitched upon" were Roberval, the 
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great Cartesian; Picard; Huygens; and Claude Perrault, Charles's 
brother and the editor of Vitruvius's architectural works. The academy 
later attracted such luminaries as the Italian astronomer Cassini and 
the Dane, Roemer. At the same time Louis XIV and Colbert created a 
center of science in the famed Observatory in Paris, which would 
"serve many purposes. There will be winter gardens, a laboratory, 
and several other things suitable for making all sorts of experi­
ments."74 In the 1670's Paris became a modern Rome, attracting to 
its salons and laboratories not only Steno, Huygens, and Cassini, but 
the jurisconsultant Samuel Pufendorf and the philosopher Leibniz. 
Did the king's intervention in the sciences destroy initiative? 
Harcourt Brown observes that the Academy of Science became "more 
like a branch of the French civil service. . . .  " Yet, it should be 
noted that even under the repressive measures adopted in the 1680's 
by Colbert's successor, Louvois, the academy suffered relatively little 
direct interference from the government.75 Louis may thus be given 
credit for having been one of the first monarchs in modern time to 
have subsidized the sciences without demanding an immediate quid-
pro quo. 
The king himself displayed a greater interest in fine art and archi­
tecture than in the sciences; that interest, moreover, was not wholly 
altruistic, because he had an overriding passion for building and 
needed the advice of specialists in the field. As with the sciences, 
Louis ordered Colbert to establish committees to advise them in the 
fields of both art and architecture. In the arts Colbert again selected 
Charles Perrault and, in addition, Charles Le Brun, an artist already 
noted for his works of interior design in Fouquet's palace, Vaux-le-
Vicomte. Le Brun, with Louis's encouragement, became in the decades 
of the 1660's, 70's, and 8o's the official purveyor of hon gout. He was 
then and has since been criticized as being a hack, a mediocrity, an 
opponent of such a man of genius as Bernini; but he was useful to 
Colbert and Louis. He accommodated the production of interior deco­
rations to the demands of modern technology, making the manufacture 
of tapestries (particularly of the Gobelins) and mirrors into a discipline 
commune. His designs were turned out en masse by teams of artisans, 
blocking out patterns for use in the great palaces of the king. As 
products of an assembly line, they were far above the average for 
the day. Le Brun was also helpful to the king in the reorganization 
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of the Academy of Painting in 1664 and in the establishment of the 
French Academy of Rome in 1666.76 
In architecture, too, Le Brim's star was in the ascendant; he served 
on the council of architecture composed of Louis Le Vau, the king's 
chief architect until his death in 1670, and the ubiquitous Claude 
Perrault. This "Triade" dominated the arts as surely as the "Triade" 
of ministers dominated the government. When Le Vau died, his 
place was filled by Jules Hardouin-Mansart, the grand-nephew of 
the great architect Francois Mansart7T and in his own right a superior 
technician and able adapter of his predecessors' ideas. 
Supported by members of the Academy of Architecture, founded 
in 1671, the "Triade" espoused a doctrine of art that pleased Louis's 
and Colbert's taste. As Hardouin-Mansart succinctly expressed it: 
architecture should follow a "logical and simple plan with strong 
and sober lines, discrete decorations, and bold execution."78 Vitruvius 
was their oracle and Palladio their interpreter. The colonnade of the 
Louvre, designed in committee, represented a curious blend of Italian 
baroque and French classicism, but, withal, it initiated a departure 
from the high Roman baroque style. On the other hand, the plans 
for the palace of Versailles were at first guided by Louis Le Vau, 
who had a penchant for Italian baroque design. Only later in the 
1670's, when Hardouin-Mansart's influence became dominant, was 
there an emergence of a more vital classical style, with an emphasis 
on the principles of order. This French classicism reached its perfec­
tion in the serried columns of the arches and windows of Versailles's 
facade, which was completed in the 1680's. 
The role of builder was in the early modern era an attribute of 
the kingly craft. Louis's great-grandfather Philip II of Spain, his 
grandfather Henri IV, and his father Louis XIII had all been great 
builders. The Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin had added to their 
own gloire by sponsoring the construction of churches, colleges, and 
schools. Louis was not to be outdone either by his ancestors or his 
ministers. From the early 1660's Louis scrutinized with childlike 
eagerness plans submitted to him by his architects. He was also keen 
to consult the pope's architect Gianlorenzo Bernini about plans for a 
colonnade to be added to the Louvre, and in 1665 he sent a personal 
message to Bernini inviting him to Paris. Bernini replied that it 
would be an honor and delight "to design for a king of France, 
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un roi d'aujoiird'lwi, buildings grander and more magnificent than the 
palaces of the emperors and the popes."79 The great Roman archi­
tect arrived in Paris on June 2, 1665, and departed in October, 1665, 
after having submitted plans for the colonnade. Although his plans 
were not accepted by Louis and the "Triade," the Bernini interlude 
is, nevertheless, noteworthy, because the Roman was a shrewd, dis­
cerning student of human nature and because he has left us one of 
the masterpieces of his day, a tangible sign of his visit, a bust of 
Louis XIV, which consciously adds to the iconography of Louis's 
kingship. Somehow, Bernini, who worked steadily at his portrait of 
Louis for three months, has made the king's features peep out from 
the stone in a marvelously lifelike fashion. Here are the full sensual 
mouth, the well-shaped upper lip, the pencil-line moustache, a la 
mode; and above the mouth the long, misshapen nose, the sight of 
which caused Louis to whisper to his brother: "Do I really look like 
that!" Here, too, is the arrogant tilt of the head by which Bernini 
tried to capture the youthful majesty of a man who for the artist and 
his French audience was indeed un roi d'aujourd'hui, the symbol of 
modern kingship.80 
For Louis the building of a colonnade at the Louvre was as much 
an interlude as Bernini's visit. Much to Colbert's chagrin, Louis 
insisted upon lavishing great sums of money on his country resi­
dences at St. Germain-en-Laye, Chambord, Vincennes, and Versailles; 
the minister complained that Louis "neglected the Louvre, which is 
assuredly the most superb palace in the world." But the king per­
sisted. He gave his architect Le Vau explicit commands to design at 
Versailles a block of buildings that would surround—literally encase 
—his father's old hunting lodge, which Saint-Simon called the petit 
chateau de cartes—the house of cards. Yet even as Le Vau's con­
struction neared completion in the late 1660's, Louis was still not 
content. The proportion between the old and the new sections of 
the palace were off balance; and since Louis refused to raze the 
older, inner shell, new wings had to be added to round off its 
symmetry. When Le Vau died in 1670, he left blueprints for yet 
more additions to Versailles; and within six years Hardouin-Mansart, 
adapting Le Vau's drawings to his own specifications, began the 
central facade and the extension to either side of the main building 
of two vast wings. Behind the palace proper arose a great block of 
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buildings that housed a maison of over 10,000 people. Beyond the 
palace grounds themselves a town sprang up, studded with hdtels 
of the great nobles and princes of the blood who made their winter 
home at court. 
As Versailles rose, Andre Le Notre, the king's gardener, laid out 
around it his famed jardin de Vintelligence, or formal garden. Aiding 
nature, Le Notre imported over 75,000 trees and had them planted 
in the filled-in land that stretched in front and to the sides of the 
palace; he also created a first and second parterre, and a Grand Canal 
upon which Colbert for the king's amusement and instruction floated 
a navy in miniature. Some 1,400 jets of water played from the foun­
tains, and thousands of statues and urns dotted the gardens.81 
From every turn in the patterned floral aisles, from every glade and 
grotto, the attentive Le Notre displayed the iconography of kingship. 
Visitors found on all sides the legends of the kingly craft written in 
stone: the Apollonian image of Phoebus-Roi in the chariot of the 
sun gliding atop a vast pond; or Hercules-Roi, semi-concealed by 
an elegantly trimmed hedge, subduing the Hydra-headed image 
of religious non-conformity; or of Louis himself, lightly disguised 
as a Roman emperor, leading his victorious legions against the 
Teutonic hordes. 
Yet beneath its facade of royal grandeur, with its iconographic 
and artistic splendors, Versailles appeared often as a cold, dark, damp, 
and malodorous pile to the courtiers who had to inhabit it. In a wick­
edly telling passage in his Memoires Saint-Simon speaks of Versailles's 
seamy side: 
His apartment [Louis XIV] and that of the Queen suffer from the 
most dreadful inconveniences, with back-views over the privies and 
other dark and malodorous offices. The astonishing magnificence of 
the gardens is equalled only by the bad taste with which they are 
designed. . . . To reach the coolness of the garden's shade one is 
forced to cross a vast, scorching plain at the end of which there is 
not alternative, at any point, but to climb upwards or downwards. 
. . . The violence done to Nature everywhere is repellent and 
disgusting. The innumerable water-courses pumped or otherwise 
guided in from all directions makes the water itself green, thick 
and muddy . . . and gives off a vile odour. . . . From the vantage 
point of the gardens, one may enjoy the beauty of the whole design, 
but the palace itself looks as though it had suffered a conflagration 
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in which the top stories and the roofs had been destroyed. . . . 
One could go on listing indefinitely the defects of this enormous 
and enormously costly palace and its seven more costly outhouses.82 
An English visitor, Lord Montague, was no more favorably 
impressed: 
The monarch as to his health is lusty enough, his upper teeth are 
out, so he speaks a little like old Maynard [a famous London 
lawyer], and picks and shows his under teeth with a good deal of 
affection, being the vainest creature alive even as to the least things. 
His house at Versailles is something the foolishest in the world; 
he is strutting in every panel and galloping over one's head in every 
ceiling, and if he turns to spit he must see himself in person or his 
Vicegerent the Sun with sujficit orbi, or nee pluribus impar. I verily 
believe that there are of him statues, busts, basreliefs and pictures 
above two hundred in the house and gardens.83 
Louis, like his English visitor, seems in time to have wearied of 
his great palace and increasingly as he grew older sought refuge in 
the smaller palaces—the hermitages—that he built close to Versailles. 
At first he retreated to the Porcelin Trianon, completed in 1670 by 
Hardouin-Mansart and rebuilt in the late 1670's, with its exquisite 
gardens in miniature and its view of the Grand Canal. As the 
pleasures of the Trianon palled, Louis had the palace of Marly con­
structed, at the cost of 11,000,000 livres. The grounds contained 
some of the "finest gardens in the world." Even Saint-Simon admired 
them. "Shady avenues," he said, "changed suddenly into huge lakes, 
with boats and gondolas, and reconverted as suddently into forests 
of impenetrable gloom, with their succession of fresh statues. . . . 
Such was the fate of a place which had been a den of serpents, toads, 
frogs, and carrion. . . . 84 The costs of all these magnificent piles, 
with their attendant gardens and water courses, was conservatively 
estimated at between $100,000,000 and $120,000,000. 
But for Louis, Versailles was far more than another chateau in a 
long line of royal residences: it represented, above all, his adminis­
trative capital, a fact that did not escape the notice of the omniscient 
Saint-Simon: 
[Louis XIV'sJ constant residence at Versailles caused a continual 
coming together of officials and persons employed, which kept 
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everything going, got through more business and gave more access 
to ministers and their various business in one day than would have 
been possible in a fortnight had the court been in Paris. The benefit 
to his service of the king's precision was incredible. It imposed order­
liness on everybody and secured despatch and facility to his affairs.85 
The prime concern of the roi-bureaucrate had been served. He had 
within his sight—within the confines of one palace—his minister-
servants and his courtier-clients, all of whom were petitioners for 
royal favors. He could say of those whom he wished to punish: "I 
do not know them/' or, "They are people I never see," because the 
king was literally blind to those of whom he disapproved. Louis 
thus reduced the art of kingship to a timetable, which well suited 
his temperament, his "middling" disposition. The cadence of the 
kingly craft became deliberate, precise, ordered, and predictable, 
drained of surprises. It evolved into a ritual that could be re-enacted 
daily for each succeeding wave of courtiers. The king had become 
his own best architect of stability. 
At Versailles, Louis XIV established not only the finest adminis­
trative capital in Europe but peopled it with creative, talented men 
and women, musicians, writers, poets, preachers, arbiters of taste 
and morals. The reader of contemporary journals and memoirs is at 
once struck by Louis's remarkably well-developed taste in music. He 
inherited from his mother a love of the violin, and his chamber 
orchestra, the "Twenty-four violins of the King," became famous 
throughout Europe. The sound of music pervaded the court. It was 
heard at ceremonials, in the king's chapel, in the daily routine of 
suppers and dinners, and in the evening entertainments, the apparte­
ments, as they were called. There was thus a great demand for musique 
de drConstances, occasional music, and the titles of the pieces reflect 
this demand and the pervasiveness of the king's patronage: J. J. 
Mouret's "Fanfares for the King's Suppers"; M. R. de Lalande's 
"Symphonies for the King"; J. B. Lully's "Plaude, laetare Gallia" 
(composed in 1668 for the baptism of the Grand Dauphin); Lully's 
"March of the Turenne Regiment" (from which Bizet probably took 
one of his themes for L'Arlesienne suite); Marc-Antoine Charpentier's 
"Epithalamium" for Elector Max Emmanuel's marriage; and Francois 
Couperin's "La Steinquerque," composed for the French victory of 
1692.86 
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The major-domo of the king's musicians was J. B. Lully, who 
marshaled under his command not only the Twenty-Four Violins of 
the King but a full orchestra, several chamber groups, and a corps 
de ballet. Lully made his debut at court in the 1660's as Moliere's 
collaborator in the production of comedie-ballets: Les Fdcheux, 
George Dandin, and he Bourgeois Gentilhomme. He also collabo­
rated with Pierre Corneille on Psyche. In later years Lully produced 
hundreds of divertissements, masques, comedies, and dozens of operas. 
He was noted for the use of mechanical stage devices perfected by 
Rameau in the eighteenth century. In Lully's music we find a char­
acteristic of the age: animated expression of the Italian baroque style 
moderated, often to the point of austereness, by the restraining influ­
ence of the French classicism, much the same as we find in other 
artistic expressions at Versailles.87 
Like Lully, Louis XIV had a penchant for the opera-ballet, a taste 
that was not universally admired. The French critic Saint-Evremond 
asked: "Would you know what an opera is? I'll tell you, it is an odd 
medley of Poetry and Musick, wherein the Poet and Musician, equally 
confined one by the other, take a World of Pains to compose a 
wretched Performance." But like Louis himself, Saint-Evremond 
favored Lully: "Only in my opinion, Lully is to be exempted, who 
knows the Passions, and enters further into the Heart of man 
than the Authors themselves."88 High praise from one of the most 
discerning critics of the day. 
Another musician favored by Louis was Francois Couperin, "the 
Great." His music was marked by the intensity and grandeur that 
Louis loved. During the 1690's Couperin composed organ music for 
the king's chapel at Versailles and also jotted down occasional pieces 
for the amusement of his noble friends. The latter are playful satires, 
poetry in music, written so as to reflect the personality of a great 
court official as he caught them in music. In these pieces there is a 
marvelous admixture of themes from the corn-media dell'arte, from 
popular French tunes, and from the more dignified Italian inven­
tions of such a virtuoso as Arcangelo Corelli, a great favorite of the 
French court. Couperin's art, like Lully's combined "le gout italien 
et le gout francais" and therein achieved the Bachian compromise 
before Bach.89 
Louis recognized the greatness of another musician, Marc-Antoine 
Charpentier, much of whose music was known to his age only in 
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manuscript. Louis himself awarded Charpentier a pension in 1686 
when illness prevented the musician from actively entering the com­
petition for a royal prize in music. Like Lully, Charpentier collabo­
rated with Moliere in writing musical comedies; but unlike Louis's 
chef d'orchestre, he tended toward religious mysticism and left a 
large body of music written for the church. 
These men of the court, these king's servants, bequeathed a remark­
able musical legacy of ingenuity and virtuosity that often reached 
heights of grandeur and intensity. It attests the mixture of Italian 
baroque and French classical elements so common at the end of the 
seventeenth century.90 
Louis demanded music as a backdrop for court ceremonial, as 
companion at his meals, as a solace, and as a tranquilizing influence 
in his life; but like Mazarin he also thirsted after the excitement 
and the spice of the drama. The lively art of the theater had under­
gone a transformation between the late 1630's and the 1650's. The 
appearance of Pierre Corneille's he Cid (1637) and Horace (1640) 
marked a watershed in dramaturgy. They juxtaposed the baroque 
elements of illusion, tensions, and conceits with the classical elements 
of restraint and internal conflict that foreshadowed the plays of 
Racine, and at the same time introduced a tenderness and gravity 
that one finds in commedia dell'arte. Corneille also employed the use 
of stage mechanism, with its trompe I'oeil effect, which was so dear 
to Louis and his court.91 
By the late 1650's Louis XIV had become an avid theatergoer. 
He attended the opening of Thomas Corneille's Timocrate at the 
Theatre du Marais and of Pierre Corneille's CEdipe. His first serious 
patronage of the theater, however, came in the 1660's when, after 
Fouquet's fall, he inherited that minister's favorite playwright, J. B. 
Poquelin, called Moliere. 
Moliere, who had toured France with troops of comedians in the 
1640's and 50's and who had written farces, masques, and comedies 
during this period, brought a wealth of experience to the royal 
theater at the Louvre and at Versailles. During the 1660's and early 
70's he produced in rapid succession some of the greatest comedies 
of all time. The untutored taste of Louis's court at first favored per­
formances of the lighter, less significant works: Les Vacheux, Cocu 
imaginaire, and Manage force. But by the late 1670's the taste in com­
edy of the king and his courtiers had apparently improved, and we 
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see that Le Median malgre lui, Femmes savantes, Tartuffe, and Le 
Misanthrope top the list.92 
Louis also delighted in the tragedies of Jean Racine. It offered 
the king an opportunity to weep—a practice of which he was very 
fond—at hearing noble sentiments expressed in some of the most 
gloriously cadenced French of the age. Between the mid-1660's and 
the late 1670's Racine produced ten plays, including Andromaque 
(1667), Britannicus (1669), Berenice (1670), Bajazet (1672), 
Mithridate (1673), Iphigenie (1674), and Phedre (1677). Louis's 
two favorites were Mithridate and Britannicus, with their portrayals 
of great kings and princes struggling valiantly against an overwhelm­
ing fate.93 
Racine's last two plays Esther and Athalie were written expressly 
for Madame de Maintenon and were produced in camera for her 
girls at St. Cyr.94 Louis XIV attended all the performances. He and 
the courtiers who accompanied him to St. Cyr were struck by the 
"grandeur" of the themes, which in their intensity rivaled Milton's 
description of revolt against the Gods. Here is the eternal struggle 
of Good and Evil, of Baal against Jehovah, Satan against God. These 
last dramas epitomized not only Racine's own struggle to find mean­
ing in an age engulfed in the abyss of war but also epitomized the 
plight of the intellectual generally. Racine was a man torn by sense 
and sensibility, reason and emotions, yearning for la belle simplicite, 
yet forever frustrated in his search by the demands of society. 
Louis, who may have felt these dilemmas but dimly, was himself 
torn by the tensions of his age. These tensions were signalized early 
in the reign by the production of Moliere's Tartuffe, a bitter satire 
on hypocrisy in high places. Moliere himself pointed up the moral 
dilemma to Louis in this way: 
[When] Moliere wrote his Tartuffe . .  . he read the first three 
acts to the King. This play pleased His Majesty who spoke much 
too well of it not to arouse the jealousy of Moliere's enemies and 
above all the cahale des devots. M. de Perefixe, archbishop of Paris, 
placed himself at their head and spoke to the king against the 
comedy. The king, who was continually under pressure on all 
sides, told Moliere that one must not annoy the devots who were 
implacable and that he ought not to perform his Tartuffe in pub­
lic. His majesty thought it sufficient to speak to Moliere in this 
way without ordering him to suppress the play.95 
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But Moliere fought back, attacking the religious zealots on their 
own grounds: he baited "the hypocrites," saying that they could not 
take a joke: "they started by panicking and were amazed that I could 
be so daring as to ape their looks. . .  . In their usual praiseworthy 
fashion, they have disguised their own interests as the cause of God; 
in their mouth, Tartuffe is a play dangerous to religion."96 
Moliere's cri de cceur dramatized the dilemma of the great classical 
age of French arts and literature. Underneath the facade of gentility 
seethed the hatred of one faction for another, the loathing of the 
nobles for the regne de vile bourgeois. "What," asks W. G. Moore, 
"is the outstanding feature of life in the seventeenth century, as we 
can see it from contemporary memoirs, pictures, letters, documents'? 
Not order or rule or reason, nor pageantry or splendour, but vigour 
and even violence, restless activity."97 
Louis XIV, who himself admitted that as regards the arts he "was 
continually under pressure on all sides," also found himself buffeted 
by economic and social crises: by wars, directly and indirectly of 
his own making; by controversies in the realm of religion, where 
Jansenist fought Jesuit and Protestant fought Catholic; in the sci­
ences, where Cartesians struggled with traditionalists; in the arts, 
where supporters of the Roman school of the baroque hurled insults 
at the indigenous school of classicists. Little wonder that Louis tried, 
in reaction to the divisive factionalism of his intelligentsia, to impose 
a regime of order. The Colbertian reforms thus represent an attempt 
to bring the dissident elements within society under control. These 
reforms, Sagnac believes, reveal Louis as a "tentative revolutionary."98 
But a revolutionary—even a tentative one—is too strong a word to 
apply to Louis in the realm of the arts; his actions show him to be, 
rather, a trimmer. His favorite playwright, Moliere, was permitted 
to present plays at court, but not in Paris. Racine could espouse 
Jansenism, but not so openly as to offend the royal conscience. 
Boileau, the great critic and Louis's friend, could create the daring 
first Satires, but must not forget that he was the defender of the 
classical order in society, the author of the great classical epitome, 
L'Art poetique. Throughout his life Louis mistook the spirit of 
dissent for the esprit frondeur, the energy of intellectual discus­
sion for conspiracy. But it must be said in his favor that he usually 
reacted to a furor academicus with caution and cunning. Above all, 
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Louis pictured himself as an arbiter, as a stabilizing influence within 
society, raisonnahle, solide, juste, the guardian of the rules of conduct, 
the dispenser of bon sens and juste cadence. 
Colbert, as we have seen, was one of the major agents of the 
Ludovican compromise. It was not the greatness of his mind 
but his devotion, his perspicacity, his breadth of knowledge, his 
relentless activity, and his vigor that gave him such a formidable 
reputation in his own day. He became the symbol of the royal bureau­
crat, the defender of the regime against ententes, disorders, incipient 
frondes. His legend was perpetuated by his friends and enemies alike. 
In 1699 businessmen of Bordeaux wrote to the new controller-general 
expressing the pious hope that he would be as vigorous a partisan of 
their welfare as Monsieur Colbert had been. And in England a few 
years later Vanbrugh wrote to a mutual friend in praise of Colbert: 
"Ah, what would Mons. Colbert in France have given . .  . for 
such talent!" 
But Colbert was not the only great architect of stability in France. 
There were two others who deserve special mention: the Le Telliers, 
father and son. The father, Michel Le Tellier, was born in 1603, 
the son of a councilor in the cour des aides. He served Richelieu as 
a civil servant in the war department in Paris and in the early 1640^ 
as an intendant of the French armies in Italy. At the accession of 
Louis XIV to the throne, Mazarin named Le Tellier the secretary of 
state at war, a post that he held until 1677, when he resigned his 
charge in favor of his son, Francois-Michel, marquis de Louvois. 
Dubbed "le fidele" by Mazarin in the terrible years of the Fronde, 
Le Tellier did indeed serve the cardinal and the queen mother faith­
fully. It was during those years and in the later 1650's that Le Tellier 
initiated a number of reforms of the army; these reforms did not 
constitute a coherent program but were, rather, a piecemeal offering, 
for the minister was an fond a conservative reformer, extremely 
cautious, or as Louis Andre describes him, "Fhomme du passe," a 
man of tradition. He was Richelieu's continuateur, a link between 
the moderate reforms begun in the 1630's and the period of more 
rapid change in the 1660's." 
Michel Le Tellier's basic conservatism did not prevent him from 
setting in motion a series of changes that led in the path of adminis­
trative centralization. His chief problem concerned civil administra­
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tion, i.e., on the housing, payment, and transportation of troops, on 
the establishment of special services, such as engineering and artillery 
corps. Like his colleagues in finance and foreign affairs, Le Tellier 
began in the 1640's and 50's to strengthen his adminstrative controls 
over both the local and the provincial centers. With the armies, 
either on march or in quarters, he placed commissaires des guerres, 
whose duty it was to check the muster rolls, see to local housing and 
feeding of troops, to aid in buying supplies and in routing the armies. 
The commissaires reported and were responsible to the intendants 
d'armee who were usually drawn from the ranks of the gens de robe, 
the trained royal judges and court officials, and were sent on the 
king's special charge to serve with the armies in Flanders, the Rhine, 
Italy, and Spain. The army intendants like those in the provinces 
wielded extensive police powers: they could arrest insubordinate offi­
cers, including marshals of the army; they could institute court mar­
tial proceedings, inspect the financial records of the army, and attend 
all councils of war. Like their counterparts in the navy, in the prov­
inces, and in the colonies, they represented civilian authority and 
served as countervailing force to the military establishment.100 
Both the commissaires and the intendants were directly responsible 
to the secretary of state in Paris (or later, at Versailles), to whom 
they reported as often as once a week. Inspectors, called maitres des 
requites inspecteurs delegues, were periodically sent out to consult 
with the intendants and to report irregularities in the intendant's 
office directly to the secretary of state. Thus, as in Colbert's minis­
tries, a rough check-and-balance system developed under the aegis of 
a minister-centered administration. 
As the number of commissioners, intendants, and inspectors 
increased during 1650-80, so, commensurately, did the personnel 
of the central administration. By 1680 there numbered in the war 
ministry eight bureau chiefs, hundreds of clerks and agents, and an 
enormous archive of documents, which by 1691 contained 900 vol­
umes of correspondence covering a thirty-year span. The king's treas­
ury dispensed millions of livres, even in peacetime, to stoke this 
great war machine. The armies they administered jumped in size 
from 25,000 at the time of Turenne's invasion of the Germanies in 
the 1640's to 220,000 men in the mid-reign, to 350,000 during the 
War of the Spanish Succession (1702-14).101 
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If the 1650's mark the first reformation of the army, then the 
1660's mark the second. In the second wave of reforms, instigated 
by Louis XIV himself, the Le Telliers worked side by side. Their 
characters reveal striking similarities and differences that still trouble 
historians of the reign. Both men, like Colbert, were dedicated 
bureaucrats who, in Isaiah Berlin's words, were hedgehogs who pur­
sued one great idea, in this instance the improvement of Louis 
XIV's armies. Both were "bland, quick, insinuating, supple, and cun­
ning, and could be as dangerous and as vindictive as an Italian." 102 
But the differences between father and son were striking too: the 
father was far more the law-giver, the codifier of reforms, the civil 
servant who worked in camera through his bureaucratic network. 
Although conservative by nature, the senior Le Tellier proved to be 
quite inventive within the circumscribed sphere of the war office. 
On the other hand Francois-Michel Le Tellier, marquis de Louvois, 
was far less the diplomat than his father—more direct and at times 
blustering. "He was a brutal, violent man, imperious and tough." 
Louis XIV termed him "le confident." Madame Sevigne described 
him, more accurately, as La Mer, unpredictable, often violent, sub­
ject to sudden surface changes, yet, ultimately, unfathomable. Born 
in 1641, four years after Louis, Louvois was carefully trained for his 
position at the College de Clermont and at the ministry of war, where 
in the early 1660's he was entrusted by his father with a number of 
special missions. It was Louvois who planned the campaign in Ger­
many and Austria (1664) that sent supplies and troops to aid the 
emperor in his campaign against the Turks. In 1666 Louvois gained 
Louis XIV's favorable attention for his meticulous logistical prepara­
tions for the War of Devolution. Louvois accompanied the king on his 
reviews of troops in 1666-67 a n ^ o n n^s t o u r °f duty m t n e Low 
Countries during the actual war with Spain in 1667—68. The young 
secretary took infinite pains in planning Louis's itinerary, and the king 
was impressed by Louvois's enthusiasm and efficiency. Indeed, enthusi­
asm and efficiency became the hallmarks of Louvois's success. He 
matured into a highly trained liaison officer, co-ordinating efforts of 
the ministry and the high command. For this task he drew from an 
armory of bluff, blunt words by which he intimidated the officers of 
the general staff, prima donnas like Turenne and Luxembourg; yet, 
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Louvois was not enamored of words; plainly, he knew that it was 
planning that won a battle, not oratory.103 
All the same, the Le Telliers, father and son, worked well together. 
Louvois was as "ardent, devoted collaborator, animated by the same 
sentiments" as his father. Together they busied themselves in estab­
lishing winter quarters for a standing army that numbered about 
40,000 in 1661 and over 150,000 in 1678. In the 1660's they 
regrouped the army corps along the north and northeastern borders, 
in the Italian Alps, and in the provinces adjacent to the Pyrenees; 
munitions magazines were built along the grandes routes leading to 
the garrison towns; casernes were established or refurbished in the 
towns themselves, particularly at Pignerol, and Perpignon in the 
south and southeast, and along the north and northeast at Grave-
lines, Arras, Amiens, Soissons, and Breisach. Arsenals, where gun 
powder and cannon balls could be stored, were built in Paris, Gre­
noble, and Metz; foundries were established at Sedan, Pignerol, and 
Douai; military hospitals were founded or rebuilt at Dunkirk, Arras, 
and Calais, and the cornerstone laid in April, 1674, for the famous 
old soldier's home in Paris, the Hotel des Invalides. The engineer­
ing corps, which was completely revamped under the leadership of 
Chevalier de Clerville, helped in the 1660's to design model citadels 
at Marseilles and Pignerol in the south, and at Dunkirk, Arras, and 
Breisach in the north and northeast.104 
In the years 1672-73 to 1691 (the year of his death), Louvois 
contributed a number of reforms, en sent. In his heavy-handed, often 
peremptory fashion, he tried like his father before him to wrench 
order out of feudal chaos. Inspectors-general, the most famous being 
Martinet, drilled the army infantry into some semblance of disci­
pline; conges—leaves—were denied to officers needed for soldiers in 
winter quarters; depots were established at local quartermasters' posts 
to receive and store supplies; uniforms were issued by a central 
quartermaster's office; and schools were established to train officers. 
Louvois strained every bureaucratic muscle to circumvent, if not sub­
vert, the old feudal machinery of war—to abolish the old ban and 
arriere-ban as means of raising troops and to break the aristocratic 
monopoly of the officer corps. In so doing, Louvois, with the king's 
consent, elevated many of his own creatures to the dignity of mar­
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shals of France: Duras, Lorges, Rochefort (in the mid-1670*5), and, 
later, Tallard, D'Huxelles, D'Harcourt, Boufflers, and Villars. All of 
his men were loyal to the ministry and to the king rather than to a 
feudal lord or territorial prince. The days of Saxe-Weimar, Turenne, 
and Conde—the age of condottieri—was disappearing by 1680 and 
with it the spirit of the Fronde. Like Richelieu and Colbert, Le 
Tellier pere and Louvois employed their family as active agents of 
reform. Among them were Saint-Pouanges, D'Alegre, Claude Le 
Peletier, and Louvois's brother, Charles-Maurice, jokingly called "Le 
Cochon Mitre," who for all his grossness of person and of character 
was a powerful family pawn in the game of church politics.105 
Despite his reputation for hauteur, Louvois rewarded talent and 
listened to advice. His confidants included Martinet, the inspector-
general; the Marquis de Chamlay, the grand strategist; Berthelot, 
the munitioner; and, above all, Sebastien Le Prestre, marquis de 
Vauban, a great engineer and one of the geniuses of his age.106 A 
self-made man, the Horatio Alger of his times, Vauban was born in 
1633 of a poor gentry family. He attended school for a few years 
but left in 1651 to follow Conde's standard. In 1653 he joined the 
royal service, becoming in 1655 an ingenieur ordinaire du roi. Serv­
ing his apprenticeship under Louis's engineering consultant, Clerville, 
he made his debut as a chief engineer during the War of Devolution 
in the late 1660's. Louvois at once recognized his genius, and in the 
years following 1667 sent him on numerous missions along the north 
and northeastern borders. Vauban's letters of that time burst with 
energy, ebullience, and impatience; he represented the angry and 
eager generation of the 1660's, liberated from the oppressive appren­
ticeship of Cardinal Mazarin's age. These young men looked to 
Louis—much as did the younger generation in the United States 
look to John F. Kennedy—as the embodiment of youthful energy. 
Gloire, "nee pluribus impar," were a part and parcel of kingship, 
the paraphernalia of rejuvenated monarchy. Vauban's enthusiasms 
reflected this era of hopes and grand designs. The engineer showered 
the ministry in Paris with plans for acquiring towns of strategic 
importance. In 1668 it was Lille; in 1675, Conde, Bouchain, Valen­
ciennes, and Cambrai. Concerning these fortresses and the adjoin­
ing areas, Vauban observed to Louvois: "Seriously now, the king 
out to give some thought to establishing his meadow square (the 
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pre quarre [pre carre]),"107 i.e., a fortified zone along the northern 
border, where there could be defense in depth, a shield against the 
razzias, or heavily armed raiding parties. 
In 1678 Vauban was again importuning the minister, this time 
suggesting the annexation of the towns of Dixmude, Courtrai, Lux­
embourg, and Strasbourg as excellent portes into the Germanies. His 
demands became more persistent and peremptory in the next few 
years and began to reveal ever more clearly his thoughts for a line 
of strategic bases, or frontiere de fer. Certain portes in these strategic 
lines must serve as bastions of strength to guard the Flemish, Brabant, 
Lie'gois, Lotharingian, and German borders. Vauban did not have 
in mind a static line but rather a web of fortifications, resilient and 
interconnected, protected by canals and waterways that could be 
flooded at times of invasion. Outside the walls of the great forts were 
to be built camps retranches, large entrenched camps not unlike the 
Roman fortified encampments described by Julius Caesar in the Gallic 
Wars (favorite reading of Louis XIV as well as of Vauban). These 
forts, armed camps, and waterways were meant to complement nature, 
to guard a gap in the forest lands, to assure control of a river valley 
or close a mountain pass. 
In all, Vauban surveyed and helped design the fortifications for 
128 fortresses along the French northern and northeastern borders; 
and in 1692, as a tacit recognition of his work, Louis XIV set up a 
monument on the Rhine to the Securitati Perpetuae of France. These 
words in time became alive in French foreign policy as well as set 
solidly in stone. 
THE QUEST FOR STABILITY IN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE

CRISES IN GOVERNMENT, 1 6 6 1 - 1 7 1 5

If Louis loved war, or, rather, the mechanics of warfare, he loved 
diplomacy more. Vauban and Louvois were men of energy—honnetes 
hommes—whom Louis respected; yet consistently, the councilor with 
whom he most frequently consulted was the minister for foreign 
affairs. From the first year of the personal reign in 1661 Louis 
established the custom of meeting with his foreign secretary both 
in the morning and again in the evening to hear the dispatches 
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read. When the great peace congresses met at Aix-la-Chapelle (1668), 
Nijmegen (1677-79), Ryswick (1696-97), and Utrecht (1712-14), 
the foreign ministers worked even more closely with the king, "pa­
tiently summarizing Louis's endless instructions." Louis also liked 
to have the Gazette de Holland read to him, usually in the hour 
before supper. As he grew older, the king became increasingly 
absorbed in matters of foreign policy, particularly as they touched 
upon the Spanish Succession. When his own grandson ascended the 
throne of Spain as Philip V, Louis took infinite pains in spelling out 
the responsibilities of kingship and the duties imposed by the metier 
du roi. From this correspondence with Philip V developed a type of 
secret du roi, a secret diplomacy that was not channeled to the for­
eign secretary's office. But Louis's secret du roi—unlike that of the 
eighteenth century—was of a very limited nature, usually reserved 
only for family matters. More often than not, the king respected the 
prerogatives of the secretary of state and did not, as had been the 
custom in Mazarin's day, go over his head.10S 
Louis XIV's first foreign minister was Hugues de Lionne, the third 
member of the Triade of 1661. Lionne was an exceptionally talented 
man, sensitive to the nuance of diplomacy—a skilled negotiator and 
a master of foreign languages. The nephew of Abel Servien, one of 
Mazarin's ministers, Lionne early in his career served on special mis­
sions to the Congress at Miinster in 1648 and to Spain, Italy, and 
the Germanies in the 1650's. Appointed one of the chief delegates 
to the congress that drafted the Peace of the Pyrenees, he authored 
the moyennant—marriage—clause that provided the basis for later 
French claims to the Spanish inheritance. From 1659 until his death 
in 1671 Louis XIV relied on his judgment and named him a min­
ister in his first meeting of the conseil d'en haut. Regretably, personal 
misfortunes plagued his last years in office. The notoriety of his 
wife's infidelities drove Lionne increasingly to drink, and he was 
often acutely ill; as Lionne's health declined, his colleagues, especially 
Louvois, interfered increasingly in the affairs of his department.109 
Lionne's successor, Arnauld de Pomponne, was one of the most 
admirable men of Louis's reign, gifted with great wit and politesse, 
a model for the honnete homme. Pomponne, whom Herbert Rowen 
calls one of Louis's "moderate" ministers, served his apprenticeship 
as ambassador to The Hague and to Sweden. In the late 1660's he 
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tried to negotiate a settlement of the Franco-Dutch disputes, but 
failed. After he became foreign minister, he continued to pursue a 
policy of accommodation that quickly aroused the distrust of Louvois. 
Unfortunately, Pomponne also incurred the enmity of Colbert, and 
together the war and finance ministers helped unseat their colleague 
in 1679. Louis, however, had misgivings about his harsh judgment 
of Pomponne and in 1691 recalled this "moderate minister" to the 
high council, where he served without portfolio (actually a second 
foreign minister) until his death in 1699.110 
Pomponne's immediate successor was Colbert's brother, the Marquis 
de Croissy. In contrast to Pomponne, Croissy was "a bluff, obstinate, 
opinionated and often quite irascible man/'111 Yet, like most of the 
Colberts, he was an energetic and faithful servant of the king, and 
like Lionne and Pomponne, was carefully trained for his office, serv­
ing in the 1650's as the intendant in the strategically important 
frontier province of Alsace and in the late i66o's as ambassador to 
London. Croissy, again like Lionne and Pomponne, suffered the 
brunt of Louvois's dislike and constantly struggled with the war 
minister over what constituted the prerogatives of the foreign minister's 
office. Yet Croissy, who was of the same mettle as Louvois himself, 
held his own against Louvois and actually outlived him by five years. 
Croissy was known to the diplomatic corps for his punctiliousness 
and for the care with which he composed his dispatches. 
Croissy's son, Colbert de Torcy (foreign minister from 1699 to 
1715) was a model diplomat and administrator. During the difficult 
years of the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-14) Torcy 
conducted with consummate skill the negotiations that led to the 
meeting of the Congress at Utrecht. Torcy was withal an excellent 
administrator. During his term in office the budget for the foreign 
office personnel rose from 1,000,000 livres to 3,450,000 livres, and 
the size of the bureaucracy nearly doubled. Torcy also assembled 
around him a brilliant staff, including Francois Callieres, the author of 
On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes; Abbe de Polignac, a 
future cardinal and negotiator at Utrecht; Antoine Pecquet, the author 
of one of the leading manuals for diplomats; and Nicolas Mesnager, 
a Rouen merchant and expert on the asiento agreements. An Acad­
emy of Politics was established in the Louvre in rooms alongside the 
archives, where bright young men were to be trained for the diplo­
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matic service. Although the scheme did not have time to mature 
before Torcy's forced retirement in 1715, it served as a model for 
future schools. Under Torcy's guidance, the bureaucratization of 
diplomacy was begun and the conduct of foreign affairs increasingly 
institutionalized.112 
Overtures to Aggression, 1661—1672 
From the vast number of dispatches, aide-memoires, instructions to 
ambassadors, and letter-books preserved in the archives of the foreign 
ministry, the historian can piece together with a fair degree of accu­
racy the history of international relations during the reign of Louis 
XIV. Louis's policies were concerned principally with anticipating on 
the diplomatic chessboard the moves planned by the Hapsburgs in 
Vienna and Madrid and, laterally, the strategems advanced by the 
Atlantic powers of England and the United Provinces of the Dutch 
Netherlands. 
The memory of Spanish aggressions in the Low Countries, the 
Franche-Comte, and the Pyrenees was fresh in the minds of French 
statesmen during the 1660's. A dozen or more times during the 
Thirty Years' War French soil had been violated by Hapsburg troops, 
with Spanish commanders usually at their head. And although peace 
had been signed officially at the Pyrenees in 1659 and sealed by a 
marriage between the two dynasties, there lingered in the French 
monarch's mind a desire for revenge and, at the same time, for the 
safety of his realm. In point of fact, a cold war existed between 
France and Spain during most of the reign, erupting four times into 
open conflict before 1700: namely, the War of Devolution, 1667-68; 
the so-called Dutch War, or War of the First Coalition, 1672-79; 
the War of the Reunions, 1683-84; and the War of the League of 
Augsburg, or the Second Coalition, 1689-97. 
Louis XIV, as punctilious in matters of precedence as his Spanish 
cousins had been earlier in the century, set out deliberately to 
humiliate his father-in-law, Philip IV, in the so-called petites 
affaires of the 1660's. In June, 1661, the French ambassador to 
Madrid, Embrun, demanded and gained the right to make a public 
entree into the Spanish capital, which had been previously denied to 
France.113 In October of the same year an open street fight broke 
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out in London between the French ambassador and the Spanish 
ambassador, Watteville. After a free-for-all between the ambassadors' 
retinues, the French retired ignominiously from the field.114 Louis 
and his court were spending the last of the autumn season in Fon­
tainebleau when on October 16 Louis received word of the Spanish 
"outrage." The Spanish ambassador was summarily shipped off to 
Spain. Again, as in the Embrun affair, Philip IV bent before the 
French storm and henceforth, as Louis demanded, the French ambas­
sador took precedence over the Spanish in the courts of Europe, 
except in Vienna, where the emperor would not acknowledge French 
pretensions. 
Louis also undertook aggressive diplomatic moves against his father-
in-law at the level of strategic military planning. From his cousin 
Charles II of England Louis purchased the port of Dunkirk on 
the border of the Spanish Low Countries as an entrepot for possible 
military action against Spanish forces in the area.115 Through his 
ambassadors in London and Lisbon, Louis surreptitiously aided the 
Portuguese War of Independence. Expressly forbidden by the peace 
settlement of the Pyrenees to take an active role in the affairs of 
Portugal, the French king used England as his cats-paw. An Anglo-
Portuguese alliance, sealed by the marriage of Charles II to the 
Portuguese princess Isabella, brought to England as a dowry the 
cities of Tangier and Bombay. In return, Charles II promised troops 
and a fleet to help in Portugal's bid for independence. Louis sent 
money and a military commander, Schomberg, to bolster English 
resources. Spain formally acknowledged Portuguese independence 
in 1668.116 Louis also pressed the Spanish for payment of Maria 
Theresa's dowry, and when the gold was not forthcoming, he 
dropped the hint that France would accept in lieu of money pay­
ment the Franche-Comte, the city of Luxembourg and environs, 
Cambrai and the Cambresis, all of which portended future demands. 
The second strand of French anti-Hapsburg policy was interlaced 
in Louis's personal relations with his cousin, Emperor Leopold I. 
Leopold had been elected Holy Roman Emperor in 1658 despite 
French attempts to gain the crown for Louis. In his own day Leopold 
was a figure of some amusement to foreign ambassadors and even to 
members of his own court.117 The young Torcy described him as a 
man with pinched features, a long beak-like nose, a partially open 
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mouth, the overhanging Hapsburg lip, and half-closed eyes, all of 
which caused him to appear to be not quite bright.118 Other observ­
ers commented that he was, variously, dominated by his wife, by the 
Jesuits, by the great Austrian court officials. Yet, these same critics 
often failed to note that Leopold was withal a shrewd observer, an 
obstinate and tenacious guardian of his family's rights, and ulti­
mately Louis's most determined enemy in Europe. His importance 
to this narrative is based on three elementary but important facts: 
his longevity, his passivity, and his modernity. First, his longevity: 
he was emperor from 1658 to 1705, and during those forty-seven 
years there emerge discernible patterns in his foreign policy, contin­
uities that one does not find in the policies of Spain or England 
or even in the Dutch Netherlands. Second, his passivity: Leopold 
inclined before the winds of adversity, before storms that might have 
frightened and fatigued and even broken more active monarchs—a 
William III or a Louis XIV. In giving way, it often appeared that 
he was being bullied by the Spanish faction at court, or the Bohemian 
cabal, or the Jesuits, or the Italians. Yet, for all of his procrastinations 
and real or feigned indecisions, Austria and the Austrian empire of 
the Danube emerged as the victor in the early eighteenth century— 
"the miracle of the House of Austria." But then, his modernity: in this 
he resembled Louis XIV. Leopold was not a warrior. Like Louis, he 
had sloughed off the quasi-feudal guise of the active military leader 
in exchange for the less hectic and more modern role of commander-
in-chief, remote among his files and secretaries. Leopold's contempo­
raries William III, Charles XII of Sweden, and Peter the Great 
retained the strenuous office of field commander, and in so doing 
represented a less-advanced stage of the kingly craft. 
Louis's reaction to the Austrian Hapsburgs was much the same as 
to the Spanish cousins: he plotted aggressions, petites affaires. In the 
1660's the king moved his troops into Lorraine, forcing Austria's 
ally, the duke, to flee to Vienna. At the same time Louis strength­
ened his hold on the Alsatian territories and increased his subsidies 
to the Rhineland princes, to the elector of Brandenburg, to the Pol­
ish magnates, and, secretly, to the Hungarian nobles who opposed 
Austrian domination. Yet, for all the heated rivalry that existed 
between Louis and Leopold, they were quite capable, in the name 
of raison d'etat, of dividing up the Spanish inheritance between 
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themselves. In early 1668 when it appeared that Philip IV's suc­
cessor, the child-king Carlos II, might die before reaching majority, 
the French emissary to Vienna negotiated the Secret Partition Treaty 
with the Austrians. Leopold I and his children were to have Spain, 
Milan, and a lion's share of the Spanish colonies. France claimed 
the Spanish Netherlands, Franche-Comte, Navarre, Naples, Sicily, 
and the Philippines. Thus in two instances Louis detailed his 
demands on the Spanish empire: first, through his letter to Philip IV 
concerning Maria Theresa's dowry; and second, in the Secret Par­
tition Treaty of 1668.119 These demands would at the very least 
include claims to part of the Spanish Netherlands, to possession of 
the Franche-Comte and Luxembourg, and to compensation in Italy. 
The French attitude toward Vienna and Madrid, which was gov­
erned largely by considerations of territorial aggrandizement within 
the circle of Burgundian and Lortharingian lands, represented a tra­
ditional and fairly consistent policy that can be traced down through 
the reign to 1714. 
French policy toward the Atlantic powers of England and the 
Dutch Netherlands is, on the other hand, more difficult to chart. It 
is filled with trials and errors, with egregious mistakes, with threats 
of reprisal and promises of gold. From the first, Louis and his min­
isters underestimated the power of England and misjudged the ability 
of that country to recover from the terrible years of civil war. Louis, 
moreover, misjudged Charles II, who was a man passively hostile to 
the French but no fool; in need of French money and therefore 
willing to accommodate Louis, he would, yet, in moments of danger 
to the crown, bend to the anti-French sentiments of his parliament 
and people. Withal, Charles was a dangerous ally for Louis XIV.120 
The Dutch were equally puzzling to French statesmen. Louis and 
Colbert called them "horse traders of . .  . Europe, lock-pickers and 
messengers of the ocean" and "a nation of herring mongers, of 
cheese vendors." Yet, these very cheese vendors and herring mongers 
employed upward of 20,000 ships in the i66o's while France main­
tained only 600.121 Louis was also bemused by the fact that the 
United Provinces were an aristocratic republic that sported the 
house of Orange-Nassau, whose prince became during wartime the 
virtual military commander-in-chief. Louis, who failed to compre­
hend the workings of the complex Dutch political and military estab­
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lishment, dismissed them as unreliable allies and unworthy enemies. 
Like Voltaire, Louis seems to have pictured the Dutch in terms of 
canaux, canards, canailles. In coalition, however, they proved to be 
formidable foes. 
By 1665-66, just as the "Dutch problem" was becoming acute, 
Louis suffered crises in his public and personal life. In September, 
1665, Philip IV died after a long illness, bringing into dramatic 
focus the question of the Spanish inheritance. In January, 1666, 
Anne of Austria died of cancer, leaving Louis bereft of a strong 
female influence in his life. Louis truly grieved for his mother be­
cause, as he admitted to his son, "I . .  . knew better than any one 
person with what energy that princess preserved my dignity, at a 
time when I could not defend it myself . . . "; she displayed as 
well "intrepid firmness . . . and [when the time came] had volun­
tarily made [resignation] of sovereign authority in my favour."122 
Altogether, in Louis's eyes, she was an admirable woman. And 
yet, her death was for the king a release from the last vestiges of 
parental control. 
Although he mourned his mother's passing, it was the death of his 
father-in-law, Philip IV, that set in motion a portentous series of 
events. As early as 1664, Michel Le Tellier oversaw the building 
of granaries and munitions centers on the routes that led to the 
frontiers of the Spanish Netherlands. Great stores of arms, cannon, 
and powder were accumulated in the newly acquired fortresses of 
Dunkirk, Arras, and Amiens. Troops were assembled close to the 
northern border, and Louis held a series of reviews, in that year of 
reviews, 1666. The king enjoyed the military pageantry; his taste 
for gloire militaire was whetted. 
In May, 1667, Louis dispatched a letter to Madrid, addressed to 
"Her Most High, Illustrious and Mighty Princess, our dear and 
loving Sister Mariana, the Queen Dowager of Spain," in which the 
Jus Devolutionis—rights of Devolution—were set forth by the 
king's lawyers. The latter claimed that (1) Louis's wife, Maria 
Theresa, had not renounced her rights in the Spanish inheritance 
since no portion of her dowry had been paid; that (2) she was heir 
to her mother's marriage settlement and to her jewels amounting to 
1,100,000 crowns in gold; thus (3) since neither had been paid, 
Maria Theresa was claiming certain places in the Spanish Low 
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Countries as her right by the local Brabant Law of devolution, which 
allowed the mother's fortune to devolve on the daughter. Her claims 
for territorial compensation were not inconsiderable: Antwerp, Upper 
Guelderland, Namur, Limburg, Hainault, Artois, Cambrai, the 
county of Burgundy, and the duchy of Luxembourg.123 
The Spanish Court, for once prompt in its answer, pointed out 
that ( O the Jus Devolutionis was not recognized as valid by Madrid; 
it was only a municipal (private) law of Brabant, having nothing to 
do with the sovereignty of that area; (2) there was no precedent, 
even in Brabant law, that favored the female over the male heir, and 
therefore Maria Theresa had no right to supersede her half-brother 
Carlos; (3) the fact that payment of Maria Theresa's dowry had not 
been made did not invalidate the renunciations she had acceded to; 
(4) lastly, the edict of Charles V in the sixteenth century, confirmed 
by the Estates of Brabant, forever joined the county of Brabant to 
the crown of Spain. Not content with these arguments, the gov­
ernor of the Spanish Netherlands added his own answer in a letter 
to Louis XIV in which he appealed to the Law of Nations and 
Nature. He reminded Louis that the Empire could never allow 
"as noble a Member, as the Circle of Burgundy, . . . [to] be taken 
away," and recalled that Louis's proposed "appeal to arms" violated 
the Treaty of Miinster, which provided a ten-month "cooling-off" 
period. These arguments point up the strong sense of legalism in­
herent in most of Louis's dealings with the house of Hapsburg. Yet, 
this lawyers' quarrel quickly turned into armed conflict. As a con­
temporary dolefully admitted: "Once the flame of a new War . . . 
began to be kindled"124 there was no damping it. French troop move­
ments commenced on May 20, 1667, just as Louis arrived at St. 
Quentin to oversee personally the movement of munitions to the 
front. Louvois had preceded his master by two days, preparing in 
minutest detail the military parade into the Low Countries. The 
ministers Lionne and Colbert followed closely behind. Turenne 
headed an army of 25,000 infantry and 10,000 horse against the 
border positions. The war was entirely one-sided. The Spanish gov­
ernor, true to his own predictions, retreated, destroying his border 
fortifications as he went. Tournai fell, then Bergues, Fumes, Oude­
narde, place-names of war that would become familiar in the next 
century and a half. 
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After lengthy negotiations, peace was signed at Aix-la-Chapelle one 
year later in May, 1668. The terms left France in possession of 
twelve fortresses including Lille, Courtrai, Douai, Tournai, and 
Charleroi, forming an irregular border that was "so dangerous and 
absurd" that it invited revision at the earliest opportunity.125 
Five months before the signing at Aix-la-Chapelle, the Dutch and 
English representatives, on January 23 (N.S.), 1668, signed a sig­
nificant document known as the First Triple Alliance (so called 
because Sweden came into the agreement in April); it was a har­
binger of the emerging Anglo-Dutch entente that slowly evolved 
in the 1670's and that was directed against French pretensions to 
the Spanish Low Countries and against the French overseas empire.126 
Even before the news of the signing of the Triple Alliance, Louis 
and his advisers, Lionne, Louvois, and Colbert, contemplated a 
"neutralization" of the Dutch power. The government of the United 
Provinces of the Dutch Republic had since 1635 allied themselves 
with France against the Spanish threat. But as that threat receded, 
the Dutch negotiated a detente with Madrid, first by making a 
separate peace with the Spanish in 1648 and second by granting the 
Spanish crown a subsidy of 480,000 crowns in 1668. Paris did not 
hide its resentment, and it became clear to the Dutch that an old 
proverb of theirs was becoming an alarming reality: Gaullus amicus 
sed non vicinus—France a friend but not a neighbor. 
The Triple Alliance appeared to France as an aggressive move on 
the part of the Dutch, and Louis XIV countered by weaving a 
diplomatic web of alliances around the United Provinces, gaining 
uneasy allies in the Rhineland, including the elector of Cologne 
(whose dependent territory of Liege provided the necessary invasion 
route against the Dutch), the elector of Trier, and the bishop of 
Miinster. Brandenburg, through bribery and promises, was neu­
tralized. The emperor still adhered to the provisions of the First 
Partition Treaty, and Charles II of England—the key to the Atlantic 
entente—was suborned through promises of gold. As the Danish 
envoy in London reported: "The French are leaving no stone un­
turned in their machinations against the Triple Alliance."127 The 
Secret Treaty of Dover was a further checkmate: a promise of three 
million livres to be paid to Charles II, one-half to be delivered before 
an English declaration of war on the Dutch. 
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Several developments unfolded in 1669 just before the signing 
of the Secret Treaty. First, Carlos II fell ill, throwing into stark 
relief the problem of the Spanish Succession. At the time a Dutch 
statesman wryly remarked that "the whole state of Europe is to be 
pitied when its peace depends upon the pleurisy or other illness of 
a child."128 Close upon the illness of Carlos followed Louis XIV's 
claim that the seaport town of Nieuport in the Spanish Netherlands 
was "feudally subordinate" to the territory ceded him in the Treaty 
of Aix-la-Chapelle. The tactics employed in the Reunions of the late 
1670's had already begun. 
As the Dutch conflict moved inexorably toward its violent phase, 
what, in sum, were its causes? Certainly the formation of the Triple 
Alliance was one; and commercial rivalry another. Third was the 
clash of interest between the French and Dutch over the Burgundian 
lands, which was one of the major catalysts in changing Dutch friend­
ship for France into fear; fourth was the urgent need for a settlement 
of the Spanish inheritance, dramatized by Carlos II's illness in 1669. 
Louis XIV and his advisers felt ever more strongly that their outposts 
on the borders of the Spanish Netherlands must be strengthened and 
their enclaves enlarged; fifth was the "very existence" of the Dutch 
Republic, which Ernst Kossmann called "a paradox and a challenge" 
to the French—they disliked its parochial, independent ways, its 
fidelity to an antiquated "aristocratic ideal of liberty," which in itself 
was an insult to Louis's concept of the state. Yet, of all these contribu­
tory causes, those that concerned the Burgundian and Spanish in­
heritances were probably the most important. Professor Haley puts 
it succinctly when he says, "The ultimate object of Louis XIV's 
invasion of Holland has been to make easier his encroachments in 
Flanders without Dutch interference."129 
In order to move against the Spanish Low Countries and at the 
same time to "neutralize" the Dutch armies, Louis struck at the Dutch 
Netherlands by way of the "corridor" through the bishopric of Liege. 
Like the campaigns of 1667-68, the Dutch War began as a triumphal 
parade. Louis, accompanied by his brother the duke of Orleans, his 
two great generals Conde and Turenne, four other marshals, and an 
army of 25,000 horse and 86,000 foot, followed the course of the 
Sambre and Meuse valleys to the Rhine and crossed into Dutch 
Netherlands, near the border post of Tolhuis. "At the first sight of 
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the French Army," the historian Stephen Baxter has quipped, the 
United Provinces collapsed, "like a bad souffle."130 The year 1672 
quickly became the Rampjaar, the year of disaster, in the annals of 
Dutch history. m Their army, pitifully small and miserably armed, 
retreated before the French, falling back on Fortress Holland, that 
quadrilateral containing Rotterdam, The Hague, Haarlem, and 
Amsterdam. As an English agent noted: "The near approach of the 
French doth so much amaze us and put us into confusion here [in 
Rotterdam] that we are all in an uproar, the common people 
tumult, . . . pretending the great ones send away their money & 
best things, . . . and intend to follow after, & leave the people to 
the mercy of the French. . . . "132 
As the wealthier population fled before the furia Franca, the regent 
or ruling classes of the Netherlands fell to quarreling among them­
selves. But out of this internal chaos was born the spirit of resistance 
to French hegemony, the antithesis to Louis's ideal of gloire. The 
active leader of this antithetical movement was William of Orange-
Nassau, the stadtholder and military leader of the Dutch Nether­
lands. At the time of the French invasion William was twenty-one 
years old and like Leopold of Austria something of a physical curiosity. 
Barely five feet tall, hunch-backed from birth, wearing a brace to 
prop himself up during battles, asthmatic, subject to migraine head­
aches, fainting spells, and temper tantrums, William had neither 
the physical appearance nor the political maturity to inspire con­
fidence among even the most loyal Orangemen. Seldom has a nation 
in a time of crisis called upon such a misfit and misanthrope to be its 
leader. Yet, as the jingle went: 
Though he be very small 
He'll be Stadtholder after all.133 
And stadtholder he became and remained, because like Louis XIV 
he was tenacious of his rights and possessed of an exaggerated sense 
of duty both to his house and to his country. In other ways he re­
sembled not only Louis but Leopold I: all three were egocentric; all 
three boasted an exaggerated sense of gloire; all three were intolerant 
of dissent. Yet, they tempered these faults with political prudence; 
they weighed evidence, they listened to rumors, they took their time— 
often an inordinate length of time—to come to a decision. 
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Louis' own hesitations were never more clearly manifested than 
in his hour of triumph over the Dutch in the spring of 1672. 
Louis preferred the slow measured pavan of siege warfare; he 
enjoyed the spectacle of a stately maneuvering army. The rapidity 
with which the campaign broke into the Dutch Netherlands in 
the spring of 1672 startled the king and left him without a coherent 
or viable policy for peace or war. At the end of June, faced with 
the imminent collapse of the Republic, the Dutch States-General 
sent a delegation to Louis with very generous offers of territorial 
and commercial concessions. The king, nonplussed, appealed to the 
two ministers traveling with him, Louvois and Pomponne, for advice. 
Each outlined a course of action. Pomponne advised moderation 
and prudence; Louvois urged the king to demand even harsher 
terms, hinting that the French might soon dictate peace terms from 
the town hall in Amsterdam. Like polar opposites within Louis's 
own character, the ministers fought for dominance, and Louvois 
won temporarily. The peace delegation was sent packing, and the 
French demands were increased to include all the lands along the 
Rhine, extensive tariff concessions, free exercise of Catholic faith 
in the Netherlands, and an indemnity of 24 million livres. The 
politics of gloire triumphed.134 
Yet, to Louvois's surprise and Louis's chagrin, Dutch defenses 
held. The lands around Amsterdam and other areas of Fortress 
Holland were flooded; and William appealed to some European 
princes to support his cause pro religione et libertate. To others he 
played on the old theme of universal monarchy, substituting a French 
variation for the older Spanish one. On August 30, 1673, the Grand 
Alliance of The Hague, pledging military support for the Nether­
lands, was signed by Spain, the Rhenish states, Lorraine, Branden­
burg, and the emperor. Louis's armies, having already retreated from 
their advanced positions in the Netherlands, took up a defensive 
line along the Rhine, the Moselle, and the valleys of the Spanish 
Low Countries in what was to become the classic strategic disposition 
of troops for the next three wars of coalition. 
The campaigns that followed trumpeted patterns of warfare often 
repeated in the late seventeenth century: the siege of great fortresses, 
such as Vauban's brilliant investment of Maestricht in 1673; the 
march and countermarch of armies, such as Turenne's invasion of 
Alsace or Marshal Luxembourg's sallies along the Flemish front; and 
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the rapid military maneuver, such as the seizure in 1676 of the 
Franche-Comte. The Imperial forces retaliated in what was already 
a characteristic response by mounting a counterinvasion, led on this 
occasion by the great Austrian commander Montecucculi, which 
swept into Lorraine in 1676—77, arriving at the very gates of Metz. 
During that campaign Strasbourg was used as a forte d'entree, a fact 
that did not escape the notice of the planners at Versailles. 
Although Louis had for the second time won a claim to the 
Franche-Comte by the right of conquest, his war efforts on other 
fronts were dogged by diplomatic and military defeats, beginning in 
1674 ^dth the defection of England from the French alliance, 
followed in July of 1675 by Marshal Turenne's death on the 
battlefield, by the military rout of France's ally Sweden in June, 
1675, and by the popular uprisings in Bordeaux and Brittany. Louis, 
heartily sick of the Dutch adventure, initiated peace negotiations in 
earnest in 1676 at the Dutch town of Nijmegen. England, serving 
as mediator, was represented by the shrewd and articulate statesman 
William Temple. The French delegation was headed by the seasoned 
diplomats D'Estrades, D'Avaux, and Colbert de Croissy, the last of 
whom had Louis's "particular confidence." The Imperials sent Count 
Kinsky and the Dutch, J. Beverning, both able negotiators. A 
stalemate developed at once because, as Temple observed: "Those 
who had gained by war pretended to retain all they had got and 
those that had lost pretended to recover all they had lost."135 Later, 
Temple complained even more bitterly that the negotiations lan­
guished, "accroche des ceremonies." The stalemate was broken in 
1677 when "the treaty [was] . . . truly won [by the French] in 
the field. . . . "  1 3  6 So secure was Louis in his gains that even the 
"coquins" of Amsterdam accepted French terms, which again, as at 
the Pyrenees and Aix-la-Chapelle, marked out Spain as the victim. 
The Spanish ceded France the Franche-Comte and eleven towns in 
Flanders, including Ypres and Cambrai, thus rounding off the 
northern borders between the Spanish Low Countries and France 
and giving Vauban his prized pre carre. Maestricht, the great fortress 
town on the Meuse, was returned to the Dutch along with certain 
economic concessions; territory lost to Sweden was restored; and 
finally, the emperor, signing in February, 1679, granted Louis garrison 
rights to Freiburg-im-Breisgau, with access to Breisach on the Rhine. 
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The lessons learned from the Dutch War, or War of the First 
Coalition, are among the most significant of the reign because of 
their impact on Louis's attitude toward strategic planning and plan­
ners. First of all, Louis became thereafter more cautious in the 
deployment of his troops. The impetuosity of youth was gone, and 
he and his advisers made few grand gestures again like the invasion 
of the Dutch Netherlands. Under strict orders from Versailles, French 
planners were content with punitive raids into the Rhineland (1688), 
or campaigns in northern Italy in the 1690's; but not until the War 
of the Spanish Succession, when the grand strategy of the dulce of 
Marlborough and of Prince Eugene forced them to it, did the French 
commanders risk the exposure of their inner lines. Second, for the 
next twenty years the strengthening of strategic frontiers was upper­
most in Louis's mind. In the years following Nijmegen, Vauban was 
ordered to design fortifications for the length of the northern and 
northeastern frontiers. Elaborate defenses sprang up at Mount Royal, 
Saarlouis, Breisach, Luxembourg, and Philippsburg, all in an area 
where the memory of Montecucculi's invasion of 1676-77 was still 
fresh. At the same time Croissy, Louvois, Vauban, and Chamlay 
urged on Louis the policy of reunions and annexations.137 
A third legacy of Nijmegen was the concept of an anti-French coali­
tion of powers. The idea was spawned in the Triple Alliance of 1668 
and reinforced in the Grand Alliance of The Hague of 1673. Louis 
and his advisers noted that the great variable in these coalitions was 
England, who in the 1670's was rapidly recovering from the malaise 
of civil war and the three Dutch wars of the 1650—70's. But as 
Pomponne sagely observed in a memorandum to Louis XIV: "So long 
as she [England] is divided within herself she will be little equal to 
making herself considerable abroad and to holding that balance 
which seems to lie naturally in her hands among the contentions of 
Europe."138 "That balance which seems to lie naturally in her 
hands"—a prophecy of which Louis and his foreign minister seemed 
well aware but were powerless to prevent. William Temple, too, 
realized England's strategic position. Writing to Charles II in early 
1677, he noted "that all men knew, France was not in condition . . . 
to venture a war with England in conjunction with the rest of the 
Allies."139 By 1679, with or without England's support, Louis's two 
implacable enemies—the Austrians and the Dutch—had formed a 
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working alliance. Out of the machinations of these two nations and 
the allied princes in the Low Countries, in the Germanies, and in 
Spain arose the great coalitions of the end of the century (coalitions 
raisonnees). 
The fourth lesson of Nijmegen was reflected in the conseil d'en 
haiit: conflicts within the council were exacerbated by the pressures 
of war. Louvois quarreled with the high command, with the Colberts, 
and with the king himself. As a group, they vented their spleen 
on the unfortunate Pomponne, whose plight became known in 1679 
as the affaire Pomponne. It reached its crisis point in April, 1679, 
when Louis dismissed his foreign minister. Louis explained his action 
by saying that Pomponne had been derelict in the performance of 
his ministerial responsibilities, which was in part true, as is reported 
by the Venetian ambassador and other observers. Pomponne was also 
suspected of leaking information concerning the Jansenist problem 
to his family, many of whom were leaders in the Jansenist movement. 
This charge may, in part, be true also; if so, it was a serious breach 
of confidence. More likely, however, Pomponne was simply the victim 
of an intramural quarrel between the Colberts and the Le Telliers.140 
Louis, always cautious in these internecine fights within his 
council, did not heed Louvois's pleas that a member of the Le 
Tellier clan be appointed as foreign minister. Instead, Louis main­
tained a balance within the council by appointing Colbert's brother, 
the able lawyer and diplomat, Colbert de Croissy. It was Croissy who 
immediately initiated the policy of the "Reunions," by which the 
French minister reverted to cautious tactics of piecemeal annexations 
in the area of Alsace and Lorraine.141 The Courts of Reunion— 
chambres des reunions—were established at Metz, BesanQon, and 
Breisach, and were charged by Colbert de Croissy with making "an 
exact investigation of the king's rights" in the provinces as granted 
him at Miinster, Aix-la-Chapelle, and Nijmegen. The cities of the 
Decapole had already been occupied in 1672-73. In the early 1680's 
French troops, bearing writs from the chambres des reunions, seized 
territories contiguous to the city of Strasbourg. Strasbourg, indeed, 
was the prize. It had served as a bridgehead over the Rhine by which 
the Imperial-Brandenburg army had entered Alsace in 1676-77, and 
Louis's advisers believed the Strasbourg forte must be closed. Louvois 
and Vauban were particularly adamant on this point. It was Louvois, 
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the technician of war, who planned down to the minutest detail the 
march into Strasbourg, which took place on September 30, 1681.142 
At that time a medal was struck grandly announcing that Clausa 
Germaniae Gallia: France had closed the gate to Germany. On the 
reverse side was inscribed Securitas Alsatiae, the security of Alsace 
assured. But the verdict of history was not as certain as Louis XIV 
might have hoped. In 1871, as the Prussians hailed their king as 
emperor of Germany at Versailles, the historian Ranke could write 
that Germans were still fighting the wars of Louis XIV—still hoping 
to regain Strasbourg irredenta. 
Beginning in the years of the Reunions and of Strasbourg's fall, 
Louis XIV seems to have suffered a series of personal crises, which, 
for want of a better term, we may call crise de midi. In 1682 Louis 
was forty-four years old and was suffering from ill health: he com­
plained of his "vagaries"—headaches, toothaches, chills (in part from 
attacks of malaria), dyspepsia, and acute swelling and bleeding 
associated with an anal fistula (which was to be operated upon in 
1686). In the same years Louis's personal relations underwent a 
crisis. His wife Maria Theresa died in 1683. Of her he said, the only 
sad moment she had given him was in her dying. But Maria Theresa's 
death was a minor inconvenience. More serious was the revelation 
three years before that his vivacious and imperious mistress, Madame 
de Montespan, companion of his early maturity and mother of seven 
of his children, had been strongly implicated in a scandal that in­
volved a series of infamous poisonings and the practice of black 
masses. The news of the affaire des poisons was quickly quashed by 
the lieutenant general of the police;143 but enough of the details were 
known at court to alarm the council and to disillusion Louis. 
During the same period Louis seems to have undergone a crise de 
conscience as well. He became concerned for his immortal soul. In 
his quest for surety he turned increasingly for guidance and comfort 
to the governess of his legitimated children, Madame de Maintenon, 
one of the most remarkable women at his court. Madame de Main-
tenon, a descendant of a noble but impoverished Huguenot family 
and a convert to Catholicism, was widowed at an early age. She had, 
as an act of charity, been given the post of governess to the bastard 
children of Louis XIV by her kinswoman, Madame de Montespan. 
Maintenon's greatest virtues as a governess were patience and an 
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even temper. She was also an excellent listener, and Louis found 
her a perfect confidante, an ideal repository of secrets. She kept her 
own counsel, and she did not belabor Louis with complaints or 
gossip. When she did speak, her words were balanced, cautious, 
non-commital, lest she perpetrate a political or personal faux fas. 
Like his hermitage at Marly, Madame de Maintenon's rooms at 
Versailles provided Louis with a refuge, a secluded corner in which 
to muse for a few hours. Madame de Maintenon herself describes it 
best: "When the king returns from hunting, he comes to me; then 
the door is closed, and no one enters. Here I am then alone with him. 
I must bear his troubles, if he has any, his sadness, his nervous 
dejection; sometimes he bursts into tears which he cannot control, 
or else he complains of illness."144 Maintenon in her later years was 
at once a companion, a confidante, and, in short, a mother substitute 
to the aging monarch. 
Maintenon's rewards were not inconsiderable. Louis built her a 
school at St. Cyr, close to Versailles, where she could indulge her 
schoolmarmish bent by directing the education of young ladies of 
good but impoverished families. The king may also have married 
Maintenon, but the exact date is difficult to determine, sometime 
between 1683 and 1700, probably closer to the former. Her political 
influence, though considerable, is likewise difficult to ascertain: Louis 
did not tolerate direct advice from his family or from his women 
companions. So much did he detest the image of the roi faineant, the 
king ruled by a strong minister or wilful woman, that he was on 
constant guard lest he be accused of having fallen prey to the sin 
of his ancestors. Yet, critics of Maintenon, then and now, have 
credited her with a major role in the revocation of the Edict of 
Nantes (1685); in Fenelon's exile to Cambrai (the late 1690's); in 
the attacks on Louvois (1689-90); in the acceptance of the will of 
Carlos II (1700); in initiating overtures for peace in the period 
1709-12.145 These political coups are either fabrication from whole 
cloth or exaggerated. Maintenon did wield political influence in 
Louis's later years, but she did so through her creatures, her friends 
in office—men like Michel Chamillart, minister from 1699 to 1709, 
and a former controller in her household; or Daniel-Francois Voysin, 
a minister from 1709 to 1715, also a former official in her household; 
or through close friends, like Marshal d'Harcourt or Princess des 
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Ursins. But as to direct political influence, it is difficult, if not impos­
sible, to document. From scattered evidence we may, however, con­
jecture that in decisions affecting foreign policy Maintenon probably 
had very little influence; but in decisions affecting political appoint­
ments (particularly after 1698) her opinion, when sought by the 
king, was not lightly disregarded. 
Madame de Maintenon, as one might expect, was hated by 
members of the king's immediate family, by Louis's supercilious 
and effeminate brother, Philippe, and by Philippe's rather masculine-
appearing wife, Elizabeth-Charlotte of Bavaria, nicknamed Liselotte, 
and by Louis's son, Monseigneur, the Grand Dauphin. They thought 
of her as the perpetrator of mesalliance and referred to her with 
scorn as that monstrous woman, that sorceress; or in more colorful 
language, particularly from the pen of Liselotte, as that "old bag," 
"old slut," and worse.146 But the courtiers sensed about her an aura 
of quiet competence and referred to her as Toute-Puissante—the all-
powerful. Her pre-eminent position in Louis's entourage was assured 
after 1684, a n  d she survived the political vicissitudes of the closing 
years of the reign because of a fortunate mixture of religious ardor, 
political astuteness, and personal asceticism. 
Maintenon's ascendancy coincided with the further routinization 
of Louis's life. In May, 1682, the court officially moved to Versailles, 
and the secretaries of state, with their bureaus and files of state 
documents settled into a wing of the huge palace. The conseil d'en 
haut met in chambers leading directly off Louis's great state bedroom; 
there, at a long table covered in green velvet and trimmed in gold 
fringe, the ministers and their king debated affairs of state, usually 
from 9:30 in the morning until nearly noon, and often, in wartime, 
again in the late afternoon. Louis in later years consulted more 
frequently in private audience with his ministers or with a favorite 
general or admiral or ambassador returned home; these tete-a-tetes 
were held before mass in the morning, in the early afternoon, or in 
the evening beside Madame de Maintenon's fireplace. 
As the affairs of the council began to loom more importantly in 
Louis's life than the affairs of the heart, the quarrels among his 
ministers increasingly absorbed his attention. Following Pomponne's 
disgrace in 1679, the Le Telliers and the Colberts jockeyed for the 
premier position in Louis's council. However, until the great Colbert's 
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death in 1683, the two families were evenly matched, with Michel 
Le Tellier and Louvois on one side and Colbert and Croissy on the 
other. Then with the death of Colbert and the appointment of 
Louvois's creature Claude Le Peletier as controller-general, the Le 
Telliers held a slight edge. Le Peletier soon proved to be an ineffectual 
administrator, and with the elder Le Tellier's death in 1685 and 
Colbert's son Seignelay's appointment to the council in 1689, a 
balance between the two families was once again restored. In 1690 
a third family, the Phelypeaux, was introduced to the conseil d'en 
hant. Louis Phelypeaux, Comte de Pontchartrain, who represented a 
long line of civil servants, was named controller-general and secretary 
of state for the marine; his son, Jerome, became a secretary en 
survivance and officially succeeded to the marine in 1699. With 
Louvois's death in 1691 Louis appointed moderate ministers in his 
stead: the Due de Beauvillier and Arnauld de Pomponne, the latter 
recalled out of semi-retirement. The power of the Le Telliers declined 
precipitously in the decade of the 1690's. Indeed, Louvois's heir, 
Barbezieux, was so inept that though he was allowed to retain his 
inherited office as secretary of state for war, he was never given a 
seat on the council. The Colberts, on the other hand, maintained 
their prominent position in the government. The Marquis de Torcy, 
Colbert's nephew and Croissy's son, succeeded to the office of foreign 
minister in 1699; and Nicolas Desmaretz, another of Colbert's 
nephews, was nominated as controller-general in 1708, after having 
served for thirty years as one of the most important civil servants in 
that ministry. At the end of the century there emerged two other 
factions: one led by the creatures of Mme de Maintenon, Michel 
Chamillart and Daniel-Frangois Voysin; the other—dubbed the 
devots, or devout party—headed by the Dues de Beauvillier and 
Chevreuse. The latter group allied itself with the young duke of 
Burgundy and his mentor, Archbishop Fenelon. Louis, however, 
never permitted a person or a faction to hold the preponderant 
position in his council; by skilful apportioning of favors and offices, 
he maintained until the very last years of his reign a precarious 
equilibrium among striving parties, be they the Colberts, the Le 
Telliers, the Phelypeaux, the creatures of Maintenon, the devots, or, 
later, the supporters of the dukes of Maine and of Orleans. 
Even as the king was withdrawing into the remoteness of his palace 
at Versailles and submerging himself in the debates of his councils, 
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his personal crise de conscience was projected ever more forcibly 
into the religious affairs of France. Ironically, just at the moment in 
the late 1670's and early 1680's when the king's concern for his 
salvation became strikingly evident, the pope, Innocent XI, appeared 
as one of Louis's bitterest critics. Macaulay said of Innocent that "in 
all private relations [he was] the meekest and gentlest of men; when 
he spoke officially from the Chair of St. Peter, he spoke in tones of 
Gregory the Seventh and Sixtus the Fifth."147 Two strong men of 
Louis XIV's and Innocent XI's ilk seem fated to quarrel, as indeed 
they did over the regale, which was "the right of disposing of the 
revenues of a bishopric when vacant, and of nominating to the 
benefices. . . .  " It had by custom in France been a local privilege; 
but in his quest for uniformity, Louis and his religious advisers had 
in the years 1673-76 nationalized it. Several stalwart opponents of 
Louis challenged the king's right to interfere in local church affairs, 
among them the bishops of Pamiers and Alet, who appealed to the 
pope in Rome. Innocent supported their petitions and in so doing 
infuriated Louis. At the end of the 1670's the king came close to 
breaking diplomatic relations with Rome. Louis was reinforced in his 
opposition to the papacy by his confessor, Pere La Chaize; by Bishop 
Bossuet; and by the archbishop of Paris, Harlay de Champvallon. 
Although a member of the Jesuit order, La Chaize was a convinced 
Gallican;148 Bossuet, a famed orator at court,149 the tutor of the king's 
son and heir, and the author of a number of books on church govern­
ment and history, was, like La Chaize, a defender of the rights and 
privileges of the French church; and Harlay a "balanced, just and 
sound man," 15° was a model courtier. None of them opposed Louis's 
private war on Innocent XL 
The clash between king and pope gained in intensity in the 1680's, 
exacerbated by the promulgation of the Gallican Articles of 1682, 
with their emphasis on the local and national rights of the French 
Roman Catholic church over those of the ultramontanes, and by 
Louis XIV's apparent neutrality in the Turkish invasion of the Holy 
Roman Empire. As the French foreign minister supposedly remarked 
at the time: "You know that [Holy Wars] have ceased to be in 
fashion since St. Louis."151 An attack on Innocent XI personally was 
heralded in the early 1680's by the publication of a Memoire by the 
Reverend Father de la Chaize to Prove that Innocent XI is a 
Jansenist. These personal and doctrinal quarrels reached an apogee 
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in 1687 when Louis replied to one of Innocent's frequent complaints, 
saying "I have never regulated my actions by those of others; God 
has placed me here to give example, not to receive it."152 The Roman 
curia retorted that Louis's attitude toward Rome was "villianous, 
calumnious, blasphemous!" The king's advisers saw in such words a 
"sign of mental aberration" in the pope. The confrontation of a 
seemingly impious and certainly imperious king and a pious and 
certainly intractable pope precipitated a European scandal. 
The Franco-Papal imbroglio, which was not resolved until after 
Innocent's death in 1689, was further complicated by the Huguenot 
problem in France. Some authors have suggested that Louis's intensi­
fication of the attack on the so-called Reformed Religion in the late 
1670's and early i68o's was sparked by his desire to appease the pope. 
This seems highly unlikely; Innocent XI, although a staunch 
crusader against heretics, was not one to be placated by French 
offerings of this sort. In fact, Louis complained that the pope was 
not sufficiently appreciative of his government's efforts to purify 
the religious body of France. What, then, sparked Louis's concern 
with the problem of the Protestants in 1680? Like so many of his 
decisions, it seems in part to have been a pragmatic one. Following 
the Peace of Nijmegen in 1678-79, Louis found that he had at 
hand an army of veteran troops that he did not wish to disband.153 
In consultation with the war office, the king sent some of the 
soldiers to frontier garrisons; others were deployed in Alsace and 
Lorraine to aid in the occupation of territories claimed by the 
chambers of reunion; still others served as the labor force in Vauban's 
vast construction programs or under Hardouin-Mansart's supervision 
at Versailles. It was probably Louvois's suggestion that the remainder 
of the contingents be sent as "booted missionaries" into the province 
of Poitou to help "persuade" Protestant families to return to the 
Roman Catholic religion. Since the first days of his personal reign 
Louis had dreamed of a unified state. His dislike of the spirit of the 
Fronde, as we have seen, embraced all forms of dissent, and he 
particularly abhorred what the French called "L'Etat dans l'etat"—or 
imperio in imperium, which, in theory, the Huguenot sect repre­
sented. The Edict of Nantes promulgated in 1598 by Henri IV 
had granted political and religious rights to the Huguenots as means 
of pacifying the nation. Yet, the Edict should be remembered in the 
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context of its time. It granted limited toleration, with civil and military 
rights to buttress its religious clauses. From the first it had been so 
unsatisfactory an arrangement that Richelieu had been impelled to 
repeal the political clauses in 1629. In the 1650's bishops had begun 
a campaign urging the repeal of the religious clauses; and by the 
1670's a full-fledged crusade was undertaken against the Protestants.154 
Louis felt that in undertaking this crusade he was exercising his 
right to follow the doctrine of cujus regio, ejus religio, set down in 
the sixteenth century; and he looked upon himself as the New 
Constantine, the New Charlemagne, whose gloire was to be further 
enhanced by religious triumphs. To many Frenchmen, Louis was 
like a colossus of stability standing in the midst of the troubled 
seas of dissent. Thus, when the Edict of Nantes was revoked by 
the Edict of Fontainebleau in October, 1685, Louis, like his chancellor 
Michel Le Tellier, viewed this act as one of the great achievements 
of his reign. 
In reviewing Louis's policy today, several aspects still confound and 
repel the observer. The use of the dragonnades seems reprehensible: 
they caused untold suffering, the flight of over 200,000 men and 
women, and a series of subsequent revolts, including those in the 
Cevennes in 1702-5. Second, the policies of Louis and his religious 
advisers, most notably Bossuet, seemed to be running counter to the 
movement for toleration that was being born even in the 1680's. 
As the modern critic Paul Hazard has remarked, 'While Louis XIV 
was still at the zenith of his power and glory, . . . virtually all those 
ideas which were called revolutionary round about 1760, or for that 
matter, 1789, were already current as early as 1680. . . . "155 In­
deed, in the Low Countries the Huguenot exile Pierre Bayle, an early 
philosophe, railed against Louis's policies in his great work Philo­
sophical Commentary on the Words of Jesus-Christ: Compel Them 
to Come in, saying that "to use force in matters of conscience—the 
thing [is]monstrous and horrible."156 Louis's thoughts, on the other 
hand, were one with Pere Maimbourg, who said, "The disastrous 
conflagration which has wrought such ruin in France [Protestantism 
and the religious wars] . . . and of which little more than the 
smoke remains, that will soon be utterly extinguished."157 
Of the denunciations of Louis XIV's aggressive policies none were 
more eloquent or biting, or inspired more by politics, than those of 
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the Austrians. In 1683 the Ottoman Turks had invaded Austrian 
crown lands, but no French troops were sent to Vienna's succor. 
In fact, it was strongly rumored that Louis was encouraging Turkish 
aggression. A doggerel then current underscored the Austrians' 
suspicions of France: 
The Crescent Moon [of Islam] climbs up the night sky 
And the Gallic cock sleeps not!158 
When, in 1683-84, the crescent flag of Islam began its retreat from 
the gates of Vienna before the combined forces of the king of Poland, 
the German princes, and the emperor, the jubilant Viennese posted 
a great placard in letters of gold on their gates: 
Vienna Stands Freed 
The Turkish Power Totters 
Happy Austria (for which God always 
doth Wonders against the Turks and French) 
Arises from her Ashes. 159 
Austria did indeed, like the phoenix, arise from her ashes, and 
pursued the defeated Turks to the gates of Belgrade, capturing the 
city of Buda in the beginning of what was to become a great 
Drang nach Osten. As the historian Stoye points out: "The advance 
down the Danube [is] one of the major developments of seventeenth-
century history."160 
But as the doggerels on the street placards attest, the Austrians 
had not forgotten what they considered to be the perfidy of France. 
In the west during the summer of 1686, like another phoenix from 
the ashes, arose the League of Augsburg, bringing with it an associa­
tion of the emperor, Carlos II (in his capacity as the duke of 
Burgundy), Charles XI of Sweden, and the elector of Bavaria.161 
It was the League of Augsburg and the policy of the Reunions that 
focused French attention on the "German problem" in the 1680's. 
The war of 1688 was prefaced by the French siege of Luxembourg 
in 1683, which led to limited war with Spain and the Twenty Years' 
Truce, signed at Ratisbon in 1684, by which France retained her 
conquests made under the Reunions. Following the formation of the 
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League, Louis's government prepared for war with the emperor. 
Louis abandoned the legalism of the Reunion policy by seizing Lux­
embourg in 1682. At the same time Vauban's vast building program 
in Alsace appeared to give plausibility to the claim: Clausa Germaniae 
Gallia. Louis's aggressive religious policy and his intervention in the 
affairs of the Burgundian Circle drove many of the German princes 
into open opposition, and with them a motley assemblage of allies: 
the emperor, Spain, Innocent XI, the Dutch, and, belatedly, the 
English. 
The problem of England at this time was a curious one. Louis and 
his advisers cast a jaundiced eye at James II's indiscretions. Having 
come to the throne in 1685,  J a m e  s possessed neither the charm nor 
the caution of his brother Charles. The French ambassador Bonrepaus 
warned Louis's government that James was a bumbler, a bigot, and, 
worst of all, a fool, who would not listen to the cautionary note 
sounded by his cousin in France. When Louis suggested that French 
subsidies be spent on a fleet that would work in concert with France, 
James turned a deaf ear. Thus when William of Orange set off in 
1688 to invade James's England, Louis was caught in a dilemma. 
Even though James had told "his dear brother, France," that an fond, 
he had a "French heart," Louis's plea for co-operation had been 
brusquely declined. Moreover, information supplied to Louis by the 
secretary of the marine, Seignelay, had predicted that William would 
not sail for England so late in the season. With a recalcitrant James 
on the throne, and with the French navy at a technical disadvantage, 
Louis and his advisers thought it might be to their advantage to foster 
a full-fledged civil war in England, which might keep the English out 
of a continental war. Another factor also played an important role: 
the recurrent problem of the Spanish inheritance.162 
Lastly—and probably the clef to the whole problem—was the 
German question. Louis in 1687 became deeply involved in the 
nomination of a French candidate, Cardinal Fiirstenberg, to the elec­
toral seat of Cologne. Innocent XI refused to confirm Fiirstenberg 
on the ground "that he was a notorious pluralist and simoniac."163 
As the French ambassador in Madrid told the council at Versailles: 
the pope with "gaiete de coeur et d'un dessein premedite" plotted with 
the emperor a war on Louis. Louvois saw the issue clearly: "The 
Germans, henceforth, must be considered as our true enemies; they 
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alone can do us great harm; if they had an emperor who could mount 
a horse"164 (italics added). Louis's great minister of war enunciated 
anew the old conception of France inter teutonicos et latinos. 
While the Germanies and Vienna thus engrossed Versailles's atten­
tion, England fell to William's invading forces without a single 
French soldier or naval vessel being sent to help James. At the same 
time, war in the Germanies broke out, not in the electoral territory 
of Cologne but in the Palatinate, where Louis, claiming certain 
rights of inheritance for his sister-in-law (shades of the War of 
Devolution) sent his armies to lay waste the country in the hopes 
of slowing down the advance of Imperial forces. The destruction in 
the Rhineland areas of the Palatinate was dreadful, and though the 
Palatine War of 1688-89 proved to be a tactical victory, it was a 
diplomatic debacle. The German princes, enraged over the scorched 
earth policy, flocked to Imperial colors. 
By a pact signed in May, 1689, known as the Grand Alliance 
of Vienna, the German princes, the emperor, the Dutch, and the 
English joined together the might of Mittel-europa with the power 
of the emergent Maritime states in an alliance to put a halt to Louis's 
pretentions to the Palatinate. The war of 1688-97 ^s variously called 
the War of the Second Coalition, the Orleans War, the War of the 
Grand Alliance, the Palatine War, the War of the English Succes­
sion, King William's War, the Nine Years' War, or the War of the 
League of Augsburg.165 The latter designation, which is usually given 
it by the French historians, will be adopted here. 
The War of the League of Augsburg was a rather dreary spec­
tacle: Fortress France, which was ranged against the rest of Europe, 
preserved her borders against incessant allied hammering. Quite 
early in the war, a stalemate of march and countermarch developed 
within the pre carre of the Spanish Low Countries. In June, 1691, 
Marshal Luxembourg captured Mons, which Louis had so many 
years before viewed through his telescope; in June, 1692, Namur 
surrendered, with Louis and his court in attendance; and a victory 
at Steinkirke in the same year caught the French fancy: it became 
fashionable to wear a "Steinquerque" cravat at court and to play 
Couperin's new "Steinquerque" march at concerts. The year 1693-94 
brought further French victories; but in 1695 Marshal Luxembourg, 
France's ablest commander, died, and Villeroi, his successor, was one 
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of Louis's poorest appointments. During these annual Flanders cam­
paigns William III displayed a dogged determination to rally his 
troops against the might of France: he rode with his officers, encour­
aged his troops personally, and oversaw the minutest details of logis­
tical planning. In September, 1695, came William's one great land 
victory, the recapture of Namur. The French war effort was also 
weakened on the home front. The year 1693-94 brought a devastat­
ing crop failure, one of the worst winters in the seventeenth century, 
matched only by the famine of 1708—9. At the same time new taxes 
were levied in order to finance the war, the capitation or head tax, 
being the most famous. 
France needed peace. Louis sent off his special emissaries to Spain 
and the veteran diplomat D'Avaux to Sweden. Louis followed the 
negotiations with his usual concern for details, carrying with him, 
as he did in the Dutch war, a staff of junior ministers and secretaries 
to whom he dictated letters and discussed peace proposals. In Paris, 
Pomponne urged that "considerable concessions" be given to the 
allies of the Grand Alliance. His "suggestion," seconded by Louis XIV, 
was at once relayed to Bonrepaus in Copenhagen and to agents in 
Switzerland and The Hague. Their combined efforts were rewarded 
in 1696 when Savoy shattered the Grand Alliance by making a sepa­
rate peace with France. In 1696—97 the French held serious nego­
tiations with the Dutch and Imperials, who met in the palace of 
Nieuwberg in Ryswick.166 One of the hinges upon which the door 
of peace swung was the question of the fate of the city of Strasbourg. 
Alarmed by reports that Louis XIV meant to surrender that great 
city to the Imperials, Vauban wrote that "a Rhine crossing and loca­
tion of Strasbourg's size and strength [is] worth more than all the rest 
of Alsace. . . . [Moreover, it is] the finest and most secure arsenal 
in Europe."16T The clinching argument, however, was that only with 
Strasbourg in his possession could Louis style himself king in Alsace— 
otherwise, he was "but a great nobleman."168 Louis, who probably 
read Vauban's letter, worked out a compromise with the allies: he 
gave up claims to all fortresses on the right-hand bank of the Rhine 
and to Philippsburg, to the city and fortress of Luxembourg, and 
to certain places in the Southern Netherlands in exchange for the 
recognition of France's legal title to Strasbourg and possession of 
Saarlouis. Vauban's bridgehead and arsenal was thus secured. As for 
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William III, he wrested the title of king of England from Louis. 
Otherwise, the European settlement signaled a return to status quo 
ante helium. 
In the matter of empire overseas, France was more fortunate. 
Governor Frontenac of Canada had defeated the Phipps expedition 
against Quebec in 1690, and in the years following had initiated a 
successful Indian campaign against the New England colonies. In 
1697 a French-Canadian commander, Iberville, and his troops had 
raided the Hudson Bay country, capturing Fort Nelson,169 and 
a French fleet had sacked Cartegena on the Spanish Main. The 
Ryswick settlement recognized the modest French colonial gains. In 
India, on the African coast, and in North America the status quo 
ante was maintained. In the Caribbean, Spain acknowledged French 
de jure rights to the western half of the island of Santo Domingo 
and to the island of Tortuga. 
Three observations can be made of the Ryswick settlement: first, 
it represented a quest for legitimacy, as was shown in the pursuit of 
de jure rights to Strasbourg, to Santo Domingo, and above all to 
William's claim to the English throne. Second, Ryswick ushered in 
a settlement of world as well as European problems, with heavy 
emphasis on colonial claims. Third, it reiterated Europe's search for 
security, whether in the form of barrier fortresses in the Southern 
Netherlands or a bridgehead to the Rhine. 
With the legal French occupation of Santo Domingo went an 
increase of the king's interest in the French empire. Louis in consul­
tation with Vauban and Jerome de Pontchartrain (who served his 
father, Louis de Pontchartrain, as unofficial secretary of the marine) 
envisioned several colonial ventures, including an expedition to the 
Louisiana country. With Jerome's vigorous support a French expe­
dition led by the Canadian hero Lemoyne d'lberville set sail for 
the New World late in 1698, landing at Pensacola Bay in January, 
1699. On March 2 of the same year the Iberville expedition discov­
ered the mouth of the Mississippi River, which they claimed for 
France. From this modest beginning grew the Louisiana colony. 
Along with the revival of interest in the colonies went Jerome de 
Pontchartrain's attempts to strengthen the ministry of the marine. 
In 1695-96 he created a depot of maps and plans, which in time 
evolved into a central planning agency for the marine and the col­
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onies. To this bureau were attracted geographers, marine and military 
engineers, former colonial governors and intendants, lawyers, diplo­
mats, and swarms of agents. From its members were recruited men 
who planned the fortifications of the New World and the French 
coast; geographers to map the vast wildernesses of the Mississippi 
and Laurentian valleys; oceanographers and cartographers who pro­
duced such works as the revisions of he Neptune frangais, and the 
publication of Carte des environs du Mississipi (1701); and strate­
gists like Iberville, who outlined in his Projet sur Caroline a compre­
hensive blueprint for French expansion into the New World, at once 
a containment policy and a gospel for the spread of Pax Gallica.170 
After Ryswick 
In the years immediately following the Ryswick settlement, Louis 
XIV seemed to seek greater seclusion, frequently retiring from the 
formality of Versailles to his hermitage at Marly, where during the 
"season" (October to spring) he would remain from late Wednesday 
until Sunday. He did not, however, abandon the practice of meet­
ing daily with his ministers, whether it be in conseil d'en haut or 
singly or in pairs, or whether it be Marly or Versailles. He also 
took to consulting frequently with his two chief military strategists, 
Chamlay and Vauban, who planned for further revisions of the north 
and northeastern border. One of the results of these military conver­
sations was the construction of Vauban's masterpiece, the great for­
tress of Neuf-Breisach, built to guard against a sudden invasion of 
the Alsace territories. 
During the same years of 1697-1700 Louis relied heavily on the 
advice of the aged Pomponne and on young Torcy, both of whom 
served as foreign secretaries after Croissy's death in 1696. The king 
and his foreign ministers recognized the need to reach a compro­
mise settlement with the emperor and the Atlantic powers over the 
question of the Spanish inheritance. A group of able ambassadors 
were sent off to capitals of Europe: Villars to Vienna, Tallard to 
London, and D'Harcourt to Madrid. William III, "my dear brother, 
England," proved to be more amenable to a negotiated settlement on 
Spain than did the emperor, who, flushed with recent victories over 
the Turk, became ever more intransigent.171 
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Torcy and Pomponne set forth the problem in a series of memoirs: 
the chief contender for the throne of Spain was Emperor Leopold's 
grandson Joseph Ferdinand, son of Max Emmanuel, elector of Bavaria, 
and of Leopold's daughter Maria Antonia. The elector's family was 
then living in Brussels, where Max was serving as Spain's viceroy. The 
other two candidates were Archduke Charles, Leopold's second son 
by his third marriage, and Louis XIV's son and heir, the Grand 
Dauphin. Both Louis XIV and William III favored a partition of 
the empire among the three candidates, leaving the lion's share of 
Spain and Spanish overseas possessions to Joseph Ferdinand, who 
as a Wittelsbach-Hapsburg would serve as a make-weight in the 
power struggle between Bourbon and Austrian Hapsburg. The French 
dauphin was to be compensated by lands in Italy—Naples, Sicily, 
the Tuscan ports; and the Austrian archduke was compensated by 
cession of Milan and the Milanese. This agreement to partition the 
Spanish inheritance was signed in October, 1698; but it was at best an 
uneasy and tenuous accord because Leopold I was certain to reject it 
and England was equally certain to claim compensation for herself, 
probably, as William suggested in a conversation with Tallard, a 
naval base at either Ceuta, Port Mahon, or Oran. Yet, as shaky as 
the settlement was, it was an experiment in the politics of modera­
tion that both Louis and William felt was necessary. Moreover, the 
First Partition Treaty left the "crucial area" of the Spanish Low 
Countries—that prize piece of the Burgundian inheritance—in the 
hands of a Wittelsbach rather than a Bourbon or a Hapsburg.172 
The diplomatic house of cards collapsed in February, 1699, when 
the young Joseph Ferdinand died. His passing snatched away the 
best hope that the French and the Maritime powers had for reach­
ing a compromise. Undaunted, Torcy alone—for Pomponne was too 
ill to be of much help—negotiated a Second Partition Treaty, signed 
on March 13, 1700, that left the Archduke Charles with Spain, the 
Indies, and the Spanish Low Countries (where England preferred 
the Hapsburgs over the Bourbons). The dauphin received as com­
pensation the same Italian possessions suggested in the First Parti­
tion Treaty and, in addition, the Duchy of Milan, which he hoped to 
exchange for Lorraine (and settle the Lotharingian problem). The 
second agreement, unfortunately for the peace of Europe, had less 
chance of success than the first. Louis most reluctantly gave up to the 
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house of Hapsburg what amounted to the hegemony of Europe; 
and once again, the Atlantic powers found themselves inadequately 
compensated.173 
THE SPANISH SUCCESSION, THE PEACE OF UTRECHT,

AND AFTER, 17OO-I715

In October, 1700, a few months after the English and French 
emissaries had pieced together the Second Partition Treaty, Carlos II, 
in Madrid, ordered his last will and testament drawn up. Carlos, who 
was in a dudgeon over rumors of the partition of the Spanish empire, 
had, in one of his few energetic moments, decided to leave the 
empire "entire" to the strongest candidate in Europe, Louis XIV's 
grandson Philip of Anjou. Failing the Bourbons, the Spanish in­
heritance was to go to Charles, the son of Leopold I, and failing the 
Hapsburgs, to the house of Savoy. Carlos died on November 1, and 
his will was presented to the French conseil d'en haut, which met at 
Fontainebleau on November 9. The peace faction, led by the Due 
de Beauvillier, favored the Second Partition Treaty; but Colbert de 
Torcy, who had been one of the major architects of that treaty, in an 
apparent volte face, supported the will. Torcy argued that (1) Leopold 
was, in any event, committed to a war policy if any part of the 
Spanish inheritance was left to the Bourbons, so that war with the 
Austrian Hapsburgs was inevitable; (2) that Louis must accept the 
inheritance "entire," or by the terms of the will it would legally 
pass to the next in line of succession, Archduke Charles; (3) that if 
the French did not accept the will at once, the Spanish grandees and 
the ruling junta in Madrid might shift their allegiance to Vienna.174 
After long hours of discussion Torcy's views prevailed, and six days 
later Louis XIV announced to his assembled court that his grandson, 
Philip of Anjou, had taken his rightful and legal title as Philip V 
of Spain. Many of the European princes received the news from 
Fontainebleau with astonishing equanimity; and even the cautious 
Maintenon confided that the "wisest people are sure that we will 
have no war."175 
Yet, like a restless contagion, war fever spread across Europe, and 
the great powers drifted ever closer to the maelstrom. The observer 
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may ask why. The answer would seem to be that, first of all, the 
ruler of England, the governors of the United Provinces, and the 
emperor either wanted war or felt that it was inevitable. William 
III wrote to the Dutch Grand Pensionary Heinsius that he would 
"drag this people in by prudent and gradual means." Meanwhile, 
Heinsius and his associates in The Hague began at once casting about 
among the German princes for allies, and in Vienna, Leopold ordered 
an army under the command of Prince Eugene of Savoy to invade 
the heartland of northern Italy, the Lombard plain. 
The second major cause of war was the lack of direction given by 
Louis XIV to his foreign policy. During the events of late 1700 to 
May, 1702, Louis seems to have suffered a failure of nerve not 
unlike those he experienced in 1672 and 1688. He was torn between 
personal loyalty to his grandson Philip V and to James II on the one 
hand and to a policy of Realpolitik on the other. Characteristically, 
Louis trimmed his sails, leaving both his allies and his opponents 
uncertain as to his goals. For example, at the behest of his grandson, 
Philip V, Louis dispatched French troops to occupy the barrier 
fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands, sending their Dutch garrisons 
packing. Such an action was legal, but it caused rumors of war to 
sweep over the Dutch Netherlands. At the same time Louis sent 
some of his best diplomats to The Hague to assure the Dutch that 
his intentions were pacific. In Madrid, meanwhile, Louis's agents 
framed a new asiento (monopoly of slave trade) agreement that 
favored French interests, confirming the fears of William III and 
Heinsius that France meant to exercise economic as well as political 
hegemony within the Spanish empire.176 
In answer to what they saw as the French challenge, William III 
and Heinsius along with the representatives of the Empire signed 
the Grand Alliance of The Hague, actually, a Third Partition Treaty, 
on September 9, 1701. Louis's indirect response to the Allied gauntlet 
came on September 18 with the recognition of James III in succession 
to his father James II, who had died that very day. It was an ill-
timed beau geste. 
With news of the first full-fledged campaigns of the war in June 
and July, 1702, Louis seemed to slough off his ennui, becoming, 
instead, as the Dutch would say, "obsessie," absorbed with the task 
at hand. Louis met with his conseil d'en haut nearly every day to map 
out the strategies for war and peace; and in the evenings he often 
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worked late into the night to frame a viable war policy and to seek 
a quick settlement of the conflict. 
Although Louis pursued a policy of war and peace simultaneously, 
the historian can for heuristic purposes separate them. In matters 
pertaining to war the major administrative burden was carried by 
Michel Chamillart, controller-general of finances from 1699 to 1708 
and minister of war from 1701 to 1709. A pleasant, well-meaning 
mediocrity, Chamillart is an excellent example of a "palace appoint­
ment," whose nomination to these great offices was probably due to 
the favor shown him by Madame de Maintenon. Chamillart, un­
fortunately for Louis and for the French war effort, was a bumbler, 
who too often interfered in the conduct of other ministers' affairs, 
angering, among others, the foreign minister Colbert de Torcy and 
the secretary of the marine Jerome de Pontchartrain.177 As tensions 
again mounted within the king's high council, the ministers and the 
secretaries of state began to complain quite openly of insubordination 
and disobedience of orders. This malaise became so widespread within 
the administrative hierarchy that ministerial reports were filled with 
words like malversations, mauvais conduite, desoheissance ferme et 
declaree, grand ahus, insolence. It was what Marcel Giraud has 
described as a severe "crise de conscience et d'autorite."178 
To add to Louis's griefs, the war went badly for France. The Allied 
commanders, John Churchill, the duke of Marlborough, and Prince 
Eugene of Savoy outmaneuvered and outfought Louis's marshals on 
battlefields ranging from Flanders to Bavaria and from Italy to central 
Spain. As a consequence, the king's high command suffered its own 
crisis of leadership. Marshals Villeroi, Marsin, Tallard, and D'Har­
court, all creatures of Louvois, had distinguished themselves as 
courtiers and ambassadors but not as field commanders; they were 
indeed poor substitutes for the veterans Catinat and Vauban, who 
retired early in the war. Only Vendome, Berwick (James IFs illegiti­
mate son), Boufflers, and Villars acquitted themselves with distinction 
on the battlefield; and, as time and the crucible of war would prove, 
it was only Villars who would mature into a first-rate tactician. In 
the meantime a series of startling defeats stalked the French armies 
and stunned the council at Versailles. In 1704 Marlborough and 
Eugene cornered and routed a French army at Blenheim in Bavaria, 
capturing Marshal Tallard; in 1706 at Ramillies in the Southern Low 
Countries the troops of the incompetent and inept Villeroi were driven 
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out of most of the Southern Netherlands; and in 1708 at Oudenarde 
in the same area yet another French army was outmaneuvered and 
defeated by the Allies. Little wonder that by the winter of 1708-9 
both the ministers at Versailles and the populace in country cried out 
for the reform of the army and for the dismissal of the architect of 
the war policy, Michel Chamillart. Even his patroness, Madame de 
Maintenon, was heard to exclaim of the war minister, "Ah, that poor 
unfortunate man"; and in the streets of Paris a parody on the Lord's 
Prayer was sung with these words: 
Our father who art in Versailles

Your name is no longer glorified.

Your kingdom is no longer great!

Give us our bread which we totally lack 
Forgive our enemies who have beaten us 
But not our generals who have let them do so 
Do not succumb to the temptations of the Maintenon 
And deliver us from the Chamillart! 179 
In early June, Chamillart was dismissed from his offices, and in the 
same month France rejected the first important Allied overture 
for peace. 
These two acts may at first seem incompatible, but in reviewing 
Louis's peace policy, we may see some logic to it. As with the war 
program, Louis depended on a minister to help direct his policies. 
But unlike the war minister, the foreign minister was an able admin­
istrator and a perceptive statesman. "Torcy chose the via media be­
tween the extremes of the peace faction . . . and the war faction. 
. . . His . . . balance . . . and moderation were traits in which 
. . . [he] most nearly resembled his father-in-law Pomponne, [yet] 
above all he was a Colbert and in many ways clearly resembled his 
father [Croissy] and his uncle [Colbert], particularly in his austere 
compulsion to work. We might say that, like Sir Edward Grey, . . . 
he displayed a certain 'strenous simplicity.'"180 
Torcy and his associates at the foreign office, especially Francois 
Callieres, Pierre Rouille, and Nicolas Mesnager, undertook clandes­
tine peace talks with the Allies from the first year of the war. Recog­
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nizing The Hague as an important lieu de reunion, Torcy sent more 
than a dozen deputations there in the first five or six years of the 
conflict. Each mission ended in deadlock, until in 1708 Louis and 
Torcy became desperate in their search for an agent at once acceptable 
to the Allies and to France. In March, 1709, Torcy sent his trusted 
aide Rouille to the Dutch Netherlands, but he, too, failed because, 
as Torcy noted, the Dutch were "carried away by the torrent [of war] 
and prefer agreeing with [the British] to contradicting them."181 
Following Torcy's note to Louis in April, 1709, stating that "there 
was no longer room to hope for success" in the peace negotiations, 
the king hastily assembled the conseil d'en haut attended by Torcy, 
Beauvillier, Pontchartrain, Chamillart, and Desmaretz. Beauvillier, 
prompted by a desire to see a speedy end to the war, painted France's 
plight in the most somber hues, and at the end of one of the most 
dramatic council meetings in Louis's long reign, the king wept. "Then 
indeed," Torcy observed, "the king was aware . . . that the situation 
of a monarch, absolute master of a great kingdom, is not always the 
happiest. God was pleased to humble him, before he checked and 
chastised the pride of his enemies."182 
On the spot, Torcy was commissioned to proceed secretly to The 
Hague, where he was to treat in person with the allied representatives. 
The summary articles of this conference, known as The Hague Pre­
liminaries, reflect the desperateness of the French position: the allied 
statesmen demanded Strasbourg and other fortresses in Alsace, an 
extensive string of barrier fortresses in the Southern Netherlands, a 
barrier for Savoy, and Philip V's abdication of the Spanish throne. 
Torcy was appalled by the allied intransigence and wrote to Louis that 
he should "feel entirely free to reject absolutely these conditions."183 
On Torcy's return to Versailles on June 2 one of the stormiest 
sessions of the entire history of the conseil d'en haut took place. 
Beauvillier again spoke for peace; the dauphin supported a continu­
ation of the war. Torcy and Louis found themselves in the "middling" 
position, favoring a rejection of the Preliminaries with the option 
of reopening peace negotiations. In the end their view prevailed, but 
war continued while the statesmen talked. 
If 1708-9 was the Rampjaar for the French, the year 1709-10 
was one of renewal. With Louis's refusal to accept "the inadmissable 
terms" of The Hague Preliminaries, French determination to resist 
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the Allies increased. The dreadful winter of 1708-9—the worst in 
the memory of that time—caused tens of thousands of peasants to 
join the army, where they would at least receive a daily ration of 
bread. Daniel Voysin, Chamillart's successor, was a competent admin­
istrator, and at once began the strategic redeployment of his new 
recruits. Louis and Voysin together agreed to the appointment of the 
bumptious but brilliant Villars as commander of the Flanders army. 
Villars, along with Boufflers, was able to infuse the army with the 
will to victory; and in the autumn of 1709 the French army made 
a stand at the village of Malplaquet, where they sustained 15,000 
losses to 24,000 lost by the Allies. Although the French were forced 
to retreat, the battle at Malplaquet, as Torcy noted, 'raised the 
courage of the French nation rather than weakened it." 
In early 1710 the French again sought peace, hoping for more 
acceptable terms. Meeting at the small Dutch town of Gertruyden­
berg, the French plenipotentiaries, the Marshal d'Huxelles and Abbe 
de Polignac, found that after four months of negotiations the Allies 
still pressed for Philip V's abdication; and if he were to refuse, they 
demanded that Louis send a French army to help dethrone him.184 
Yet, even the duke of Marlborough realized the absurdity of such a 
demand, because as he had earlier admitted to Godolphin: "It is 
plain the French Ministers have it not in their power to recall the 
Duke of Anjou."185 
Following the abortive Gertruydenberg conference, the direction 
of French foreign policy fell more and more into Torcy's hands. 
Hearing of a shift in the balance of power within the English govern­
ment that favored the more pacific Harleyite Tories over the bellicose 
Marlborough-Whig coalition, Torcy attempted a rapprochement with 
the Tory leaders in the late spring and summer of 1710.186 After 
nearly a year of clandestine negotiations, Matthew Prior, traveling 
incognito to Fontainebleau, presented the foreign minister with an 
outline of British demands. Torcy, although taken aback by the 
English pretentions to Gibraltar, Port Mahon, the Asiento agreement, 
Newfoundland, and the Hudson Bay country, sent his veteran eco­
nomic adviser Nicolas Mesnager back to London with Prior. In early 
October, 1711, the French and English were able to patch together 
preliminaries that encompassed most of the English demands, leaving 
the details to be worked out at a general congress. By astute diplomatic 
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moves Torcy and his associates had thus been able to split the Grand 
Alliance by separating England from her allies. 
Heralded by a furor diplomaticus, in which the Dutch and the 
Imperials denounced the English as a perfidious ally, the penultimate 
peace congress of Louis XIV's reign met in January, 1712. From all 
over Europe plenipotentiaries, representing neutral as well as belliger­
ent nations, journeyed to the Dutch cathedral town of Utrecht. 
Amidst the bustle of continual meetings, diplomatic procedure was 
relaxed, partly in order to avoid the interminable quarrels over pro­
cedure and protocol that had marred the congresses of Ryswick and 
Nijmegen, and partly because the precarious state of Queen Anne's 
health impelled the English and French delegations to hasten their 
deliberations. Thus at Utrecht no neutral arbiter—papal or secular— 
was appointed; delegates entered the meeting hall pell-mell, seating 
themselves at a great round table placed in the meeting room of the 
town hall. A vast number of technical advisers appeared at this 
congress: experts on economic affairs, engineers, colonial governors, 
mapmakers, Latinists, historians, military advisers, and, inevitably, a 
large number of journalists. After fifteen months of heated debate 
and consultation, after secret missions sent from London to Paris and 
Paris to London, and after a suspension of arms and then an armistice 
between Great Britain and France, the statesmen of Europe—except­
ing those of Spain and the Empire—signed a general peace agreement 
on April 11, 1713.187 
Out of this great peace congress at Utrecht and the related meetings 
at Ratstatt and Baden emerged a more clearly defined balance of 
power in Europe and the world, a balance that was shared among 
three great geopolitical areas. The first area comprised the island 
kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and her allies on the Continent, 
the United Provinces of the Netherlands and Portugal. The second 
consisted of the Mittel-europan Austrian empire, with its scattered 
lands extending from the Southern Netherlands in the west to the 
Carpathian Mountains in the east, from Poland in the north to 
Serbia and the Ottoman empire on the south. The renascent of 
Austrian power allied itself until 1756 with Great Britain in 
what is known as the "old system." The third geopolitical area of 
power embraced the Franco-Spanish states and included on its periph­
ery the Wittelsbach electors of Bavaria and Cologne. France, as the 
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leader of the Bourbon-Wittelsbach entente, survived the War of the 
Spanish Succession with her boundaries, as of 1697, largely intact: 
Strasbourg and Alsace had been preserved; the Franche-Comte incor­
porated into France; and Lille and the Cambresis added to the 
frontiere de fer. Moreover, Louis's grandson sat on the Spanish throne 
as Philip V. Philip, who saw French friendly overtures as disguised 
hostility, rebuffed an alliance with France until the late 1730's when, 
in the face of Anglo-Austrian hostility, both courts espoused a series 
of "Family Compacts," in a policy known as Bourhonisme. 
In 1714, however, Louis could look back on his diplomatic efforts 
as having achieved a degree of success. The great Alsatian portes had 
been closed, the northern borders had been fortified and "rounded 
off," and the Porte-de-Bourgogne, or Belfort gap, along with the 
Franche-Comte, had been secured. Louis and France had good reason 
for public rejoicing. Yet, the last years of the king's life were filled 
with sadness. In 1711 his son, the Grand Dauphin, died, followed to 
the grave in 1712 by his eldest grandson, the duke of Burgundy, and 
by his eldest great-grandson, leaving only two heirs to the throne, the 
Due de Berry and a two-year-old great-grandson, the future Louis XV. 
Outwardly, however, Louis's life was little changed by public 
triumphs or personal sorrows; the ritual of kingship was too clearly 
established and the mask of the kingly profession too firmly set. The 
hunts, the appartements, the chapels, the meetings of the council, 
the fireside chats, all unfolded from day to day as they always had. 
In the ministries Colbert de Torcy and his cousin, Nicolas Desmaretz, 
a supple financier trained by the great Colbert himself, carried the 
burden of government. They were ably seconded by the war and 
navy secretaries of state, Voysin and Jerome de Pontchartrain. The 
king, with his usual grave self-possession, listened to his ministers' 
reports, but it was obvious to many observers that policy decisions 
were increasingly being formulated in the ministers' chambers rather 
than in Louis's council room. In fact, the king-minister-centered gov­
ernment, which had been Louis's great achievement as roi-bureaucrate, 
was itself giving way to a minister-bureau-centered government that 
was to characterize the eighteenth century. 
In mid-August, 1715, the king himself interrupted the routine of 
kingship by complaining of an acute pain in his leg. Louis had long 
suffered from the "vagaries" of so many ailments that his physicians 
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at first showed little concern over his latest complaint. It was only in 
late August, when it appeared that the king was seriously ill, that the 
spot on his leg was diagnosed as a gangrenous infection. Asked if he 
would consent to having his leg amputated below the knee, Louis 
replied that he was too old and too weary to undergo such an opera­
tion. It was then that he resigned himself to death: he breathed his 
last on September i, 1715, five days short of his seventy-seventh 
birthday. 
EPILOGUE 
As Louis XIV himself said of the tasks of kingship, they were at 
once great, noble, and delightful. Yet Louis's enjoyment of his 
metier—his craft—was tempered by political prudence. As a child he 
learned the lessons of circumspection. The disturbances of the Frondes 
caused the already introspective boy-king to build psychological and 
institutional barriers between himself and the outside world. At an 
early age he learned to listen attentively to his advisers, to speak when 
spoken to, to ponder evidence presented in the high council, to avoid 
confrontations, to dissemble, to wait. Like Mazarin he believed that 
time and tact would conquer. Invariably, in later years he greeted 
importunate petitioners with the words Je verrai. In order better to 
assess the actions of his courtiers, the king drew not only on his own 
prodigious memory but on material aids: the collective recollec­
tions of his councilors, his household servants who carried tales 
to him overheard in the corridors, police reports, excerpts cut or 
copied from the gazettes, or letters intercepted by his postmasters. 
Yet despite all the evidence provided him by his ministers and his 
servants, Louis often hesitated before making a decision; he brooded, 
and in some instances put off decisions altogether. 
As he grew older, the king tended to hide his person and his office 
behind a screen of Byzantine ritual. Like an icon, Louis was displayed 
to his troops and to his people, and like an icon he was returned for 
safe-keeping to his niche in Versailles, or Marly, or Fontainebleau. 
Even his officials seldom saw the king for more than a brief inter­
view; many were content to be acknowledged by a regal nod of the 
head. And as decision-making became centralized in the hands of the 
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ministers and their intendants, the great corporations of the realm— 
the municipalities, the judges, the local estates, the guilds, and at 
times the peasantry—contested royal encroachments on their rights 
and privileges. Yet to many in the kingdom, to some members of the 
clergy, to wealthier bourgeois, merchants, gens de la plume (civil 
servants), better-to-do peasants, Louis represented a rot d'aujourd'hui, 
a modern king, an agent of stability whose struggle was their struggle 
and whose goal was to contain the crises of the age. To some critics 
of Louis XIV his reign appears as a hideous solidarity, "une sorte de 
monotanie passionnee." Louis XIV would no doubt have taken such 
a description as a compliment. 
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The Formation of a King

J OHN B. WOLF 
T HE biographer of a king and his portrait painter share a number of problems. Neither can be sure of the final shape or tone of 
any of the royal features until the whole picture—the background, 
the costume, and the paraphernalia of office—have been completed. 
It is probably true that a man's personality and characteristics have 
achieved firm contours by the time he is twenty-five, but the historian 
trying to portray them finds that it is a formidable problem to sift 
the evidence that comes down to us from a seventeenth-century life 
and to separate the significant from the transitory. All personality 
studies seem to show that some experiences are enormously mean­
ingful, others, of little importance; and yet, unless the man we study 
becomes articulate in his testimony and his contemporaries record 
voluminously the things that happen to him, it is nearly impossible 
to assign weight to the important and to dismiss the myriad of his 
ephemeral contacts with the world. This is particularly true in the 
case of Louis XIV, since he has left us very little that can be called 
introspective evidence; even the remarkable Memoires, intended for 
the instruction of his son, allow us only to infer his experience. Just 
as he cautioned his son never to say today what can be put off until 
tomorrow,1 Louis was reticent about his feelings and motivations. This 
limits the historian; without the significant testimony from both the 
king and those who watched him grow up, it becomes difficult to 
study Louis, the man, or Louis, the king, en Dr. Freud; and there­
fore, we must largely proceed with our inquiry en Dr. Watson.2 
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Obviously, one must begin with a man's family. Louis XIV 
inherited the blood and the traditions of the houses of Austria, Spain, 
Burgundy, Florence, and France; both his father and his mother 
were descendents of the Hapsburg-Valois; Louis seems to have in­
herited the physical frame and features of his Burgundian ancestors. 
Unlike his own son, who was more completely a Hapsburg, Louis's 
genetic background was not the product of inbreeding. His social 
environment was as rich and varied as his genetic inheritance. In 
his ancestral traditions there were models for a king: Charles V, 
Philip II, Henri IV—these were great kings who had left their marks 
on Europe. His preceptors told him about the great rulers of France, 
but the early death of Louis XIII and the frictions between Louis's 
mother and the Orleans and Conde families made the Spanish 
Hapsburg influence of Anne of Austria more important in his im­
mediate environment than the Valois-Bourbon traditions of his 
French forebears. 
There can be little doubt that Anne and Mazarin were the two 
most important individuals in Louis's early life. We know very little 
about the contacts he had with his father, and the stories that do come 
down to us are not of the type that could be used with any degree 
of assurance. Louis never talked about his father, never honored his 
father's memory.3 Beyond this observation very little can be said with 
assurance about the part that Louis XIII played in his son's life. 
Anne's role is much less equivocal: Louis was born after more than 
two decades of a childless, loveless marriage, and his birth not only 
justified Anne as a woman and released great stores of emotional 
energy but also gave her a new status as queen. The haunting fear 
that she might be ignominiously sent back to Spain as well as the 
humiliation resulting from her failure to fulfill the role to which 
she had been born were both dissipated at the birth of the dauphin. 
Anne, who had so recently been a foreign princess suspected of 
treasonous correspondence with the enemy, became in a few short 
years not only the mother of the next king of France but also the 
regent charged with the task of maintaining the position and prestige 
of the realm. In her late thirties and long anxious for a child, Anne 
was able to give her son something quite rare for a royal prince: his 
mother's love and long hours of concentrated attention and care. 
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Louis's personal stability in the face of adversity as well as the 
healthy structure of his ego may well be traced in important part to 
the influence of this vigorous, proud, attentive, and determined 
woman. Mazarin's influence upon the young Louis will emerge as a 
major part of this paper. As his stepfather and first servant, as pre­
ceptor and friend, as a respected and almost certainly beloved father-
figure, Mazarin must have been the most important masculine 
influence in Louis's life. 
Two years after Louis's birth, his brother Philippe came into the 
world. Brothers, as he wrote to his son, create a problem for the 
first-born. "My care," he writes, "will be to raise them [the dauphin's 
non-existent brothers] as well as you, but yours ought to be to raise 
yourself above them, and to make the whole world see that you 
merit . . . this rank that seems to have been given by the order of 
your birth alone."4 Elsewhere he warns that brothers of the king of 
France can become political problems. But Louis's own experiences 
with Philippe were conditioned by the fact that Anne was deter­
mined that her second son would not behave toward Louis XIV as 
Louis XIII's brother did toward him. Philippe was brought up to defer 
to his brother in all things; he was dressed as a girl much of the 
time until he was well past adolesecnce, and he continued occasionally 
to dress in women's clothes as an adult. His latest biographer insists 
that Anne's rearing of this boy was probably responsible for his 
homosexual tendencies.5 There may have been some sibling rivalry 
between the boys, as the anecdote of their wetting each other in bed 
might indicate; but neither contest for their mother's affection nor 
feelings of inferiority vis-a-vis his brother could possibly have bothered 
Louis. Poor Philippe was not so lucky; the mere fact that he, and not 
Louis, became the ancestor of so many of Europe's nineteenth-
century kings probably would have been no recompense for the 
feelings of frustration and inferiority that he must have had. 
Louis had other relatives who taught him wisdom by their own 
lives rather than by their precepts. His uncle Orleans had conspired 
and revolted against Louis's father; the elder Conde had played the 
same role against Louis's grandmother. Orleans's daughter, La Grande 
Mademoiselle, was to fire cannons at Louis's own company; and 
Conde's son, the Grand Conde, was to join the Spaniards in war 
against France. Beaufort, a grandson of Henri IV from the left hand, 
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plotted to murder Mazarin and, along with the Grand Conde's sister, 
joined the Fronde. Louis's aunt Henriette of England brought the 
tragic tale of rebellion climaxed by the execution of her husband, 
Charles I. These relatives may not have had much personal influence, 
but their lives were evidence that the throne was no rocking chair, 
and that a king must look long to find men whom he can trust. 
The entourage of a minor king is a fluid, changing force. At one 
time Anne's court seemed to Conde to resemble a ladies' circle rather 
than the court of a great king; at another time Louis was surrounded 
by boys and girls of his own age: the nieces and nephew of Mazarin, 
the noble youths who were chosen to be his companions. In the 
troubles of the Fronde and the years that followed, with the war 
against Spain, Louis found himself in a court of intriguers, soldiers, 
bureaucrats, and, occasionally, statesmen who turned his attention to 
the massive problems of the day. Each of these in turn, as we shall 
see, contributed to the formation of the king. 
GENERAL EDUCATION 
What sort of an education did Louis receive? If we are to believe 
his testimony given in his old age, it was so scanty that he could 
almost pose as a self-made man, a posture enjoyed by many men of 
action. Saint-Simon heartily agrees with Louis's estimate; Louis, in 
his eyes, was an ignoramus who did not even know how little he 
knew. Writing in the late nineteenth century, Druon reached the 
same conclusion. What did Louis know at twenty, he asks; the 
answer, "Nothing, or almost nothing!"6 Such harsh judgments must 
have some foundation; once found, it is simple. Louis apparently 
knew little Latin beyond a schoolboy's translation of Caesar's Com­
mentaries and a few exercises; thus he was largely ignorant of the 
Latin and Greek classics common to the humanistically educated 
men of both the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries.7 If a 
Renaissance education is the criterion by which one judges a man's 
culture, Louis undoubtedly was an ignoramus. By other standards, 
his education does not seem so hopelessly inadequate. 
Although his knowledge of Latin was weak,8 Louis did learn to use 
the French language with a degree of elegance. His achievement may 
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be contrasted with that of the Grande Mademoiselle's faulty use of 
her mother tongue; and it is altogether surprising when one reads 
the ungrammatical half-Spanish, half-French written by his mother, 
or the Italian-French of Mazarin, and if one remembers that both 
Anne and Mazarin spoke French with atrocious accents. Druon 
believes that Louis learned his French from Anne's women, and it 
may well be the case; however, it seems unwise to discount completely 
the training of his teachers. In addition to his mother tongue, Louis 
learned enough Italian to speak it fluently and to appreciate Italian 
lyric poetry. He also learned, but imperfectly, to speak Spanish; of 
course he had no trouble understanding it. English and German 
seem to have been terra incognita to him, but a man with three 
languages is hardly illiterate. 
Louis's knowledge of geography was more advanced than that of 
most of the men of his day; both foreign ambassadors and his own 
correspondence testify to his considerable understanding of the 
geography of Europe. It is unlikely that the schoolbook geographies 
he used as a boy were more than the basis upon which this knowledge 
was founded. In the mid-seventeenth century "geographies" included 
a melange of material about customs, politics, climate, and the like. 
Louis had books available that discussed the cities and provinces of 
France, the kingdoms of Europe and the Orient, including the Otto­
man Empire. His own travels as a youth never took him outside the 
kingdom, and it is difficult to assess the educational value of his 
journeys with the court, for it would be possible to travel all over 
France with the court and yet see very little of the country. Dis­
cussions with Mazarin, interviews with ambassadors, and the reports 
of French agents were undoubtedly of great importance in forming 
Louis's understanding of Europe. 
In the instructions for the dauphin, Louis urges the importance 
of the study of history; but aside from an occasional recondite 
digression into the past that probably originated with the pen of 
Perigny or Pellisson, the Memoires are largely written without bene­
fit of historical learning. Nonetheless, we know that Louis was 
exposed to considerable historical lore. Perefixe wrote for him 
L'Histoire de Henri le grand as a principal text for studying the "role 
of king" in France. Perefixe's idea of history was admirably conceived 
for the education of a king; he studied Henri's decisions, the reasons 
for them, and the possible alternatives; this could be useful training 
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for a man whose birth placed him in a position that demanded de­
cisions. La Porte, Louis's valet de chambre, contributed his bit by 
reading to Louis from Mezeray's L'Histoire de France, which began 
to be published in 1643. We can believe with La Porte that Louis 
was incensed over the behavior of the early faineant kings,9 and 
determined not to be Louis, the Faineant. Louis probably read Corn-
mines, or at least discussed his work with La Mothe le Vayer, who 
joined Perefixe as instructor; and during the Fronde he probably 
listened to readings from several chronicles describing the uprisings of 
the past. But how much could he get from this effort? As far as we 
can tell, most of his formal historical instruction was finished before 
he was fifteen; the professor of history who reads the test papers of 
even twenty-year-olds should not be surprised that Louis's Memoires 
were not buttressed by historical evidence. 
There was another more or less informal source of Louis's education 
in history. When the court was traveling, it was customary to visit 
the church in any town where the queen stopped. This often meant 
a harangue by a clergyman or other important notable, and very 
often the theme of the address was taken from history.10 There were 
three kings whose lives and works were again and again paraded 
before the young king and his mother as models for action: Clovis, 
St. Louis, and Henri IV. The reasons for the choice were simple 
enough. Clovis held firm to the Roman church and destroyed the 
Arians; the clergy hoped that Louis would end the toleration of the 
"pretended reformed religion." St. Louis gave France a mild and 
just reign during which the church prospered; furthermore, Blanche 
of Castile, the regent during his minority, could be used to remind 
Anne of her obligations. Henri IV, whose alleged policy of peace and 
prosperity contrasted with the war and taxes of the era of Mazarin, 
made the third "model" for the young king. It is difficult to guess how 
much Louis understood of these discussions, but even if he did retain 
some, there remained gaps in his historical knowledge that, as Saint-
Simon testily asserts, were never bridged. 
How much mathematics did he know? He had some instruction 
in the subject, but probably little more than simple arithmetic. His 
literary education was equally limited. He may have read Don 
Quixote, and he did read Scarron's Le Roman comique (an early 
contact with that family). He also attended performances of the 
plays of Corneille and Moliere and the Italian theater that Mazarin 
io8 LOUIS XIV AND THE CRAFT OF KINGSHIP 
brought to Paris to please Anne. His conception of la gloire was 
almost identical with that propounded in Le Cid. Marie Mancini 
introduced him to Italian lyric poetry, but this was hardly enough to 
make up for the lack of imaginative literature. No stories have come 
down to us to indicate that Louis as a child exercised his imagination 
in play-acting; as a young man, he occasionally took part in amateur 
dramatics at the court, but aside from that there is little evidence of 
his having a very lively fancy. It might be true that humanistic liter­
ature would have filled this gap, but it might also be argued that his 
natural disposition and temperament and his lack of a sense of 
humor, as much as his education, dictated his turn of interests and 
his feelings about the world. 
We have no direct evidence about any education in the fine arts, 
and yet, as king, he was a patron of painters, sculptors, and architects. 
It is probable that he was familiar with Mazarin's fine collection of 
Italian art, and he undoubtedly was influenced by the Italian decor­
ators, some of whose work for Mazarin can still be seen in the Musee 
Carnavalet in Paris. Indeed, an art historian might be able to develop 
an interesting study by comparing the artistic tastes of Louis XIV 
and the cardinal. How familiar Louis was with Mazarin's magnificent 
library is also a matter for conjecture. 
The instruction of the king also included fencing, dancing, riding, 
hunting, and some music. The Fronde interrupted the process of 
instruction, but Louis learned to dance, ride, and hunt with elegance. 
His marvelous physique and natural grace may have been more 
important than the formal education. Every picture that we have of 
Louis as a young man bespeaks his handsome figure, his athletic 
prowess, his natural charm; his teachers cannot be credited for 
these graces. 
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 
February 10, 1638, Louis XIII issued lettres patentes announcing 
his intention to take the Virgin Mary as the protector of his kingdom. 
On March 26 he ordered the archbishop of Paris to proclaim his in­
tention from all the churches "so that each could prepare himself to 
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offer himself with me . . . and to join his prayers with mine so that 
it will please her to extend her powerful protection to her kingdom." n 
Louis, le Dieudonne, was born seven months later. In the celebrations 
that followed the fortunate event, religious services played an im­
portant part: indeed, it can be said that Louis le Dieudonne came 
into the world with a chorus of Te Deums, hundreds of forty-hour 
devotions, and thousands of votive masses rising from the churches 
of France. As Louis XIV, le Grand, he continued to order religious 
services to thank God and the Mother of Jesus for benefits bestowed 
upon the kingdom. The medal that Louis XIII had struck portraying 
the king of France on his knees before a statue of the Virgin Mary 
offering her his kingdom in gratitude for her favor was illustrative of 
the religious values of the French royal family in the mid-seventeenth 
century; Louis absorbed these values with the air he breathed and 
made them part of himself. 
Anne, even more than Louis XIII, regarded the birth of Le 
Dieudonne as a miracle. Her religious background was strict and 
tinged with mysticism. Her father, Philip III, read his office daily with 
the spirit of a monk; he heard voices (in Castilian Spanish) from 
heaven; he pressed the pope to proclaim the dogma of the Immaculate 
Conception; reared in the court of the aged Philip II, he was more 
suited for the church than for the throne. Anne's mother was at 
least as attentive to the services of the church as Philip III; she heard 
two masses daily, took Communion every Sunday, and spent many 
hours on her prie-Dieu. Under such influence Anne grew up reading 
books of devotion and religious mysticism; accepting the symbolism 
found everywhere in the Escorial as substantial idea; finding solace 
and meaning for her life in church services; and seeing religious 
mystery in the strange religious allegories of Lope de Vega. Before 
her marriage to Louis XIII her life had been wrapped in a texture 
of religious observances, cults, and mysteries that conditioned her 
thought and action until her death. This was not as apparent in her 
first years at the court of France, when youthful vigor and animal 
spirits encouraged playful, often frivolous, behavior; but one has 
only to read the De Motteville memoirs to see how much she changed 
after she was forty. Anne's Catholicism was Spanish: candles, hours 
at the prie-Dieu, books of devotion, and mystery.12 
IIO LOUIS XIV AND THE CRAFT OF KINGSHIP 
Her most important declaration of faith was crystalized in the 
baroque church at Val-de-Grace. In the days of her near disgrace 
that cloister had been a place of refuge where she could talk about 
God in Spanish with sympathetic nuns;13 when the birth of a son 
gave her status, Val-de-Grace became the object of her special atten­
tion. Her body was buried at St. Denis, but her heart was sent to 
Val-de-Grace, along with many of her most treasured possessions. The 
symbolism14 in the church identifies the mother of the king of France 
with that other mother whose son was the King of Heaven; in the 
chapel of Saint Anne at Val-de-Grace, the sculptor Michel Anguier 
glorified wdth mystic symbolism the married state and divine love in 
marriage. St. Anne and St. Joachim, the parents of the Virgin, 
suitably became the central figures of the drama of marriage. Roman 
Catholics in the twentieth century will recognize the emotional force 
behind this sort of cult of saints. 
Although not as pious as Anne, Marzarin, too, was a deeply 
religious man. For a long time the present writer tended to discount 
as mere formalities the appeals for prayers, the expressions of respect 
for God and His saints, and the religious tone in so many of Mazarin's 
letters. Could it be that this man who seemed to fear so little in the 
world was so respectful of God? However, it is clear that Professor 
G. N. (now Sir George) Clark was unquestionably correct when he 
once remarked that we must take a seventeenth-century man seriously 
when he talks about God. Mazarin, like Anne, must have encouraged 
Louis in the fulfillment of his religious duties. 
There were many priests and monks in and out of the court during 
the childhood of Louis, but the man whose name occurs most often 
as an intimate of the family was St. Vincent de Paul. He prepared 
Louis XIII for death; he remained as friend and counselor of the 
queen during the regency. His influence on the Council of Conscience 
was often enough nullified by Mazarin, but until his naive attempt 
to end the conflict during the Fronde, St. Vincent was well known at 
court. He was no theologian, not even a "thinker," but his religion 
of good works, pious intentions, and spiritual exercises suited the 
royal family; and it did not seriously interfere with other activities 
that may have been less pleasing to God.15 
The young king's formal spiritual education was entrusted to 
Father Charles Paulin, S.J., who, as confessor and friend, directed the 
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conscience of the young man. Father Paulin's interest was the saving 
of Louis's soul by giving him a Christian upbringing. How much he 
recognized Anne's part in the work can be seen from a letter written 
to the general of the Jesuit order at the time of Louis's first Com­
munion: "There is no lamb more sweet, more tractable than our 
king. . . . He has in him the piety which the most Christian Queen 
has inculcated in him from early childhood by her tender counsels 
and advice."16 Anne more than "counseled" her son; when Louis 
attempted to use some language that he had learned in the stables, 
Anne imprisoned him in his room in solitary confinement for two 
days.17 This punishment may or may not have been responsible for 
the fact that Louis's speech was never profane, but there can be little 
doubt about the influence of Anne's "counsels" on his later life. It 
was she who reduced him to tears over his weakness for La Valliere; 
and it was probably her introjected superego that forced him so often 
to try to give up De Montespan and finally, when his queen had died, 
to take Mme de Maintenon as his wife. It is well to remember that 
Louis may have enjoyed the pleasures of the flesh in his early man­
hood, but not without attacks of conscience. 
It is difficult to assess the impact of a single event on a man's 
life, and yet it is hard to believe that the ceremony of consecration 
performed when Louis was a boy of fifteen could fail to leave a 
strong impression on his mind. The sacre was Mazarin's answer to 
the rebellious noblemen who could not be controlled by a regent and 
a boy king; the event itself, however, must have been an emotional 
experience for the young man. Louis prepared himself spiritually 
for the consecration the night before much as a bishop prepares for 
his elevation. At 4:30 A.M. the high clergy robed themselves and 
began the ceremonies; by six o'clock the court and a great press of 
people filled the great cathedral of Rheims, and then the bishops of 
Beauvais and Chalons, followed by the crowd, marched to the door 
of the archepiscopal palace where the Due de Joyeuse, acting as 
Grand Chamberlain, demanded: "What do you wish?" Beauvais: 
"The king. We ask for Louis XIV, son of that great king Louis XIII, 
whom God has given us for king." Upon the third repetition of this 
formula, the doors were thrown open and the crowd marched to the 
bed where Louis, clad in rich clothing, awaited them. With holy 
water, incense, and prayers, they led him to the cathedral for the 
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age-old ceremony of anointing with oil that "came from Heaven" 
for the consecration of Clovis. The consecration emphasized the 
sacerdotal character of the kings of France: "Your Majesty," he was 
told, "must recognize by the maxims of piety as much as by the 
light of pure truth, that if the kings of France are of a divine order 
. . . this striking privilege flows from the sacred unction, the holy 
ampoule of oil that gives sacred character. . . .  " Louis may have 
noted that Conde and others were absent, in rebellion against his 
rule; but he also knew that God had established kings as His rulers 
on earth, and that the church consecrated their rule.18 
Dubois tells us of the young Louis's strict attention to religious 
duties; Fenelon assures us that the old Louis's religion was super­
stitious and devout, in the Spanish style.19 These two witnesses, over 
a half-century apart, can be corroborated by many others. Louis 
probably understood no more than his mother did about the theo­
logical differences that separated the Catholic and the Reformed 
churches; his conception of God as an object of worship seems to 
have led him to perform acts of piety, to cause prayers to be said, 
to thank God for His blessings. When things went well with the 
royal projects, Louis knew that God had blessed his labors and 
ordered Te Deums and Masses and other religious services in thanks­
giving.20 When his armies were defeated, when drought brought crop 
failure, when his kingdom looked like a land occupied by a hostile 
power, Louis feared that God had withdrawn his protection from his 
kingdom; then his prayers were to supplicate God's forgiveness for 
his pride and to ask for a return of favor.21 
It should finally be noted that Louis's respect for the church and 
its ministers did not blind him to the fact that the church and the 
churchmen played many roles in society. One can almost hear 
Mazarin's voice in one passage of the Memoires: "I have never failed 
to call your attention whenever the occasion presented itself to the 
respect we owe to religion and the deference we owe to its ministers 
in the things that make up their principal mission, that is, the cele­
bration of the mysteries of cult and the spread of evangelical doctrine. 
But because the men of the church are likely to take advantage of 
their profession . .  . I am obliged to point out to you certain points 
that may be important."22 The "certain points" concerned the prop­
erty of the church and the service of churchmen to the state. In 
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other words, as Louis's career indicates, he was brought up to respect 
cult, to give his heart to God, but he also had a practical attitude 
toward the clergy and its wealth. 
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION 
Louis's general education may have been neglected, but his pro­
fessional training was not. The times in which he lived, as well as 
the devoted efforts of his mother and Mazarin, combined to give 
Louis XIV an education in the art of government seldom allotted to 
princes. It was professional education that would have appealed to 
John Dewey: he learned by doing, by direct experience with the 
problems of state. Louis could never be a doctrinaire politician; his 
education gave him a practical, pragmatic approach to the problems 
of government. 
Anne once remarked that kings did not need to study history since 
they lived in it. Louis certainly lived in history from the time he could 
take note of things, even though it is improbable that he understood 
what was happening at first. Minority governments had long since 
been the "opportunity" for the "great ones" who wished to reverse the 
centralizing tendencies of the royal authority; and in the 1640's the 
"great ones" were joined by the regular officials of the kingdom 
(members of the sovereign courts and the municipal and provincial 
officials) who resented and feared the rising power of the king's 
council and its agents.23 The Fronde really started almost as soon 
as Louis XIII closed his eyes. Beaufort and the "important ones" 
plotted to murder Cardinal Mazarin; parlement refused to register 
the edicts of the council; Conde demanded special favors for his son 
as soon as that young man won victory for the king's arms; the boy 
king had to hold a lit de justice and listen to the tense speeches; pro­
vincial as well as parlementary officers complained about the activities 
of the king's maitres des requites on mission (intendants). His aunt 
Henriette of England, a refugee in France, did not need to tell of 
the troubles in her husband's kingdom for the young Louis to realize 
that the paths of kings are not easy. He had only to see his mother's 
anger and humiliation at the speeches of Omer Talon in parlement 
and hear her mutter, "My son will punish them when he grows up." 
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The boy of ten who remarked on the occasion of a French victory in 
the Netherlands, "The gentlemen in Parlement will not be pleased/' 
had absorbed much from his environment about the politicial process 
in the kingdom, and there was more to come. 
The Fronde was well under way before the riots and barricades in 
Paris called attention to the problems in France. However, the drama 
of the rioting crowds demanding the release of the arrested parlemen­
tarians; the tense speeches and hasty conferences; the fears that the 
royal palace might be invaded and sacked; the intrusion of men 
demanding to see if the young king was really asleep in his bed and 
not spirited away; the nocturnal flight from the city with his mother 
and the cardinal, obviously afraid of the possible consequences of 
their act; the siege of Paris and perhaps some knowledge of the 
awful things that men were writing and saying about his mother 
and Mazarin;24 the semi-hypocritical appeals for the king to return to 
"his city of Paris," which was at war with him: these and many more 
dramatic events of the first year of the Fronde were unforgettable 
experiences for the boy king, and there were more to come. Writing 
for his son some twenty years later, Louis says of this period: "It is 
necessary to point out the conditions of things: terrible agitations 
throughout the kingdom both before and after my majority; a foreign 
war in which these domestic troubles cost France a thousand advan­
tages; a prince of the blood and a very great name at the head of the 
armies of our foe; cabals in the state; the parlements still in pos­
session, and in taste for, usurped authority; in my court, very little 
fidelity without personal interest. . . .  "2  5 This is a graphic descrip­
tion of the misery of the Fronde. 
Charles Peguy once wrote a moving essay about Misere in which 
he asserted that anyone who has ever experienced such total privation 
can never forget it and can never act without its influence. Such a 
person will pile up money and any other security beyond all need 
simply because of the memory of the pain. The Fronde was misere 
for the young king of France, an experience that he never forgot. 
Its memory colored many of his acts in later years: the maintenance 
of a strict etiquette to control members of the court, the treatment of 
a harmless brother asking for favors or for a military command, the 
regulation of parlement and the royal bureaucracy, and a host of 
others. This is not surprising: it was humiliating to be shut out of 
his own cities (it mattered little that the rebel soldiers also cried, 
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"Vive le roil,"26 since they still held towns against the king's loyal 
forces); it must have been near to terrifying to see his mother being 
forced to send Mazarin, the only man she really trusted, into exile; 
it must have been disturbing not to know whether a soldier like 
Turenne would be on the side of the king or of the king's enemies. 
Nor did the humiliation end with the victory over rebellious noble­
men, parlementarians, and the Spanish armies; years later, when Louis 
was proudly showing his recently forgiven cousin La Grande Made­
moiselle a new regiment equipped with kettledrums, he asked her if 
she had ever heard the like before (he, Louis, had not). The answer: 
"Oh yes, years ago during the war (Fronde) with the foreign 
troops." 27 Even the joy of a new military toy was blighted by memory 
of the Fronde. 
Though the Fronde was a period of political misery, it was also 
an object lesson in the art of government, a time when a young man 
with his eyes open could learn much about the game of politics. 
It was as instructive to watch a master politician like Mazarin manipu­
late affairs, even from exile, as it was to observe the twisting and 
turning of his uncle Orleans, of the wily Retz, of the calculating 
Chateauneuf, and others. Soldiers no less than politicians had much 
to teach about politics as well as about war. Louis learned well. His 
later dramatic arrests of the Cardinal de Retz and Fouquet plagiarized 
the pattern set by Anne and Mazarin in the arrest of Conde; his 
famous response to all requests—"je verrai."—probably originated 
in a youthful slip of the tongue during this period. 
Mazarin's role in the political education of Louis XIV was, as 
mentioned above, most important. He was Louis's godfather (at the 
request of Louis XIII); he was superintendent of Louis's education 
(suggested by the then dead king, the queen, Orleans, and Conde);28 
he was probably Louis's stepfather; finally, he had a deep affection 
for the young man. Memoir writers and many historians have told 
stories about Mazarin's neglect of the young boy, of hostility between 
the two, of Louis's impatience to be rid of his minister. The facts 
seem to have been exactly the opposite. There was a deep friendship, 
a feeling probably near to love, between the two men. One has only 
to read Mazarin's letters to Anne to see the warmth, the fatherly 
feelings of the elder man.29 Like Anne, who always treated Louis 
as her king and gave him the homage due a king, Mazarin always 
showed great respect for the person of his "master"; even when he 
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sent Louis letters filled with scolding words, recalling him to his 
duty as a father might write to an erring son, the formal tone of the 
letter was that of a courtier, just as Anne's behavior toward Louis 
was that of courtesan. But neither Anne nor Mazarin were really 
formal toward Louis; their courtly ways were intended to teach him 
the respect due a king. Both of them thought of Louis as king and 
man, and were anxious that the boy should succeed in both roles. 
Mazarin wrote, "He [Louis] has in him the stuff of several kings 
and of an honnete man."30 On another occasion he wrote to Villeroi, 
"As you know how many times I have said to you that we can 
expect that he [Louis] will be a prince as accomplished as any that 
one has seen in several centuries."31 
"Le Confidant" (Louis) was obviously Mazarin's pride and hope. 
Writing to Anne: "The king is well—he has taken great pleasure 
in the letters that you have sent me. . . . He knows the firm and 
tender love that you have for him. . . . He never fails to embrace 
me in the evenings, and we talk in terms from the heart."32 Louis 
was privy to the secrets of the household; he knew that Anne did not 
wish to displease Mazarin "by deed or even by thought."33 When 
Louis and Mazarin were with Turenne at the front, the cardinal's 
letters to Anne sound like those of a doting father, proud of the 
achievements of his son. And when Louis was deathly ill, in 1658, 
Mazarin wrote to Lockhart, "I want above all to hope that God 
does not wish to punish this kingdom by taking from us the one who 
brings it joy, being the father of the people. . . .  " And to Turenne, 
when the fever finally broke: "I rejoice again with you over the 
grace that God has given us in conserving for us the king." These 
letters during Louis's illness are filled with paternal love and anxiety; 
because of his confidence in the queen's love, it was not until later 
that Mazarin realized how much personal danger he might have 
been in had Louis's brother become king.34 
Louis's own feelings are more difficult to assess. Even as a small 
boy, he was reserved and sober; yet the oft-quoted words to the 
cardinal at the time of the illness give some indication of his feelings: 
"You are a man of resolution and the best friend I have; therefore, 
I beg you to alert me if I shall be near to death; for the queen would 
not dare to do it for fear that it would augment the illness." Up 
until Mazarin's death Louis deferred to him and left all to his 
judgment; and Louis wept hot tears both after his last interview with 
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the cardinal and when the news of his death was announced. Anne's 
grief was not the only reason for ordering full court mourning, here­
tofore reserved for members of the royal family. Furthermore, Louis's 
Memoires and his government after Mazarin's death are a standing 
monument to his respect and his love for the cardinal. Lacour-Gayet 
was not wrong when he concluded that Louis loved and respected 
Mazarin so much that it almost seemed that the Cardinal ruled 
decades after his death."35 
Mazarin's method of instructing gave the young king direct contact 
with affairs. In the first place, he urged him to read the state papers as 
they came in, accustoming him to the most elementary work of a 
ruler, namely, the learning of the facts upon which decisions must be 
made. In addition, Mazarin gradually introduced Louis into council 
meetings, but only after the young king had read the papers to be 
discussed, and in slow stages, so that the problems would be simple 
enough for him to understand. At first it seems that Louis attended 
only meetings at which decisions could easily be made; later, he was 
to learn that it is not always possible to make a decision. In his 
Memoires Louis explains that he would secretly make up his mind 
how the matter should be decided, and prided himself that very often 
the decision of older heads was the same as his own. When foreign 
ambassadors visited the court or when a French envoy was sent abroad, 
Mazarin had Louis assist him with the interview, thus instructing him 
in the art of high politics and the counters of diplomacy. The un­
questioned skill and knowledge that Louis was to show as king are 
tributes to the success of this method of instruction.36 
Louis spent many hours closeted with Mazarin during the last 
half-dozen years of the cardinal's life. When the court was domiciled 
at one of the palaces, the young king would spend time in the 
morning and again in the afternoon in the cardinal's chambers; when 
the court was traveling, the two were together almost as much. What 
went on during these interviews? There is no direct documentary 
evidence, but much can be inferred from a study of Louis's Memoires. 
These pages were dictated, written, and suggested by Louis for the 
education of his heir; some of the passages recount events and 
decisions that Louis had made as king and therefore are the result of 
his own experience; other passages are general reflections about 
politics, society, the handling of men, and the like; still others, insight 
into the art of government, rules for managing affairs. Many of these 
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are much more sophisticated than one has the right to expect from a 
young man in his twenties, even a young man as bright as Louis. 
It cannot be proved, and yet there is undoubtedly a strong presump­
tion, that these passages are Louis's recollections of the advice and 
counsel of the cardinal, and, perhaps of his mother. 
In a short paper it is impossible to analyze the content of the 
Memoires;37 it is enough to note that parts of them are surely some 
of the best pointed and practical counsels that were ever written for 
the education of a prince. Here and there, Louis falls into a high 
moral tone, exhorting his son to "give his heart to God" or expatiating 
on "virtue"; but for the most part he confines himself to practical 
advice. They deal with questions in the everyday life of a king as 
well as more difficult problems of state policy. "How shall a king 
live with his neighbors?" "How shall he choose his ministers?" "How 
does a king reward those who serve him?" "The importance of keep­
ing one's given word." "Do not presume too much; it is better to wait 
until success is sure before announcing victory in politics." "Do not 
hope too much from fortune; indeed, be suspicious of hopes." "Wis­
dom and councils." "Faithful and faithless servants." "A king must 
be father of his people." "Factions: it is better to prevent their 
forming in the state." "Means and methods of dealing with the 
clergy." "All classes have utility to the state; protect the bourgeoisie 
and peasants from the soldiers." These and many more were topics 
for the dauphin; they must also have been Mazarin's lessons for 
the young king. 
Mazarin's advice covered big as well as little things. He did not 
need to urge Louis to be his own first minister, but we know that 
he did so. Louis scrupulously followed Mazarin's policy of thanking 
those who served the king's government; this sort of letter bulks large 
in the correspondence of both men. Both men managed people by 
indirection whenever possible rather than by force; both were polite 
to those about them. Perhaps even more important, Mazarin's dis­
cussions of foreign policy, the only policy that really interested him, 
must have left a strong impression on his protege, for Louis's foreign 
policy for the next quarter-century and more can best be understood 
by studying Mazarin's ideas about Europe and the role of the French 
Bourbon dynasty in Europe. Lastly, Louis's methods of work were 
unquestionably in part influenced by Mazarin. The cardinal insisted 
FORMATION OF A KING I 19 
that no one can govern without studying the documents; he urged 
Louis to be attentive to work and praised him when his style of 
writing and his grasp of political problems improved. It may even be 
that Louis's feuillets, from which he wrote or dictated the Memoires, 
were in imitation of Mazarin's Carnets.38 
Where Mazarin left off, Anne took over the task of preparing her 
son for the metier du rot. Louis's love for his mother led him to see 
her often and intimately. Like those of so many attentive mothers, 
Anne's counsels were not always heeded by her son; and yet, much of 
Louis's vision of himself and his part in the world cannot be explained 
or understood unless we infer that Anne, the Spanish princess 
educated in the Escorial in the days when the memory of Philip II 
was still a vital force in that court, was a significant factor in his 
education. Anne's vision of royalty and the role of the king in society, 
as well as her conception of the honor and respect due to kings,39 
was not in the Bourbon tradition. Henri IV's court had been managed 
with the easy-going manners of a guerrilla captain; he got his way by 
backslapping, by cajolery, by feigned intimacy, or, at last, by force. 
Louis XIII had run the state and secured obedience by cold, surly, 
and, at times, brutal insistence upon his policy; though Richelieu 
understood the meaning of diplomacy and indirection, both he and 
Louis XIII were willing to rule by force. Anne and Mazarin, perhaps 
because they had less moral authority, were less cruel, less willing to 
depend upon the headsman's ax. She knew that men can be con­
trolled by etiquette, by imposed manners, by a system of values 
saturated with ideas of rank and social position. She also retained 
a vision of a great king, Philip II, whose life might have been a failure 
but whose notions about the metier of a king surely ought to he the 
secret of success. Louis did not follow all of his great-grandfather's 
patterns, but the long hours over paperwork, the attention to detail, 
the vision of the grandeur of royalty, and, of course, the obvious 
connection between Versailles and the Escorial, all indicate possible 
relationship between the two men. The student should never under­
estimate Anne because of her love of cocoa, her self-indulgence, her 
passion for entertainment, nor even her indolence; the mother of 
Louis XIV was the woman who stood up (with the aid of Mazarin) 
against the storms of the Fronde, coldly scorning and hating her 
enemies who did not share her vision of her son, and finally 
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triumphing (again with the aid of Mazarin) over princes and noble 
cabals and sovereign courts that wished to limit the royal authority. 
In Louis her scorn and hatred was translated into action that con­
trolled the minds and bodies of men and forced them to play parts 
that were set by the king. 
There were two important roles that Louis XIV assumed: that of 
soldier and that of administrator. Louis's own heirs failed to see that 
when Louis the soldier was combined with Louis the administrator 
and Louis the Great, Louis the enlightened despot emerged. Frederick 
II of Prussia did not miss this lesson. In the education of Louis the 
soldier-administrator, many men, unmentioned here, contributed a 
share: bureaucrats and soldiers who trained the king in the arts of 
war and administration. 
The French king was expected to be a soldier; indeed, that was 
his historic role in an age when war was the natural agency for 
curing anarchy and shaping political life. Louis's father, his grand­
father, and the great kings of the Capet-Valois line had been soldiers; 
it was a role that French kings had to play. Le Tellier and Turenne 
were Louis's most important preceptors in military affairs; the one 
taught the art of command, the other, the science of military adminis­
tration. Turenne was a hardheaded teacher of the art of war; his 
cadets included the dukes of Luxembourg, Lorraine, Villars, and 
Marlborough ("handsome Jack Churchill"), and many other soldiers 
who fought for and against France in the era of Louis XIV. Louis's 
period of apprenticeship under the great soldier was not long enough 
to make him into a great captain, but Mazarin and Louis spent much 
time with the army between 1654 and 1659, and most of it was in 
the company of Turenne. Mazarin's letters tell us of the enthusiasm 
and ardor with which Louis followed the sieges and other operations.40 
Turenne's counsels were reinforced by those of Le Tellier, the first 
bureaucratic war minister who, with his son Louvois, was the architect 
of the French standing army. Le Tellier, whose code-name was "le 
Fidele" in the Anne-Mazarin correspondence, was one of the few 
people whom the family could really trust. It is not unlikely that 
Louis not only learned enough from these two men to write the 
shrewd passages about military affairs that one finds in the Memoires 
but also got from them his liking for wars of position, of sieges and 
maneuvers, as well as his fear of infantry battles in the field, in 
which a war could be won (or lost) in an afternoon.41 
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Colbert's influence upon Louis was undoubtedly important, but 
by the time Colbert became the king's trusted man, Louis's character 
and ideals were already fixed, so that Colbert's role was more that of 
a counselor and advisor than of a teacher; many historians who see 
Louis's wars as acts of the royal will, regret that the minister of 
economics did not get to the king earlier.42 When Mazarin died, 
obliging him, as he wrote to his son, "no longer to defer that which 
I had hoped for and feared so long," Louis recognized himself as 
ready to assume the task of government. It only remained for him 
to use his education effectively. 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
Seventeenth-century men were more conscious of the problems 
involved in justifying political power than any European generation 
before their time; a galaxy of political philosophers—Hobbes, Har­
rington, Bossuet, Pufendorf, Spinoza, Grotius, James I, Locke, and 
Leibniz, to mention only a few—proved how fruitful were their 
efforts. With his contemporaries so self-conscious about the problems 
of political philosophy, it was inevitable that Louis XIV should some­
how be instructed in its secrets. But, as in his study of history, his 
philosophical education was neither formal nor structured. That he 
was king was unquestionably an important factor in the formation of 
his ideas; both sycophants and sincere men combined to exalt the 
office in his mind. The structure of political society itself was also 
significant; centuries of political evolution under a monarchy in which 
the king was a consecrated officer had created a series of political 
assumptions that the young Louis absorbed in much the same way 
in which he breathed. A politically self-conscious generation made it 
necessary to form these ideas into words. 
Louis warned his son that "those people badly abuse themselves 
who imagine that the pretentions to this quality [the pre-eminent 
position of royalty] are only a matter of ceremonies. . . . " 4  3 Yet 
the numerous ceremonies in which he either took part or that were 
held in his honor must also have been of considerable importance 
in the formation of his ideas about the role of king. Meetings in 
parlement when the government held a lit de justice, receptions of 
delegations, and, of course, the impressive consecration at Rheims—all 
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entailed implications about the role of king. The elaborate ceremonies 
after 1661, when the king's real or imaginary triumphs were cele­
brated with tableaux of papier-mache, fireworks, trumpets, pantomines, 
and extensive oratory were not as common during his minority and 
early years as king, but the number of receptions and speeches honor­
ing the king is nonetheless impressive.44 
In the period of the regency not all the speeches were friendly 
to the government; if there is one thing that all of these ceremonies 
had in common, however, it was a full recognition of the idea that the 
king had been established by God as father of the people. Even Omer 
Talon, when his forthright words in parlement offended Anne, 
admitted freely that God had given France her king, and that the 
king should be obeyed.45 The large number of books and pamphlets 
published without royal permission during the Fronde manifest this 
same tendency; even though the authors hated the regent and her 
minister, they were almost universally royalist and ready to admit 
that the throne was established by God.46 In other words, both sides 
of the conflict in the mid-seventeenth century accepted the basic 
assumption that the king's power came from God, and both regarded 
the king as a sacerdotal officer. 
There has been, however, considerable misunderstanding about 
the nature of that grant from God. Did "king by divine right" mean 
that the king could do what he wished? By no means. The Roman 
church had long expounded the doctrine of divine right based upon 
the sentence in St. Paul's Letter to the Romans XIII: 1: Non est 
potestas nisi a Dei. Men with as varied backgrounds as Mazarin, 
Bishop Bossuet, Claude Joly,47 and Antoine Arnauld, all would agree 
on the church's teaching on this point. All power and authority— 
indeed, everything in the world—came from God; and since hier­
archical society was necessary for man's well-being, God therefore 
had created kings to rule over men. But in Catholic thought, man 
had the free will to do right or wrong, and kings were no exception 
to this rule: it would make God the author of the evils committed by 
bad men if God were responsible for kings' actions. The problem 
was solved by making God the source of power, power that he be­
stowed upon kings with the right to act as His lieutenants on earth. 
But just as Locke divided power (ability to govern) and authority 
(right to govern), giving one to kings and retaining the other for the 
people, so the doctrine of divine right left the authority (the right 
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to govern) in the hands of God, giving only the potestas (the power 
to rule) into the hands of magistrates. Jacques Maritain insists that 
the same relationship exists today between God and governments, 
even parliamentary ones. God, however, expected kings to do their 
duty, to carry out His work on earth; and if they failed to do so, He 
not only would punish them in the next world but also would 
withdraw His protection from them in this one. Perefixe had the 
young Louis translate into Latin the phrase, "I know that the prin­
cipal duty of a Christian prince is to serve God and that piety is the 
basis for all royal virtues." Louis wrote for his son a long passage 
insisting upon the necessity for a king to submit to God's law and 
urging him to believe that kings have greater obligations toward God 
than other men. "Important obligations demand of us, heavy duties" 
he wrote; "and since, in giving us the scepter, He has given us that 
which appears as the most striking thing on earth, we ought, in giving 
Him of our heart, to give him that which is most agreeable in His 
eyes."48 Mazarin put it even more bluntly at the time of the Mancini 
crisis: "God," he wrote, "has established kings to care for the well­
being, the security, the repose of their subjects, and not to sacrifice 
those goods and that repose to their own passions, and if that un­
fortunate situation does occur . . . the Divine Providence abandons 
them. The histories are full of revolutions and prostrations [accable­
ments] that they [wilful kings] have brought down upon themselves 
and their subjects."49 It would be hard to find a statement that better 
expressed the assumptions of the doctrine of divine right as it was 
understood in the mid-seventeenth century. 
Louis's deductions from the idea that God established kings and 
endowed them with power to govern were in part his own and in 
part common to his society. Kings, he was sure, were a race apart, 
signally different from other men because of God's action. They 
are the "fathers of their peoples." God not only placed them on the 
throne but also gave them the wisdom necessary to do His work. 
Kings, created in the image of God, Louis believed, had a natural 
understanding of politics. He was certain that he could deal with 
affairs of state more surely and more deftly than his ministers, who 
were always anxious to be sure that their action would be acceptable. 
Since power was the gift of God to the king, any division of 
sharing of that power, in Louis's opinion, tended to corrupt or degrade 
it. How many of the Mazarinade pamphlets expressed this same point 
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of view in urging the king to govern without a "companion" 
(Mazarin), to be the sole "father of his people". It was also the lesson 
of the valet, La Porte, who read histories of faineant Icings, of Mazarin 
who urged Louis to become his own first minister. Louis writes about 
the plight of English kings: " . . . This subjugation, which forces the 
sovereign to take the law from his people, is the last calamity that 
can fall upon a man of our rank." He went on to say that a prince 
who has to give power to a first minister is in a miserable condition 
even though he has the right to choose that minister; but infinitely 
worse is the lot of a monarch who has to depend upon a popular 
assembly, because it is not "merely power that a people assembled 
attributes to itself; the more you give it, the more it pretends to; the 
more you favor it, the more it despises you; and when this power is 
once in its possession, it is held so strongly that one cannot take it 
away without extreme violence."50 
So brief a statement does not do justice to Louis's discussions about 
power and the use of power, and yet a fuller statement would only 
modify and expand his basic assumptions, namely, that God has 
established kings and endowed them with the ability to carry out 
His work on earth, and secondly, that his gift of power is personal 
and therefore the king should exercise it himself. However, in reading 
Louis's Memoires it becomes clear that the expression of absolutism 
is tempered by the fact that Louis also understood that he ruled a 
kingdom in which history and tradition had created a matrix of rights, 
customs, and privileges, limiting the action of power; royal absolutism 
did not imply the right to arbitrary political action even in the mind 
of so absolute a king as Louis XIV. 
THE PERSON OF THE KING 
Anyone who has watched children grow up to become men knows 
that there are important individual differences in physical and emo­
tional inheritances. American environmentalist assumptions some­
times tend to ignore these genetic differences, and historians usually 
pay no attention to them. Nonetheless, inheritance is important. In 
Louis's case he was richly endowed by nature. As a youth and as a 
man he was handsome, athletic, and vigorous; his emotional temper­
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ament was calm, at times almost lethargic, and even as a small boy he 
carried himself with a natural dignity, related perhaps to good mus­
cular coordination. In spite of his tendency to hypochrondria, which 
caused him to take quantities of pills and potions,51 he was usually 
in excellent health. Just what the relationship of inheritance and 
environment was to the various characteristics of his personality we 
cannot, of course, say. Even more baffling are other aspects of his 
personality. The present status of personality psychology still leaves 
us at a loss to know which questions are the most important ones to 
ask: and even if we did know the proper questions, it is often im­
possible to find trustworthy witnesses to supply the answers. 
Personality theorists are, however, largely in accord with an obser­
vation that wise men had long suspected, namely, that an individual 
develops the contours of his personality in part as the result of mean­
ingful repetition of behavior that proves to be successful in effecting 
inner satisfaction. In other words, characteristic behavior patterns 
tend to become firmly fixed to the measure that the individual receives 
satisfactions in the form of social rewards, inner feelings of well­
being, success in dealing with anxieties, and the like.52 It would be 
very difficult to produce evidence that would prove the connection 
between Louis's behavior patterns and his inner feelings, and yet 
the Memoires are replete with passages from which we can infer that 
Louis learned to fill the role of king by successfully becoming king 
under the tutelage of Mazarin and his mother; that he "resolved" 
the threatening anxieties of the Fronde by being associated with the 
master politician whose skill pulled the teeth of the rebellion; that 
he absorbed the ceremonial pattern of the king by successfully acting 
out the role on a score of platforms. Such achievements alone prob­
ably would not have given him the conscience that drove him to try 
to fulfil his part as king, and yet they may well have been the added 
fillip that brought satisfaction to Louis, the man, when he acted out 
the part of Louis, the king, and demanded of himself the effort 
necessary to live up to his gloire. 
William James believed that a man's "self is the sum of the 
different roles that he plays in the world; more recent psychologists, 
affected by Freudian concepts, have produced considerable evidence 
that strongly suggests that the interpersonal relations of a child with 
his parents or qua parents are of great importance in the fulfillment of 
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roles, as well as of "ego" development. Of particular significance seems 
to be the love-respect attitudes of the parents toward the child, and 
the consequent desire of the child, in order to be assured of his 
parents' continued love, to act within the patterns, values, and be­
havioral limits represented by the parents. In "important" (to the 
parents) and stressed behaviors, the child who is loved, respected, 
and guided with some consistency is said to "introject" the values of 
the parents.53 Louis was born to the role of king, but so were many 
others, and yet only a few of them have acted out their role on the 
stage of the world and fulfilled it as seriously and pervasively as 
Louis XIV did. Today when we think of a king, the stereotype is 
either Louis XIV or Charlemagne. Why did Louis assume so well 
his role1? 
One thing that we can be sure of is the mutual affection between 
Louis and his mother, and it seems almost equally sure that a similar 
relation existed between him and Mazarin. Who knows the hundreds 
of daily and persistent contacts among these three people that may 
have been decisive factors in Louis's opinion of himself, his role, and 
his obligations toward God, man, and himself—in short, his gloire. 
We do know that Anne never ceased to impress upon him her desire 
that he should grow up to be a great king, as well as a good man: 
she had a sense for majesty, a feeling for the rights and obligations 
of rulers, and an ideal of la gloire that meant in effect the fulfilment 
of both the role and the inner potentials entrusted to a man. How 
she transmitted these to Louis cannot be told, but her attitudes and 
values and his later actions correlated so well that we do have the 
right to infer a strong relationship. We have also shown similar 
instances with regard to Mazarin. 
Furthermore, Mazarin's intervention at the time that Louis wished 
to marry Marie Mancini has left us a series of letters that leave no 
doubt about his attitudes and influences. The deeply infatuated Louis 
was ready to throw over all the advantages of a royal Spanish marriage 
to marry Mazarin's niece. Louis's argument that the house of Bourbon 
was deeply indebted to Mazarin and that the marriage he wished to 
make would, in a way, repay that debt, speaks for Louis's ingenuity 
as well as for his feelings toward Mazarin (and Marie). Mazarin's 
letters are those of a father using all the arguments he can muster 
to prevent a wilful son from committing an act of folly. He speaks 
of Anne's feelings, of his own labors for the well-being of the 
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kingdom, of Louis's duties as king, of his obligations to society. At 
one point he recalls that Louis had often asked what he must do to 
become a great king: attention to duty, hard work, recognition of 
obligations. The fact that Mazarin was willing to go further in his 
argument, balancing his own career and life against the will of the 
young king, may indicate his feelings more poignantly than the im­
personal arguments; it may also indicate the extent of his moral 
authority over the boy, for Louis was the king, and Mazarin never 
questioned that fact. Indeed, it was to Louis the king that Mazarin 
appealed to check the passion of Louis the man. 
These letters at the time of the Mancini crisis seem to be the most 
dramatic documentary evidence of the sort of influence that made 
Louis XIV seek so untiringly to fulfil his historic destiny, his con­
ception of his gloire. All the formal education in the world cannot 
persuade a man to play his part, to fulfil his potestate. But if a man 
has taken into the core of his self-concept, of his ego, if he has 
identified with himself the deepest values of his beloved and respected 
parents—in this case, his destiny as a great king and an honnete 
homme—this may well drive him forward to accordant action. The 
fact that Louis gave up Marie Mancini may well be the great tragedy 
in his life,54 but that fact that he did give her up upon the insistence 
of his mother and Mazarin that in this way lay duty to kingdom and 
la gloire seems to argue that, among other influences that we do not 
know about, the relationship that existed among these three persons55 
—Louis, Anne, and Mazarin—provides a most important key for the 
understanding of this man whose career was so fateful for the history 
of Europe. 
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of Writings Since the War of 1914-1918," Journal of Modern History, XXXVI, 
127-44. 
2. How true this is becomes apparent with even a cursory investigation of the 
literature on the early life of Louis. G. Lacour-Gayet, L'Education politique de 
Louis XIV (Paris, 1898 and 2d ed., 1923) is the best study dealing with his youth, 
but it attempts no evaluation of the possible significance of the events or ideas dis­
cussed. The two more recent and more popular studies, Mme Saint-Ren6 Taillander, 
La Jeunesse du Grand Roi, Louis XIV et Anne d'Autriche (Paris, 1945), and 
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Henri Carre, L'Enfance et la premiere jeunesse de Louis XIV (Paris, 1944) 
follow the same pattern. Mile E. Carpentier's L'Enfance de Louis XIV (Paris, 
1869) is even less revealing. Shorter discussions, such as are to be found in 
Lavisse or Cheruel, are largely conditioned by the author's interpretation of 
Mazarin's influence or of the author's feelings about Louis himself, matters that 
will inevitably color any study of personality. Naturally, the present paper relies 
heavily upon the copious memoir materials long available for the period. Those of 
Louis XIV, De Motteville, De Monpensier, Montglat, La Porte, and Dubois were 
the most important. These memoirs, however, will not be cited in the footnotes 
unless the incident or idea has not been used by other writers. 
3. Saint-Simon tells us that he was the only one to attend the annual Mass for 
the soul of the late king. Saint-Simon, of course, considered Louis XIII to be a 
great king, perhaps because from him came the ducal title of the house of Saint-
Simon. 
4. Dreyss (ed.), Memoires de Louis XIV, II, 18. 
5. Philippe Erlanger, Monsieur, frere de Louis XIV (Paris, 1953). 
6. N. Druon, Histoire de Xeducation des princes dans la maison des Bourhons de 
France (2 vols.; Paris, 1897), I, 177. 
7. Many nineteenth-century writers assumed with Saint-Simon that Mazarin 
had deliberately sacrificed Louis's education. French hatred of the Italian favorite 
is one of the most interesting residues of the Fronde. Lavisse remarks, "Louis was 
a bad scholar because of the fault of the Cardinal . . . ," and then adds, "but 
also because of the circumstances of the civil war . . .  " (E. Lavisse, Histoire de 
France [Paris, 19051, Vol. VII, Part 1, p. 124). 
8. The 1806 edition of the CEuvres de Louis XIV contains the translation of 
Caesar's Gallic Wars that he made, according to La Porte, to surprise his teacher. 
The present writer also once translated this work and was impressed with Louis's 
version, but there is no reason to believe that Louis's translation may not have been 
"corrected" here and there before it was published. 
9. See also Dreyss (ed.), Memoires de Louis XIV, II, 2>72>­
10. There are a large number of accounts of these speeches given at "receptions 
of the king," some of which were delivered in the royal presence and others simply 
"presented" in printed form. The following are illustrative of this kind of litera­
ture that can be found for the entire reign: Buhot, Discours sur le joyeux avene­
ment du roy Louis XIV, prononce le 15 juin 1643 (Paris, 1643); Les assurees 
nouvelles des magnificences faites a Ventree de sa Majestee dans sa ville de Bordeaux 
et Vharangue a luy prononcee par MM du Parlement (Paris, 1650); La vray et 
veritable harangue fait au roy par un des principaux deputiez en presence de toute 
sa cour (Paris, 1652); Harangue fait au roy et a la reyne dans la ville de Mellium 
. . . (Paris, 1652); Entree de Louis XIV dans la ville (D'Auxerre, 1658). 
11. Lettre du roy, escrit a Monseigneur VArchevesque de Paris, 26 mars, 1638. 
The vow of Louis XIII attracted much contemporary attention both because of 
the piety of the act and because of the birth of a son, which many saw as an 
answer to Louis's prayers. One of the most interesting discussions of the vow was 
in a sermon given by P. Gilles Buhot in which he compared Louis's dedication 
to the Virgin with Hadrian's taking Hercules for his companion. He also traced 
the history of the cult of the Virgin in France from Druid days to his own. See 
Gilles Buhot, Discours sur le Voeu du Roy a la Saincte Vierge (Paris, n.d.). 
12. De la Varende, Anne d'Autriche, femme de Louis XIII, 1601-1666 (Paris, 
1938), has amassed the evidence on Anne's piety. See also P. H. Cherot, S. J., 
La premiere jeunesse de Louis XIV (164Q-1653) d'apres la correspondence inedite du 
P. Charles Paulin . . . (Lille [1892]), pp. 9-20. 
13. The full story of the relationship between the great ladies of the seven­
teenth-century court and the nuns in the cloisters about the city of Paris has not 
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yet been written. It will make an interesting study of courtly society and religious, 
practices. 
14. Cf. G. Vauthier, Anne d'Autriche et I'eglise du Val-de-Grace (Paris, 1916). 
15. There are many books on St. Vincent de Paul. In addition to G. Maynard, 
St. Vincent de Paul (1827), III, 393-403, C. Capefigue, Vie de St. Vincent de Paul 
(1839) and Siiri Juva, Monsieur Vincent, evolution d'un Saint (Paris, 1939) 
should be consulted. 
16. Quoted by P. -H. Cherot, ha premiere jeunesse de Louis XIV, p. 49. 
17. Louis seems not to have been punished very often, since none of the 
memoir writers make much of it. This contrasts strikingly with the treatment his 
father had been given in his boyhood. Henri IV believed that no one should 
rule who had not "felt the whip himself." Anne was less cruel in her treatment 
of her son, but we cannot assume that the difference in punishment in part accounts 
for the fact that Louis XIII used the ax where Louis XIV relied upon the prison; 
on the other hand, it must be given consideration. 
18. Le Sacre et couronnement de Louis XIV (1717); Le veritable journal de ce 
qui s'est passe au sacre du roy Louis XIV (1654); Ceremonies faites et ob­
servees au sacre et couronnement du roy Louis XIV, 7 juin, 1654 (n.d.). 
19. Dubois, Journal du valet de chambre Dubois, ed. L£on Aubineau, Bib. de 
I'Ecole de Chartres, IV, 2d ser., 1847-48, pp. 22-25; Fenelon, CEuvres completes, 
VI, 509. 
20. The magic of mid-twentieth-century recording is making this music available 
today. A magnificent example is the Lully Te Deum, Westminster Hi-Fi W.L. 5326. 
21. Louis was not the only seventeenth-century ruler with so nai've a view; 
his cousin Leopold of Austria was sure that God had withdrawn protection from 
the house of Hapsburg during a particularly unhappy period of his life. Louis 
writes in one place, "Les heureux succes que j'avais en toutes ces choses me faisant 
voir la protection que Dieu donnait aux premices de mon administration, je 
m'efforcais aussi de lui faire paraitre mon zele en tout ce que regardait son 
service" (Dreyss [ed.], Memoires de Louis XIV, II, 417-18). And in yet another 
passage he indicates that he does not think that observance of cult is enough: a 
king must also give his "heart" to God (ibid., II, 422-23). 
22. Dreyss (ed.), Memoires de Louis XIV, I, 208 ff. 
23. A. Lloyd Moote, in "The Parlement of Paris: The French Crown and 
Royal Absolutism during the Fronde, 1643-1652" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Minnesota, 1958), analyzes the problem of the conflict between the two levels of 
royal officials and presents a fresh interpretation of this important aspect of the 
Fronde. 
24. The pamphlet literature and songs of the period were scurrilous in the 
extreme. One version of a song popular at the time went as follows: 
Veut on scavior la difference 
qu'il y a de son Eminence 
et le feu Monsieur la Cardinal 
La response en est toute preste 
Ton conduisoit son animal 
et l'autre monte sur sa Beste. 
(Bibliotheque Mazarine, MS 2158 [27] 
See also Pierre Barbier and France Vernillat, Histoire de France par les chansons, 
Vol. II, Mazarin et Louis XIV (Paris, 1956). 
25. Dreyss (ed.), Memoires de Louis XIV, II, 373-74. 
26. Siege of Bellegarde, April, 1650. 
27. Memoires de Mile de Montpensier, ed. J. F. Michaud and J. J. F. Poujoulat 
(Paris, 1838), p. 263. All discussion of the Fronde was banned at court, as though 
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Louis the man wanted to forget what had happened to Louis the boy; but the 
reflection "on the miserable condition of princes subjected to the will of their 
people" and "on the conduct of princes of the royal house" are only part of the 
evidence that it was not forgotten (Dreyss [ed.], Memoires de Louis XIV, II, 5-13). 
28. "Lettre de la Reyne a Mms. de la Chambre touchant le gouvernment de la 
personne du roy," March 15, 1646, Bibliotheque Mazarine, Paris, MS 2117. 
29. Cf. P.-A. Cheruel (ed.), Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin (Paris, 1872-1906), 
Vols. V, VI, and VII passim. 
30. The quotation is from Memoires de I'abbe de Choisy, ed. J. Michaud, 
pp. 6-7, but the idea runs through Mazarin's letters. For example, he wrote to 
Louis during the Mancini crisis that he knew that 'la Confidante [Anne] 
s'interesse plus que personne a vous voir non seulement le plus grand roy au 
monde, mais le plus honnest homme" (Cheruel [ed.], Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin, 
IX, 28). He hoped to use Louis's love for his mother and knowledge of her 
wishes to see him a good man to control the king's emotions. About the same 
time he wrote to Anne, "Je suis au desespoir de voir la payne ou vous estes de 
toutes les choses que vous avez la bonte de me mander . . . priant Dieu de tout 
mon coeur qu'il benisse mes intentions; car, en ce cas, le Confident sera le plus 
grand roy du monde et plus heureux . . .  " (Bibliotheque Nationale, MSS 863, 
I; 188, V). 
31. Cheruel (ed.), Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin, IV, 435. 
32. Ibid., V, 649. 
33. Ibid., V, xiv. 
34. Ibid., VIII, 498 ff. 
35. L'Education politique de Louis XIV (2d ed.; Paris, 1923), pp. 136-37. 
36. In this paper we shall not consider the question of the wisdom of the 
policies defined by Mazarin and carried out by Louis XIV. This is obviously another 
problem. 
37. The Dreyss edition, Vol. I, contains an exhaustive analysis of the problems 
of authorship of these Memoires. See also P.-A. Cheruel, Etude sur la valeur 
historique des "Memoires de Louis XIV" (Paris, 1886) and Paul Sonnino's essay 
in this collection. 
38. Both are to be found in the Bibliotheque Nationale. The Cornets, written in 
Italian, French, and Spanish, all in a crabbed hand, are now in the process of 
being re-edited. 
39. When Louis XIII died, she knelt down and made an obeisance before her 
child son as her king; and, as mentioned above, until she died, she was a courtesan. 
40. Cheruel (ed.), Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin, VI, VII, VIII passim. 
41. John B. Wolf, The Emergence of the Great Powers, 1685-1715 (New York, 
1951), p. 44. 
42. This point of view, however, is postulated upon ideas unknown in the 
seventeenth century (cf. Sir George Clark, War and Society in the Seventeenth 
Century [Cambridge, England, 1958]) or upon uncritical acceptance of Louis's 
remark as an old man: "J'ai trop aime la guerre." Warfare provided the sole means 
of giving firm contours to large aspects of seventeenth-century political society. 
Louis's fault was not so much love of war as it was his failure to understand what 
was happening in Europe after the treaty of Nijmegen; it did not prove easy to 
disengage France from a war that was undertaken as a limited adventure. But 
this is another story. 
43. Dreyss (ed.), Memoires de Louis XIV, II, 15. 
44. Both the number and the elaborate structure of these celebrations, festivals, 
welcomes, and so on, is astonishing. It is only after studying the numerous records 
of these festivities honoring the king that one can get an understanding of Louis's 
later vision of himself. It would have taken a remarkable person to have been 
unaffected by the adulation inherent in the worship of the "cult of the king." See 
John B. Wolf, Louis XIV (New York, 1968), pp. 357-78. 
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45. Omer Talon, Memoires (The Hague, 1732), IV, 182-94. 
46. Between the library of the University of Minnesota and the Newberry 
Library at Chicago, the Midwest has about as many titles of this Mazarinade litera­
ture as one can find in the libraries of Paris. 
47. Recueil des maximes veritahles et importants pour Vinstruction du roy, 1652, 
by Claude Joly, was apparently widely read by clergymen, for many quoted freely 
from it. 
48. Dreyss (ed.), Mimoires de Louis XIV, II, 422-23. 
49. Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin, La Paix des Pyrenees, IX, p. 75. 
50. Dreyss (ed.), Memoires de Louis XIV, II, 6-8. 
51. Cf. Vallot, D'Aquin, and Fagon, Journal de la sante du rot Louis XIV de 
Vannee 1647 a Vannee 1711, ed. J. -A. LeRoi (Paris, 1862), passim. Cf. the essay 
in this volume by Charles D. O'Malley. 
52. J. Dollard and N. E. Miller, Personality and Psychotherapy: An Analysis in 
Terms of Learning, Thinking, and Culture (New York, 1950); C. S. Hall and G. 
Lindsay, Theories of Personality (New York, 1957); O. H. Mowrer, Learning 
Theory and Personality Dynamics (New York, 1950). The present writer is in­
debted to his wife for insights and bibliography in this section. Naturally, she is 
not responsible for the form of the statement. 
53. These processes lose none of their significance because they seem frequently 
to be unconscious or unintentional on the part of the child and/or the parents. 
A succinct statement re this viewpoint can be found in J. McV. Hunt (ed.), 
Personality and the Behavior Disorders: A Handbook Based on Experimental and 
Clinical Research (New York, 1944), pp. 85-113; but, as most of the readers will 
know, it occurs widely in the literature of personality development. 
54. It is the present writer's opinion that Louis's subsequent marriage to Maria 
Theresa, a woman of very limited abilities, was responsible for much of the 
disorder in his personal life. 
55. Obviously, there were other factors and personalities involved in the 
formation of the king; the role of his parents, however, deserves the special 
treatment given in this paper. 
The Medical History of Louis XIV: 
Intimations of Mortality 
C. D. O MALLEY 
L OUIS of Bourbon, elder son and heir to the throne of France, "after having kept the queen in labor for more than five hours," 
was born at 11:22 in the morning of September 5, 1638, ushered into 
the world by a single midwife, Dame Peronne. His royal parents, 
Louis XIII and Anne of Austria, had lived through twenty-two years 
of sterile matrimony and strong mutual hatred prior to the birth of 
the child, so that it was no wonder that the French nation looked 
upon the event as little short of miraculous and called the infant 
prince Louis Dieudonne. Moreover, according to an old superstition, 
a child born with teeth already apparent was a child favored by 
destiny, and the infant Louis could display two such prophetic teeth 
that, incidentally, boded ill for the wet nurses of the royal child who, 
as Hugo Grotius was to write to Christina of Sweden, "not only 
drains the breast of his nurse, but lacerates it with his biting. Let 
France's neighbors take care against such an early voracity." Indeed, 
the infant prince had a succession of wet nurses, each in turn com­
pelled to retire as a result of this rather bizarre occupational hazard. 
Among these lactifluous heroines we may salute Elisabeth Ancel, 
Pierrette Dufour, and Marie de Segneville Thierry. 
To be born alive in the seventeenth century represented triumph 
over merely the first of many lethal obstacles between the infant and 
the adult, even though, as in the instance of the recently born 
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dauphin, everything possible would be done to insure survival. 
Actually, from our point of view, not a great deal was then possible; 
and that Louis survived into the eighteenth century was despite him­
self, his physicians, and the then uncontrolled diseases that were 
ubiquitously active, their transmission made all the easier by reasons 
of the throngs that crowded the court. 
Hygienically speaking, it was a dirty world, less concerned with 
personal cleanliness—at least in regard to bathing—than had been 
so in the previous period of the Renaissance or even of the Middle 
Ages. Although it was recognized that from time to time bathing was 
necessary, usually such baths were recommended as part of medical 
treatment; they were occasionally prescribed for Louis XIV, but in­
frequently, since it was believed that they were a cause of his head­
aches and fits of vertigo. In contrast, it was recognized that the hands 
ought to be, not necessarily washed, but at least wiped with a cloth 
daily upon arising; and in Louis's case the cloth was normally first 
dipped in brandy, providing perhaps, not apparent cleanliness but at 
least a fortuitous antiseptic measure. Further hand-wiping followed 
meals since as yet, even at court, the fork was an uncommon piece 
of tableware. 
The extended period during which clothing was worn without 
change was a complementary feature of that unhygienic age, but 
did not represent any retrogression from earlier practices. The heavy, 
elaborate costumes may have provided some comforting warmth dur­
ing the cold season, but at other times of the year they naturally 
promoted perspiration and compounded the olfactory offense of which 
even the sinners occasionally complained and sought its concealment 
under the pungent cloak of strong perfumes. To conclude, it may be 
added that the handkerchief was considered to be part of one's adorn­
ment and an object primarily for use in various polite gestures 
and flourishes; nasal cleanliness was achieved by other and less 
pleasant means. 
Living conditions were a source of similar sensory unpleasantness, 
and, in addition, contributed more effectively to ill health. Large, 
high-ceilinged rooms were naturally difficult to heat, especially in an 
era of inefficient heating devices; in consequence, they were often 
sealed so tightly that any proper ventilation was out of the question. 
The heavy furniture of the period, the beds enclosed by draperies 
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on all sides, contributed to this condition as well as to an interior 
gloom and somberness. As one should not be astonished at the absence 
of bathrooms, so, too, of the privy, a rare adornment of homes, or 
even palaces, although toward the close of the century a number of 
them were installed at Versailles but as curious luxuries rather than 
necessities. The quantities of dogs that had, so to speak, the freedom 
of Versailles, especially in the king's quarters, somewhat nullified 
this last hygienic measure. In the midst of all this unpleasant lack of 
cleanliness, which from the viewpoint of later times would almost 
suggest a determination to make the onset of disease as easy as 
possible, it should be noted that, quite unlike the situation in Paris— 
where the waters of the Seine, used for both sewage disposal and 
consumption, represented an ever-present danger of disease—some 
effort was made at Versailles to provide water from a pure source. 
When there, Louis, on the advice of his physicians, drank only from 
an uncontaminated spring. 
Were disease to assert its presence, there was not very much that 
the physician could do to stem the attack, even if he succeeded in 
making a correct diagnosis. Indeed, he was more likely to attempt 
far too much and so obstructively weaken his patient's natural re­
cuperative powers. Despite some advancement in basic medical re­
search and some improvement in surgical techniques, clinical medicine 
of seventeenth-century France for the most part displayed little 
advancement over that of the previous century. In fact, there were 
few French clinicians of the time who displayed the merits of such 
sixteenth-century figures as Jean Fernel and Guillaume Baillou, or, 
in the seventeenth century, could approach the accomplishments of 
Thomas Sydenham in England and Giorgio Baglivi in Italy; there 
is considerably more fact than fantasy in Moliere's unflattering repre­
sentations of the French physicians of his day. 
This cheerless situation was certainly not improved by the conflict 
between the methods and philosophies of the two rival medical 
schools of Paris and Montpellier, which led each to attempt to 
prevent graduates of the other from practicing in its area, and, 
generally speaking, made it impossible for whatever the merits of 
one school to be accepted and introduced into the other. Paris 
recognized a strict allegiance to orthodox, Galenic herbal medicine, 
but Montpellier, despite some basic Galenism, had for long covered 
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itself with a veneer of Moslem influence in so far as its pharma­
copoeia was concerned, to which, under the influence of Lazare 
Riviere (i589-1655), it added the spagyric doctrine of Paracelsus; 
most notably, Montpellier took its stand on the use of antimony, a 
purgative mineral drug that was long anathema to Paris. 
The hostility between the two schools was brought to a head in 
consequence of the activities and temporarily successful defiance of 
Paris by Theophraste Renaudot (1584-1653), a graduate of Mont­
pellier (1606). Arriving in Paris in 1612, Renaudot gained nominal 
appointment as a physician to Louis XIII, which gave him the right 
to carry on a private practice that was unusually successful owing to 
Renaudot's marked sense of publicity. As a "foreigner" and as an 
advocate of chemical drugs, especially antimony, the newcomer was 
bitterly attacked by the local physicians but found strong support 
among the apothecaries of Paris, who resented their subjugation to 
the medical faculty, and with Richelieu. The latter, looking with 
disfavor on the privileges and powers of the University of Paris, 
notably those of the medical faculty, saw in the dispute with Mont­
pellier an opportunity to gain control of the former institution. With 
Renaudot as his cat's-paw, he developed plans for the construction of 
a charitable medical clinic in the suburb of Saint-Antoine as the 
first step toward the establishment of an institution to rival, and hence 
to reduce, the power of the medical faculty as a move toward the 
subjugation of the university as a whole. However, with Richelieu's 
death, the scheme collapsed; and the Paris faculty, suddenly em­
boldened by this turn of events, in 1644 undertook a lawsuit aimed at 
strengthening restrictions against the practice of medicine by "foreign­
ers" in Paris, as well as emphasizing the prohibitions already existing 
against the use of antimony. Although the suit was successful, never­
theless the faculty had had a bad scare that tended to intensify feelings 
against Montpellier and its products. 
During the long reign of Louis XIV the direction of the royal 
medical service had been drawn at one time from Paris and at another 
from Montpellier; and since the king lived most of his life in or near 
Paris, those premier physicians who were products of the southern 
school were subjected to constant harassment from a source dis­
tressingly near at hand, and especially from the caustic pen of Guy 
Patin (1601-1672), member of the Paris faculty of medicine and 
I36 LOUIS XIV AND THE CRAFT OF KINGSHIP 
its self-appointed spokesman and defender. Patin was a violent 
opponent of the slightest deviation from Galenic orthodoxy, and his 
conservative position may be judged from his assertion that Harvey's 
doctrine of the circulation of the blood was "paradoxical, useless, 
false, impossible, absurd, and harmful." However, no matter which 
philosophy controlled the direction of the royal medical service, the 
existence of two such strongly opposed and belligerently divergent 
philosophies within the kingdom could only be harmful to that service. 
Nor was this situation of disquiet within the royal medical service 
the result solely of conflicting professional philosophies. The ever-
increasing idleness of the nobility at the royal court and a consequent 
serious concern with frivolity and gossip led to its taking the utmost 
interest in every aspect of the king's life, including those matters 
relating to his health. Of course, at a time when everything depended 
upon the favor of this one man, it was undoubtedly of importance to 
know the state of the royal health, which might determine decisions 
affecting the personal lives of the courtiers; perhaps, too, it might be 
possible to make one's own contribution to the maintenance or 
recovery of that health and thereby gain some token of favor. Memoirs 
of the period contain much gossip about the inconsequent details of 
Louis's frequent bouts of self-induced gastric upset, his headaches, 
colds, and, of course, his more serious ailments; it seems, too, that 
there was no detail of the royal physiological processes that was not 
discussed with amazing frankness as to function or malfunction. Such 
lack of delicacy should be no cause for astonishment when one con­
siders that the king himself set this earthly tone by such practices as 
giving audiences from his chaise percee or by reading, without em­
barrassment or displeasure—perhaps with satisfaction—his physician's 
account of the various purges given him with monotonous regularity 
and the resultant, carefully counted, multiple bowel movements. Great 
ladies of the court occasionally made all preliminary arrangements 
in the royal presence for the taking of a clyster, and the device itself 
was frequently the subject of the artist's pencil. 
The seventeenth century was the great age of the clyster, or enema, 
actually an ancient device but given great prominence and certain 
refinements in Regnier de Graaf's book on the subject, and generally 
used as a purgative or an emollient measure. In time it came to have 
a certain literary prominence as the "instrument of Moliere" because 
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of the place it held in many of the great dramatist's plays in which 
he so frequently satirized the medical profession of his day, especially 
its blind faith in certain therapeutic measures and its determination 
to employ those measures, whether needed or not. Hence when one 
of the characters in The Doctor despite Himself remarks, "I never 
felt better in my life," the reply is, "This superabundance of health 
forbodes some evil; and it would not be amiss to bleed you gently, 
and administer a little dulcifying injection." Such, in fact, was often 
the fate of the unfortunate king. To the seventeenth century such 
facts—which no one pretended to conceal, even to the actual em­
ployment of the instrument—added further to its distinction. No 
well-run household would ever be without it, and fashionable society 
required its daily use. 
It was no great distance from concern with every royal symptom 
to confident, curial diagnosis, and, finally, equally confident proposals 
for treatment, so that the premier physician often found himself 
compelled to compete with courtiers in the maintenance or recovery 
of his royal patient's health. This particular plague of non-professional 
advice arose chiefly among the women of the court. 
Despite the apparent brilliance of the royal court, many of its 
members were, in fact, not far or long removed from the earlier, 
rustic, and unsophisticated life of the French nobility in which the 
nobleman's wife had dispensed medicine and medical advice through­
out the countryside, and within her own household had ministered 
to a large brood of children subject to many diseases and, indeed, 
mostly carried off in their early years. Such medicines had been of 
the homely variety that had no sanction in any pharmacopoeia but 
were, nevertheless, time-honored within the family or had been 
accepted for use on the recommendation of some other noblewoman. 
Occasionally, they may have had some value, knowledge of which 
had been gained empirically; but often these medicines reflected 
nothing but gullibility and superstition. At court such medicines might 
be altered on the side of pseudosophistication, but the tradition of the 
woman's role in treatment remained, as well as the belief that 
medicine was actually a very simple affair; as the Marquise de 
Sevigne wrote, "The study of medicine is neither long nor difficult," 
and, she continued, one might quickly learn more about it than any 
physician. The marquise, an especially gullible woman, was always 
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a ready prey to the latest charlatan so that in the course of her in­
dustrious letter-writing, she was never at a loss for some new remedy 
to recommend strongly to her trusting family or friends; it was her 
sort, "the woman who interferes with our profession," that Guy Patin 
described as "a stupid animal." 
The new, superficial splendor of the court, the desire to replace 
any appearance of rusticity by one of sophistication, and to indicate 
one's membership in the circle of learned women—who were, of 
course, completely unlearned so far as medicine was concerned—led 
to the production of new medicines and panaceas of which the more 
esoteric the ingredients, the greater the belief in their efficacy. In 
illustration we may turn once again to the Marquise de Sevigne, 
whom we find recommending a broth made from viper's flesh for 
the improvement of vision while others recommended the therapeutic 
value of oil of scorpions, or an essence of urine. Such activities were 
strongly supported by boredom, gullibility married to enterprising 
charlatanry, as well as by the rage for alchemy and the search for 
the philosopher's stone. The results were as completely nasty as they 
were ineffectual. Even chocolate, tea, and coffee, because of their 
novelty, were for a time looked upon as having therapeutic value— 
even by physicians—although in the completely irrational fashion of 
the day there were those who declared such beverages to be harmful 
and, on occasion, even lethal if used in large amounts or over a 
long period of time. 
The royal medical service as it was to be found in the reign of 
Louis XIV had its beginnings with the first Bourbon king, Henri 
IV, under whom for the first time the premier physician, or archiater, 
became one of the high-ranking officials of the court. Indeed, the 
archiater was in some ways set apart from all others since by the 
nature of his duties he had access to the monarch at all hours— 
under Louis XIV, even before the first levee—was aware of certain 
intimate aspects of the royal life and person denied to all others, and 
might develop a uniquely personal influence over the monarch that 
could be maintained or improved through such unlimited approach 
and opportunities to make the most of his patient's physical and 
mental condition. Although the members of the court might have 
scant regard, if any, for the archiater as a man, nevertheless, even 
the highest nobility paid close heed to his remarks and activities in 
his official capacity. 
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In the fully developed service of Louis XIV, the archiater—or, 
officially, "Premier physician of the king"—once appointed was pretty 
much at liberty to appoint the rest of the staff, including a physician-
in-ordinary—not an associate but, rather, an assistant lacking either 
the status or the income of the archiater but occasionally able to 
succeed or to supplant him. Eight further physicians served for tri­
mestrial periods at court, and throughout the kingdom there were 
sixty-six consultant physicians to be called upon whenever the king 
ventured forth on a tour of his realm. Later, four "spagyrists," or 
physicians specializing in the use of chemical drugs, represented a 
triumph of the medical school of Montpellier; and their further con­
cern with alchemy demonstrated the continued irrational, gullible 
character of the age, as did also the two "physician-mathematicians" 
who were, in fact, astrologers. The final appointment on what may 
be considered the professional level was that of the "physician­
botanist," although the control of the royal botanical garden, the 
Jardin des Plantes, and the related, valuable perquisites belonged to 
the archiater. 
Lower-ranking members of the royal service, since they were as yet 
declared officially to be members of crafts rather than professions, 
were the premier and second surgeons, eight more surgeons serving 
trimestrial periods, and twelve consultant surgeons located throughout 
the kingdom; still lower on the scale were the apothecaries and their 
assistants, and such so-called empirics as dentists, lithotomists, oculists, 
barbers, herbalists, and masseurs. In due course, as it came to be 
considered desirable to imitate the king in every way possible, not 
only did other members of the royal family develop their own medical 
hierarchies but also such members of the nobility as possessed the 
means for that purpose. 
From his birth until the year 1646, thus as dauphin and thereafter 
for his first several years as king, Louis was under the medical care 
of Jacques Cousinot (c. 1585-1646), a graduate of Paris (1618) and 
once dean of that school's faculty of medicine (1624); as a conse­
quence of his antecedents and his unquestioned and complete allegi­
ance to Galen, he enjoyed the favorable comment of his sharp-
witted colleague Patin. Because of admirable forethought, or, at least, 
good fortune, Cousinot had married a daughter of Charles Bouvard, 
premier physician of Louis XIII, and due to this circumstance was 
introduced to the court, became physician to the young dauphin, 
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and, virtually designated as successor to Bouvard, shared in the care 
of the tuberculous Louis XIII during the final period of his life. 
Faithful to the doctrines of Paris, Cousinot's treatment was no 
different from that of his father-in-law, who could declare proudly 
that in one year he had dosed the unfortunate, dying king with 215 
medicines, given him 212 clysters, and bled him on 47 occasions. 
Much as we may sympathize with Louis, who shortly before his 
death described his physicians as "executioners," such treatment was 
fully orthodox according to the Parisian school of medicine. 
Since Cousinot had no immediate and possible professional heirs 
upon his succession to the post of king's archiater in 1643, the 
question of who would next gain that position naturally became a 
source of the greatest interest in medical circles. It was further 
intensified by uncertainty as to whether the successor would be 
drawn from the school of Paris or from antimonial Montpellier, 
which, supported by Richelieu, had, upon the death of the cardinal, 
been successfully suppressed, as far as its influence was concerned, 
through the efforts of the briefly powerful Cousinot. 
The appointment of Cousinot, devoid of any consideration of his 
professional ability, had been the result of family influence as well 
as political turmoil and some reaction against the regime of Richelieu, 
in so far as he had shown favor to the products of Montpellier. The 
appointment of Frangois Vaultier (1590-1652) as the next premier 
physician was in turn the result of reaction against the previous 
monarch, as distinguished from Richelieu, and represented the favor 
of Mazarin and Anne of Austria, gained at least in part by Vaultier's 
clear record of disfavor in the eyes of the now defunct Louis XIII. 
After receiving his medical degree at Montpellier (1612), Vaultier 
came to Paris, where he succeeded in establishing a fashionable and 
lucrative practice. Introduced at court, it was not long before this 
handsome and presentable physician became the medical attendant of 
Marie de' Medici, but was dismissed by Louis XIII because of the 
great influence he was considered to have acquired over the queen 
mother. Thereupon, Vaultier joined the cabal against Richelieu and, 
with its failure, was imprisoned in the Bastille for the next twelve 
years. Such a past was enough to insure his welcome at the new 
court, to which he returned to become the physician to Mazarin and 
the confidant of Anne of Austria. He was even made one of the 
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physicians to the dying and helpless Louis XIII, but behaved with 
the utmost circumspection since succession to Cousinot was not 
beyond the bounds of possibility. 
Naturally, the conflicting medical philosophies of Paris and Mont­
pellier brought Vaultier, as the new premier physician, under fire of 
the Parisian faculty (notably, of course, that of Guy Patin, who 
declared him to lack knowledge of Hippocrates and Galen and to be 
mostly concerned with astrology, alchemy, and the search for the 
philosopher's stone). Nevertheless, Vaultier was a clever man, what­
ever his capacity as a physician, and, for better or worse, an innovator 
who had much to do with the further popularization of chemical 
drugs, especially the emetic antimony. His besetting sin was avarice, 
which could be regarded sympathetically by Mazarin; and in 1649 
it was nominally the king who rewarded Vaultier's services with the 
revenues of the abbey of Saint-Taurin d'Evreux "in special recognition 
of his cure of Monsieur, sole brother of the King." At this time Louis 
was eleven years old. 
There is little factual information regarding Vaultier's services as 
archiater. His successors were to keep a complete record of the 
king's health, illnesses, and medical treatment, the Journal de la Sante 
du Roi that, begun by the succeeding archiater, Antoine Vallot, was, 
however, retrospective for the year 1647 when Louis suffered an 
attack of smallpox, his first serious illness. Vallot, friend of Vaultier, 
fellow alumnus of Montpellier, and, so to speak, second in command, 
had been called into consultation on this occasion; hence the Journal, 
otherwise beginning with the year 1652, contains reference to this 
earlier medical problem, a success for the Montpellier physician over 
the objections of those of Paris. Vallot may well have included the 
case as a mark of gratitude for Vaultier's good will, ultimately of no 
little assistance in gaining him succession to the premier post in the 
royal medical service. 
On the eleventh of November, 1647, Louis complained of pains 
in the region of the kidneys and lower back, accompanied by a 
general malaise; a restless night, increasing fever, and certain other 
indications led Vaultier to consider the possibility of smallpox, and 
on the following day the king was bled. A second disturbed night 
was taken as indication for further bleeding, and by the thirteenth, 
any doubts of the nature of the disease were dispelled by the appear­
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ance of the pustules. Alarmed by a royal delirium, on the following 
morning Vaultier called into consultation Francois Guenault, a lead­
ing Parisian physician, Vallot, and Pierre and Claude Seguin, uncle 
and nephew, physicians to the queen mother. All agreed that the 
medicinal cordials thus far employed were satisfactory, although, 
curiously enough, the Seguins opposed a third bleeding, even carrying 
that opposition to the queen mother. Nevertheless, Vaultier, strongly 
supported by Vallot, ordered it carried out, and coincidentally and 
fortuitously the patient's condition appeared to improve; a later setback 
on the twenty-first led to a fourth bleeding on the following day that 
once again corresponded to improvement, and by the twenty-fifth a 
safe recovery was foreseen, to the relief not only of the physicians but 
of Mazarin and Anne of Austria, who, had the patient failed to 
respond, might have had their control of the state jeopardized. 
Although the young king from time to time suffered bouts of minor 
ill health arising from his gluttony, there was no further official 
medical information until 1652 when, upon the death of Vaultier, 
the post of premier physician was given to Antoine Vallot (1594­
1671), as has been mentioned, like his predecessor a graduate of 
Montpellier and consequently a partisan of that chemical pharmacy so 
strongly opposed by the orthodox, Galenic medical school of Paris. 
Arriving in Paris, Vallot had quickly gained a fashionable clientele, 
and through the influence of Vaultier became physician to Anne 
of Austria, a steppingstone to the king's service; however, it has been 
said, without clear proof, that the decisive factor was a payment of 
30,000 ecus to Mazarin. Vallot's strong support of Vaultier's treatment 
of Louis's smallpox in 1647 was by no means to his disadvantage, 
although, of course, the new premier physician was strongly criticized 
by Guy Patin, that foremost defender of the Parisian school of 
medicine. 
It was Vallot who initiated the Journal, or medical record of the 
king, that was fully and meticulously maintained by him and by 
his successors and remains the major source of knowledge of the state 
of Louis's health from 1652 to 1711. However, since Louis himself 
from time to time read the Journal, not only does it reflect the general 
aura of adulation that pervaded the court but also occasionally contains 
curious circumlocutions necessary for avoidance of any injury to the 
royal sensitivity. As well, one may find in it here and there expressions 
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of irritation aroused by meddling courtiers and some indication of the 
growing conflict of interests between physician and surgeon. 
Although the Journal introduces the young monarch as possessing 
every imaginable virtue, it nevertheless contains a note of reservation 
respecting his health, recognizing inheritance from a sickly father 
which it was hoped would be cancelled by that from a robust mother. 
In addition to this hint that the king would be well served by control 
over his already intemperate nature, there was the further suggestion 
of the importance of the medical service, requiring the premier 
physician to pay ever close heed to his patient lest medical aid need 
be thrown into the balance; nevertheless, the king's sympathy and 
all-important support seems never to have been extended to the 
medical profession as a whole, in contrast to his protection and even 
applause of Moliere, medicine's most savage critic. 
That Louis had at least inherited his mother's appetite—indeed, 
surpassed it to the point of gluttony—was already apparent in 1652 
when the new premier physician was required on several occasions 
to administer to a so-called flux of the stomach, or, as we may say, 
diarrhea. The malady and its treatment by purge, clyster, and diet 
(the last never maintained for long) appeared with monotonous 
regularity through the many years of the Journal. Constipation was 
also the major cause of Louis's bouts of vertigo, although sometimes 
these were partly fostered by other matters equally unsettling to 
digestion, such as various amorous pursuits during the king's earlier 
years and unfavorable military or political events during the later. In 
1653 Louis suffered on several occasions from the common cold, and 
this, too, was a complaint to which he was frequently subject 
throughout his life. 
It was not until 1655 that Louis, at the age of sixteen, was 
bothered by a second serious illness, the result of his initiation into 
the art of Venus by Madame de Beauvais, first lady of the bedchamber 
to Anne of Austria. Whether influenced solely by youthful inquisi­
tiveness or because of a total lack of discrimination—Madame de 
Beauvais, blind in one eye, was a woman of mature years—the young 
king gained not only initiation into the art of which he was soon to 
be recognized as a master but, as well, an unwelcome souvenir of 
this event in the form of gonorrhea. The symptoms as described 
to Vallot by the king's personal servitors and as observed by the 
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physician himself left no doubt as to diagnosis, but the problem was 
one requiring the utmost in medical diplomacy. Mindful of Louis's 
habit of reading the Journal, Vallot at first described the ailment as 
inexplicable, especially in view of the high moral and virtuous 
qualities of the patient; he finally hit upon the expedient of explain­
ing the symptoms as the result of excessive exercise, especially horse­
back-riding, which ought to be avoided for a time. Furthermore, Louis 
was advised—delicately, of course—that his complaint, "the first time 
that medical science has recorded such a case/' might have dire 
consequences in respect to future progeny and succession to the throne. 
However, the young king was impatient of any delay that might 
hinder his joining in the successful campaign being waged against 
the Spanish along the eastern border, and probably at first sufficiently 
ignorant, so that treatment was only intermittent, interrupted by the 
lure of military glory. But if these interruptions saved him from a 
certain number of bloodlettings, clysters, and medicines such as 
Vallot's Martial salt (prepared crayfish stones, pearls, and coral), 
at some state he seems to have discovered the true nature of his 
disease and some idea of the ridicule and embarrassment often asso­
ciated with it, since Vallot was ordered "not to speak to anyone 
of a matter of such consequence" and "to conceal the reason that 
required these remedies." The remedies were in fact altered from 
time to time, the last being large quantities of the water of Forges, 
brought in containers by relays of mounted troops. At the end of 
seven months Louis was declared recovered and, as history records, 
without any lasting injury to his procreative powers. 
As the attention of Venus had been a royal embarrassment, that of 
Mars was by long odds more threatening to the king's life. The 
account of this second illness bears some suggestion of typhus, then 
a common accompaniment of warfare and armies in the field, although 
the sickness has also been variously described as scarlatina, typhoid 
fever, and even malaria. According to the Journal: 
After the conquest of Dunkirk and Bergues, when the King was 
at Mardyke . .  . on Saturday, 29 June 1658, he was overwhelmed 
by an unusual warmth, weakness in all his limbs, and a severe 
headache; he was without force, vigor, and appetite. Then, soon 
after his return from a trip to Bergues, fever set in accompanied 
by extraordinary weakness. 
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At this time Vallot was in Calais attending to the mortally 
wounded Marechal de Castelnault; and to make matters even 
worse, Louis, anxious to return once more to Bergues, sought to 
conceal his condition. Nevertheless, it deteriorated so rapidly that it 
became apparent to Mazarin, then with the king, who ordered him 
taken to Calais, where Vallot awaited with the inevitable clyster; 
and despite the physician's recognition of Louis's "great weakness," 
nevertheless "that did not prevent the drawing of three basins of 
blood from the king's right arm." There can be no question as to 
the seriousness of the case, the high fever, delirium, eruption of 
"red, violet, and blackish spots . . . inflamed throat, and thick and 
black tongue"; indeed, for several days Louis was so little master of 
himself or of his surroundings as to be wholly incontinent. 
In all, from the onset of the disease until July twenty-second, 
when the king left Calais for a period of convalescence at Compiegne 
in the heartening company of Marie Mancini, he was bled eight 
times, purged on four occasions, and compelled now and then to 
submit to the indignity of the clyster. No doubt the recuperative 
powers of youth together with diet and rest, maintained "religiously 
and with great exactitude," and despite the violence of treatment, 
promoted recovery. Nevertheless, Vallot, as a son of Montpellier, 
would have us believe that the administration of the hitherto-banned 
antimony—"three ounces of emetic wine"—given on July eighth with 
the approval of Mazarin, had no little effect on the outcome of 
the case. According to this physician, the effect was "prodigious," a 
description strongly supported by further precise details, and "we 
recognized a notable change and a decrease in the fever and all that 
accompanied it." It was a marked victory for the school of Montpellier 
since henceforth antimony, become a remedy for the king, had to be 
recognized as a respectable medicine despite protests from Paris. But 
even Paris was compelled to capitulate in accordance with a decision 
of the Parlement of Paris in 1666. 
The final disease of Louis's youth was a case of measles contracted 
from his recent queen, Maria Theresa. A paragon among husbands, 
except when he was being unfaithful, Louis had manifested intense 
but indiscreet devotion during the queen's illness, remaining with 
her day and night and even sharing the connubial couch; in con­
sequence there could be little doubt of his fate. There is no particular 
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reason, however, for dwelling upon this incident in the calendar of 
royal ailments; suffice it to say that the first symptoms became 
apparent on May 28, 1663, but by June 5, thanks to the strength of 
his constitution, Louis began his convalescence and was able to enjoy 
Racine's ode celebrating his recovery from "the insolent disease that 
had dared to threaten him." 
Thereafter for some years, Louis's health suffered only from self­
afHicted abuses, that is, occasional gastric upset following upon 
excessive bouts of gluttony. His appetite was gigantic. A meal might 
consist, as on one occasion, of four bowls of different soups, a whole 
pheasant, a partridge, a large bowl of salad, two slices of ham, a slice 
of mutton, and a dish of pastries, topped off with fruit and boiled 
eggs. It was an abnormality that remained until the end of his life. 
As the gourmand king was no gourmet, so, according to report, he 
was not an elegant feeder, and, to quote from a contemporary text, 
"a person gifted with good hearing and standing in the next room 
with the door open, could hear an unmistakable sound of chewing." 
Later, as the king's dental problems developed, the chewing all but 
ceased, and food was sometimes wolfed—peas in their pods, for 
example—without mastication and, of course, with ultimately dis­
tressing results. Curiously enough, the king was abstemious in his 
drinking habits, and it was not until the age of twenty that he was 
prevailed upon to take a little wine with his meals, and that always 
much diluted. About 1675 the royal physician suggested that he 
drink coffee for his spells of dizziness, but the resultant restless nights 
compelled him to give it up. 
In 1662, for the first time, Louis experienced a spell of faintness 
and vertigo, a condition often to recur and ascribable to those dietary 
excesses just mentioned, sometimes assisted by immoderate work or 
pleasures and perhaps occasionally assignable to particular events. In 
1661, as a result of Mazarin's death, Louis for the first time assumed 
the actual reins of government; it seems not unlikely that intensive 
concentration upon affairs of government may have been a factor 
helping to bring on the first bout of the new and troublesome con­
dition. Nor should we overlook the fact that throughout much of 
his life Louis, like his father, suffered from intestinal worms, first 
discovered in 1659. In this regard, however, strong doubt must be 
expressed over the proposal of two of the king's biographers, Louis 
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Bertrand and G. Lenotre, to the effect that Louis, unknown to his 
physicians, harbored throughout his life a gigantic worm, of a size 
truly worthy of the great monarch, and that this was the actual 
cause of his enormous appetite—that Louis was in fact eating for 
two—and his bouts of vertigo. 
Although it is difficult to place any credence in the theory of a 
king-sized ascarid lurking through the years in the royal intestines, on 
the other hand it seems probable that, at least in the latter half of his 
life, the king's "naturally very bad teeth" were contributory to his 
gastrointestinal difficulties. For a long period he had been subject 
to toothache, which could often be calmed by the use of essence of 
clove or essence of thyme. During a period of hunting in September, 
1678, and in consequence of exposure to bad weather, Louis caught 
cold and with it developed a dental abscess that produced a suppurat­
ing periostitis. In 1685, as a result of caries, it became necessary to 
extract all the teeth on the left side of the upper jaw. However, the 
extraction was carried out in such clumsy fashion that the jawbone 
was split and a portion of it carried away with the teeth, and in time 
the hole that resulted became carious. Although Dubois, the royal 
dentist, cauterized its sides with satisfactory results, henceforth when­
ever Louis drank, the water was liable to go from his mouth into 
his nose "and flow from there as from a fountain"; Moreover, as a 
consequence of his loss of teeth on this occasion, as well as others, 
the king could not masticate his food properly, a fact readily apparent 
in the closely watched royal stools. This disastrous condition, com­
pounded with the king's dietary intemperance, reached a climax in 
periodic and embarrassing incidents, even in the presence of 
visiting dignitaries. 
Meanwhile, the death of Vallot in 1671 had been followed the 
next year by the appointment of Antoine d'Aquin (c. 1620-1696) 
as premier physician. As a graduate of Montpellier (1648), he repre­
sented a continuation of that school's ascendancy in the royal medical 
service, a continuity made even tighter by the fact that D'Aquin had 
married a niece of Vallot. It was this relationship, coupled with dis­
creet deference to his uncle-by-marriage, that led to D'Aquin's 
appointment in 1667 as physician to the queen; and the strong 
support of Madame de Montespan, then at the height of her power, 
gained him appointment as premier physician to the king in 1672, 
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despite a vigorous contrary campaign of intrigue by the Parisian 
medical faculty. 
Relative to the seventeenth century, it may be said that the king 
was now entering upon his elder years, although, as it turned out, 
that final period of his life was to be an unusually extended one. 
Nevertheless, he seemed to become more prone to brief illnesses and 
accidents and began to develop some more or less chronic complaints. 
In 1679, as the result of exposure to inclement weather while hunt­
ing, he caught a severe cold that left him for several months with an 
unpleasant cough. In 1682 he had his first attack of gout, an inheri­
tance from his father and grandfather and made inevitable by his 
dietary habits. In 1683 exposure during the course of a hunt led to 
otitis, and in the same year a fall from his horse produced a dis­
located elbow; within the same month an inflammation of the left 
axilla produced lymphangitis. This doleful accumulation of ailments, 
as well as the sudden death of the queen in 1683 from staphylococcal 
septicemia, the result of an axillary abscess, was a kind of preparatory 
stage for the most dramatic and publicized incident in Louis's medical 
history, his anal fistula. 
On 15 January 1686, his Majesty complained of a small tumor 
. . . two finger-widths from the anus, rather deep, insensible to 
touch, without pain, redness, or pulsation; otherwise he was well 
and in no way impeded in his normal activities, even horseback 
riding. Nevertheless, this tumor, little by little, appeared to grow 
and harden, and on 31 January it seemed to us significant enough 
so that we pressed the King to accept some remedies to resolve 
it if possible. His Majesty agreed, and on 5 February a poultice 
was applied. 
When it was realized that the tumor was not responding to such 
treatment, the premier surgeon, Charles Francois Felix de Tassy (d. 
1703), urged upon Louis the advisability of surgery, but the latter, 
rather than submit, preferred first to pay heed to the urgings of 
courtiers. As a result, he was prevailed upon to try a plaster prepared 
by one of the ladies of the court, Madame de la Daubiere; and this 
was administered in the presence of, and under the direction of, the 
lady herself. However, a trial of several days convinced Louis that 
the highly praised remedy was useless, and, in considerable pain 
and hardly able to walk, he took to his bed. The care of the problem 
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was restored to the physicians, now understandably somewhat irri­
tated, who decided that the tumor must be drained. To this end they 
applied a caustic to it, but the result was merely a small opening, 
not sufficient for complete drainage, and in consequence a fistula 
developed penetrating into the rectum. 
Despite this unfortunate turn of events, Louis recovered his 
mobility and appears to have suffered no great inconvenience in his 
activities; in fact, he was sufficiently active to take up horseback-
riding again. Nevertheless, his medical staff was greatly disturbed, 
although it was not until the latter part of the year that the king 
could be induced to submit to more radical treatment by surgery. 
By mid-summer his condition was widely known, and in the manner 
of the times a variety of remedies had been proposed from all sides, 
especially since it was felt by those at court and elsewhere that 
resort to surgery would be unnecessarily dangerous; and those who 
could not otherwise meddle turned to the churches in order to seek 
divine assistance for this regal sub-divinity. 
Louis was only too willing to try the various treatments proposed 
before yielding to the terrors of surgery, but even his civil councilors 
recognized the necessity for prior trials. Thus when the healing power 
of the waters of Bareges was recommended, four volunteers with the 
king's complaint were sent to Bareges at royal expense; but Gervais, 
surgeon to the Hopital de la Charite, who accompanied them, was 
compelled to report with regret that daily injections of the water into 
the fistulas of these volunteers showed no curative effect. A similar 
group of subjects was dispatched to test the waters of Bourbon, 
recommended by one of the ladies of the court, once more to no 
avail. Still other remedies were offered, and since none of them 
could be ignored, Louvois, one of the chief ministers of state, was 
compelled to set up a kind of temporary research station in Paris to 
which fistulous volunteers came or were summoned to give their 
services as human experimental animals. None of the remedies was 
found to live up to advance testimonials. 
The king had been kept advised of these trials by Louvois and 
Felix de Tassy, the latter losing no opportunity to declare that only 
surgery could produce a cure. Finally, after further consultation with 
a famous Parisian surgeon, Bessieres, who supported the advice of 
the royal surgeon, Louis was reluctantly convinced that there was no 
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alternative to that drastic procedure, although first demanding that 
it be explained to him step by step. Actually, the royal surgeon had 
never performed such an operation, and in order to gain experience, 
as well as to perfect the instruments necessary for it, he rounded up 
further volunteers in Paris upon whom he practiced. Inevitably some 
of them died or, we may say, sacrificed their lives in a national cause. 
On November 18, 1686, "the great operation" took place at 
Versailles. At five o'clock a preparatory clyster was administered, and 
at seven, with Louis placed on the edge of his bed, a pillow under 
his belly, and his thighs held wide apart by two apothecaries, the 
operation was performed by Felix de Tassy, attended by the members 
of the medical staff as well as by Louvois and Madame de Maintenon. 
It was completely successful, and an hour later Louis was able to 
receive from his bed the major personages of the court and there­
after hold a meeting of the conseil d'en haut. 
Despite some tendency to be amused by the nature of the ailment 
and by a mental picture of the ridiculous position of the august 
monarch during the course of the operation, we should note it as 
much to Louis's credit that he bore the considerable pain quite un­
flinchingly and without complaint. Moreover, he was well aware who 
deserved the credit; and although he presented D'Aquin with a gift 
of 100,000 livres, he gave three times that amount, as well as an 
estate, to the surgeon. Indeed, the success of this highly publicized 
operation had some share in promoting the status of surgery in 
France, so long subservient to medicine. A ludicrous instance of this 
is to be found in the case of the thirty gentlemen of the court who, 
in complete health, applied to the royal surgeon to duplicate the 
king's operation upon them, and their intense disappointment when 
informed that they lacked the requirement for such surgery. 
Throughout the remainder of Louis's life his medical history, 
although revealing frequent instances of morbidity, for the most part 
lacked those dramatic qualities that had hitherto aroused national 
interest; then and henceforth, that history was more indicative of 
advancing years and, in some degree, a full harvest reaped from 
earlier intemperance. It should be no cause for astonishment that 
the king began to surfer from gout, a complaint which, as mentioned 
earlier, attacked him first in 1682 and recurred periodically for the 
rest of his life—from 1686 onward becoming chronic—producing 
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not only the usual pain but sometimes utter incapacity. Sometimes the 
gout was blamed on diet, resulting in short but, of course, never-
sustained periods of restricted regimen. In 1689 the wine of Cham­
pagne, always drunk temperately by the king, was declared the 
villain and, on the order of the premier physician, replaced by that 
of Burgundy, so producing a heated polemical exchange between the 
vintners of Champagne and Burgundy over the merits of their 
respective wines. 
On August, 6, 1686, "the king awoke at three o'clock in the 
morning with headache, his teeth chattering, a feeling of lassitude 
and weakness, and some fever." Although there are a few possible 
indications of malaria earlier in Louis's medical history, henceforth 
there was to be no doubt of the nature of this further complaint, a 
side effect of such pleasure as he gained from his new residence at 
Marly. The very rustic design of woods and waters that Louis en­
joyed provided an excellent breeding area for the Anopheles mosquito, 
vector for the malaria then endemic in parts of northern Europe. 
Louis's recurring attacks, coinciding with his summer visits to Marly, 
were, however, relatively effectively controlled by the administration 
of a preparation of cinchona bark, introduced at the French court 
by an English pharmacist, Sir Robert Talbor. Unlike Cromwell, who 
died of malaria because, reputedly, he would not be dosed with 
"Jesuit bark," the French king purchased the method of preparation 
from Talbor. Thereafter, the new medicine enjoyed great popularity 
as a panacea, so that, as Racine wrote to Boileau, "one no longer 
sees at court anyone whose belly is not full of quinine." 
In 1693 D'Aquin was removed from office partly as a result of 
his avaricious demands upon the king, of which the latter had 
grown weary, partly as a result of his unwise criticism of other 
members of the medical service (especially Felix de Tassy, who had 
profited so greatly in wealth and esteem from his successful treatment 
of the king's fistula), and partly as the result of a court intrigue in 
which Fagon, then physician to the royal children, succeeded, with 
the help of Madame de Maintenon, in undermining D'Aquin's pro­
fessional reputation. For the first time since 1646 a graduate of the 
Parisian medical school was placed in charge of the royal medical 
service: Guy-Crescent Fagon (1638-1718), M.D. (1663); physician 
to the dauphine (1680); premier physician to the queen (1680­
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1683); thereafter, to the royal children; and, finally, premier physician 
to the king (1693-1715). 
It is to Fagon's credit that he recognized the damage that had 
resulted from the rivalry between Paris and Montpellier and so 
sought to introduce a spirit of conciliation that was of some success 
in helping to bring about advancement in French medicine. As 
premier physician, he naturally took over the care of those problems 
of the king's health already existing as well as several new ones. 
"On 12 August [1696] as the King was putting on his perruque 
in the morning, he felt a pain at the nape of the neck where I 
[Fagon] saw a red point which I recognized as a furuncle." Attempts 
to relieve this condition by the application of plasters were unsuc­
cessful, since the furuncle continued to grow in size, became sup­
purative, and developed into a carbuncle that required the royal 
surgeon's services; two incisions provided for drainage. Some days 
later a second carbuncle appeared nearby to the great distress of 
everyone—causing Madame de Maintenon to faint at the news— 
since the condition was one considered to have lethal potentialities. 
However, the second carbuncle was also opened, and by the end of 
seven weeks the king was declared to be safely recovered from this 
acute problem representing merely an incident within the pattern of 
his more chronic complaints. 
Long and frequently subject to colds, Louis now began to develop 
complications in the form of heavy, chronic nasal discharge and 
prolonged fits of coughing. Gravel and renal colic first appeared in 
1709, made all the more vexing by the accompaniment of increas­
ingly frequent bouts of constipation and the discomfort of flatulence 
arising from unreformed dietary habits and an ever-decreasingly 
active life as age advanced and the king was compelled to shoulder 
more and more of the cares of state. Yet, whatever else might change, 
the huge royal appetite remained constant, so much so that, for 
example, we find a weary and aging Louis genuinely considering his 
dinner as a slight one when it included no more than a few crusts of 
bread, a bowl of soup and three roasted chickens. 
For various reasons Fagon did not carry the Journal beyond the 
year 1711, hence there is no official medical description of Louis's 
final days and death. In consequence we must rely chiefly on the 
accounts of Saint-Simon and Dangeau, from whom we learn that 
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the king was reasonably active until the final weeks of his life. From 
August 15, 1715, he was bedridden, for the first week bothered by 
a general discomfort that gradually became centered in his left leg. 
In the final week senile gangrene made its appearance as the leg 
became gangrenous from foot to thigh, indicating that it would be 
only a very short period, until death would occur, as it did on 
September i. The autopsy conducted by George Mareschal (1658­
1736), then premier surgeon, merely confirmed the clinically recog­
nizable cause of death as atherosclerosis. 
On occasion, attempts have been made to relate Louis's death 
somehow to his gout and to his stone, quite different medical entities 
and, according to the findings at autopsy, wholly unrelated to the 
cause of death. It has also been remarked from time to time that the 
king died as a result of his chronic gluttony, but this is to forget 
that amazing vigor which permitted him to spend the day hunting 
at the age of seventy-four and to return with a full bag of game; 
to control a runaway team of horses that threatened to throw his 
carriage over a cliff at the age of seventy-five; and, finally, that he 
lived to the age of seventy-seven, approximately three times the aver­
age life span of his contemporaries. Louis, it appears, died of old 
age and nothing more. 
What then was the value of his elaborate medical service? It is 
much to be feared that it served little purpose except, as one indus­
trious writer tabulated, to give the king somewhere between 1,500 
and 2,000 purges, some hundreds of clysters, a vast quantity of 
cordials, juleps, and medicinal broths, a great variety of so-called 
specifics, and several pounds of quinine; it may be added that the 
king was relieved of a considerable quantity of blood until, through 
repugnance and perhaps some common sense, he refused to sacrifice 
any more. 
No doubt such medical persuasion as produced a temporary 
restriction of diet helped ease the king's gastrointestinal difficulties 
from time to time, and undoubtedly the administration of quinine 
was of value in controlling his attacks of malaria. There were, further­
more, several occasions when surgery was effective, most notably, of 
course, in the instance of the celebrated anal fistula. Nevertheless, 
having given this somewhat scanty credit to the royal medical service 
and so dismissing it from consideration, we may then declare that 
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Louis survived into what for his day may be called extreme old age 
despite his excesses, despite an utter disregard for the ravages of an 
active and laborious life, and despite the well-meant ministrations of 
his physicians, simply because of the strength of his constitution. 
When Antoine Vallot, as premier physician, had inaugurated the 
Journal de la sante du Roi in 1652, he called attention to Louis's 
double inheritance from a sickly father and a robust mother and 
expressed the hope that the maternal legacy might prevail. That 
Vallot's hope was fulfilled seems beyond dispute. 
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Louis XIV and His Fellow Monarchs

R. M. H ATT ON 
1
 I ' HANKS to his exceptionally long personal reign,1 Louis XIV 
-L had what might be termed—from the point of view of the space 
at our disposal in this chapter—a superfluity of fellow monarchs.2 
Moreover, their number increased between 1661 and 1715, since 
some of Louis's fellow sovereigns who were not monarchical heads of 
state (electors, dukes, landgraves, and lesser princes come into this 
category) attempted, and at times succeeded in achieving, the status 
of crowned head. In the European table of ranks it was relatively 
easy to cope with the few "mixed cases": the elected kings of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Rzeczpospolita Polska, gen­
erally known in western Europe as the Republic of Poland; the 
elected popes, who as temporal sovereigns of the small Papal States 
counted little but carried great weight as the crowned spiritual heads 
of the Catholic church; the elected emperors of the Holy Roman 
Empire of the German nation, the office that carried the undisputed 
highest temporal honors, and on which the Austrian Hapsburg 
family had so strong a hold that, in Louis's words, "the imperial crown 
has become virtually hereditary in the house of Austria." 3 It is more 
difficult to make a hard and fast distinction between fellow mon­
archical sovereigns and other categories of fellow sovereigns when 
surveying Louis's reign because of the several regencies during minor­
ities or illnesses of rulers: in Spain after the death of Philip IV 
and in Sweden after the death of Charles X; in Portugal when 
Alfonso VI was incapacitated by mental illness. At such times Louis's 
relationship with his fellow monarchs (whatever it might be in 
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theory) was in practice transferred to influential individuals, as was 
the case with the oligarchic republics of Europe, those of the Dutch,4 
of Venice, and of Genoa. Even where the king was alive and of 
sound mind, there is evidence suggesting that unless he was a 
strong king, his state tended to be looked upon, at least by French­
men, as a temporary republic.5 Conversely, a strong republic could 
successfully battle to achieve equality with monarchies in diplomatic 
etiquette. 
The division of Europe in Louis XIV's time into monarchies, or 
states that received monarchical honors, and "the rest" can therefore be 
seen to be based in a rough and ready way on the estimation of the 
realities or—where a monarchy had become temporarily weak— 
potentialities of power. The very geopolitical situation of Louis XIV's 
France at the time when he took over personal responsibility was 
such that his attention had to be focused on his fellow sovereigns, 
whether these were fellow monarchs or not. In the first place, Louis 
was concerned with his immediate neighbors: with the kings of 
Spain, the rulers of Austria, the Stuarts of England, and that scion 
of the houses of Stuart and Orange, William, whom Louis hoped 
(for reasons of state as well as for the sake of monarchical solidarity) 
to make sovereign ruler of the Northern Netherlands long before 
1672. After 1688, whatever the state of official recognition at any 
particular time, Louis regarded him as the reigning king of England 
and the de facto head of the Dutch state, although his title was that 
of a mere stadtholder. The way in which Leopold (head of the 
Austrian Hapsburg dominions since 1657 and emperor from 1658) 
tried to govern the Empire in foreign affairs, despite the terms of 
the capitulation imposed on him at the time of his election, rendered 
the German princes vitally important for Louis XIV's diplomacy. 
Further afield, the kings of Sweden, fellow guarantors of the Treaties 
of Westphalia, were of the greatest significance, the Swedish state 
comprising not only Sweden, Finland, and the East Baltic provinces, 
but also the Swedish king's possessions in the Holy Roman Empire. 
The kings of Denmark-Norway had to be taken into account as well, 
since they shared control of the Sound with Sweden; but the tsars of 
Muscovy were just impinging on the European map of power politics 
toward the end of Louis's reign. It was also in the later years of 
his life that Louis was faced with a female fellow monarch: Anne, 
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who succeeded William III in England in 1702. Louis seems to have 
assumed (though not ranking Anne either with minors or lunatics) 
that with her accession England had more or less reverted to the 
republican form of government in which it had existed in Cromwell's 
time,6 and his diplomatic contacts were with her ministers. In the 
War of the Spanish Succession Louis visualized recognition of Anne 
as queen and a guarantee of the Protestant succession as part of 
the price to be paid—and not a stiff one, in the circumstances—for 
the peace, along with the promotions of the elector of Brandenburg 
to king in Prussia and the duke of Savoy to king of Sicily. Shortly 
after the 1713-14 settlements, Louis granted "Their High Might­
inesses," the States General of the United Provinces, royal treatment 
in matters of precedence, ostensibly to compensate the Dutch for 
the implied loss of status suffered by William's death, but in reality 
in order to gain good will at a time of diplomatic rivalry.7 
The hierarchical organization of states was one that all Europe took 
for granted as the outward expression of power and prestige, and 
changes were not easily made: bitter enemies joined to resist in­
novations that might disturb the balance of the pyramid that had, 
haphazardly enough, though on a realistic basis, been constructed. 
Before peace was concluded after the Nine Years' War, Emperor 
Leopold, the electors of the Empire, and Louis XIV joined success­
fully to refute the claim of a mere prince, supported by Leibniz's 
pen, to send an ambassador to the peace congress on the plea that 
the Treaty of Miinster had given all German princes sovereign rights 
and thus equality.8 Louis himself jealously guarded his own rank 
and privileges lest concessions might become precedents working to 
the detriment of French prestige in the future. On the basis of inci­
dents studied in isolation, it has become commonplace to assert that 
Louis regarded himself as the very apex of the hierarchical pyramid 
and demanded to be treated as above his fellow monarchs. One 
could cite Louis's insistence that Leopold of Austria must notify him 
of his election as emperor before his diplomats could be received 
at the French court;9 the apology demanded from his father-in-law 
after the servants of Philip IV's ambassador to St. James's had 
attacked those of Louis's in a struggle for precedence;10 the humiliation 
of the pope following a similar fracas in which members of the 
French suite were killed;11 the forcing—by threats of reprisals—of the 
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doge of Genoa, contrary to the laws of that city, to come to Versailles 
to transmit in person his promise to remain neutral during Franco-
Spanish hostilities.12 This view becomes less tenable once the cases 
used as illustrations are put into perspective13 and compared with 
actions of other monarchs of the time in such disputes. The kings 
of England refused to grant reciprocity of salute in the Channel to 
Louis XIV and demanded in the most arrogant terms that the Dutch 
should salute their flag;14 when the king of Denmark refused such 
salute, English diplomats worried whether the nation would stand 
for "this affront" without recourse to war.15 The Dutch denied the 
title of "Your Holiness" to the pope at the Congress of Nijmegen;16 
rulers not infrequently had to ask satisfaction for the murder or 
wounding of servants of their envoys; there were constant squabbles 
about precedence at all courts with consequent demands for apologies 
and punishment of those guilty of transgressions. In reality Louis 
showed a remarkable flexibility and ease in matters of etiquette once 
his equality with all hereditary monarchs—under the Holy Roman 
Emperor, who by virtue of his elected office held the first rank—was 
accepted.17 He was freer with the cherished "Frere" for aspiring 
fellow monarchs (prized above the "Cousin" for dukes and the 
"Sieur" or "Monsieur" for princes) where it did not conflict with 
French interests;18 he permitted his diplomats great freedom to find 
expedients in matters of precedence "as long as the royal dignity is 
not impaired."19 He proved keen to agree to expedients suggested 
by other powers when he wanted negotiations to proceed: he accepted 
Temple's suggestion to get the traffic moving in the narrow streets 
of Nijmegen when rigid attention to rank threatened to paralyze the 
congress by the pile-up of carriages unwilling to yield on account of 
rank;20 he co-operated meticulously in the mathematically contrived 
Dutch solution to ensure full equality between France and Spain at 
the signing of the peace treaty of 1678, when a table was so placed 
between doors that the two missions, entering simultaneously, reached 
the table at exactly the same time, to sign, with synchronized speed, 
respective copies on the coveted side of the document;21 he worked 
with the English at the Congress of Utrecht "to lay aside titles" in 
order to avoid trouble over rank.22 Indeed, it is safe to assume that 
where Louis made any difficulty over a question of diplomatic 
etiquette, he had an underlying political motive of some importance. 
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This is true also of his fellow monarchs of the first and second rank; 
it is possibly less easy to discern the Realpolitik behind the refusal 
of the envoy of the elector of Mainz to the Diet of Regensburg to 
deliver his credentials since the particular staircase by which his 
predecessors had been admitted had been destroyed.23 
The concern with political realities is also evident when we go 
beyond etiquette to Louis's conception of royal behavior in inter­
national relations. He had, like most of his fellow monarchs, a code 
of honor. He argued, as most of them did (exceptions can be found, 
one of them Augustus of Saxony-Poland),24 that a ruler pledged his 
word. Treaty obligations must not be surrendered lest trust be dis­
sipated and allies not forthcoming; the promise and the threat must 
stand lest the next ones be treated lightly. But Louis, like other rulers 
of his time, would permit mediators to release him from his pledge. 
In 1678-79 a scheme was devised whereby Louis was persuaded to 
go back on his promise not to make peace with Leopold before the 
prince of Fiirstenberg had been released from captivity by that 
prince's brother petitioning Louis not to let his given word become 
the obstacle to a peace so eagerly desired by all Europe; similar ways 
were found to permit a minor concession to Brandenburg in respect 
of land in Swedish Pomerania, once Louis's insistence that the king of 
Sweden should have all his German possessions restored, as promised, 
had been largely effective.25 This loyalty to the given word was part 
of the gloire, or reputation, of the ruler, and of his gloire every ruler 
was extremely jealous. Such and such action would be against his 
gloire, Charles XII of Sweden argued;26 Leopold used very similar 
terms;27 and so did William III.28 In twentieth-century historical 
writing there is too often a tendency to equate gloire with military 
glory only, or at most with military glory coupled with "magnificence." 
The military glory and the pomp and circumstance were obviously 
part of gloire, but it was not all of it. It is significant that when an 
Italian agent of Leopold's reported a conversation with Chamlay, he 
translated gloire with Reputation or with Ansehen.29 It is also signifi­
cant that crowned heads did not reserve the term only for themselves 
as persons or representing the nation: Louis XIV urged Turenne to 
act "for the good of the state and the glory of your arms."30 This 
concept, the hienfait of the nation, was in Louis's case nearly always 
coupled with mention of his own gloire;31 and indeed, the concern 
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for gloire seen in its proper perspective sprang from a preoccupation, 
which is discernible in most of the monarchs of the period, with the 
verdict of history on the individual ruler. 
The very task of an absolutist ruler in respect of foreign policy 
(and in foreign affairs, as we have been reminded, William III acted 
in England as independently as any absolutist king,32 while in the 
Republic he had full control once he had learnt to manage the 
anti-Orangist regents) 33 tended to produce certain common character­
istics. The work was hard, the responsibility weighed heavily, and 
the reward was often gross flattery to one's face34 with criticism and 
unfavorable comment behind one's back: the latest story of favor­
itism, obstinacy and pride, or of stupidity, going the rounds of court 
and gossip. Neither William III, nor Louis XIV, nor young Charles 
XII drank much, fearing it might cloud brain and judgment ("I 
hope he does not expect good wine at my table," Louis drily com­
mented on the arrival of an ambassador known to enjoy his glass). 
They read endless memoranda and dispatches, they listened to experts, 
and had, finally, to make up their own minds. They worried when 
things went wrong: Charles XII shut himself up and refused to 
see anyone while he got over private grief (the death of a beloved 
sister) and the public humiliation of the surrender of his army at 
Perevolochna;35 William burst out in a moment of despair, "There is 
nothing left for me here, I shall have to go to the Indies";36 Louis 
wept over the miseries of the nation in the War of the Spanish 
Succession.37 But all three (and other monarchs of their time in 
other, if less drastic, dilemmas) had to grit their teeth and fight 
back. The very weight of their responsibility and their concern for 
the gloire, for the verdict of history upon them, helped them to 
mobilize reserves of personal courage. They were all determined not 
to leave the state entrusted to them diminished and more defenseless 
than when they had received it: this would be the ultimate blot on 
their own gloire. "Rather a forty years' war in the Empire," Charles 
XII commented on the eve of his 1718 offensive, "than a bad peace."38 
"Shall I be the one," cried William in bitterness to Heinsius in 1701 
when French troops poured into the Southern Netherlands, "to lose 
without a battle what I have struggled for during more than twenty-
eight years?"39 "Never," reported Chamlay, during the Nine Years' 
War, "have I, in the twenty years I have known the king, seen Louis 
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XIV so angry as when it was suggested from Vienna he should give 
up the gains of the Treaty of Westphalia." "What!" Louis had 
exclaimed, "am I to sacrifice the work of thirty years—I who have 
struggled so hard lest my enemies shall come into my house. . . . 
Rather war for ten years more."40 
If one is to make a distinction, and one ought to be made, between 
the three rulers whose attitudes have just been compared, it is be­
tween the two, William and Charles, who commanded armies in 
person, and Louis who, though passionately interested in the army,41 
was no commander in his own right. A difference in degree, therefore, 
between William, who said, "I can always lie in the last dike," 42 and 
Charles, who argued that it was up to him to risk his life encouraging 
the soldiers to be unafraid ("Better to die in battle than surrounded 
by doctors and weeping relatives," he once joked),43 and Louis, who, 
when he could not sleep because of bad news from the front, com­
forted himself that there was yet the grand army between the frontier 
and the capital.44 And on the personal level, in any comparison be­
tween the three, the inclination to take risks characteristic of com­
manders in the field, once preparations are complete, is strongly 
marked in William and Charles ("We must take risks while we 
are in luck," was one of the Swedish king's standing phrases;45 "his 
almost reckless boldness" is a recent verdict on William by a Dutch 
historian),46 and notably absent in the cautious Louis, who loved the 
craft of diplomacy and being at the center of things, who planned 
ahead for all eventualities, but who sometimes missed opportunities 
by being too unwilling to take risks in the military sense. Typical of 
Louis was also a certain doctrinaire, legalistic outlook that is particu­
larly noticeable in his attitude to the house of Stuart after the debacle 
of 1688. Outward forms were insisted upon; the niceties of scrupulous 
use of the title "Prince of Orange" for William III was maintained for 
years after Louis had decided that the restoration of James II was 
no longer feasible, partly as a lever in peace negotiations but also, as 
Louis's correspondence with D'Avaux between 1694 a n  ^ l&97 makes 
clear, out of concern for the legal position of the Stuarts. It would 
be offensive to a fellow monarch who had been unlucky enough to 
lose his crown, and against Louis's gloire, to expose James publicly 
to shame and humiliation by a premature recognition of William: if 
peace were not gained, such hurt had needlessly weakened James's 
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position.47 And it would seem, from evidence only recently brought 
to light, that it was the complaint of Mary of Modena that her son 
would, on James's death, be just an ordinary person (un simple) that 
helped to decide Louis in favor of granting royal title to James 
Edward in 1701: William, it was argued, was king of England de 
facto; James Us son had the title by hereditary right, and to deny 
him the rank of king would be tantamount to a denial of his legitimate 
birth.48 The dangers of recognition were clearly seen, but accepted 
in the hope that no ill would come of it since Louis was tied by the 
Peace of Ryswick not to foment trouble for William in the British 
Isles. To break this would go against honor and gloire; but—it was 
held—if the country rose against William or, later, Anne, then 
armed assistance from France would be permissible. Similarly, sup­
port for a Stuart invasion in 1708 was held to be a "legitimate" retort 
to the allied attempts to stir up trouble for Louis in the Cevennes49 
and to land troops in Toulon. Another field where Louis was forced 
into a more equivocal position than he might have preferred was 
the Hapsburg struggle against the Turks. Louis was never the ally 
of the Ottomans,50 and in the 1660's (when his relationship with 
Emperor Leopold was on the whole good)01 he sent his contingent 
of 6,000 men as a member of the League of the Rhine to fight bravely 
in the battle of St. Gotthard, while a detachment of the French fleet 
joined that of Venice to do battle with the infidel at sea;52 but Louis 
took no part in Europe's defense of Vienna in 1683. The years of 
detente with the Austrian Hapsburgs had come to an end with the fall 
of Lobkowitz and Leopold's renunciation of the partition treaty of 
1668, and Louis felt that the most he could do to live up to the title 
of "His Most Christian Majesty" was to withdraw troops from his 
eastern frontier to make clear that he would not embarrass or hinder 
the fight against the Turks.53 The Hapsburg battle against the Otto­
mans in the 1680's enabled the house of Austria to rally the Empire 
to its side,54 and the gloire that came to Leopold as the victor of 1683 
was considerable. In Italy, French diplomats reported, it was Leopold's 
fame—not that of Louis—that rang through the land.55 Yet, the 
tradition of French policy in the Near East56 and Louis's own growing 
rivalry with Leopold over the Spanish succession prevented his playing 
an active role against the Turks, and his conception of his own 
gloire made it impossible for him to use the opportunity to attack 
Leopold. 
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Louis personally met very few of his fellow monarchs, and none 
while they were actually reigning, with the exception of his brief 
meeting with Philip IV on the Island of Pheasants in 1660. The 
Stuarts Louis knew as exiles, Charles II before the Restoration, James 
II after 1688; John Sobieski he met before his election as king of 
Poland.57 His own grandson, Philip V of Spain, was in a special 
position. Louis's personal knowledge of the young man illuminates 
the post-1700 correspondence between them and makes it a particu­
larly valuable (and underestimated for this purpose) source for 
Louis's concept of the duties of kingship.58 Other monarchs he could 
only learn something about from diplomatic reports. The standard of 
the best French diplomats was very high indeed. Callieres—himself 
an erstwhile diplomat and then secretaire du cabinet—wrote on the 
duty of giving pen-portraits of the king and the chief ministers of 
the country where one resided: 
Thus the able diplomatist can place his master in command of all 
the material for a true judgement of the foreign country, and the 
more successfully he carries out this part of his duties, the more 
surely will he make his master feel as though he himself had lived 
abroad and watched the scenes which are described.59 
But Louis was not only a passive receiver; he asked specific 
questions and ordered Callieres, Harlay, and Crecy (and was 
criticized for it by Vauban) to pay an extended call on William III 
after the French recognition of him in 1697. It is from a detailed 
report of this conference that we learn that William spoke excellent 
French, "without any accent"; the word-for-word reportage and the 
description of behavior and habits (the "shy half-smile" reminding 
us of the more publicized half-smile of Charles XII—the protective 
device of rulers schooled to guard secrets) is extremely vivid.60 From 
the time of the negotiations for the first partition treaty, Tallard's 
dispatches from London are full of fascinating details of conversations 
with William, the king's every word and facial expression being re­
produced.61 One particularly important conversation we can check 
against William's equally detailed report of the French ambassador's 
every word and facial expression to Heinsius at The Hague. The 
differences in interpretations are, however, noticeable: Tallard pleased 
that he had skilfully maneuvered William into a position whereby he 
must move closer to France; William delighted at the effect of his 
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calculated statement that, were he to come to an agreement with 
Louis, he would separate himself from the house of Austria. ("I 
never saw a man in such joy, scarcely able to contain himself, and 
repeating it four or five times.")62 But such temporary misinterpreta­
tions are inseparable from all diplomatic intercourse, and in the long 
run Louis's methods paid dividends. By carefully collecting and 
sifting information, by memorizing the idiosyncracies of fellow 
monarchs and their ministers, useful guidance could be given to later 
diplomats. One striking example comes to mind. When Croissy (the 
brother of Colbert de Torcy) was sent to Charles XII at Stralsund 
early in 1715, he was told, "Do not bother to penetrate this king's 
designs—he does not give anything away."63 There speaks the voice 
of experience. But the amount that could be found out, and the 
amount of pressure that could be put on ministers and officials abroad, 
was such that Louis himself was anxious to deny his fellow monarchs 
the advantages of negotiating important matters at the French court. 
Such negotiations offered too many opportunities for close observance 
and of influence with ministers; and Louis, therefore, preferred, if at 
all possible, to send his trusted men to other capitals to transact im­
portant business. For this reason few pen-portraits of Louis at work 
informally were sent home to his fellow monarchs: the one by 
Portland, who became as charmed as one of Louis's own diplomats 
(Pomponne) when he had the chance to see the king throw off the 
cloak of majesty and the proud haughty air he wore in public,64 
is worth noting: "He did me the honor to speak to me as a private 
individual, with an obliging freedom and familiarity, often laugh­
ing, and quite throwing aside the gravity which is usual on such 
occasions." 65 
The long reign and the constant diplomatic and military activity 
have made it difficult for historians to deal adequately with the 
theme of Louis and his fellow monarchs on a European-wide scale. 
The sheer bulk of the material to be handled, its relative inaccessi­
bility when compared, for instance, to the published memoirs of the 
king himself, of courtiers, and of some of his ministers, are not con­
ducive to a balanced picture. It is very easy to forget that his 
Memoires were penned66 when Louis was a fairly young man and 
to let the views he expressed then remain valid for the whole reign, 
thus denying him development. Even so, clues in the Memoires to 
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regrets for past actions (as Louis, when reviewing the Dutch war, 
suggests that ambition and a desire to shine in combat might be 
forgiven "in so young a ruler as I was and one so favored by fortune") 
have been ignored.67 Anti-Louis propaganda has also been easily avail­
able in the many German and Dutch pamphlets of the reign, so that 
we have become familiar with the warnings of Lisola and others that 
Louis aspired to "universal monarchy."68 The inevitably one-sided 
arguments of propaganda warfare have tended to become accepted 
as objective facts. Obviously, the circumstances surrounding each dis­
cussion of Louis's candidature for the imperial crown must be taken 
into account: in 1683 it was the elector of Brandenburg who offered 
to work in the interests of Louis or the dauphin, or any prince 
favored by Louis, in the hope of securing French co-operation against 
Sweden; in 1670, when Louis had suggested that the elector of 
Bavaria should vote for him, it was with the proviso that the latter 
should be made king of Rome—again, a diplomatic bargaining to 
gain support, this time for France.69 The very nature of the Grand 
Alliances forged against France encouraged the two Maritime Powers 
(Protestant in their religion) to give public utterance to their genuine 
horror and fear at Louis's Catholic aggression against the Huguenots 
in France after 1685, whereas the equally sincere protests of the 
Dutch and the English against Leopold's treatment of the Protestants 
in Hungary, and the use of the Neapolitan galleys for those who 
would not retract,70 were delivered discreetly and privately. Small 
wonder, therefore, that the treatment of Louis XIV in his relationship 
to Europe is at times in the history books of those nations who fought 
against him a rather over-simplified one. The twentieth century's ex­
perience of, and attitude to, war also help to brand Louis as the 
aggressor, so that even the most objectively intended non-French 
survey of the reign tends to superficiality: "This period of undoubted 
great preponderance unfortunately witnessed a series of aggressive 
wars, which Louis XIV undertook for purposes of international 
prestige, military glory, and the extension of his frontiers."71 
Modern French survey works have been even harsher on Louis 
XIV, though the views of their authors are more varied.72 He is often 
presented as a bully compelled by visions of personal glory, easy to 
mislead, and hardly ever taking the right advice. There is usually 
some sympathy for his moral courage during the War of the Spanish 
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Succession;73 and curiously little condemnation of the War of Devolu­
tion, which is reckoned, with the Dutch war, as the "defensive wars" 
of the reign74—the rest being "aggressive wars" or "unlimited wars." 
It used to be fashionable to seek for one basic motivation in Louis 
XIV's foreign policy: for some the Spanish succession issue deter­
mined the king's attitude toward the rest of Europe throughout the 
reign; for others the dogma of the drive toward the "natural frontiers" 
was paramount.75 Today, historians either deny any pattern,76 inter­
preting Louis's policy as responses to incidents provoked by circum­
stances, or attempt a neat division into periods. One such division 
runs: the age of gold, the age of magnificence, the age of occasional 
coalitions against Louis, the age of determined opposition against him. 
Another: the age of defensive warfare followed by the age of aggres­
sive warfare. Yet another: Louis's foreign policy before and after the 
fistula (1686).77 But all tend to assume that one underlying motive 
of the policy, however divided into periods, was the desire to control 
Europe, the search for hegemony and preponderance. 
Material for a revision, or at least a modification, of this view does 
exist on the level of Louis XIV's diplomacy as such, on the place of 
Louis in France, and on the role of France in Europe and overseas. 
Historians who have worked on the foreign policy of their own 
countries have come to what was for them rather startling conclusions. 
Geyl found that "Louis showed himself surprisingly moderate" in 
negotiations with the Dutch in the 1660's, and has shown that it was 
the domestic struggles in the Northern Netherlands that made im­
possible (in spite of De Witt's agreement) a Franco-Dutch solution 
of the problem of the Southern Netherlands.78 Mark Thomson, while 
concluding that France's enemies had reason to distrust Louis during 
the peace negotiations that did not come to fruition in 1708-10, 
has in all his work stressed Louis's shrewdness and sense of responsi­
bility.79 Even monographic studies that are one-sided in their approach, 
such as that of Heinrich Ritter von Srbik on relations between Leopold 
and Louis in the Nine Years' War (the intrigues of France are 
always "Machiavellian" here),80 have brought to light documents 
that are of the greatest importance for understanding the motives of 
the rulers and countries discussed. Srbik, just because he is so biased 
in interpretation, makes lively reading; the more objective studies of 
various aspects—or periods—of France's relations with Europe in 
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Louis's reign are possibly duller but always valuable for the variety 
of material that is collected and studied, or for the microscopic exam­
ination of a particular topic. Mention must be made of Hoynck's 
monograph on the Congress of Nijmegen; of the many studies con­
nected with the Rhineland by Max Braubach and his pupils;81 of the 
work by French and American historians on problems connected 
with the Alsace and Lorraine regions;82 and of the fine analysis of 
Strasbourg's fate between 1648 and 1789 by Franklin Ford,83 to 
which we shall have occasion to return. Specialist work not directly 
connected with France nor using French material yet manages to 
throw indirect light on Louis's relations with Europe; Veenendaal's 
book on the Anglo-Dutch condominium of the Southern Nether­
lands;84 Coombs's study of Anglo-Dutch relations during the War 
of the Spanish Succession;85 Stork-Penning's examination of the 
Dutch attitude to peace with France between 1708 and 1711.86 Any 
study of Jacobitism naturally enough touches on Louis XIV.87 
Swedish research into Franco-Swedish relations is also illuminating 
but less easily accessible, though happily a growing number of 
historians on both sides of the Atlantic read one (and thus all) of 
the Scandinavian languages: Andrew Lossky, whose main interest 
lies in the intellectual history of Louis's reign, has made some 
significant contributions also to the topic of French relations with 
the north of Europe.88 Research even on the purely domestic history 
of France's neighbors helps the historians put Louis and his country 
into perspective: we must take into account that Spain's decline was 
(in the opinion of several scholars) arrested in the third quarter of 
the seventeenth century; and that a series of demographic and other 
studies has recently demonstrated that the Hapsburg dominions were 
increasing in resources and power during Louis's reign.89 In France 
diplomatic history as such has for some time been out of fashion 
(the only new work of importance for Louis, at the end of his reign, 
is by Claude Nordmann);90 but the interest in officials and adminis­
trators—noticeable also among American historians working on 
French history91—is producing important bases from which to illumi­
nate Louis's relations with those who worked with him. The biogra­
phies published on Turenne92 and on Vauban (though written in the 
1930's, the latter has only just appeared)93 are of great value for an 
assessment of the role of military considerations, although Zeller's 
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work on the frontier remains the foundation on which all must build 
who want to study French foreign policy. "The natural frontier" as 
the guiding motive for the reign was demolished by Zeller's book and 
articles, but his lucid analysis of the part played by considerations of 
defense and of the "out-works" across the Rhine for defense as well 
as for bargaining from strength stands unsurpassed.94 
There are gaps. The chief one is that we do not know enough 
about one of Louis's great adversaries, Leopold of Austria. We possess 
a fine historiographical study of the older works on Leopold, Joseph, 
and Charles;95 we have brief but perceptive character sketches of 
these three emperors by Kann in his recent work on Austrian in­
tellectual history and by Wandruzska in his history of the Hapsburg 
dynasty.96 There are monographs that help to illuminate aspects of 
Hapsburg policy in Louis XIV's reign.97 Braubach's massive biography 
of Prince Eugene98 is of special interest for us, but we still lack 
modern well-documented studies of the Hapsburg rulers between 
1648 and 1740. From the point of view we are here considering, 
new light on Franco-Hapsburg relations may be thrown by work 
in progress in the United States, for example, by Spielman's study 
of the relations between the Maritime Powers and Austria during 
Joseph's reign and by Snyder's work on Godolphin and Marl­
borough.99 The interest of Canadian and American scholars in French 
policy overseas during Louis's reign100 is already yielding results and 
may lead to reassessments of the impact of such policy on Louis's 
European diplomacy. 
My own interest in Louis XIV and Europe started, so to speak, 
with the wrong end of the reign: I have moved backward from 
the post-Utrecht period all the time. My main preoccupation is with 
diplomatic relationships during those two long wars, the Great North­
ern War (1700-1721) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702­
1713).101 The study of Sweden, France, and the Maritime Powers— 
that convenient single name for the Dutch and the English nations 
at a time when they were both allies and rivals—has restricted me 
to the archives of London, The Hague, Paris, and those of the 
Scandinavian countries. I have found, however, that some of my 
hobbyhorses, and in particular my curiosity about "presents and 
pensions" and their role in foreign policy, have pushed me back to 
1688,102 and to considerations of even earlier years, on a more 
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European-wide scale. For the pre-1688 period there is, fortunately, 
a great deal of documentary material in print; not only the fine 
series of the French Recueil des Instructions,103 but the magnificent 
edition now in progress in Germany of the Treaties of Westphalia.104 
The year 1648 may seem to take us back a long way (since Louis 
XIV at that time was only ten years of age), but it is my contention 
that neither of the two big war periods that interest me can be 
understood without reference to the 1648 settlements: in the am­
biguous terms imposed on each other by war-weary powers still 
reluctant to surrender cherished aims, in the elucidations and 
counter-elucidations that followed, we find the vital clue to the 
struggle between Louis XIV and the Hapsburgs for the interpretation 
of the Treaty of Miinster. The Treaty of Osnabriick—that between 
Sweden, the Empire, and the Hapsburgs—was less ambiguous, but 
the struggle for interpretation still went on: for example, over the 
Swedish attempt, eventually unsuccessful, to include the town of 
Bremen105 with the duchy of Bremen. The Great Northern War 
can be seen (as Hugo Hantsch noted as far back as 1929) as a 
late harvest sprung from the seed of the Thirty Years' War.106 
The connection between the settlement of 1648 and Louis XIV's 
foreign policy is obvious to Ford, who has had to cope with the 
knotty problem of the ten towns of Alsace (the Decapole) that were, 
in one paragraph, ceded by the house of Hapsburg to France with 
all rights; then, in a later clause, their sovereignty somehow kept 
for the Empire; yet with a final paragraph added that nothing pre­
viously stated should in any way diminish the sovereign rights 
accorded to Louis.107 What becomes clear, however, when all material 
at our disposal is studied is that the struggle was not only about 
differing interpretations of French sovereignty in Alsace but of the 
virtual undoing of one of the main gains of 1648 for France: the 
transfer of sovereignty in that year to Louis XIV over the bishoprics 
of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, occupied by the French since 1552. 
Both sides were aggressive. Leopold, Joseph, and Charles insisted 
on the return of the three bishoprics both before and after the French 
interpretation in respect of the Alsace towns had been confirmed at 
the Peace of Nijmegen. One of the aims of the Hapsburgs in the 
Nine Years' War, as well as in the War of the Spanish Succession, 
was the return of Metz, Toul, and Verdun; after 1679 the reversal 
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of the Nijmegen decision on Alsace, and of Spain's cession to Louis 
of Franche-Comte at that peace, loomed large among Austrian objec­
tives.108 There was a parallel move in the north of the Empire by 
Brandenburg to force Sweden out of her German possessions with 
the emperor's help—a German-wide movement, therefore, against the 
"foreign" powers that influenced, and also was influenced by, Leibniz's 
scheme for a closer federation of Germany and by the so-called Ger­
man mission of Leopold. For his part, Louis was determined to keep 
the gains of 1648 and tried to interpret all treaties and incidents in 
France's favor; first, in relation to what had been gained in Alsace; 
then, in the reunion clause; and, finally, in the occupation of Stras­
bourg as a punishment for that city's help to Leopold. The French 
case was that the Hapsburg side had been the initial aggressor, the 
Emperor Ferdinand III (Leopold's father) having, contrary to the 
stipulations of 1648, let 6,000 soldiers march across the Empire to 
reinforce Spain in the Southern Netherlands. In his turn Louis 
earned the distrust of those preoccupied with German liberties when 
he, against assurances that had been given, or at least assumed, began 
pushing his claims in Alsace.109 
Even greater international concern came over the French attempt 
to incorporate Lorraine with France. It was true that Lorraine had 
been occupied for long periods at a time before 1660; it was true 
that Louis had made a deal with the family that included (and for 
that reason met opposition from the French princes of the blood) 
giving the house of Lorraine a share in the heritage of the French 
crown; but the non-fulfilment of the Treaty of Montmartre from 
France's side, coupled with its repudiation by the young Duke 
Charles, who did not feel tied by his uncle's promises, rendered 
Louis's case indefensible from the point of view of international 
morality of the time, and Duke Charles's marriage to the Emperor 
Leopold's sister gave little hope for success in Louis's cherished objec­
tive of "rejoining this province of France to the body and heart of 
the country".110 Louis never gave up hope, however. Lorraine had to 
be evacuated in 1679—though with French control of the four mili­
tary routes through the country; but reoccupation soon followed, and 
Louis continued with schemes, common enough throughout Europe 
at this period, for exchanges and equivalents: the dukes of Lorraine 
(first, Charles V, and after his death, his son, Leopold Joseph) became 
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candidates, if not for vacant thrones as in the case of Augustus of 
Saxony-Poland between 1706-9 and of James Edward Stuart after 
1701 (for whom Poland, Egypt, and the Barbary states were at times 
canvassed), at least for territory thought tempting enough to make 
them sacrifice Lorraine. The Southern Netherlands, Naples and/or 
Sicily, the Milanese, and a host of other possibilities, were dis­
cussed.111 The French share of the partition treaties in Italy (which 
worried English and Dutch competitors for trade in the Mediter­
ranean) were intended as an exchange for the duchy of Lorraine. 
A successful exchange would enable Louis to make sure of land 
through which his enemies had entered France in previous times: 
one of the "doors'' Qportes) into the heart of the country. The porte 
into France represented by Dunkirk had been secured by purchase 
from Charles II in 1662, that leading from the Franche-Comte had 
been closed by Spain's cession of the province in 1678, and that from 
the Southern Netherlands was bolted in the 1680's by an iron bar, 
the famous carte of Vauban, which withstood attack in the wars 
of 1689-1713.112 Concern for the remaining eastern "doors" deep­
ened with growing Hapsburg power. The hope of closing at least 
one of them is fundamental to the partition treaties. Naples and 
Sicily (the French share of the First Partition Treaty of 1698) would, 
it was planned, be exchanged for the duchy of Lorraine; and when 
the Second Partition Treaty (of 1700) added to France's gains the 
Duchy of Milan, as well as Naples and Sicily, an exchange of the 
former with either the Duke of Lorraine or (if he refused) with the 
Duke of Savoy was stipulated in a secret article. It is difficult to over­
emphasize Louis's and his advisers' concern for the safety of the 
eastern frontier or their desire to incorporate enclaves inside the 
territory they considered as "France." The most striking illustration 
came during the Nine Years' War when (as Srbik has shown) Louis 
was willing to renounce for himself, the dauphin, and all his 
heirs, any share in the Spanish succession—and to let this re­
nunciation be registered by the Paris Parlement—provided France 
was permitted to retain the gains of Nijmegen in the east and to 
absorb Lorraine against equivalents. One condition was postulated 
(not an unreasonable one): in his turn Leopold had to promise that 
the Austrian Hapsburg dominions and the Spanish inheritance, which 
would then come with Louis's blessing to the Vienna branch, should 
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never be united under one ruler. The empire of Charles V must not 
be restored.113 I shall have more to say of the Spanish succession 
issue as such in a moment; here I am just stressing what sacrifices 
Louis—who never relinquished belief in the hereditary legitimate 
right of his children and grandchildren to the crown of Spain—was 
willing to make for the security of the eastern frontier. Similarly, 
Hapsburg concern to undo 1648 is illustrated by the immediate 
refusal of Louis's offer; probably not, as contemporary diplomats 
believed, because Leopold loved his son Charles better than his son 
Joseph and hoped to see him restore the empire of Charles V,114 but 
because there was in Vienna as genuine a fear of Louis and of French 
plans for invasion along the Danube valley (did he not hold Stras­
bourg, the key to the Hapsburg house?) as there was of Hapsburg 
designs in Versailles (where Strasbourg was looked upon as the key 
that turned the lock against invasion). Neither side could give up 
its attempt, even at the cost of appeal to the dice of war, to get a 
solution favorable to itself. 
It has been argued that if Louis had only rested content with the 
truce of Ratisbon (Regensburg) of 1684 and refrained from efforts 
to have it turned into a permanent peace by his aggressive actions in 
1688-89, an" would have been well.115 It is an interesting point of 
view; but it does tend to ignore that Louis at the time, and some of 
his advisers, were convinced that once Leopold had achieved peace 
with the Turks on his terms, he would turn against France. And the 
Austrian archives have yielded confirmation of such fears: those in 
favor of the Turkish war prevailed on the emperor to postpone the 
reckoning with Louis only because they convinced him that, vic­
torious in the east, he would be better equipped to defeat France.116 
The vital importance of the eastern frontier can also be illustrated 
from the War of the Spanish Succession. In his several efforts to 
obtain peace Louis offered to give up every gain that had come to 
the Bourbons from his having accepted the will of Carlos II; but he 
remained firm, even in the darkest hours, that he could not, and 
would not, give up Metz, Toul, Verdun, nor the Nijmegen confir­
mation of the sovereignty over the Decapole and the transfer of 
Franche-Comte, though Strasbourg—gained by treaty in 1697 when 
the occupation of 1681 was internationally recognized—he at times 
despaired of keeping. And when, after the breakdown of the Hague 
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conference of 1709, he issued his famous manifesto to the French 
people, appealing for their support, the point that loomed so large 
with the Allies (and with English historians)—his refusal to give 
military help to throw his grandson out of Spain—was mentioned 
only in one sentence, in the form nearly of an afterthought: "I pass 
in silence over the suggestion made to me. . . . "  1 1  7 What loomed 
large in the manifesto was his explanation that if he surrendered the 
cautionary towns118 that had been asked for in return for an armi­
stice, the Allies—unless the suspension of arms were turned into a 
safe peace, for which there was no guarantee—would be able to 
penetrate to the heart of France and wrest from it to the gains of so 
many years and so many wars: the nation would be dismembered. 
It is my contention, therefore, that despite the aggressive actions 
of Louis XIV on the eastern borders of France (where deeds were 
perpetrated that, however justifiable from the strategic point of view 
and regardless of whether Louis was personally responsible or not, 
have been condemned by contemporaries and posterity), the under­
lying purpose of defense is part and parcel of the struggle that took 
place between Bourbon and Hapsburg over rival interpretations of 
1648, and that Louis's actions were not the prelude to the establish­
ment of control over the Empire or of universal monarchy. 
Where Louis can be labeled "aggressive" is in an area where 
modern French historians have been unexpectedly soft with him, 
classing the War of Devolution as "defensive" or even explaining it 
as a "rectification" of the Treaty of the Pyrenees.119 The preposter­
ousness of applying private Brabantine law to the realm of interna­
tional politics has been stressed, naturally enough, by historians of 
the Netherlands; but that issue has been largely ignored in books 
written in French, even in a modern Etude historique sous les droits 
successor'aux de la Reine Marie-Therese de France.120 Nor was there 
at the time any grounds for fearing that the United Provinces would 
take offensive action in the Southern Netherlands; the Dutch, having 
refused French plans for partition that would bestow some territorial 
benefit on both parties, leaving an independent Catholic buffer state 
between them, were content with the status quo. Their attempts dur­
ing the Thirty Years' War to conquer the Southern Netherlands for 
themselves had failed; the outright partition they had offered France 
during that war had been declined at a time when Mazarin was 
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negotiating privately with Spain. Now any discussion of change 
brought fears to the rich towns of the province of Holland, and in 
particular to Amsterdam, that the river Scheldt might be reopened 
and Antwerp become a competitor in trade. 
Louis XIV's purchase of Dunkirk from Charles II in 1662 had 
not worried the States General;121 Louis was their ally, whereas the 
English were bitter trade rivals. But Louis's precipitate invasion of 
the Southern Netherlands in 1667 was deeply disturbing to the 
Dutch. He saw it as a justifiable attempt to improve France's fron­
tiers since Philip IV had refused to annul Maria Theresa's renuncia­
tion, even though the term within which her dowry should have 
been paid had expired. They saw it as an abuse of French power. 
Louis, when he became aware of their unease, gave Spain the choice 
of ceding to France either Franche-Comte or certain towns in the 
Southern Netherlands. Franche-Comte (which the Spaniards thought 
of as indefensible in the long run and had earmarked as a bargaining 
counter to achieve the return of the "gap in the Pyrenees," Roussillon 
and part of Cerdagne, given up in 1659) was what Versailles expected 
Carlos II to cede; but the Spanish king's advisers consciously sacri­
ficed part of the Southern Netherlands to frighten the Dutch Republic 
enough to make sure of its support in case of renewed French agres­
sion. In Louis's attack on the Dutch in 1672 there is undeniably an 
element of irritation and annoyance at the manner in which the 
States General took upon themselves all honor for having arranged 
the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1668). The war had, however, two 
basic purposes: to warn the Dutch that France was a serious com­
mercial competitor in Europe and overseas, and to force them to give 
Louis a free hand in the Southern Netherlands when the Spanish 
succession issue should be decided. By the partition treaty between 
Leopold and Louis in 1668 it had been agreed that the Southern 
Netherlands would fall to Louis's share;123 and though a secret article 
in the Franco-Swedish treaty, which (with many others) belongs to 
the diplomatic preparations for the war on the Dutch, guaranteed 
that France would respect the integrity of the Southern Netherlands 
and permit the States General an independent existence,124 Louis at 
this time certainly envisaged a chastened Republic and the road open 
to a future incorporation of the Southern Netherlands with France. 
The greed of the War of Devolution and of the Dutch War of 
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1672 was, at least according to my reading of the Memoires and the 
instructions of the Recueil, regretted by Louis in more mature years. 
It might have been poor comfort for him to reflect that retribution 
had not been slow in coming: Leopold, anxious not to lose the 
leadership of the German mission and beginning to aspire to the 
whole of the Spanish succession for his own house,125 renounced the 
partition treaty; the Dutch war developed into a struggle for the 
whole eastern frontier of France; and William Ill's determination 
that Louis's aggression must be resisted at all costs126 was forged to 
last his whole life through. 
At the end of the Dutch war Louis accepted that the Republic— 
which was not the tiny, powerless state127 of those who read history 
backwards—was entitled, since he had begun the war, to have the 
status quo restored and also to receive some compensation (given in 
the form of trade advantages), in contrast to those rulers, such as 
Carlos and Leopold, who had declared war on France.128 Further­
more, Louis, who did learn from experience, accepted the basic lesson 
of the war: the impracticability of aspiring to the Southern Nether­
lands against the wishes of the Dutch. From 1679 onward Louis 
had no serious hope of ever incorporating all or most of the Low 
Countries with France. But he was—and to this Dutch historians 
have paid too little attention—worried whether the States General 
might come to an arrangement with someone other than himself for 
a partition or for a government essentially in the Dutch economic 
interest. His attempts to persuade Spain to let Charles of Lorraine or 
Max Emmanuel, elector of Bavaria, receive the Southern Netherlands 
as an independent state (a scheme that would benefit Louis in 
that Loraine could then be incorporated with France, by a direct 
exchange in the first case, and by the duke of Lorraine taking over 
Max Emmanuel's German lands in the second) met opposition from 
all sides: from the Dutch, who feared either duke would be tied to 
French apron strings; from Carlos of Spain, who did not want to 
dismember his patrimony; from Leopold of Austria, who aspired to 
the entire Spanish succession to dispose of as he wanted.129 The 
Dutch, always frightened of a repetition of 1672, were, for their 
part, also on the alert for opportunities to checkmate Louis in the 
Southern Netherlands. At the Peace of Ryswick they wrung from 
him permission to negotiate with Spain about keeping Dutch garri­
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sons in certain fortresses inside the Southern Netherlands to serve 
as a barrier against future French aggression: this Dutch "Barrier" 
was arranged in 1698,130 and its security and extension became one 
of the major aims in Dutch foreign policy from that date.131 When 
Max Emmanuel was made governor general of the Southern Nether­
lands, the Dutch held conversations with him for the purpose of 
securing the country against France once Carlos II should die. The 
secret treaty that France and Europe believed the two parties entered 
into has recently been shown as much more likely to be genuine 
than not, in spite of the denials of the elector and the States General 
when the news leaked out.132 It was the fear of such arrangements 
that a French minister used, in confidential conversation with a 
Swedish diplomat at Versailles, as an explanation for the entry of 
Louis's troops into the Barrier towns in 1701.133 The official reason 
given (which also must be allotted some weight because of the 
French need to show Spain that Philip V would bring power in his 
train) was that the new king of Spain, Louis's grandson, had no 
need of help from the Dutch to defend his own.134 It was this very 
entry that reduced William to despair, that he had to witness "in one 
day and without a single battle being fought" the loss of the security 
he had worked for for twenty-eight years; and it was this entry that 
decided both William and Heinsius for war.135 
Great efforts had been made by these two statesmen and by Louis 
to avoid hostilities over the Spanish succession. Once Leopold's intran­
sigence became known, the Maritime Powers adroitly avoided renew­
ing their promise in the Grand Alliance of 1689 that they would 
work for the succession going in its entirety to the Austrian Haps­
burgs; but this did not particularly worry Vienna, where it was 
argued that in any war over the Spanish inheritance the English and 
the Dutch would eventually be drawn to the side that fought against 
Louis XIV. William's distrust of the emperor (whose efforts on 
behalf of the Stuarts in the Nine Years' War were not unknown in 
Whitehall) 136 and the general concern at the growth of Hapsburg 
power led to negotiations between William and Louis for a settle­
ment of the succession, in which it was hoped the emperor would 
eventually join. The death of Max Emmanuel's son, Joseph Ferdinand 
—grandson of Philip IV's daughter, Margareta Theresa—shortly after 
the signature of the First Partition Treaty was a cruel disappointment 
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to both monarchs. The candidature of the electoral prince might, 
they hoped, have been enforced without recourse to arms, by moral 
and diplomatic pressure alone, on Austria as well as on Spain.137 The 
partitioning aspect of the first treaty was relatively slight: enough 
concessions for France in Italy to permit Louis to offer exchanges to 
either Lorraine or Savoy (which would realize one or other of the 
rectifications of the French frontier discussed above), with hopes also 
of colonial concessions that would benefit France's plans for mari­
time and commercial expansion.138 The duchy of Milan was to go to 
Archduke Charles as compensation for the Austrian Hapsburgs. The 
Second Partition Treaty, by necessity choosing the younger of the 
emperor's sons as king of Spain and heir to most of Carlos II's realm, 
inevitably widened Louis's claims for compensation. Spain would now 
lose all her Italian posessions to the dauphin, and Louis would be put 
in a position to achieve both the desired exchanges: Lorraine as well 
as Savoy might be incorporated with France.139 
A partition between the two main claimants, even with the lion's 
share going to the Austrian Hapsburgs, must be hurtful to Spain's 
pride and might still not prove acceptable to Leopold. The emperor 
had worked against the candidature of his grandson, the electoral 
prince, in Madrid even when the whole succession was involved; 
and he proved adamant in refusing accession to the Second Partition 
Treaty: the perils of war were far preferable. In his view he would 
lose nothing by insisting that the whole succession should go to the 
younger of his two sons since William and Heinsius would support 
him, rather than the Bourbons, in any clash of arms. He bargained 
also on the influence of Carlos II's German wife, related to the 
Austrian house,140 to have the Archduke Charles declared heir to all 
Spain. So, it is clear, did William and Heinsius; for when the struggle 
for succession inside Spain had produced a will in favor—in the first 
place—of Louis's grandson, the duke of Anjou (Archduke Charles 
to be offered the entire monarchy only if the French candidate 
refused), both these statesmen were utterly taken by surprise. "I had 
thought Spain was on our side; I never expected them to call in the 
French," was the comment of Heinsius.141 Louis XIV's suspicions 
that the king of England and the Dutch grand pensionary had not 
pressed Vienna strongly to bring about acceptance of the Second 
Partition Treaty seem reasonably well founded. William thought of 
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the partition treaty as a reinsurance that could be used to wring some 
sacrifices from Leopold once the succession was safe with the Austrian 
Hapsburgs: Louis should be given enough to permit him to keep the 
peace, and the Maritime Powers would receive rich rewards as medi­
ators.142 That William did not regard the Second Partition Treaty as 
one to be enforced on Leopold with arms is evident from his outburst 
after Carlos's will became known: "Having made the partition treaty 
in order to avoid a war, I am not fighting a war to enforce the treaty 
for France's benefit."143 Furthermore, once the unexpected offer of all 
Spain for the duke of Anjou had been accepted—though Louis took 
care not to let his grandson set foot on Spanish soil till the term given 
Leopold for entry into the Second Partition Treaty had expired144— 
William and Heinsius looked upon the treaty as one that might serve 
to wrest concessions both for the emperor and the Maritime Powers 
from Louis XIV. 
Whether such concessions were possible, given the temper of 
the Spaniards (who had chosen Louis's grandson for their king 
not out of a love for France but out of a conviction that French 
power would be able to protect them against partition), is a debat­
able point. What is clear is that Louis felt he could not let the suc­
cession go by default to Austria; that would mean—in view of 
Leopold's refusal to give an undertaking that the empire of Charles V 
should not be restored—the certainty of encirclement, the probable 
loss of the gains of his own reign (the improved northern frontier; 
the incorporation of Alsace, Franche-Comte, Strasbourg; the four mili­
tary routes through Lorraine and the occupation of that duchy, which 
he hoped would become permanent), and the possibility of losing 
even the gains of 1648 and 1659. Louis, in accepting the will, 
gambled on peace and a Bourbon family alliance that would give 
him a friendly neighbor in the south, favorable opportunities for 
French commerce in the Spanish empire overseas, and, in the future, 
exchanges of territory that would improve France's own borders.145 
Above all, he felt that the balance of Europe would become redressed: 
the access in power and gloire that the Turkish wars had brought to 
Leopold would now be compensated for by a Bourbon family alliance 
in the west. That Louis did not enjoy the peaceful possession of the 
Spanish succession was in part due to the accidents of history, such 
as the death of James II at a particularly delicate time of Anglo­
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Dutch negotiations with France. But it was also due to Louis's own 
mistakes: he could have made it much clearer to the Maritime Powers 
than he did that the reservation of Philip's rights to the French crown 
was intended to keep the Orleans branch of the royal family distant 
from succession and dictated by hopes of keeping Philip, as king of 
Spain, in some dependence on a France he might—if death removed 
the nearer heirs—rule once he had made alternative provision for 
Spain. As it was, he raised the specter of Charles V's empire under 
Bourbon sway. Nor must the insistence of William and Heinsius 
that he should not enjoy the peaceful possession of the will, except 
at the price of concessions to them in respect of Barrier towns and 
overseas trading posts, be forgotten. Louis's inability (quite apart 
from his unwillingness) to make immediate sacrifices of Spanish 
territory, either to the Maritime Powers or to the Austrian Hapsburgs, 
proved Leopold right in his analysis of the situation: the Dutch and 
the English would be driven to support him rather than Louis in a 
struggle over the Spanish succession, provided he took the initiative 
in resisting a French candidature. As soon as Philip reached Madrid, 
Leopold prepared to send his troops into Italy to take over the Spanish 
possessions there for his own family. The Grand Alliance followed in 
1701, and general war broke out when the preparations of the Mari­
time Powers were complete in 1702. 
That Louis, after this hardest of all the wars that France had to 
fight during his reign, achieved a reasonable compromise peace in 
1713-14, he owed in part to the accidents of history—such as the 
change of government in England in 171 o—but also to his own and 
his advisers' clever use of the opportunities that this and other hap­
penings presented, and to the country's grasp of what was at stake: 
not Spain, but the security of France. After the settlements of 1713­
14, Philip remained king of Spain and of Spain overseas; but the 
areas that had been the particular concern of the partition-treaty 
negotiations, the Southern Netherlands and the Spanish possessions 
in Italy, were detached from that crown to move—more or less per­
manently—into the orbit of the Austrian Hapsburgs. Spain also had 
to give concessions to the English, if not to the Dutch (outdistanced 
and even cheated by the Tories in the peace negotiations), in respect 
of trade; and some, at least, of England's claims to Mediterranean 
possessions—long since postulated146—were satisfied by the acquisition 
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of Gibraltar and Port Marion. France herself had to sacrifice land 
overseas that she had, in Louis's own reign, taken from England.147 
But the European gains of Louis's reigns were safeguarded, and the 
French maintained their interpretation of 1648. In contrast, the Dutch 
lost their hoped-for gains from the Thirty Years' War: Cleves, and 
Spanish Guelders—to which the Treaty of Miinster had given them 
a claim—went to Prussia.148 Charles XII, on his return from Turkey 
at the end of 1714, fought hard in defense of Sweden's German pos­
sessions, Prussia and Hanover having joined the anti-Swedish coali­
tion to obtain, respectively, Swedish Pomerania and Bremen and 
Verden. To keep Sweden, the fellow guarantor of 1648, in the 
empire, Louis entered in April, 1715, into a subsidy-treaty with 
Charles XII. The death of Louis in September of that year certainly 
weakened Sweden's cause in Germany. By the peace treaties of the 
Great Northern War, 1719-21 (after the death of Charles in 1718), 
Sweden was left with Wismar and a small part of Pomerania as 
footholds in the Empire; but she was no longer a power to be reck­
oned with in German affairs. 
Louis XIV's attitude to his fellow monarchs was, naturally enough, 
deeply anchored in the past. His policies in respect of the frontiers, 
the Empire, and Italy—even toward the pope149—were in general 
conditioned by those pursued by Richelieu and Mazarin; the tech­
nique of the reunions was in the Capetian tradition of his predeces­
sors, as were his efforts (successful in the case of Orange, unsuc­
cessful in the case of Avignon) to absorb foreign enclaves on French 
soil. He did not, however, slavishly follow established patterns or 
lines; he tried to avoid what he regarded, in the light of experience, 
to have been mistakes in the past. To give one example: Louis looked 
upon Mazarin's alliance with Cromwell as being, in part, responsible 
for Charles II's vacillating policy after 1660—this, it has been sug­
gested, helps to explain the recognition of James Stuart as king in 
1701 as a form of reinsurance for the future.150 That Louis learned 
from his own mistakes has already been proposed in our discussion 
of the Southern Netherlands (though he did not realize the sensi­
tivity of the Dutch fully enough to avoid further mistakes in 1701); 
and he did try to avoid falling into traps that had proved dangerous 
in the past. In 1700, when Louis sent Villars to Vienna to attempt 
securing Leopold's accession to the Second Partition Treaty, he 
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warned his ambassador not to mention the strength and power, the 
puissance, of France, nor boast of its armed forces or its good finances, 
lest Vienna should become frightened and set about forging coali­
tions against France—though he was warned not to make France 
out so weak and poor that the dignity of king and country would be 
impaired.151 In 1714, to give another example, when Louis sent a 
French diplomat to Italy to inspect, discreetly, the future second wife 
of Philip V, the envoy was reminded that the preference of Philip 
and his first wife for French advisers had alienated Spaniards, and 
he was enjoined to lead the new bride into better ways: in a percep­
tive instruction Louis summed up what he had learned from the 
sometimes strained relationship of Spain and France during the War 
of the Spanish Succession.152 
We are left with the problem of why Louis XIV—were he as 
relatively sensible and moderate as this paper has argued—has had 
such a bad press. He certainly was insensitive at times to the reac­
tions of fellow monarchs and other nations, but in this he was not 
alone: Professor Kossmann has reminded us that "the Dutch had no 
idea of the intense feelings of jealousy and fear that their success 
had aroused in others."153 Louis, like all rulers, at times misjudged 
situations. His most serious misjudgment is probably that of the 
situation in the Empire after 1689. His dispatches to French diplo­
mats, and in particular to D'Avaux in the important years 1694-97, 
are full of arguments that he genuinely felt must carry weight with 
the Swedes and the German princes: he tried to rouse the king of 
Sweden against a Leopold who was becoming so powerful that he 
might not only throw France and Sweden out of the Empire but 
also subdue the German princes and rob Germany of her liberties.154 
Similar arguments are found in letters to French diplomats inside 
the Empire.155 It does not look as if Louis realized that, in an age of 
individual ambitious drive among the German princes, the emperor 
had the upper hand because he was the fountain of honor and titles 
inside the Empire. One by one the German princes gave Leopold 
their support: Hanover in 1692 for the electoral title; Saxony in 1697 
for support for its prince to be elected king of Poland; Brandenburg 
in 1701 for the title of "king in Prussia"; while George I of Hanover-
England and Frederick William of Brandenburg-Prussia were kept on 
tenterhooks, dancing to at least some of the tunes of Charles VI, by 
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their need to obtain imperial investitures for their Swedish conquests. 
The accepted view of the consequences for French economic life 
of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes has recently, by the studies 
of Scoville and Liithy, undergone some necessary revision.156 But on 
Louis's relations with the Protestant powers of Europe, the evidence 
that comes to light points to an ever-deepening distrust and horror 
of Louis after 1685. Geyl has shown how the Dutch, from the cynical 
"Tut, tut, what does religion matter in state affairs"157 of the pre­
1685 v e a rs , entrenched themselves in a belief that Louis plotted not 
only universal monarchy but also universal religion to be imposed on 
Europe by his arms. This belief was reinforced by the clause (No. 4) 
in the Ryswick Treaty that decreed that in the reunions returned by 
France to their rightful owners the Catholic religion should prevail. 
Srbik has shown how great a share Leopold and his Jesuit advisers 
had in clause 4;158 but though some contemporaries blamed Lillie-
root, the Swedish mediator, for not preventing the clause,159 Louis 
has carried most of the blame. Belief in the plot of resurgent Catholi­
cism has found some support in modern research. Louis and Leopold 
had a common interest in the Stuart cause and in its concomitant, a 
Catholic England, which facilitated those negotiations between them 
that so worried William III during the Nine Years' War.160 A similar 
Catholic-front element can be discerned in the 1714-15 negotiations 
between Versailles and Vienna, when Louis was anxious to reinsure 
against George I restarting the war against France, and Charles VI 
was alarmed at the growing power of the Protestant princes in the 
north of the Empire.161 That fear of Louis as the instrument of a 
counter-reformation was spread by Huguenot refugees is well known. 
More important, possibly, is the fact that many Dutchmen and 
Englishmen, settled as traders in French ports, felt the full force 
of the Revocation—either because they had become naturalized or 
because they (though remaining subjects of their own country) had 
French wives who, with their children, were not exempt from the 
Edict. Their bitter complaints aggravated anti-Louis feeling in Lon­
don and at The Hague.162 William III was also concerned at the 
difficulties his restored principality of Orange encountered as an 
enclave of tolerance in an intolerant France.163 The spread of perse­
cution and brutality to the Savoyard Protestants (instigated by Louis, 
who objected to French Huguenots settling across the border in such 
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numbers that they constituted a threat to the security of France) 
further alienated European opinion. Louis's argument is given some 
support by the fact that the Allies in the War of the Spanish Suc­
cession helped to rouse the Protestants of the Cevennes (at a time 
when persecution had already ceased) against Louis. The tolerant 
attitude of William in religious matters and his genuine concern and 
attempts to help Protestants in trouble for the sake of their religion 
(clearly evidenced in his correspondence with Heinsius) 164 tends to 
make him rather than Louis the more acceptable character to a toler­
ant age, even when it has been shown that Louis personally was not 
the instigator of persecution inside France and was ignorant of much 
that happened.165 
In other and more personal spheres Louis irritated contemporaries— 
at least in the earlier part of his reign—as well as posterity. There is 
a telling comment by one English diplomat who disliked and feared 
"this Great Comet that is risen of late, the French King, who expects 
not only to be gazed at but adored by the whole world."166 Most 
nations struck medals, put up monuments, or otherwise remembered 
their victories: France was annoyed by the Dutch inscription on a 
medal struck after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle;167 the English took 
offense at Dutch commemoration of their Chatham victories; but a 
great many nations felt hurt by the monument in the Place des 
Victoires by which Louis in 1686 celebrated the Peace of 1679. 
Rumor even had it that allies no less than former enemies had been 
humiliated in verse and paint on that occasion to enhance the glory 
of France.168 Charles XII, with his aversion to statues of living rulers, 
felt a slight contempt for a monarch who praised himself by having 
statues put up in his own lifetime: such gloire should be left for 
posterity to decide. 
Deeper than such resentments went the distrust of Louis, bred by 
the progressive interpretation of 1648; by the several occupations of 
Lorraine, which pointed to permanent designs (the Dutch, when 
Louis's inclination to incorporate Lorraine became apparent, harked 
back to a statement of his from 1670 specifically denying such designs 
and told him they would "rather die" than let him realize his plans); 
by the memory of the War of Devolution, which rendered Louis sus­
pect in the Palatinate: what might he not do with the claim of his 
sister-in-law's hnmeubles at a time when the legal heir, as settled by 
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the 1648 treaty, was the father-in-law and supporter of the emperor r1 
From this distrust grew the desire of all who felt threatened to con­
tain Louis by united diplomatic and, if need be, military action: 
William Ill's "indivisibility of the peace" became their slogan, at 
least as long as fear was strong. Yet, toward the end of Louis's reign 
relations mellowed between him and Europe. Old enemies died: 
William III, who had inherited Lisola's mantle as leader of the anti-
French coalitions; then Leopold of Austria; then his son Joseph. The 
new emperor, Charles VI, was both less "German" and less "Austrian 
Hapsburg" in the early years of his reign than his father and brother 
had been. Heinsius and the Dutch were shocked enough at English 
behavior in the last years of the Spanish Succession War, and both­
ered enough by Charles VI's intransigence in the Southern Neth­
erlands over their Barrier, to take a better view of Louis. Saint-
Simon noted, with some surprise, that not one adverse comment on 
Louis was heard from the capitals of Europe when his death was 
announced.169 
Louis's relationship with France is being reassessed. As Asher has 
shown,170 specialist studies are undermining the image of the all-
powerful autocrat at home. The tyrant abroad, the aspirer after uni­
versal monarchy, may also diminish somewhat in stature when seen 
in the proper perspective permitted by new lines of research. The 
textbook picture of the just downfall of the tyrant, the Louis who 
after a long reign of aggression in Europe met with utter failure at 
the end of his life, also needs some realignment. This paper ventures 
to suggest that Louis XIV was, on the one hand, more frightened 
than has been realized, and, on the other, moderately successful in 
achieving, after hard struggles, the relatively modest goals he set for 
himself—or fate set for him. The objectives of 1648 were secured 
in 1678-79, and not lost in 1713-14;171 a Bourbon dynasty in 
Spain helped to safeguard the eastern frontier as completed by 
1697 and made possible the later Family Compacts; the principality 
of Orange was absorbed; m the four military routes through Lorraine 
were kept, and the incorporation of that duchy was—by 1738— 
achieved in principle along the lines of exchange-equivalents in Italy 
laid down by Louis.173 The deepest concern of Louis not to lose 
gloire by bringing his country loss of territory and of rights was, at 
least in Europe, gratified. 
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Louis XIV, Soldier-Kmg

JOHN B. WOLF 
T HE king of France was a soldier, and a king of France born during the Thirty Years' War, when all the talk in the court 
concerned battles and heroes, would inevitably want to play out the 
role of soldier-king. Although the young Louis may not have learned 
much about the art of war during the Fronde and the Franco-
Spanish war that followed, these years did reinforce his determination 
to achieve his military gloire. La Grande Mademoiselle tells us that 
his all-consuming interests revolved around the doings of soldiers, 
their equipment, their drill. Small wonder that he was a little 
disappointed in the profound peace that he discovered in Europe 
after the death of Mazarin: " . . . My age and the pleasure of 
being at the head of my army/' he wrote, "would have made me 
hope for a few more affairs abroad."1 He could send a detachment to 
aid the emperor against the Turks, another to support a German 
bishop, another to fight the North African "pirates"; but none of 
these expeditions could test the military ability of the king nor give 
him a chance to fulfil his gloire.2 
In the letters that he sent to the men who commanded these early 
expeditions, one theme stands out as a dominant interest. He de­
manded that his soldiers maintain strict discipline both to make the 
units more efficient fighting organizations and to support the reputa­
tion of the French king in foreign lands. This interest in discipline 
continues to be a most important theme in the military correspondence 
of Louis XIV from these early years until his death. The actual 
L O U I S X I V , S O L D I E R - K I N G 197 
development of discipline in the army was left to others, but it was 
superintended by the king. In Louis's mind, discipline was closely 
related to efficient administration; perhaps this is why he was so 
interested in it. In his Memoires, intended for the dauphin, he 
explained: "I maintained so exact a discipline among my troops that 
having sent them . .  . to my allies, to Hungary, and to Holland, 
they never gave the least reason for complaint. . . . Thus I had care 
to pay them exactly . . . and in Holland I raised their ordinary pay 
because I knew that costs there were greater than elsewhere." This 
statement, of course, is optimistic about the actual behavior of the 
French army, but it indicates the attitude of the king. 
It is not surprising to find that a man who was concerned about 
his soldiers and his own career should welcome the Anglo-Dutch 
War and the death of his father-in-law, Philip IV, as chances to 
fulfil his role as king. Michel Le Tellier and Turenne had created 
a splendid army; here was the opportunity to use it. 
As a war, however, the Devolution was a disappointment. In 
1667 Louis joined his armies as a "cadet of Turenne"; the next year 
he invaded Franche-Comte with an army commanded by Conde 
"under the orders of the King." These campaigns gave Louis a 
chance to "enjoy" some of the "hardships" of war related to rain, 
mud, and short supplies; but outside of the siege of Lille, where a 
young engineer named Vauban proved his skill, they were more of 
the nature of promenades than of war. Indeed, during the summer 
the queen and the "ladies" arrived in Flanders so that Maria Theresa's 
new subjects could see their "rightful ruler"; the whole affair was 
a delightful adventure, but hardly a school for war. Louis, however, 
did learn one very important thing: the progress of the invasion was 
tied to the movement of supplies and men over bad roads. Even a 
fine army is of little use unless the logistic services support its 
drive, and Turenne's whole campaign in 1667 was limited by the 
problems of logistics. Louis understood this, for he later wrote in his 
Memoires that a commander might lose a battle as a result of chance, 
the cowardice of the soldiers, the failure of morale, or simply bad 
luck without being to blame; but if he lost because the army lacked 
supplies, then the commander alone was at fault. Throughout his 
life Louis tried to control the chance of battle by careful administra­
tion of details, by careful organization of supplies. As everyone knows, 
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this effectiveness in military detail was the secret of Louvois's 
popularity with the king. 
The next war was of a different order. Even though the Dutch 
were not prepared to fight the army of Louis XIV, the'problems 
involved in an expedition so far from the frontiers of the kingdom, 
as well as the resistance of the enemy, made the year 1672 an 
important experience for the young king. He learned much more 
about the problem of supplies: the amount of forage needed for 
an army of 100,000 men, the problems of munitions and bread,3 put 
enormous demands upon the transport services. He also learned that 
discipline was a problem that concerned the entire army from the 
lowest soldier to the marshals who commanded it. Even though 
Turenne's commission made him almost the constable of France, and 
Louis's orders made his commands supreme, three marshals refused 
to obey him. Louis had to send them home, for their action "would 
be . .  . too much a limitation on the authority of the prince; he 
can divide his power as it pleases him, and . . . according to the 
needs of the state, and not according to the pretentions of his 
officers. . . . "  4 He could disgrace a marshal, but even this would 
not assure the soldiers' obedience to orders of a war minister.5 In 
the following years Louis was to learn that even a "table of organiza­
tion" that spelled out the right to command could not erase the 
practices of soldiers who had long considered themselves independent 
agents. The presence of the king or some member of his immediate 
family alone could impose order on the line of command when it 
was challenged by "men of quality" with high social prestige, or 
officers whose backgrounds encouraged independent action. This is 
one of the reasons we so often find the royal armies commanded by 
a marshal "under the orders" of the king, his brother, his son, or 
his grandson. 
Perhaps even more important, Louis learned something about the 
"famous soldiers" whose glamorous reputations dazzled their own 
times as well as ours. All the propaganda, all the Te Deums, all the 
feux d'artifices could not blind the king to the fact that the campaign 
of 1672 was a failure, a military failure that his diplomats were not 
able to retrieve. If the "great soldiers" who commanded his armies 
were not to blame, who was? They had failed to sever the jugular 
vein of the Dutch Republic, even though it had been completely 
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exposed. Nor was that all; for Louis also learned that Condi's im­
petuous style of command not only failed to win the war but also 
was responsible for unnecessary casualties. At the crossing of the 
Rhine, Conde and a handful of volunteers ("people of quality"!) 
crossed the stream without waiting for Louis to post a battery that 
easily would have driven off the few defenders on the other side. 
Conde joined the charge of the hare-brained young men who cried, 
"Kill! Kill!," and thus left the Dutch soldiers no alternative to defend­
ing themselves. A half-dozen "people of quality" were killed, and 
Conde was wounded. It was obviously a foolish action for one who 
was responsible for the success of the campaign. Louis complained 
bitterly about the incident in a letter to his wife, and ever after was 
suspicious of soldiers who depended upon enthusiasm for an attack.6 
The campaign of 1673 gave Louis new insights into the art of war. 
This time neither Turenne nor Conde had enough troops to do 
much more than defend themselves while the king marched with a 
large force to besiege Maestricht, with Vauban really in command 
"under his orders." In a letter to his grandson many years later, Louis 
gives us insight into the relationship that developed between himself 
and the military engineer.7 Eventually, Vauban was to become a 
lieutenant general and even a marshal of France, the first engineer 
officer ever to reach such honors in any army of Europe; but in 1673 
he had no such prestige. Louis sensed that this engineer knew how 
to take a fortification as long as his orders were not interfered with 
by the other officers higher in the military hierarchy who also prided 
themselves on their understanding of sieges. Under the king's orders 
Vauban could direct a siege, and no one would dare to countermand 
his commands; thus the king's presence was probably necessary for 
a successful siege. When the king could not be present, he sent his 
orders as precisely as possible. In 1688, when the dauphin and 
Marshal Duras were sent to besiege "Philisbourg," Louvois wrote to 
Duras: "M. de Vauban will be in Alsace the 26th or 27th of this 
month. His Majesty expects that you will take his advice for the 
opening of the trenches and the details of the attack. Since you 
know his experience and capacity, the intention of His Majesty is 
that you will see to it that he is not contradicted." 8 Years later Louis 
explained that when Vauban "commanded under his orders," the 
engineer would explain to the king the problems involved in the 
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siege and then give him a list of the men and materials that would 
be needed for success. Louis assured his grandson that Vauban never 
lacked the things that he ordered. One has only to read between 
the lines of the king's correspondence to see that he understood that 
Vauban was the expert on siege operations; and it was Louis's 
pattern to support the "expert" with the authority of the king, no 
matter what might be the area of action.9 Maestricht was Louis's 
first "great siege"; the year before, his soldiers had taken fifty-odd 
forts, but none of them were like Maestricht. Undoubtedly, Louis 
was thinking of Maestricht when he wrote: "Great sieges please me 
more than other action. . . .  "1  0 
But the fascination with the operation of a siege was not all that 
Vauban taught his king. The engineer who could conquer a place 
also knew how to defend the kingdom. This was important to Louis; 
all his life, he had a neurotic fear of invasion, of violation of his 
frontiers. Thus when Vauban explained to him that the treaty of 
1668 left the frontier between France and the Spanish Netherlands 
a hodgepodge of fortifications, in which the French and Spanish 
holdings were mixed together in enclaves that made no sense and 
could hardly be defended, Louis understood the engineer's demand 
for a pre carre11 that could be defended. Obviously, neither Turenne 
nor Lionne had ever understood this demand for a lineal frontier; 
Turenne's military strategy depended upon the movement of the 
army from one fortified position to another without reference to the 
frontier, and Lionne's diplomacy never dealt in anything but frontier 
provinces or towns "and their dependencies." Under Vauban's direc­
tion there emerged the conception of "lines" with fortified cities and 
strong points that defined the military frontier of the kingdom. The 
Archives of the Ministry of War have many maps showing the 
evolution of this concept, as well as the actual structure of the "field 
fortifications" that gave security to the kingdom, since a small army 
behind these fieldworks could hope to stand off a large invasion 
force. Years later, when the balance of military power had shifted 
against France, Louis explained to Marshal Villeroi that he could 
not risk a bold attack against superior forces, because "it is important 
to think of defending my country and conserving my army in the 
best ways possible. . . . If in holding the lines one loses a great 
number of men, one can hope that the enemy will lose considerably 
more on their side and that one can defend my country foot by 
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foot."12 Vauban's skill and Louis's fears established the lines that 
guarded the kingdom. Hans Delbriick once remarked that the Roman 
legions reappeared on the soil of Europe during these years that the 
princes learned to create standing armies; he might well have added 
that with the "Roman legions" came the "Roman lines" to set many 
of the frontiers. 
This new system of defense was adopted after 1675, when the 
death of Turenne and the retirement of Conde left the field free 
to Louis and his own creatures of his own age; it was to become 
one of the cornerstones in Louis's military and foreign policies for 
the rest of the reign. After 1675 the campaigns on the frontiers of the 
Spanish Netherlands, the evacuation of Sicily, and the defensive 
position in Alsace and along the frontiers of Lorraine were all con­
ditioned by this new conception of defense. When the war ended, 
the Courts of Reunion took over where the soldiers left off to secure 
a defensible lineal frontier. One has only to visit the Saar Basin to 
see why the French king tried to firm up the lines between the 
Rhine and Luxembourg into a stable frontier that could be properly 
fortified; and of course, the annexation of Strasbourg was essential 
to the establishment of the "line of the Rhine." As far as I know, 
only once did Louis question the validity of this trend of thought: in 
1705, when Marlborough, after failing to puncture Villars' position 
in Alsace, broke through the lines in the Spanish Netherlands that 
the elector of Bavaria and Villeroi were supposed to defend, Louis 
momentarily wondered whether the French should not return to 
the old style of war of maneuver, with its well-fortified camps, as being 
more suited "to the ability and genius of the nation."13 However, 
he soon realized that the problem in Spanish Flanders arose out of 
the fact that the lines there, unlike those along his own frontier, 
were weak and ill-suited for defense. 
In face of the tradition, followed by so many historians, that 
Conde and Turenne were responsible for the military successes of 
the reign, and that after their removal, only mediocre generals 
commanded the armies, we should note that it was not until after 
Turenne was killed and Conde retired that the French armies were 
able to win the limited victory that Louis secured in the Treaty 
of Nijmegen. There is a belief that the Army of Alsace was on the 
verge of a great victory when Turenne was killed, but the precipitous 
retreat following the unlucky cannon shot hardly argues that this 
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army was much better than its German adversary. Turenne did show 
an aggressive vigor in 1674, but even then he was able only to push 
the enemy out of Alsace; it was not a victory that could impose a 
peace. In the campaigns of 1676, 1677, and 1678, however, the 
plans were more carefully drawn: the French punctured the defenses 
of the Spanish Netherlands and threatened the United Provinces 
enough to bring the Dutch bourgeois politicians to a separate peace. 
This was the work of Vauban, Louvois, and the king. Louvois, as 
quartermaster general, organized the supplies and manpower, Vauban 
projected and oversaw the sieges so that victory was assured; and 
there is one part of the campaign that bears the clear-cut mark of 
Louis's personality: each spring the enemy was thrown off-guard by a 
deceptive maneuver in which Louis used both the false movement 
of troops and the balls and fetes of the court to draw attention from 
the real objective of the campaign.14 It is difficult not to see most 
of Louis's later successful conduct of war as being founded on lessons 
learned in these last years of the Dutch War, when neither Conde 
nor Turenne were at his side. 
There are a number of problems connected with Louis's conduct 
as a soldier. The fact that he would appear at the "head of his 
armies" early in the spring for a grand siege or two and then, in 
July, leave the army under the command of his generals in a 
defensive stance while he enjoyed himself at court has opened him 
to the charge of dilettantism. It is not always possible to understand 
why he left the army so soon, but the correspondence of 1676 gives 
us a small clue. The sieges of that year had been highly successful, 
even though Louis did not fight a field battle even when he had 
an advantage that probably would have assured victory.15 William 
of Orange got his armies into the field somewhat later than the 
French, but he succeeded in establishing trenches around Maestricht; 
the French immediately besieged Aire as compensation for the pos­
sible loss of Maestricht, and after taking it, Louis suggested trying 
another siege. It was discovered that the French magazines had been 
emptied of powder and shot by the sieges already undertaken, and, 
in Louvois's opinion, it would have been dangerous to draw powder 
and shot from the frontier fortifications that might be an object of 
attack from the enemies. The correspondence is highly revealing, 
and may explain that the king went home each July because there 
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was not enough powder to undertake a project worthy of his presence. 
This correspondence also tells us something about Louis: he urged 
another attack anyway, on the ground that the "enemies" were not 
as strong as they claimed to be. Finally Louvois gave in, and the 
army besieged and took Linck.16 After the fall of Linck, Schonberg, 
in a series of forced marches, took the army to the hills south of 
Maestricht and broke William's hold on that fortification. It was a 
severe jolt to the coalition against France, proving that the death of 
Turenne had not crippled French command. 
It is probably true that the supply of powder and shot often put 
a limitation upon the "objectives" of the campaign; and thus, once 
these were achieved, the king's presence was not really any longer 
necessary. But this does not entirely excuse Louis of the charge of 
having a dilettante attitude toward war. He liked to go with the 
army, and he put up with the discomforts like a good soldier; but 
he also enjoyed having the court and the ladies with him on a 
campaign (very often, his tent looked more like a salon than a 
soldier's camp). When the court returned to the palace, he wanted 
to go with it; and he would take his personal troops, the famous 
Maison du roi, with him. Since his presence may not have been 
necessary for the army to stand on the defensive, he could easily 
find "good reasons" for his departure. It would seem that he tired 
of war when it was simply an affair of maneuvers and camps. The 
fact that he left the army sometimes had unfortunate effects. For 
example, after the king left the army during the campaign (1676) 
mentioned above, Schonberg had considerable trouble securing 
obedience to his commands; some of the great noblemen regarded 
him as a "German upstart," whereas they were "people of quality." 
Had the king been willing to stay with the army, the man who 
"commanded under his orders" would have been obeyed—even if he 
was a mere engineer. It might be noted that in later years, when 
the dauphin or the duke of Burgundy "commanded" the kings 
armies, Louis often kept them with the troops until late September 
or even October. But these were years when there was danger of 
invasion, and Louis always believed that the troops had better morale 
when a member of the royal family was at their head. 
A second charge, perhaps more serious, has been leveled against 
the king by Saint-Simon and others: namely, that he was afraid to 
fight. His personal courage has been questioned in connection with 
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the unfought battle of Heurtebise and again in the spring campaign 
of 1693; beyond this, his fear of an infantry battle has been generalized 
to mean that he was even afraid to allow his soldiers to fight anything 
but siege operations. Indeed, a recent popular biographer, W. H. 
Lewis, calls him a "reluctant soldier." 
It is surely true that the unfought battle of Heurtebise contrasts 
strikingly with Philippe's battle of Cassel the next year, but if we 
examine the conditions that contributed to the decision to stand on 
the defensive, Louis does not come out too badly. He always relied 
upon "experts" when considering decisions; thus he called a council 
of war as soon as the two armies opposed each other in battle forma­
tion. Neither Louvois nor a clear majority of the high officers who 
gathered around him wanted to risk the death of the king in a field 
battle. Luxembourg and Vauban both tell us later that the battlefield 
is no place for a king unless he is actually in command, for the 
commander is always hampered by the necessity of defending the 
king's person. Louis reluctantly accepted this decision at the time; 
years later, he was angry at Louvois because of it. In 1676, however, 
no one could forget the cannon shot that had killed Turenne a few 
months before, and no one in the entourage of the king wanted a 
regency with Maria Theresa as regent!17 
The other charge, that in 1693 Louis was afraid to fight even 
though he had a great superiority in Flanders, also fails to take into 
account a council of war held at the Abbey of Saint Denis in 
Flanders. Louis's letters to his brother and Marshal Catinat give us 
insight into that decision. He wrote to Philippe: 
I must tell you of a resolution that I took yesterday . .  . on 
[hearing] the news of the taking of Heidelberg, to send my son 
with a large army into Germany with that of Marechal de Lorge to 
make a powerful effort to force the princes of the Empire and 
perhaps the Emperor himself to accommodate themselves to me. I 
will admit [my] hopes of doing something extraordinary in this 
country [Flanders] corresponding to the power that I had assembled 
and the preparation that I had made, and a little amour propre. I 
resisted the pressing insistence that one presented and the solid 
and judicious reasons. . .  . I persisted in my first design as you 
can see by coming here [to the army in Flanders], but finally I 
gave in to the remonstrances that one presented to me and the 
movement of my own reason . .  . I sacrificed the pleasure of my 
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own desires and individual tastes and all that would flatter me for 
the good of the state, being convinced that this gambit would 
more effectively secure peace than any other that I might 
undertake. . . .18 
Saint-Simon simply did not know what he was talking about. If 
there was any real question about the king's personal courage, it 
should be pointed out that he often visited the trenches in siege 
operations. This was a dangerous thing to do, as he himself well 
understood; for we find him repeatedly ordering Vauban not to 
inspect trenches personally, since his life was so important to the 
state. Louis surely was not always wise, but he was no more a 
coward than other men. 
The question concerning Louis's attitude toward a battle in the 
open field deserves greater consideration. In this era a general could 
lose a war in an afternoon by a careless action; one would expect 
a man whose whole career was marked by attempts to foresee and 
avoid disasters in politics or war to urge caution upon his soldiers. 
There can be no doubt about his anxiety over an infantry battle; his 
correspondence after the death of Louvois is replete with admonitions 
against a battle "where my cavalry cannot act," against an infantry 
battle that "settles nothing" with much bloodshed. But this must 
not be generalized to mean that he opposed any action except 
maneuvers and sieges. The facts of his brother's victory at Cassel 
could be taken as a case study of the young king. Here we see Louis 
strengthening the army under Philippe's command, stripping all the 
cavalry from frontier fortifications for a hundred miles in each direc­
tion, and, finally, giving Philippe a free hand to act as he deemed 
necessary. Louis's only important restriction was to be found in his 
dispatching Marshal Luxembourg to join Philippe so that there 
would be another competent commander on the field in case some­
thing should happen to Marshal Humieres. In one of the last notes 
before the battle actually occurred, however, Louvois wrote to 
Humieres, saying that "His Majesty wants me to tell you . . . that 
he does not want Monsieur to make any terrible mistake,"19 but he 
did not revoke his grant of freedom of action. 
Louis's attitude toward his brother's victory also raises a number 
of questions. He replied graciously to Conde's letter of congratulations 
on Philippe's success, expressing his satisfaction with the victory and 
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his pleasure over Conde's letter.20 And yet, the men who gave the 
"news releases" to the Gazette, and the anonymous author of the 
beautifully illustrated manuscript history of the campaign, seemed 
to feel that they must play down Philippe's part in the victory and 
play up Louis's actions and foresight in providing the troops and 
the supplies that made victory possible. Which is the true Louis 
XIV? Was he the man who answered Conde's letter, or the man 
whose amour propre is so tender that courtiers believed it necessary 
to credit him with successes that he did not really achieve? Some 
have argued that it must be the latter since Philippe was never again 
in position to fight another battle. It is true that Philippe's commands 
in the next war were confined to the Channel coast, where he 
"directed" the defense against the Anglo-Dutch naval forces; but this 
may be because Louis did not want him to wave his sword and 
order a charge, as he did at Cassel. It is impossible to say why Louis 
did not give him another field command; but it is as reasonable to 
assume that the king was afraid that the next time Philippe's brash 
enthusiasm might spell disaster as it is to assume that he was simply 
jealous of his brother. Louis distrusted soldiers who depended upon 
the enthusiasm of the moment for a Conde-like attack; he pre­
ferred soldiers who depended upon longer-range plans and prepara­
tions for their victories. Philippe's character was not one to arouse 
great confidence. 
Although it is a question who really gave the orders during these 
years when Louvois was at Louis's elbow, after the war minister's 
death we can be relatively sure that decisions taken were really those 
of the king. After 1691 Louis's correspondence leaves little doubt 
that his attitude toward a battle was conditioned by his faith in his 
commander, his assessment of the enemy armies, and, finally, the 
state of his treasury and magazines. In 1691-94, for example, he 
urged Luxembourg and Catinat to fight, whereas his orders to De 
Lorges, whose judgment was more questionable, were much more 
cautious. When William threatened to attempt the recapture of 
Namur in 1692, Louis wrote to Luxembourg: "My intention is that 
you march . . . with speed and approach him . . . fight him before 
he can establish his trenches. I will not prescribe your route; you 
know better than anyone the best way to fall upon him. . . .  " A 
few days later, the king felt a little more cautious: "I believe that 
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there is nothing better for you to do than to approach him as closely 
as possible, taking positions that will not force you to fight without 
advantage. . . .  " Then a few days later, " . . . You should 
approach the enemy and try to make him attempt some gambit from 
which you can profit. . . .  " And, not yet knowing that Luxembourg 
had already fought the battle of Steinkirke, Louis ordered more rein­
forcements for his army so that he could fight "with advantage." 
Luxembourg's account of the battle includes this statement: "I have 
not wished . .  . to engage in an infantry battle, your majesty having 
told me that you did not want to fight such a combat because so 
often they decide nothing . . . , " and then went on to give his 
version of how he actually did fight the battle. He was obviously 
sure that he had not exceeded instructions.21 
The next year, after the council of war at Saint Denis in Flanders 
had detached part of the army of Flanders to Germany, Louis wrote 
to Luxembourg, who still commanded a large army: "I hasten to 
repeat to you that you should approach the enemies as soon as 
possible; I leave the timing to you, recommending only . . . pre­
cautions so that nothing disagreeable happens to my armies. . . .  " 
Four days later: " . .  . Fall on their rear guard; if you cannot find 
a way to do this, I will know that it is impossible." Again: " . .  . If 
the occasion presents itself to fight them in a position where my 
cavalry can act favorably, you may take it. . .  . " Later: "I leave 
you master of whatever you choose to do. . . .  " Little happened 
for several weeks, and Louis wrote: "If you can find an opportunity 
to fight the Prince of Orange, you can not do me a greater 
service. . . .  " Five days later came the battle of Neerwinden; Louis 
wrote to Luxembourg: "It is a pleasure to give orders when one obeys 
them as you did. . . .  " Luxembourg graciously replied that it was 
easy to obey a monarch whose orders were so clear and precise.22 
There is not space to show that Louis's letters to Catinat in Italy 
were much the same as these, except for the usual assurance that 
Louis understood that Catinat knew the situation in Italy better 
than he did, "never having been there." 23 Noailles in Spain also had 
freedom of action, but not many troops. 
It has many times been pointed out that Luxembourg's victories 
did not yield results. There are at least two reasons for this fact. 
The first is that the "victories" after 1692 were never quite complete; 
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the "Prince of Orange" could find money to rebuild his army before 
the French could act decisively to take advantage of their battles. A 
second reason may have been Luxembourg's fault. In 1693, for 
example, after the battle of Neerwinden, Louis ordered Vauban to 
join Luxembourg and besiege Charleroi. It is hard to tell from the 
correspondence whether caution or dislike of Vauban's interference 
was responsible, but Louis had great difficulty convincing the marshal 
that the siege should be undertaken. Luxembourg had all sorts of 
excuses and other suggestions. Louis urged his point: "I still think 
that . . . you can besiege Charleroi. . .  . I have not given positive 
orders being content to let you know my thoughts." Then: "I am 
not interested in promenades to Angheim, Hermes, Hiues [for contri­
butions and bombardments]. . .  . It is only a question of Charleroi. 
. . .  " After several weeks of pressure, Luxembourg gave in, and 
Louis fairly crowed: "I have always believed that you could take 
Charleroi and at the same time hold the forts and lines in Flanders, 
because of the knowledge that I have of the wretched condition of 
the enemy army. . .  . I have always said that the rumors that they 
publish . . . should not prevent me from taking Charleroi, and 
there is no evidence that I have been wrong. . . .  "2  4 
As we shall see, when famine stalked the land, Louis was forced 
to become more cautious; but the bad years of 1694-97 did not take 
all the fight out of the aging king. When the Spanish Succession 
brought on a new war, Louis was still ready to try a battle if he 
believed that he could force his enemies "to accommodate" them­
selves to him or guarantee his frontiers this way. In 1701 Prince 
Eugene, despite expectations, led an army over the Alps. It was 
inferior to Catinat's forces, and at Versailles, no one could under­
stand why Catinat did not punish "the little abbe" for his temerity. 
Catinat pointed out that Eugene was always entrenched, but Louis 
could not believe that this should prevent a successful battle. He 
called Villeroi to Versailles. Villeroi had shown imagination and 
daring as a division commander under Luxembourg, and as com­
mander of one of the armies in Flanders after 1695. Louis sent him 
to Italy with the order to fight. Villeroi left Versailles filled with 
courage and ambition; the king's letters purr with satisfaction. But 
Eugene was waiting at Chiari! Villeroi's first letter telling of the 
battle has to be read at least twice to see what had happened, and, 
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indeed, only when the casualty lists arrived at Versailles, did Louis 
appreciate the size of the disaster. "I ordered you to seek out the 
enemies . .  . to keep as close as possible to them, to give battle, but 
that order ought to have been carried out with prudence. . . .  " His 
next instructions: "You must be cautious and not risk anything with 
people who know how to profit by everything and to entrench them­
selves before you. . . .  " He could have arrived at this point of view 
from Catinat's dispatches earlier in the year, but Louis had never 
thought highly of the German troops ("caterpillars"). It took 
Eugene to teach him to write, "It seems to me that the enemy 
troops have shown much courage. . . . You must lead my troops 
with prudence."25 
The experience in Italy, however, did not dampen the king's 
belief in his arms. When the English and Dutch entered the war 
the next year, Louis sent Marshal Boufflers "under the orders of 
the Duke of Burgundy . .  . to attack the enemies or undertake some 
enterprise." This probably meant a siege. Louis went on to assure 
Boufflers that the French army would be stronger and more experi­
enced than the enemies. Sometime later, he added: "We must 
accustom the troops to having the advantage, and at the same time 
disconcert the enemies, causing divisions that might contribute to 
peace. . . .  " It turned out otherwise, for the Anglo-Dutch army 
was stronger and its commander more predatory and resourceful 
than Louis had expected. By mid-October, 1702, he wrote ruefully: 
"It is a long time since anyone has seen conquests so rapid as those 
of the enemy . . . nothing seems to stop them . .  . I have lost more 
troops than the enemies lost at the battle of Fleurus, even though that 
victory was complete."26 
Even so, the next year he sent Marshal Villars into Germany to 
co-operate with the elector of Bavaria, and readily agreed to the 
pincer plan against the Hapsburg hereditary lands. Once he under­
stood what Villars and Max Emmanuel wanted to do, Louis ordered 
Vendome to co-operate with them by sending a strong detachment 
over the Alps from Italy to complete the pincer. The plan not only 
failed but also led to a conflict between Max Emmanuel and Villars 
that limited the usefulness of Louis's best commander. As the argu­
ment got hotter and hotter, Louis tried to calm Villars; at one point 
he exclaimed to Villars: "You ought not to talk that way to a 
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hereditary prince." But the king's attitude can be understood best by 
a letter that he wrote to Vendome when he realized that Vendome 
had had no intention of obeying his orders: 
One cannot be more surprised than I to see that you have taken it 
upon yourself to defer the execution of an order of such importance 
that you will have reason to regret the rest of your days that you 
contributed to a derangement that you cannot repair. . . . Do 
you think that, when I give you an order as precise as that one that 
you received, I have no reason stronger than yours? 27 
The fact that the duke of Savoy turned traitor saved Vendome from 
further scolding or worse, but this letter does not sound like a 
"reluctant soldier"! 
Even the battle of Blenheim did not take all the fight out of the 
king. Poor Louis learned of the defeat from letters sent to members 
of his court by relatives who had survived the affair. As the full 
extent of the disaster unfolded, Louis quickly moved to return the 
remnants of the Franco-Bavarian forces to Alsace, and quietly ex­
pressed the hope that Marlborough would give him a chance for 
revenge.28 But after 1704, Louis's letters bristle with caution; Marl­
borough and Eugene had shown him what could be done with the 
new armies that he and his war ministers had done so much to 
bring into being. The one exception to this cautious maneuvering 
came when Eugene invaded France to besiege Toulon. Louis brought 
troops from all parts of his kingdom, even from Spain, to drive out 
the invaders who had had the effrontery to break into his kingdom. 
His efforts were successful: Eugene had to withdraw.29 
After the battle of Oudenarde, in 1708, when Vendome and the 
duke of Burgundy, each blaming the other for the disaster, found 
it difficult to co-operate in the effort to relieve the siege of Lille, 
Louis again showed characteristic vigor, but to no avail. Some of the 
skirmishes for the control of the supply lines would have been called 
a "battle" seventy years earlier, and these ventures had the full support 
of the king; but they could not break Eugene's hold on Lille.30 
In 1709 the French were faced with impossible peace demands 
from the enemies and almost equally impossible conditions at home, 
where famine marched in the land. With Max Emmanuel out of 
the way and Boufflers ill, Louis could appoint his best general to 
defend the Flanders frontier. Villars's letters to the king before the 
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battle of Malplaquet are among the most exciting and interesting 
readings that any historian is ever allowed to study. Louis had confi­
dence in his commander, but dreaded the cold logic that said: "One 
must fight or make peace; there is no middle way/' Louis gave his 
consent for a battle, and Malplaquet probably can be credited with 
a large part of France's successful evasion of the desperate political 
situation of 1709. In this battle Louis's caution paid dividends. He 
sent Boufflers to second Villars, with the understanding that there 
would be two men capable of command in case anything should 
happen to either of them. BoufHers skillfully disengaged the army 
when Villars was badly wounded, leaving the enemies to count 
their dead.31 
Louis's reputation for caution, verging on cowardice and fear of 
a battle, obviously rests upon misunderstood evidence. As long as he 
believed that his armies could win an advantage, he was willing to 
try a battle to force the enemies to accommodate themselves to him. 
When his armies were weaker than the enemies, he ordered caution 
and stood on the defensive. For example, the dramatic effects of the 
famine of 1693 became evident early in 1694. In January there was 
much talk of an offensive in Italy to break the duke of Savoy; Louis 
had confidence in Catinat and contempt for the enemy. But by 
February it was all called off because there was not enough money 
to hire carts, to buy forage, and to supply needed war materials for a 
campaign. The possibility of a favorable peace in Italy resulting from 
a victory had to be abandoned because of the condition of the 
country. Luxembourg had also to stand on the defensive in Flanders 
for the same reason. The dauphin, who was technically in command 
in Flanders, wrote to his father of his hopes for some kind of a 
victory. Louis's reply was prompt: "I too hope that you will be able 
to acquire much gloire, but since you ought always to think of the 
good of the state, I do not doubt that you will conduct yourself with 
wisdom and prudence as you tell me that you always do."32 The 
enemies also suffered from the bad harvests, but their naval power 
and the "English secret weapon"33 shifted the balance of military 
power against France after 1694, a fact that finally forced Louis to 
make peace under conditions quite unfavorable to his interests. 
One exchange between Louis and Villeroi in 1695 dramatically 
indicates the change in the balance of military power. Villeroi and 
Boufflers were in command in Flanders after Luxembourg's death, 
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and Villeroi conceived a bold plan to unite the two French armies 
and fall upon William before the Imperials could come to his aid. 
Louis's reply was definite: "This plan would be to my taste and I 
would hope that you could defeat them, but the more I think of 
their strength . . . and how the Dulce of Wiirtemburg could force 
the lines at Ypres, the more I am convinced that it is important to 
think of defending my country foot by foot." When Villeroi pro­
tested, Louis wrote: "You have my last letter on this subject . . . 
I pointed out my intentions . . . not believing that it is to the good 
of my service to change orders that I have given you. . . . "3  4 He 
maintained this attitude throughout the years following 1694 because 
he understood the weakness of his armies vis-a-vis the foe. 
This same cautious attitude dominated Louis's thinking after 
Blenheim, but the problem was aggravated by the fact that he realized 
that the fortifications in the Spanish Netherlands were not of the 
same quality as those that had defended the French frontiers during 
the last war. The fortifications were not up to the standards set by 
Vauban, and the lines in the Netherlands were hastily erected and 
weak. Small surprise that the king became cautious when faced with 
the aggressive tactics of Eugene and Marlborough. These years when 
the balance of power tipped badly against him must be treated in 
that context, not as a characteristic pattern of behavior found 
throughout Louis's career. 
As long as Louvois was alive, it is difficult to discover the process 
by which the military decisions were made. Louvois, Le Tellier, 
Vauban, Chamlay, and several others "assisted" the king in making 
the decisions, but Louvois's part seems very large indeed. When 
Louvois died in 1691, Louis's part in the process undoubtedly 
became more important. He called Chamlay to him on the morrow of 
Louvois's death and offered him the dead man's post, but Chamlay 
would not deprive his friend's son of his "inheritance." A compromise 
was worked out by which Chamlay agreed to act as Louis's military 
advisor while Louvois's son, Barbezieux, retained the office of secre­
tary of state for war. But Barbezieux was only twenty-three years 
old and a libertine in his personal life; he and the "war office" could 
handle the details, but he could hardly take his dead father's place. 
If we are to believe Madame de Maintenon, Louis assumed most of 
the work himself; but in the background of the king's decisions we 
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find Chamlay playing a very large part while Vauban and three or 
four others add their bit now and then. It also seems quite clear that 
Louis gave much more freedom to the commanders in the field than 
Louvois had allowed them. 
The most important decision to be made was almost as much 
political as military. It was the question of allotment of troops and 
supplies to the several theaters of the conflict. The decision seems 
always to have been made with an eye to forcing the enemy to 
accommodate himself to the French demands, and the question of 
political softness was as important as any. In the winter at Versailles, 
Louis, Chamlay, Torcy, and others would decide upon the number 
of troops and the amount of war materials that could be sent to 
each commander. Thus even though the man in the field had much 
freedom of action, the size of his army was definitely a factor limiting 
his activity. 
Both before and after Louvois's death, the men in the field did 
have considerable leeway in the determination of their program of 
action. The formula that Louis used with Conde, "I have great con­
fidence in your affection and capacity . . . ,  "3  o was a normal and 
usual procedure. Louis's letters are strewn with the expressions: "Not 
being acquainted with the land . .  . I leave in your hands . . . "; 
"My confidence in you is complete, and I do not decide matters at 
a distance. . . .  " But he did expect the commander to let him 
know what the plans were, thereby assuring for himself a veto if 
necessary. One such occasion came in 1703 when Tallard, command­
ing the army of Alsace under the "orders of the duke of Burgundy," 
proposed a siege of Breisach in the spring to assure communications 
with Villars in Germany. Louis suggested Landau as an alternative, 
but finally gave consent for an attack on Breisach. Then Vauban 
came to Versailles, and Louis discussed the plans with him. Vauban 
had fortified the place and knew that it could only be taken in the 
fall when the Rhine was low. Louis's letter is a masterpiece. Tallard 
was a favorite and much honored for his work as a diplomat in 
London. Louis wrote to him: "You know the confidence with which 
I give myself to everything that you think proper to my service . . . 
it is still the same and nothing should better persuade you of it than 
the fact that I gave the duke of Burgundy freedom to besiege Breisach 
rather than Landau because you believed it more practicable; how­
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ever, I cannot set aside the experience of a man who has served me 
so long and so well as Marshal Vauban. . . .  " The siege was post­
poned and Vauban sent to Alsace to assure success in the fall.36 
Another phase of the decision process was the practice that 
developed of shifting detachments from one army to another as 
pressure built up at new points on the frontier. This was an integral 
part of the new tactics, exploiting the "lines" and fortified anchor 
points; it gave flexibility to defense and established the idea that the 
frontier of the kingdom must be defensible. However, it was not 
always easy for the king to persuade his generals to send a detachment 
from their command for the aid of a rival. If the commander were 
a Turenne, he might find reasons for not obeying. This was the 
situation in 1674 when it seemed wise to shift troops from Turenne's 
army to Conde's. Turenne simply failed to obey. The letters are 
interesting: "In apprehension that you did not receive my letter 
[which of course he had] . . . you have not yet sent the cavalry to 
Flanders. . . .  " Later: "The present state of my cousin the Prince 
of Conde makes me desire to send at once to Flanders. . . .  " A 
little later, after indicating Conde's need: "The light cavalry should 
be sent without delay." 37 Although a Turenne or a Vendome might 
find reasons for disobedience, most of the officers in later years did 
not. This process of moving detachments from one command to 
another allowed Louis to fight a successful defensive war, even when 
the military balance was against him. It failed in 1704, when he 
shifted the whole army toward the Danube; but the failure was not 
the fault of the king and his advisers at Versailles, for, though they 
could keep a degree of military balance by these shifts, they could 
not control the aggressive command of a Marlborough and a Eugene. 
Other decisions for action came from direct intervention of the 
king. After 1691 Louis's correspondence is filled with "proposals" 
rather than "orders" for military gambits. A close reading of these 
letters suggests that many times he was simply paraphrasing either 
memoires of, or conversations with, Chamlay. However, in these 
letters Louis nearly always discussed several possible gambits and 
left the commander the right to choose. At the end of one such letter 
to Luxembourg, Louis added: " . .  . Since I take the affairs of my 
army to heart, it is not surprising that I should worry about things 
that could happen and speak out my thoughts . .  . I know that I 
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do not teach you anything . . . but since we have been to war 
together we understand each other.38 
On several occasions Louis sent one of Chamlay's memoires to 
one or the other of his commanders for their reaction. Luxembourg 
once remarked that the proposal was a good one from "a man living 
at Versailles," but in "Flanders things looked differently." Both the 
king and Chamlay were defensive, but Luxembourg had his way. 
On another occasion an engineer in charge of frontier fortifications 
suggested a winter attack on Ostend. Louis sent the plan to Boufflers 
and Vauban; it, too, was finally rejected after careful consideration by 
the men on the scene. Only rarely did Louis take responsibility for 
overruling his officers' refusal to follow a suggestion from Versailles. 
One problem that has become more important since the develop­
ment of the concept of "war crimes" is the question of responsibility 
for decisions to commit acts of frightfulness or terror. The devastations 
in the Netherlands in 1672-73, the savage bombardments of Genoa 
and the "pirate" harbors, the bombardments in the Netherlands in 
1684, the devastation of Rhineland Germany in 1689, the bombard­
ments in the 1690's, all must be seen as acts of violence that, in 
Vauban's words, "did not add an inch of land to his majesty's king­
dom." A recent biographer of Madame de Maintenon recounted these 
events and exclaimed: "Louis XIV . . . committed a crime, and 
more exactly a 'war crime' . . . seeking to achieve strategic aims by 
extra-military affairs. For this systematic utilization of terror . . . the 
sovereign was responsible. . . . " 39 Any study of the archives points 
to Louvois and Chamlay as the men who urged these acts, but Louis 
cannot escape his share of the blame, for we find him agreeing at 
every point. Louvois always insisted that it was "his majesty's wishes" 
when he browbeat recalcitrant officers into acts of terror and devasta­
tion that they wished to avoid committing;40 and the king backed 
Chamlay rather than De Lorges when the latter tried to escape from 
the commands that he, unknowingly, had asked for on Chamlay's 
prodding. Furthermore, the mere fact that the letters were signed 
by Louvois cannot conceal Louis's part in the decisions, since syste­
matic bombardment remained a French policy after Louvois's death.41 
As long as Louvois was alive, he was largely responsible for the 
administration of supplies and munitions. The minutes indicate that 
he did discuss these problems with the king, but it is almost certain 
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that Louis did very little about this important part of the Ministry 
of War. After 1691, however, when the secretary of state for war 
was a young man, or later, when Chamillart held the posts of both 
the War Ministry and the Treasury, Louis seems to have had a much 
larger part in the administration of the army and its supplies. Madame 
de Maintenon tells us that the king carried the "whole burden of 
government" during these years, and there is little doubt that she 
was partly right, for almost as soon as Barbezieux became experienced 
enough to be of service, he died; and Chamillart could not handle 
both positions. We do know that this aspect of war interested Louis 
very much. He was first of all an administrator and a planner, who 
hoped to be able to control the future by foresight and preparations. 
He liked the role that current American military practice assigns to 
the chief of staff and the German, to the quartermaster general. As 
long as he had money and food available, he fulfilled this role 
with distinction. 
Louis seems sometimes to have been more flexible in this office 
of supply and procurement than Louvois had been. When the fusil 
was developed in the Turkish war during the 1680's, Louvois sternly 
refused to allow its use in the French army because it might not be 
reliable when the weather was wet. In the battle of Steinkirke, how­
ever, the superiority of the fusil's more rapid fire became painfully 
evident, and Luxembourg sent his son to the king to place the prob­
lem before him. Louis's reaction is characteristic of his behavior 
under such circumstances. He wrote to Luxembourg, "Look into it 
to see if you believe that it would be most useful to the good of my 
service to have my infantry entirely armed with fusils or to leave the 
situation as it is. Talk to old officers and tell me what they think 
best. The Comte de Luc tells me that most of the pikemen threw 
aside their weapons and grabbed fusils from the enemy. If you 
believe it would be good to arm my infantry with them, tell me and 
I will order that they be distributed in the quantity that you desire." 
This was the king's pattern: attempt to find "expert" advice and 
then follow its recommendations.42 
The most important decisions made by any chief of state are 
the appointments that he makes to high office. The king's choices 
were often limited by the venal practices that made many of his 
offices hereditary holdings, and yet he could force an officer to sell 
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his office; and in the nomination to the high rank of marshal, he 
enjoyed a near free hand. In his Memoires Louis bragged about the 
wisdom with which he picked his "team" to help him run the state, 
and throughout his life he considered the Bienfaits du roi a most 
important part of his role as king. Those who argue that Conde 
and Turenne were the last great generals to command his armies 
insist that he failed to appoint good officers to high commands. 
Mediocrities and favorites, so the story goes, had the ear of the 
king and the command of his army. Like so many stories about this 
era, a little close attention to detail reveals that half-truth has been 
mistaken for fact. 
With the first promotions to the rank of marshal after the death 
of Turenne, the so-called monnaie de Turenne gave most of the 
batons to creatures of the dead marechal. His two nephews, De Duras 
and De Lorges, the brother team that commanded in Germany, were 
second-rate men, but they had the blood and the recommendation of 
Turenne in their favor. Had Louis not appointed them, the criticism 
would have mounted to the high heavens. Of the others, Schonberg 
and Rochefort were surely well above the average of the officers of 
their generation, and Luxembourg was probably as fine a commander 
as any produced by the wars—perhaps even including Eugene, Villars, 
and Marlborough. The others of this first promotion were not worse 
than the average commanders in late seventeenth-century armies; 
even Vivonne, who may have become marshal because of his sister, 
actually distinguished himself in combat. 
Louis's later choices were partially conditioned by the mishap 
of death. There were three or four lieutenant generals that managed 
to get themselves killed in action who might have been great captains 
had they lived. In an age when a Eugene would lead a cavalry charge, 
lieutenant generals had a hazardous occupation. But the actual choices 
were not as bad as Saint-Simon and his followers would have us 
believe. Boufflers, Catinat, Tesse, Vendome, Berwick, and several 
others were surely superior to the average of the commanders in the 
enemy ranks, and Villars was a general of the same mold that made 
Eugene and Marlborough. Men like Tallard and Marcin are pointed 
to as poor officers, and rightly so; but they earned the king's favor 
first as diplomats rather than soldiers, for after the treaty of Ryswick, 
Louis liked to send men with military experience as his ambassadors. 
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Villeroi, a childhood friend of the king, may be the best case of 
favoritism gone astray; and yet Villeroi was a good detachment com­
mander under Luxembourg, and a man with aggressive ideas about 
war. Louis might be pardoned his indulgence if he had only realized 
after 1702 that Villeroi was not a strong general. It must also not be 
forgotten that Louis promoted Vauban to the rank of marshal even 
though he was only an engineer. 
All this does not excuse the king for poor promotions and even 
less for retaining men like Villeroi and Tallard when he should have 
known that their judgment was bad. And yet anyone who looks care­
fully into the problems of choice in the latter seventeenth century 
must be surprised that the king's promotions turned out to be as good 
as they were. Vendome was promoted because he was a Bourbon, 
Berwick because he was a Stuart, Noailles because of connections 
with both the king and Madame de Maintenon, and others because 
of family or court connections. In spite of these reasons, many of 
these people turned out to be good soldiers in the context of their 
times. Perhaps this is because the armies of the enemies were also 
commanded by men whose family connections weighed heavily in 
the decisions that gave them command. 
How shall we sum up Louis's role as soldier-king? His career 
as a soldier, like his career as a politician, was marked strongly by 
his belief that plan, foresight, and careful administration would iron 
out difficulties before they arose. He and Louvois were first of all 
administrators and after that, soldiers; they both paid close attention 
to the details of supply and equipment, organization and training of 
troops, and administration of the army. When Louvois died, much of 
the responsibility fell directly on the king. Unfortunately for him, 
the years after 1693 produced both famine and fiscal disorder in 
France, and enemies in Europe whose armies grew stronger than 
those of the French kingdom. That he succeeded as well as he did 
was probably the result of Vauban's teaching about the need for a 
fre carre on the frontier. Only when the lines between the king 
and his enemies were regularized as they were on a dueling field, 
was it possible to stand off a foe whose armies were stronger than 
those of the king. This concept of defense and the tactics that went 
with the development of the "lines" might be seen as another side 
of Louis's desire to control the future with plans and foresight. 
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The charge of dilettantism at war cannot be entirely dismissed. The 
presence of the court and the ladies in the theater of combat hardly 
suggests a serious attitude toward war. But, on the other hand, if 
the king's presence was necessary to assure the uninterrupted execu­
tion of Vauban's orders in a siege, it was hardly dilettantism that 
kept the king with the army as long as an important siege was under 
way. The charge of cowardice seems clearly without foundation; 
indeed, during the Dutch War, Louis often was open to the charge 
of rashness in the exposure of his person. 
It is also evident that Louis understood that a successful battle 
might force his enemies to accommodate themselves to his demands, 
and that he was quite willing to urge a trusted commander to under­
take to fight a battle in the open field when he believed that there 
was a good chance for success. On the other hand, Louis was also 
always conscious of the balance of military power and the fact that 
a general could lose a war in an afternoon. When his enemies were 
manifestly stronger than he was, Louis always urged caution as the 
better part of valor. This seems only evidence of wisdom, and should 
not be used to mark the king as a "reluctant soldier." 
Louis's military decisions were usually administrative ones. He 
and his creatures in the court decided where the effort could best 
be made and allotted troops to the several theaters of the war on the 
basis of that decision. Once the armies were committed, the general 
in the field had a large measure of autonomy unless an enemy threat 
to one theater or another persuaded the men at Versailles that de­
tachments should be made to counter the threat. In that case a com­
mander might be ordered to send a considerable part of his troops to 
the aid of the threatened theater. But in general, Louis would 
explain his "intentions" to his commander and leave it to the men 
in the field to decide how these intentions should be implemented. 
He did require that the plans must be approved. The correspondence 
between the king and his commanders shows that Louis influenced 
their decisions, but also that he largely relied upon the judgment of 
the men in the field. After 1691, when Louis carried much of the 
burden himself, we find in his letters the ideas of Vauban, Chamlay, 
and others whose advice he regularly sought. 
His choice of commanders has long been held as evidence of his 
failure to rise above favoritism and family. Louis recognized his 
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own inability to command; he never attempted to act out the role of 
soldier-king as Francis I had played it. This may be caution or merely 
good self-analysis. His choice of men to command his armies and to 
advise his military policies was limited to the circles around him. That 
he gave confidence to men like Chamlay, Vauban, Luxembourg, 
Boufflers, Vendome, Villars, and others whose careers were distin­
guished, may be balanced off against his confidence in Villeroi, 
Tallard, Marcin, and those whose careers were hardly evidence of 
great talent on the battlefield. A fair-minded assessment must admit 
that his promotions were probably no better and no worse than those 
of other rulers during the period. Too often, the fact that the military 
balance of power shifted against France is confused with the abilities 
of the men in command. 
Louis must carry his share of the responsibility for the terroristic 
bombardments and devastations that now appear as "war crimes/' He 
was not as sensitive as many of his officers, who did everything they 
could to avoid carrying out his orders to destroy towns, cities, and 
provinces. When Louvois wrote, "The King sees with pain that you 
have not started the bombardment of Coblenz . . . , " or, "his 
Majesty is angry that the demolitions ordered were not carried out 
. . . , " or, "the King is disposed to destroy entirely the city and 
citadel of Manheim . . . ,  " 4  3 obviously he had the king's consent. 
There is reason to believe that Louis was as responsible for the 
bombardment of Genoa as he was for that of Brussels, long after 
Louvois's death. 
When failure dogged his armies and it seemed that God had with­
drawn his protection from the house of Bourbon, Louis must have 
believed that he had failed to fulfil his military gloire. His letters to 
his commanders and to his grandson, the king of Spain, during these 
years reflect his doubts and difficulties. At that stage of his career Louis 
might have agreed with Saint-Simon and others who made him 
responsible for the disasters of the reign. The historian, however, must 
modify the picture: Louis's career as a soldier was not a distinguished 
one. He was no Charles V, no Frederick II. On the other hand, he 
was the last French monarch to play the role of soldier, and his 
career, for good or for bad, had a marked effect on the conduct of 
war for at least a century after his death. 
LOUIS XIV, SOLDIER-KING 221 
There is a very large literature on Louis XIV as king, as politician, as soldier, 
and so on. My article in the Journal of Modern History, XXXVI, 127-44, as well 
as the usual bibliographical guides, points to the important secondary studies. In the 
present essay I have given documentation to direct quotations and manuscript 
materials that may not be familiar: AMG refers to the Archives of the Ministry of 
War; AAE to the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; AN to the National 
Archives; and BN to the Bibliotheque Nationale (all in Paris). 
1. Charles Dreyss (ed.), Memoires de Louis XIV pour I'instruction du dauphin 
(2 vols.; Paris, i860), II, 382. 
2. All seventeenth-century rulers wished to fulfil their gloire, that is, tofill the 
role to which they had been called by Divine Providence. 
3. He later regretted that portable bake-ovens were not available until the 
following year, 1673. 
4. AN, MSK119A, fol. 20. 
5. Although Louvois carefully explained that his orders were those of the king, 
there were numerous times when the marshals refused to obey, or avoided obeying, 
them. Marshal Beliefond actually did exactly the opposite to Louvois's commands. 
The result was that Louis often had to intervene personally to secure obedience. 
Cf. AMG, MS Ai-379, fols. 284-89, 380. Louis to Turenne, July 1, 1674. 
6. P. A. Grouvelle (ed.), CEuvres de Louis XIV (6 vols.; Paris, 1806), III, 197-98 
(hereafter cited as GEwwes). It is interesting to note that Conde's characteristic 
pattern cost him a victory two years later when LeTellier's bribe gave him com­
mand of the army in Flanders. At Seneffe he could have had a modest victory over 
the rear guard of the enemy, but instead he fought on in a bloody but quite in­
conclusive battle that only propaganda could inflate into victory. This may have 
contributed to his loss of nerve the next year. 
7. AMG, MS Ai-1667, Louis to Duke of Burgundy, July 29, 1703. See also 
Memoires militaires, AAE, Mem. et Doc, Fr. 279, fols. 107 ff. 
8. AMG, MS Ai-824, fol. 65, Louvois to Duras, c. September 19, 1688. 
9. One of the best accounts of the siege of Maestricht is to be found in the 
Gazette for June-July, 1673; the author obviously had access to the papers in the 
Ministry of War. AMG, MSS Ai-315, 335, 338. 
10. Grouvelle, CEuvres, IV, 15. 
11. When it became clear that the war, started in 1672, would not finish 
quickly, Louvois sent Vauban on an inspection tour of the frontier between 
France and the Spanish Netherlands. The engineer was astonished to see how 
carelessly the frontier had been drawn. He wrote to Louvois, " . .  . Seriously, 
monseigneur, the king ought to think a bit about making a pre carre [dueling field, 
rectangular in shape, with marked places for each antagonist]. The confusion of 
fortifications, friend and foe, helter-skelter the one beside the other, does not please 
me. You are obliged to care for three of them instead of one: your people are 
tormented, your expense augmented, and your power much diminished. I would 
add that it is almost impossible to put them all in good repair. . . . That is why, 
be it by treaty or by a good war, if you believe me, Monseigneur, preach always 
la cadrature, non pas du cercle, mats du pre." Louvois replied, "Patience." Vauban 
to Louvois, January 19, 1673; Louvois to Vauban, January 24, 1673. AMG, MS 
A1-337. This is the earliest reference to the necessity for a lineal frontier I have 
found in the AMG. There may be others, however; these papers are very extensive. 
12. AMG, MS Ai-1309, fol. 81 (italics added). 
13. AMG, MS Ai-1829, Louis to Villeroi, July 21. 
14. The most easily available secondary account of these campaigns can be 
found in C. Rousset, Histoire de Louvois (Paris, 1862-64), Vol. II. This book is 
222 L O U I S XIV AND T H E C R A F T OF K I N G S H I P 
still an indispensable account. The campaigns can also be followed in the beau­
tifully illustrated volumes presented to the king: Campaigns de Louis XIV, BN, 
MSS Fr. 8,792, 8,793, and, of course, in the documents of the AMG, MSS Ai-500's 
and 6oo's. 
15. See below, pp. 00-00. 
16. These documents are in AMG, MSS Ai-500 and 501 passim. See also BN, 
MS Fr. 7,892, fols. 16 ff. 
17. Louvois's letter to his father telling about the Heurtebise episode was the 
basis for the article published in the Gazette, AMG, MS Ai-499, fols. 153 ff. 
The episode has been described and discussed in almost every account of Louis's 
reign. Saint-Simon and De Lorge have obviously distorted the story to make De 
Lorge's reputation somewhat greater than it should be. He was Saint-Simon's 
father-in-law. Cf. A. de Boislisle (ed.), Memoires de Saint-Simon (43 vols.; Paris, 
1879-1930), Vol. X. 
18. AMG, MS Ai-1201, Louis to Monsieur, June 8, 1693. Almost the same 
letter went to Catinat in Italy, AMG, MS Ai-1220, June 8, 1693. 
19. AMG, MS Ai-544, fol. 172; this volume contains the whole story of the 
battle. 
20. Grouvelle, (Euvres, IV, 117. 
21. These letters can be found in AMG, MS A1-1142. 
22. These letters are in AMG, MSS Ai-1201 and 1205. 
23. For the battle of Marsailles (Marsaglia) see AMG, MS Ai-1220 passim. 
24. These letters can be found in AMG, MSS Ai-1202 and 1209. 
25. These letters can be found in AMG, MSS Ai-1507, 1510, 1511, 1515, and 
I5I7­
26. These letters are in AMG, MSS Ai-1554, 1555, 1556, and 1557. 
27. The correspondence on the pincer movement is to be found in AMG, MSS 
Ai-1675, 1677, 1685, and 1686. The letter to Vendome in Ai-1686, fol. 26. 
28. The Blenheim campaign shows Louis to be a skilful manipulator of the 
several armies involved in the defense of the kingdom. As soon as Marlborough's 
intention to attack Bavaria became clear, Louis shifted his armies eastward to 
match the threat. His orders to his commanders were sound from a military point 
of view, for if Marlborough could not take several important fortresses or destroy 
the Franco-Bavarian armies, he could not winter in Germany, and his dangerous 
trip would have been a failure. The visitor to the field of Blenheim today cannot 
help wondering how the Anglo-Dutch-Imperial army ever dared to attack; Louis's 
marshals had every reason to think that they had obeyed the orders of their king 
by assuming the defensive position between Blenheim and Hochstadt. AMG, MSS 
Ai-1731, 1749, 1750. 
29. AMG, MSS Ai-2041, 2042, 2049. 
30. AMG, MSS Ai-2075, 2078. 
31. AMG, MSS Ai-2151, 2152 passim. 
32. AMG, MS Ai-1257, Louis to the dauphin, July 23, 1694. 
33. John B. Wolf, The Emergence of the Great Powers, 1685-1215 (New York, 
I95I)> PP- 188 ff. The Revolution of 1688 created a fiscal situation in England 
that gave great advantage to that kingdom. Debts were no longer the "king's debts," 
for they were created by Parliament after consultation with the ministers of the 
treasury. Thus when other kingdoms were bankrupt because the king had so 
narrow a basis for taxation, the rulers of England could continue to find the money 
they needed because Parliament could and did find new taxes, and therefore could 
create new loans based upon these taxes. This was England's most important 
weapon. 
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34. AMG, MS Ai-1309, fol. 81. 
35. AMG, MS Ai-380, June 21, 1674. 
36. AMG, MSS Ai-1666, 1667 passim. The letter is in 1667, fol. 6. 
37. AMG, MS Ai-379, May 21, 1674. 
38. Grouvelle, CEuvres, IV, 306; AMG, MS Ai-1060, fol. 39. 
39. Jean Cordelier, Madame de Maintenon, une femme au grand siecle (Paris, 
1955), PP. 312-13. 
40. AMG, MS A1-871, passim. 
41. One incident connected with these bombardments deserves passing notice. 
Before the bombardment of Brussels in 1696, Louis proposed that both sides refrain 
from such attacks on "open cities" except when besieging them. This was a pro­
posal to stop the naval bombardments of the French channel ports. It came to 
nothing. 
42. AMG, MS Ai, 1143, fol. 88; Grouvelle, CEuvres, IV, 396. 
43. AMG, MSS Ai, 824, fol. 227; 872, fol. 137; 871, fol. 45. 
Law and Justice under Louis XIV

A. LLOYD MOOTE 
T HE title of this essay will appear paradoxical to many persons. How can one write about the law, or justice, in the case of an 
absolute monarch whose personal will had the force of law? Louis 
XIV may well have proclaimed with pride and sincerity: "The chief 
objective which we have set for ourselves has been to have justice 
reign, and to reign in our State through justice."1 However, the over­
whelming opinion of historians has been that his justice was often 
injustice, his law enforcement a twisting of the law, and his dis­
pensers of justice individuals who acted above and outside the regular 
judiciary of the realm. At best, the reader may agree with Voltaire 
that Louis XIV did many good things, and that his treatment of law 
was preferable to that of the selfish and corrupt judges in the parle­
ments.2 More likely, one will side with the opinion of Lavisse at the 
end of the last century that Louis XIV fell far short of his avowed 
goal, often giving it the lie.3 
The following re-evaluation of the traditional image of Louis XIV 
must contend with three centuries of historical scholarship that has 
until recently done little to revise the opinion that the Sun King's 
contemporaries held of their monarch. When Bishop Bossuet wrote 
that there was a distinction between absolute and arbitrary govern­
ment, he undoubtedly meant to imply that the Grand Monarque did 
not always make such a fine distinction. The Huguenots certainly 
knew before the Edict of Nantes was formally revoked, in 1685, that 
their ruler could interpret that law in a way that virtually destroyed 
its spirit. Their position was a peculiar one, to be sure. Many a 
Catholic Frenchman could assume that laws were not meant to pro­
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tect members of the "Reputedly Reformed Religion," who seemed 
more like aliens and traitors than loyal Frenchmen deserving of legal 
protection. Yet, the actions of Louis XIV and his administration must 
have seemed illegal and unjust to his Catholic subjects on the many 
occasions when they were punished for their activities. Political 
enemies of the crown, wayward sons of noblemen, and the lesser 
clergy could cite instances where lettres de cachet deprived them of 
their freedom with little apparent justification. Lawless petty nobles of 
the sword, and law-enforcing nobles of the robe could attack the 
Grands Jours for condemning the former without the procedures or 
institutions of the latter. The sovereign law courts of the kingdom 
could well be angry that their advice on law codification was at first 
not solicited, and then given grudgingly a cursory reception by Colbert 
and his uncle, Henri Pussort. Frenchmen who had forced the mon­
archy to abolish the intendancies during the Fronde in 1648 must 
have watched in anguish as those dispensers of summary justice 
returned to the provinces in the 1650's and 6o's. 
What contemporaries of all walks of life felt personally became 
even more indelibly marked in the minds of Frenchmen of the 
succeeding century. It is true that the philosophes in extolling the 
virtues of the rule of law were more interested in the "injustices" of 
Louis XV than in those of his illustrious great-grandfather. But it was 
clear that Louis XIV had established the system that made arbitrary, 
capricious government the apparent norm. In attacking his successor, 
the philosophes could not help but strengthen the impression that 
Louis XIV shared the blame and guilt. The French Revolution and 
the liberal-democratic-republican traditions of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries served to further the conventional view of Louis 
XIV. Generation after generation grew up in an atmosphere hostile 
to the monarchical principle and lived under a state very different 
from the one that scarcely deserved that name and was intimately 
connected with the person and will of the ruler. With less and less 
understanding of the problems, practices, and nature of Louis XIV's 
government, each successive age had found it easier to condemn the 
Sun King in the realm of law and justice.4 
This image of Louis XIV, begun by his own subjects and continued 
by the historians of yesteryear, is difficult to eradicate but by no means 
impossible to reassess. Although no comprehensive re-evaluation of 
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Louis XIV's law and justice has yet appeared, specialists in many 
historical fields are beginning the slow, sometimes laborious, but often 
rewarding task of rehabilitating the Sun King. Little known to many 
general historians and specialists outside the Age of Louis XIV, mono­
graphs and scholarly articles are beginning to give us a much fuller 
picture of the Grand Monarques government and society. Often 
without realizing it themselves, economic and social historians, scholars 
of local and central institutions, and biographers, as well as historians 
of French law, have provided the ammunition for demolishing the 
traditional image of Louis XIV. Already, the twentieth-century mania 
for historical revision has led a few scholars to pour new facts into 
new molds, rather than continue to fit them awkwardly into the old.5 
Perhaps the greatest impetus to a fresh analysis lies in the 
twentieth-century political experience. While those unfamiliar with 
the seventeenth century glibly confuse absolute monarchy with 
totalitarianism and naively contrast it with democracy, the specialist 
of the Grand Siecle can use the present to shed light on the past. 
The historian of seventeenth-century France can easily see that Louis 
XIV's absolute monarchy lacked the techniques and the freedom from 
entrenched privilege groups that make totalitarian governments such 
a frightening reality. He can also detect that twentieth-century demo­
cratic governments have a far greater power over individuals than 
absolute monarchy did, if for no other reason than the willingness of 
today's citizens to be taxed and to fight in the interests of the nation. 
Once one realizes the essential fact of the limitations rather than 
the absoluteness of the seventeenth-century monarchy, a reinterpreta­
tion becomes not only possible, but highly probable. 
No group of scholars has done more to provide a basis for reinter­
preting Louis XIV than historians of French law, institutions, and 
political thought. A generation ago, Georges Pages wrote with 
authority that Louis XIV's most significant innovation was in employ­
ing the military and police to control his subjects.6 Ironically, Pages's 
own student and now a leading authority on seventeenth-century 
France, Roland Mousnier, can present with equal persuasion a very 
different thesis.7 The same holds true for legal historians. The gen­
eration of Olivier-Martin tends to minimize the arbitrary and brutal 
elements in the Sun King's government and to stress the justice of 
that monarch. Such a view would have been inconceivable to legal 
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historians who wrote at the turn of the last century. Glasson, for 
example, condemned the Code Noir for its severity, whereas Esmein 
was convinced of the harshness of the Criminal Code. Both were 
equally convinced that there was virtually nothing to check the ex­
cessive power wielded by Louis XIV, and made pointed reference to 
the king's control over the law courts and his arbitrary attitude 
toward private property rights. As late as a quarter of a century ago, 
Declareuil and Chenon were writing in the same tradition, although 
absence of specific accusations and emotionally charged words suggests 
that they were not so certain of the arbitrariness of Louis XIV.8 
Living under the shadow of powerful twentieth-century govern­
ments, current legal and institutional historians have been struck by 
studies of absolutist political thought, which contrast so-called absolute 
monarchy with arbitrary or despotic monarchy. Such studies stress the 
early modern belief that the monarchy of the ancien regime was 
limited in theory by divine, natural, customary, and fundamental law. 
By definition, the absolute monarch is upholder rather than perverter 
or destroyer of law and justice. Since legal historians tend to see 
the ancien regime (at times this includes the period from the 
fourteenth to the eighteenth century) as a unit, Louis XIV fits neatly 
into place as merely the most important example of absolute, but not 
arbitrary, government. It is but a step for legal and institutional his­
torians to assert that Louis XIV believed in the theory of absolutism 
and consciously acted within the framework of its limitations. 
Such a view has to come to grips with the fact that Louis XIV did 
on occasion defy fundamental law (in legitimating his bastard 
children and alienating royal domains), and frequently used lettres 
de cachet and other devices to punish subjects without recourse to 
regular judicial channels. One is not convinced by the way in which 
legal and institutional historians deal with such stubborn facts. They 
contend that the use of lettres de cachet, extraordinary commissions, 
and royal councils to judge "arbitrarily" was nothing more than a 
resumption of the crown's judicial authority, which was usually 
"delegated" to the law courts. This is to argue that the king was 
just in being unjust. It is also suggested that the demands of war 
frequently lead today's democracies to suspend legal protection of 
individual rights; thus Louis XIV was no different from his more 
modern counterparts. Such an argument is beside the point. It remains 
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true that the Sun King repeatedly suspended liberties. One of the 
most persuasive arguments of students of political theory is that 
seventeenth-century Frenchmen continuously urged the king to rule 
personally. By becoming his own first minister, Louis XIV was there­
fore acting in a popular and constitutional manner. In reply, it 
should be obvious that this "constitutional" monarch still overrode 
existing legal and judicial limitations.9 
The only argument of legal and institutional historians that is 
convincing involves the medieval principle of equity. This concept 
held that the king was bound to override the letter of the law if this 
would enforce its spirit. Even so, it remains to be seen that such 
was the result of Louis XIV's equity. One can summarize this and 
the foregoing contentions of the legal and institutional historians in 
the following manner. Louis XIV was in the tradition of medieval 
kingship, which held the king's most important function to be the 
dispensing of his personal justice. This is to say that Louis XIV was 
the medieval king par excellence, realizing the goal of his prede­
cessors to a fuller degree than they found possible. One could just 
as easily say that Louis XIV used the rights of a feudal medieval 
king, but in so doing tended to destroy medieval kingship. In reality, 
medieval means "led to a modern end."10 
Although the deceptive and erroneous reasoning and conclusions 
of legal and institutional historians must be laid bare, modern 
scholarship is deeply indebted to them for forcing a rethinking of 
the "justice" of Louis XIV. To test fully their interpretation of the 
Sun King, we must go beyond the level of theory and constitutionality 
and examine carefully the practices of the Grand Monarque's gov­
ernment. We must ask ourselves when and how Louis XIV overrode 
law and the regular judicial channels, to what extent and why he 
refrained from so doing, and what other forces were at work in the 
area of law and justice during his personal reign. 
Some scholars make a test case of Louis XIV's attitude toward the 
fundamental laws of the realm. They point all too easily to the fact 
that Louis was actually bound by the fundamental law that forbade 
female inheritance to the French throne (the so-called Salic law). 
Actually, the Salic law was one restriction that scarcely limited the 
activities of a reigning monarch even if he respected it. On funda­
mental laws Louis's contemporaries were so vague and contradictory 
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on what was fundamental law and what was not that it is futile to 
discuss whether the Grand Monarque respected them.11 
It is more fruitful to examine Louis XIV's relationship to existing, 
written laws. Such an investigation must begin with the regular 
judiciary of his reign, especially the sovereign law courts, or parle­
ments. So much has been made of Louis XIV's humiliation of the 
Parlement of Paris in his famous "bed of justice" of 1655 and his 
limitation of the courts' traditional practice of judicial review in the 
succeeding decade that we forget their remaining power. Even the 
best of historians uncover facts that show the tenacity of the judges, 
only to submerge them in the old thesis of Louis's control over the 
judiciary. This is equally true of Mousnier's monumental work on 
venality of offices under Henri IV and Louis XIII, and Franklin 
Ford's fine study of the robe and sword nobilities after 1715. Both 
authors see the upward social thrust of the high robe officials into 
the old nobility during the course of the seventeenth century. 
Both also stress the entrenchment of the high robe in their offices 
under Louis XIV. But both authorities insist that Louis XIV controlled 
the judiciary!12 
Now, it is highly unlikely that the judiciary became a collective 
Rip Van Winkle for the sixty-three years following their defeat at 
the end of the Fronde. Although the courts were frustrated in their 
most obvious means of action—remonstrating, modifying, and tabling 
legislation—they had ample reason, opportunity, and power to con­
tinue independent and anti-absolutist activities in less spectacular but 
equally effective ways. This holds true especially in the field of 
private law (a field that is, incidentally, difficult to separate from 
that of public law). Venard's little study of the land hunger of the 
bourgeoisie south of Paris during the seventeenth century is a case 
in point. Among these bourgeois landowners were judges who were 
in close touch with the affairs of their rural communities and deftly 
used litigations to strengthen their rural position. Frequently, they 
loaned money to peasants, and then were awarded peasant lands 
when the peasantry became bankrupt during the economically difficult 
years of Louis XIV's wars.13 There are other indications that the 
judiciary along with civic governments and wealthy rural landowners 
frustrated Louis XIV's efforts to restrict wholesale grain trade in the 
interests of rural and urban lower-class elements.14 
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If robe officials used their influence to better themselves econom­
ically, the judges also played an enormous part in molding and 
changing social attitudes and relationships. Whereas the church's lax 
regulation of relations within the family unit tended to loosen family 
bonds and the monarchy half-heartedly interfered to strengthen the 
family, the judiciary staunchly upheld the authority of husband and 
father. Property interests of wives and freedom of children to marry 
were equally circumscribed by the frightened judiciary, which deter­
mined to make the law a conservative force in society.15 The parle­
ments were not so interested in unifying the kingdom, as their success­
ful obstruction of Louis XIV's codification of legal procedure testifies. 
On the other hand, First President Lamoignon's famous arrets of 
1702 and the jurist Domat's theoretical treatise of 1694 stand out 
as individual efforts to unite the state legally. Clearly, the judiciary of 
Louis XIV was a powerful force for making the private law in its 
own image, in a variety of ways.16 
Nor did the courts completely abdicate their traditional role in 
public law. For two decades after the Fronde, the parlements and 
other sovereign tribunals of France plagued Mazarin, Colbert, and 
Louis XIV with obstructionism, especially in the matter of judicial 
review of financial legislation. The monarchy's bold proclamation in 
1652 that the Parlement of Paris had no business interfering with 
state affairs was no different from that of Richelieu and Louis XIII 
in 1641, and it equally ignored the nature of seventeenth-century 
government. Justice still of necessity involved administrative and 
police functions, and the line between public and private affairs was 
difficult to determine. Until the government of the ancien regime 
became radically transformed, the judiciary would continue to play 
a role in public law and state affairs.17 As the personal reign of Louis 
XIV continued, the role of the robe became more modest, to be 
sure. But beneath the relatively calm surface the judiciary was as 
active as ever, changing its direction and preparing for the chance to 
reassert itself. Eugene Asher's suggestive monograph on provincial 
resistance to Colbert's naval recruitment reforms has uncovered much 
of this change. He argues with great effectiveness that the welter of 
judicial and other local authorities simply changed tactics under 
Colbert. By retreating from veto by the parlements and the provincial 
estates' recalcitrance to the more subtle delaying tactics of the courts 
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and last-ditch stands in lesser corporate bodies, the maritime provinces 
emasculated much of Colbert's program. Although one can find 
examples of the same tactics in the first half of the seventeenth 
century, it may be that they increased after 1661 as more direct 
opposition declined.18 Paul Bamford's study of French forest legisla­
tion leaves one with the impression there was not even a tempering or 
shifting of opposition in the case of the Forest Code of 1669.19 
Two fresh studies on Louis XIV's intendants show how dangerous 
it is to generalize about the judiciary's activities in public law. Li vet's 
exhaustive work on the intendancy of Alsace indicates that in that 
newly acquired province the judiciary was highly independent of the 
crown. The retention of Germanic law and the strengthening of the 
judges by the late introduction of venality, in 1698, probably placed 
the tribunals of Alsace in a more independent position than any­
where else in France.20 In contrast is Freville's thesis on Brittany. 
He believes that the local judges were docile even before the intro­
duction of the intendancy to that province in 1689, due to royal 
repression of the parlement after the abortive stamp tax revolt of 
1675. Freville's thesis will convince many, but it must be balanced 
with Asher's treatment and Freville's own emphasis on the fierce 
provincial pride and independent spirit of the Bretons.21 
The role of the judiciary in public law under Louis XIV will be 
much better understood when historians begin to unravel the threads 
of class relationships during the late seventeenth century. Ford's 
thesis that the robe fused with the nobility of the sword and assumed 
leadership of the nobles' political opposition to the monarchy after 
1715 should be expanded and amplified in two important respects.22 
First, it should be noted that the shift in noble leadership meant that 
the robe's type of opposition, non-violent and "legal," replaced the 
open and crude military obstructionism so typical of the old nobility. 
Second, the robe was already asserting its leadership under Louis 
XIV. Unfortunately, there is no study of the personnel of the courts 
under Louis XIV to compare with the work of Bluche on the Parle­
ment of Paris after 1715. One of his most interesting points is that 
the provincial parlementarians became bolder politically than their 
Paris colleagues because their wealth was securely invested in land, 
whereas the judges of Paris relied heavily on the municipal rentes 
or bonds, which could be jeopardized by the monarchy. Whether 
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his thesis applies to Louis XIV's France is not known, but it strength­
ens the impression of the robe becoming increasingly involved in 
protecting the noble landowners' interests.23 
What is least clear about the social position of the robe under 
Louis XIV is its relationship to the classes beneath it, in town and 
countryside. One would expect that the upward social thrust of the 
judges would turn them increasingly against lower-class elements, 
but this is not necessarily true. The Marxist historian Porchnev con­
tends that in the early seventeenth century there was a front of 
nobles, officials, and bourgeoisie against peasants and urban prole­
tariat.24 Mousnier is equally convinced that the seventeenth-century 
patron-client relationship continually threatened the monarchy with 
a coalition of all classes against the crown.25 Their positions are dia­
metrically opposed, and yet we must know class connections if we 
are to understand the abortive uprisings that frequently upset the 
law and order of Louis XIV's reign. Mousnier has convincingly 
demonstrated that Porchnev's thesis is shallow and simplistic, but he 
has not advanced sufficient evidence in support of his own position. 
An interesting study of specific revolts in the early decades of Louis's 
personal reign is the article by Leon Bernard on uprisings in the 
1660's and 70's.26 He supports Porchnev, and his most interesting 
observation is that Colbert deliberately and falsely accused the judi­
ciary of fomenting "popular" uprisings so that he could blunt their 
remaining power. Bernard's picture of Colbert's "paranoiac distrust" 
of the parlements is somewhat overdrawn, and his inference that 
nobles and judges were opportunistic on the few occasions when 
they may have inclined toward lower-class uprisings is questionable. 
Colbert had experienced parlementary ambivalence toward peasant 
and urban lower-class mob scenes during the Fronde.27 Undoubtedly, 
Bernard is right that Colbert associated the parlements with rebellion 
more than the facts justified. Yet the judges were so clever in dis­
guising their attitudes and actions that one cannot dismiss the possi­
bility that they still permitted and encouraged popular insurrection 
as late as the 1670's. Despite the increasing polarization of French 
society under Louis XIV, that society was sufficiently fluid that it is 
difficult to tell when a class was "opportunistic" and when it was 
showing its supposed true class position. It should also be remem­
bered that a tax revolt by peasants would mean potentially higher 
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dues to robe landowners, whereas an anti-landlord uprising would 
be a more frightening reality to judges. It would thus be in the true 
interests of judges to encourage secretly the one and firmly repress 
the other. 
The activities of the crown in the realm of law and justice are 
easier to determine, and this becomes increasingly so with each year. 
The old picture of a Louis XIV determined to impose his will on the 
Parlement of Paris after the Fronde and of a Colbert implacably 
opposed to the parlementarians' independence has undergone con­
siderable alteration. Historians remain convinced that Louis XIV's 
monarchy increasingly interfered with the judiciary, but they are 
quick to point out that within this framework several tendencies were 
developing. Above all, Louis XIV was more interested in ensuring 
general obedience and implementation of existing laws by the regular 
judges than in supplanting the latter. He went so far as to overrule 
Colbert and bring officials of the parlement into the discussion sur­
rounding reform of civil and criminal procedure.28 The famous lit de 
justice incident of 1655, although prior to the personal reign of Louis 
XIV, shows even more clearly the attitude of the Sun King and his 
government toward the regular judiciary. The apocryphal story of 
Louis XIV striding into the Parlement of Paris in riding costume to 
halt debate after the lit and declaring, "I am the State," is little 
more than a caricature of the actual sequence of events, and requires 
serious editing. What happened was that the king invoked his per­
sonal will on the specific issue but refrained from equating himself 
with the state. Moreover, his visit was followed by an attempt by 
the then first minister, Cardinal Mazarin, to flatter the judges into 
temporary submission. Mazarin went so far as to tell the judges "that 
[the king] did not claim to forbid them to assemble to make remon­
strances," but merely wished a delay of several months to save face 
for royal authority. The other ministers saw that this would only 
encourage parlementary boldness, and persuaded Mazarin to take a 
stronger stand. Through conferences the first minister then let it be 
known that the Parlement must not debate the issue for some time, 
and in the succeeding weeks the judges gradually accepted total defeat 
on the matter.29 
As for Colbert, he soon wavered in his initial determination to 
sweep aside abuses in appointments and procedures within the halls 
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of justice. He also genuinely sought to restrict the intendants to the 
time-honored function of supervising rather than replacing the judi­
ciary.30 It should be added that the crown became so accustomed to 
the judges' privilege of bequeathing their offices that Louis XIV no 
longer demanded the customary fee of the droit annual or Paulette 
at the end of his reign.31 
Our understanding of the actual activities of the intendants has 
also increased. Freville and Livet describe these watchdogs of the 
state not as "thirty tyrants" but as persons highly sensitive to local 
privileges, traditions, and interests. Freville goes so far as to see in 
Brittany a new, modern approach to local government toward the 
end of the reign. He quotes a letter from the intendant, Villemilan, 
to the controller-general in 1706. The intendant declared that he 
must proceed in that sensitive province with perfect legality, and 
asked for a conciliar decree to spell out his powers. For Freville this 
is proof that Louis XIV's government was now acting not so much 
by pure "authority" as by "perfectly legal and prudent" measures. 
Probably, Freville presses his thesis too far. The same intendant was 
known for his precipitous action and neglect of the legal niceties. 
One wonders also whether the supposedly modern approach was just 
a passing phase, until the monarchy had sufficiently assimilated the 
province that it could return to the "outmoded" way of authority.32 
In areas where the crown did compete with or bypass the regular 
judiciary, its achievements were far less striking than those of the 
regular judges, and often simply followed the desires of society and 
the lead of the judicial branch of government. This was certainly 
true of the use of lettres de cachet to enforce the authority of the heads 
of important families over wayward sons, daughters, and wives.33 Law 
and custom were also effective brakes on the crown's desire to change 
the tax structure. Like his predecessors, the Sun King often had to 
rely on halting tax innovations through a broader interpretation of 
royal domanial rights. Nor was he always completely successful in 
such modest undertakings. Legal historians used to label as tyrannical 
Louis XIV's transformation of noble alodial lands into royal depen­
dencies, subject to medieval dues.34 They now admit that the struggle 
was a long and bitter one, and that the king contented himself with 
confirming the old noble rights in return for a fine. Just how difficult 
it was for the late seventeenth-century French monarchy to convince 
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the subject that taxation was a regular and legitimate element of 
the state has been shown by Meuvret's many studies.35 
Historians continue to give new descriptive titles to the work of 
Louis XIV. One of the most ingenious is that of the late James E. 
King, who saw the spirit of science and rationalism—in a word, the 
Cartesian influence—as the major motivating force. In political 
language this amounted to the introduction of a regime of "order" in 
place of one following the "maxims of confusion." In terms of legal 
reform it meant the "extra-legal, coldly rationalistic," and efficient 
approach of Colbert and Pussort prevailing over the traditional, 
lenient approach of Lamoignon and the judiciary.36 As adapted by 
Asher, King's thesis has become a weapon to praise Colbert for 
seeking to impose a little order and reason on the parochial, selfish, 
and "feudal" interest groups in the provinces.37 Both King and Asher 
can be criticized for making the work of Colbert and the monarchy 
more rigid and inflexible than it actually was. It is also highly ques­
tionable that Louis XIV's government was significantly influenced by 
contemporary science. Strong governments in all ages have sought to 
simplify, unify, and streamline the mechanics and work of the state.38 
Frederick L. Nussbaum was able to avoid some of the pitfalls of 
this interpretation by using the phrase "absolutism as facade" to 
describe the scientific spirit of the French government between 1661 
and 1685.39 
A more convincing recent treatment of Louis XIV's government 
attaches the label "humanitarian" to its actions. Giraud sees this 
trend toward the end of the reign and in the work of Jerome de 
Pontchartrain. He gives several examples of that minister's handling 
of naval and colonial affairs, particularly his relaxation of laws over 
slaves and mutineers.40 His view is supported by the current gen­
eration of legal historians who are beginning to feel that the so called 
Code Noir dealt humanely with colonial slaves.41 Saint-Germain's 
remarkable study of La Reynie provides even better proof of humani­
tarianism. He depicts that first lieutenant of police in Paris as a 
man interested in tempering punishment of vagabonds, fallen women, 
and other unfortunates with mercy and rehabilitation. Of course, La 
Reynie was realistic enough to realize that exemplary punishment of 
a few archcriminals was more effective than attempting the still im­
possible task of bringing everyone to justice.42 
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The most difficult individual to fit into the pattern of humani­
tarianism is Louis XIV himself. Saint-Germain is quite sure that 
Colbert was implacable in his insistence that laws be applied strictly 
and severely. The Sun King, on the other hand, emerges from his 
study as a highly complex man, reviewing all death sentences, 
periodically freeing long-term prisoners, and yet brutally insisting on 
wholesale rather than exemplary punishment when Protestantism, 
pornography, or anti-royalist pamphleteering was in question.43 Other 
scholars are inclined to stress Louis XIV's devotion to hearing his 
subjects' complaints against injustice and his tendency to favor the 
underdog against the more powerful members of society in personal 
litigations.44 In the case of debtors the crown also sought to ease 
legal restrictions and give them some chance to recover economically; 
however, notable exceptions were written into the codifications of 
the Grand Monarques reign.45 One need scarcely repeat that we 
now know the infamous lettres de cachet were most often used to 
bring wavering members of families back to an upright life. But it 
will surprise many to learn that Louis XIV carefully supervised 
gambling laws and practices in order to save the nobility from ruin 
and shame.46 
If Louis XIV still appears to be the subverter of laws and the 
practitioner of arbitrary justice, it is clear that the tone of his justice 
was more exalted than previous generations admitted and his inter­
ference with the normal course of justice less severe. Some of his 
humanitarianism was obviously a continuation of the medieval tradi­
tion whereby the king was meant to be the just and paternal pro­
tector of his subjects. Much of it simply conformed to, and buttressed 
the inclination of, his society. Perhaps in part it anticipated the 
emerging attitudes and ideas of the philosophes. There are still many 
secrets to be yielded about the Sun King's reign. The parlements, the 
social and economic conditions, and the application and interpretation 
of private and public law need exhaustive studies in depth. The 
many ministers of the late years of the reign still await their 
biographers. The intendants have so far escaped any broad work of 
synthesis.47 When all this is accomplished, we may well be able 
to say that we know the France of Louis XIV better than the 
Grand Monarque himself did. 
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Louis XIV and the Church

H. G. J UDGE 
VERSAILLES was in some sense the church of Louis XIV, and the king was himself a religion: 
This nation has its God and its king: the high and mighty 
among them go at a fixed time every day to a temple they call a 
church; at the upper end of that temple stands an altar consecrated 
to their God, where a certain priest celebrates some mysteries, called 
by them holy, sacred and formidable. The high and mighty men 
stand in a large circle at the foot of the altar, with their back to 
the priest and the holy mysteries, and their faces towards their king, 
who is seen kneeling in a raised and open pew, and towards whom 
all minds and all hearts seem directed. However, a certain kind of 
subordination is to be observed whilst this is going on; for these 
people seem to adore their prince, and their prince appears to 
worship God.1 
Versailles was the epitome of the system of Louis XIV: at once a 
center of power and efficient administration and a shrine to magnify 
and institutionalize the cult of the God-King. The ordered routine 
of its life was liturgical in character and every detail of architec­
ture and decoration designed to express the honors due to the 
Apollo about whom moved the cultural, social, and political uni­
verse. Louis was developing on an impressive scale the principles that 
had informed his education: 
Que cette id£e te gouverne, tandis que tu gouvernes les autres: 
c'est ainsi qu'agirait Dieu. Que cette pens^e te reveille le matin: 
aujourd'hui, j'ai a jouer le r61e de Dieu. Que cet examen termine ta 
journe*e: aujourd'hui ai-je e*te" Dieu, ai-je ete homme:'2 
LOUIS XIV AND THE CHURCH 241 
It was not only syntactical confusion in an ancient tongue that 
caused the citizens of Aries to smudge the distinction between God 
Almighty and Louis XIV in the inscription on an obelisk they erected: 
What was formerly Consecrated to the SUN,

The GOD of the Gentiles,

Is Now with much more reason

To LOUIS THE GREAT,

Who by the Splendour and Sublimity of his Fortune,

The Light and Penetration of his Genius,

His Strength and Rapidity,

His Liberality and Greatness of Soul,

Is the true Sun of France

Not Insufficient for many,

Who neither errs nor ceases,

Like him who is always in repose,

And for his health and safety,

On which the Publick Good depends,

This Obelisque is Dedicated, Vowed and Consecrated

To God Almighty,

By the Senate and People of Aries.3

A king dedicated to the principles of uniformity, system, and order 
would not—least of all in the seventeenth century, when religious 
unity was widely believed to be the guarantee of political unity— 
tolerate religious dissent in any form. However inadequate was 
Louis's own understanding of the issues under debate, the influence 
of his mother and his own inflexible temperament marked him as a 
relentless champion of orthodoxy.4 In the religious and political uni­
verse that Louis created in his imagination, the Huguenots were 
therefore an anomaly. Although for most Catholics the settlement of 
1598—by which Louis's grandfather, Henri IV, had guaranteed to 
the Huguenots their liberties—was temporary and provisional, the 
size of the Huguenot problem discouraged wise governments from 
attempting too abrupt and comprehensive a return to normality. By 
the time the Huguenots finally lost their legal status, there were 
from one and one-half to two million of them, and they had for 
many years penetrated all ranks of society.5 They were not in 1661 
a small and depressed minority but a substantial and successful group 
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that included the general Turenne. Mazarin, whose theological con­
science was not noticeably tender, preferred therefore to leave them 
undisturbed and approved their loyalty to the royal cause during the 
civil wars. 
Louis at first protested his own disapproval of any abrupt or violent 
measures to reintegrate the Protestants in the ordered society over 
which he presided. "It seemed to me . .  . that those who wished to 
apply extreme and violent measures misunderstood the nature of this 
evil, which was produced in part by hot tempers that should be 
allowed gently to subside without being inflamed anew by forceful 
contradiction—especially as the corruption is not limited to a certain 
known number but is dispersed throughout all parts of the State."6 
The corruption that Louis detected was even less tolerable to the 
clergy, who expressed their demands for dramatic action through 
their general assemblies and through that pressure group of the 
devout, the Compagnie dn St. Sacrement.7 
Louis understood quite clearly what needed to be done. The best 
means of eliminating this foreign body was "to order the observation 
of what they had obtained in the previous reigns, but to accord them 
nothing else whatever and to restrict the execution of the law within 
the narrowest limits conformable with justice and propriety."8 They 
were at the same time to be excluded from enjoying any fruits of 
royal favor and patronage. From this discouraging prelude there 
emerged a systematic policy of interpreting the law by strict refer­
ence to its letter: the government made over three hundred orders 
restricting the benefits of the enlightenment of Henri IV.9 The 
declaration of 1669 is a good example of this crop: the exercise of 
the Protestant religion was then limited to those places in which it 
had been practiced in 1598; temples built since that date were to 
be demolished; Protestant funerals were forbidden during the hours 
of daylight; the number attending a Protestant wedding was limited 
to twelve; mixed marriages were prohibited.10 Paul Pellisson, the 
former Huguenot, founded and operated the caisse des conversions, 
from which each new convert could claim an average of six livres. 
The growing influence of Madame de Maintenon and of the Jesuits 
and the growing impatience of the king prompted a progressively 
more hostile series of measures.11 
These measures culminated in the dragonnades—the billeting of 
unwelcome and often boisterous troops upon Huguenots with the 
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intention of persuading them of their error in resisting for so long 
the clearly expressed wishes of their king. The intendant Marillac 
in Poitou could claim thirty thousand conversions as the fruit of his 
zeal in the application of this policy in 1680, and his dismissal, 
though checking the violence, did not reverse the direction of the 
king's program.12 By 1685 Louis, fresh from diplomatic triumphs, 
was confident enough to strike at the roots of the Huguenot problem. 
The Edict of Nantes was revoked; all temples were to be demol­
ished and ministers banished; lay Huguenots were forbidden to leave 
France. Bossuet spoke for all the clergy and for much of France 
when he applauded the piety of Louis: "Let us raise our acclama­
tions even to the skies, attributing to this new Theodosius, this new 
Marcion, this new Charlemagne, the words of the six hundred and 
thirty Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon; 'You have confirmed 
the Faith; you have exterminated the heretics. This is the crowning 
achievement of your reign which hereby gains a character all of its 
own.'"13 The revocation has indeed become for many the symbol of 
the reign of Louis, although not in the sense anticipated by Bossuet 
and intended by the king. 
It has recently been demonstrated that the economic effects of 
the revocation have been consistently exaggerated.14 Although only 
ten per cent of the Huguenots fled from France, they were among 
the most skilled and enterprising men of their persuasion; their 
departure was not a major factor in the prolonged stagnation of the 
French economy after 1685, but it did have a marked effect upon an 
international opinion growing increasingly hostile to French pre­
tensions and Bourbon methods.15 Bossuet came to doubt the wisdom 
of forcing former Huguenots into occasional conformity and into the 
sacramental life of the Catholic church; many wondered whether 
sacrilege was so much to be preferred to heresy. The Huguenot 
movement, distinguished for so many years by its loyalty to the royal 
power, was driven underground, to break out in the fanatical violence 
of the revolt of Camisards (1702-5).16 By 1715 it was clear that 
Protestantism was to survive, and that Louis had failed to build even 
a facade of religious uniformity. Had he been any more successful 
in dealing with problems and critics within the French church? 
The major internal problem of the French church in the second 
half of the century was that of Jansenism. There was for many years 
little disagreement between king and pope over the proper treatment 
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of the Jansenists: papal and royal policies were in this matter com­
plementary. Louis was probably no clearer than most people about 
what precisely Jansenism was—"It was a great pity," as Silvester Jenks 
observed in 1710, "so important a matter as Jansenism should be so 
universally talk'd of and so little understood"17—but he knew he 
disliked it. So great was Louis's prejudice that he was alleged to have 
refused an appointment to a noble suspected of Jansenism, but to 
have granted it when assured that the candidate was, in fact, an 
atheist.18 Louis found good reason for disliking a doctrine that owed 
so much of its success in France to the Abbe de St. Cyran, who never 
commended himself to the government.19 The early condemnations of 
Rome had failed to stifle the movement, the growth of which was 
viewed with increasing alarm by Mazarin, who entirely approved the 
mistaken belief that if the errors of Jansen were more carefully 
defined they would cease to be held. It was largely as a result of 
pressure from France that the Five Propositions attributed to Jansen 
were condemned by the bulls of 1653 and 1656, the second bull 
attempting to eliminate one Jansenist line of defense by insisting that 
they were condemned "in the sense meant by Jansen."20 Meanwhile, 
a connection had been established between Jansenism and some of 
the leaders of the Fronde.21 This alone would have moved Louis 
to hate all Jansenists; and soon after 1661, the schools of Port-Royal 
were closed and the campaign against the Jansenists intensified.22 
Cardinal de Retz having at last, now that Mazarin was dead and 
after an exile of eight years, resigned the archbishopric of Paris, was 
succeeded by Marca and, in the same year, Perefixe.23 The Formulary, 
which condemned the Five Propositions "in the sense which Jansen 
intended" and which had been first devised by Mazarin, was now 
enforced, and the pope incorporated it in the bull of 1664. Perefixe, 
who was no friend of the Jansenists, and the king, his former pupil, 
insisted on signature of the Formulary without qualifications, and 
the non-juring nuns of Port-Royal who refused this were exiled on 
Louis's orders.24 
It was precisely this signature that was also refused by four of the 
bishops: Pavilion of Aleth, Buzenval of Beauvais, Henri Arnauld of 
Angers, and Caulet of Pamiers. They took refuge in the famous dis­
tinction of droit and fait, arguing with Pascal that though the pope's 
condemnation of the Five Propositions must be accepted, his ruling 
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that the propositions represented the teaching of Jansen need not 
since on such a matter of fact no papal judgment could be infallible.25 
This refusal by bishops widely respected in France embarrassed the 
government and prompted Louis's ministers to seek a compromise. 
The election of Clement IX in 1668, which was a triumph for 
French diplomacy, made possible the so-called Peace of the Church, 
the acceptability of which depended upon verbal juggling by Lionne. 
The reluctant bishops agreed to sign sincere, preserving in their 
consciences the distinction of droit and fait; in the copies sent to 
Rome, however, the word simpliciter mysteriously but significantly 
replaced sincere.26 For some years this insecure settlement worked, but 
Louis had not forgiven the bishops who had openly rejected his com­
mands, though his attention was diverted to a conflict with the pope, 
with whom relations had, indeed, already been strained in the 1660's 
by several episodes that seem to reflect widely held Gallican opinions. 
Gallicanism in seventeenth-century France was in no sense a 
movement: the term itself was first used in the nineteenth century, 
although, of course, TEglise gallicane" was already a time-honored 
expression.27 Its use implied no particular view of the relationship of 
the French church to Rome, and it would be tempting to translate 
to this context the argument of Z. N. Brooke and to misappropriate 
the definition of Hubert Walter: "hanc occidentalis ecclesiae por­
tionem quam in Gallia plantavit Altissimus." 28 "The French church" 
is much less misleading than "the Gallican church" as a translation of 
TEglise gallicane." Gallicanism is no more than a useful term to 
describe the opinions of those Frenchmen who did not welcome the 
advance of the ultramontane claims. It has become usual to dis­
tinguish three elements in the family of Gallican opinions—episcopal, 
parlementary, and royal29—but it might prove more helpful to use 
different categories and to identify only two. Of these the first would 
be the Gallicanism of the parlement, which emphasized the depen­
dence of the church upon the protection of the king's courts and 
the king's officers, and had developed the procedure of the appel 
comme d'abus as a restraint upon all ecclesiastical jurisdiction, epis­
copal as well as pontifical.30 The second would be the Gallicanism 
of the Sorbonne. Admittedly, on most questions of substance there 
was little difference between the opinion of the parlement and that 
of the Sorbonne. In both corporations there was general assent to the 
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doctrines of the divine right of bishops, of the inferiority of the pope 
to a general council, and of the inviolability of the liberties of the 
French church. The Gallicanism of the Sorbonne was embraced by 
many of the French bishops, most of whom had read their theology 
there, and it was by the faculty rather than by the episcopal bench 
that the theory of ecclesiastical (as distinct from secular) Gallicanism 
was developed. The Sorbonne was never unanimous, and in the 
seventeenth century differences of opinion became sharper; yet, Galli­
canism continued to be the characteristic feature of les maximes de 
Paris. The Sorbonne could readily agree with the parlement in re­
sistance to papal claims, though it placed the emphasis upon the 
right of bishops to regulate the affairs of the French church. 
Behind the Gallicanism of the parlement and that of the Sorbonne 
towered the policy of the king. It would be misleading to speak of a 
"royal Gallicanism" as a separate doctrine in its own right, since the 
king's policy was opportunist and had no distinct theoretical basis. 
For the crown the authority of the bishops or of the parlement 
was a useful weapon to use against the pope or in a general defense 
of its rights, when and if such pressure seemed desirable. 
There was, therefore, in Louis XIV's France no one answer to 
the questions raised by the relations of church and state. Rome, 
pursuing a policy of centralization, invariably resented any inter­
ference with its will in the government of the church. The king, 
jealous of his prerogatives and his honor but immovable in his ortho­
doxy, could accept neither subordination to the pope nor separation 
from the Western church. The secular clergy and the Sorbonne 
exalted the authority of diocesan bishops and were indifferently 
suspicious of the pretensions of Rome and of the king's courts. The 
parlement, though sharing the hostility of many of the clergy to an 
intrusive Roman authority, was prepared to challenge the bishops 
in the king's name if they presumed to take too much upon them­
selves. The events of 1663-65 illustrate the degree of agreement 
and dissent within Gallicanism. 
Relations between Louis and Rome had already deteriorated 
seriously. In 1662 there had been an open fight in Rome between 
the Corsican Guard and the servants of the French ambassador. The 
diplomatic quarrel that followed encouraged parlement to intervene 
in the following year against theses maintained in the Sorbonne 
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defending Bellarmine's interpretation of papal authority.81 Even 
Bossuet resented this interference, not because he had any sympathy 
with the theses, but because he recognized it as an infringement of 
clerical and academic independence. The dispute was sharp, although 
it was not the doctrinal opinion of parlement that was opposed but 
its claim that a secular court of law could be a proper judge of 
doctrine.32 In the same year the Sorbonne itself produced Six Articles 
of a strongly Gallican flavor. On this ground parlement and the 
Sorbonne were at peace, and the theologians could continue their 
debates. The faculty prolonged its campaign against papal authority, 
formally censuring Vernant in 1664 and erecting against his opinions 
an elaborate statement of the classical Gallican position.33 The 
occasion was improved in the following year by a condemnation of 
the attempts of Guimenius to justify the moral theology of the 
Jesuits.34 Such presumption exhausted the patience of Pope Alexander 
VII, who roundly condemned the censures in the bull Cum ad Aures 
in 1665.35 This was the signal for a parade of the united forces of 
Gallicanism against Italian interference in the affairs of the church. 
Parlement, the Sorbonne, and the Assembly of the Clergy all pro­
tested under the patronage of the king and his ministers: the mutual 
resentments of 1663 had been forgotten.36 When the campaign faded 
away, it was not because of any change of heart among the clergy 
or the lawyers but because Louis wished to avoid a quarrel with the 
pope while he was at war with England.37 Relations with Rome were 
uneasy during the i66o's, and although the alliance of king and pope 
survived until after the Peace of the Church in 1668, it was already 
clear that Louis would not be without support in a struggle with the 
pope. Parlement and the Sorbonne, which had quarreled in 1663 
over the frontiers of their jurisdictions, had united with the General 
Assembly of 1665 in a protest against the pope. That protest proved 
abortive only because the king, for political reasons, chose not to 
force an issue. This appeasement of convenience did not long survive 
the Clementine Peace of 1668. 
Three years later, the relationship of church and state was pro­
foundly affected by the election, as archbishop of Paris, of Harlay de 
Champvallon. Harlay both deserves and needs a biographer, but has 
not found one since the late seventeenth century.38 He was in many 
ways a remarkable man, and astonishing as an archbishop under a 
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pious king in a church purified by the Catholic renaissance of the 
seventeenth century. He was worldly, scholarly, and astute. During 
the Fenelon controversy the wits observed that the archbishop had 
condemned the love of God without having heard of it. This does 
fair justice to his piety but none to his considerable learning; and 
more memorable is Saint-Simon's picture of the prelate walking in 
the grounds of his house with a favorite duchess, followed at a 
respectful distance by a gardener raking over the gravel disturbed by 
their feet. Harlay, who was born in 1625, early acquired a reputation 
for brilliance. At the assembly of the clergy in 1650 he proved his 
ability in the handling of business. At the age of twenty-six he 
succeeded his uncle as archbishop of Rouen, administering the arch­
diocese in an exemplary manner and winning the good opinion of 
the court.39 He showed throughout his life the greatest zeal in keeping 
that good opinion by defending the rights of the king in the govern­
ment of the French church. His own power in that government was 
apparently unlimited. Contemporaries were convinced, with good 
reason, that he and the king's confessor enjoyed a monopoly of power. 
Only the Confessor could speak to the King of this matter or inform 
him of criticisms of the Archbishop's conduct: that is why Mgr. the 
Archbishop handles him carefully and works in agreement with him. 
This Jesuit, as long as he achieves his ends, consents to the rule of 
the Archbishop while the Archbishop as long as his rule survives 
and he is allowed to dominate his fellows, willingly sacrifices to the 
Jesuits the doctrine of the Church.40 
This was a partisan statement by a friend of those Oratorians who 
had suffered most from Harlay's policies, yet it seems to contain few 
exaggerations on matters of fact.41 From 1675 Harlay and La Chaize 
were the only members of the conseil de conscience, and very little 
effective opposition to their agreed program was possible.42 
That program included an extension of the power of the king: 
few historians have failed to observe the irony in the spectacle of a 
Jesuit abandoning the ultramontane tradition to strengthen his in­
fluence over the French king and church. Neither Harlay nor La 
Chaize could therefore be expected to show any resistance to the 
extension of the regale. This was the right enjoyed by the crown in 
most provinces to appropriate the revenues of a vacant see and with 
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them all episcopal rights of nominating to benefices not having a 
cure of souls. The extension of this right to all the provinces of 
France naturally appealed to the king's advisers and was therefore 
claimed in the edicts of 1673 and 1675. Pavilion of Aleth and Caulet 
of Pamiers, both of whom had already achieved notoriety at court by 
their refusal to sign the Formulary, once again showed their inde­
pendence by a denial of the legality of the king's actions and an 
appeal to Innocent XL Louis was already dissatisfied with the policy 
of this high-minded pope and bitterly resented his defense of the 
appellant bishops. Both Pavilion and Caulet were dead by 1680, but 
the struggle survived them to become the casus belli in the assembly 
of 1681-82.43 Innocent reasonably insisted that he was defending not 
his own rights but those of the native bishops against the demands 
of a predatory state, hoping by this argument to drive a wedge be­
tween the Gallicanism of the clergy and that of the parlement. 
This defense was, of course, rejected by Harlay, who inspired the 
letter of February, 1682, from the assembly to the pope. The argu­
ment of the letter was that the pope was wrong to resist the king 
on a relatively small matter of discipline; after all, the effect of the 
edicts was only to make universal what was already general. It was 
foolish to resist the lawful demands of so Christian a king: "What 
need is there to describe the horror with which the King regards 
all novelties, or to assert that they will find no shelter in any part 
of his realm?"44 
Harlay admitted that the magistrates might have been wrong in 
their opinions, but not that those opinions were heretical or that the 
edicts based upon them should have been disobeyed. This admission 
was a slight concession to those moderates, like Bossuet, who had been 
made uneasy by a unilateral abrogation of episcopal rights.45 
The disgrace of Pomponne in 1679 led to the acceptance of 
Colbert's demands that policy toward Rome should be hardened.46 
Diplomatic pressure on the Vatican was increased by Cesar d'Estrees, 
the special representative of the king, and the clergy were marshaled 
for the Extraordinary Assembly of 1681. The dominant figure in this 
assembly was not Bossuet but the now less-celebrated Harlay. Behind 
him were Colbert and, keeping as quiet as possible, La Chaize.47 
There was no hint of extremism in the sermon on the unity of the 
church that Bossuet preached at the opening of the assembly on 
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November 9, 1681. The king's rights were described as inviolable, 
and the personal infallibility of the pope was denied; but no sympathy 
was shown for the encroachments of the offiders, and the absolute 
necessity of unity with Rome was emphasized.48 Bossuet's intention 
was to reinforce the moderation of Chancellor Le Tellier and of his 
son, Charles Maurice, the archbishop of Rheims. It is not surprising 
that Harlay was displeased by the sermon.49 
Any hope of successful conciliation was seriously weakened during 
the winter months. From November, 1681, to February, 1682, the 
assembly was preoccupied with the intractable problems of the 
regale. A third edict confirming the universality of the king's rights 
sede vacante was prepared with the advice of the assembly (manipu­
lated by Harlay), and the publication of this edict was the occasion 
of the letter of February, 1682.50 The edict confirmed the orders of 
1673 and 1675 and included "a precise declaration of our will and 
the manner in which we propose to exercise our effective right to 
succeed to archbishops and bishops, their sees being vacant, in the 
collation of benefices other than those having a cure of souls."61 
Bossuet was anxious that the quarrel should be no further embittered, 
but the opposing policy of Harlay and Colbert prevailed in the 
assembly. A commission was appointed to examine the controversial 
Six Articles that the Sorbonne had approved in 1663, and to produce 
a declaration de ecclesiastica potestate.52 This declaration, drafted as 
the Four Articles, was accepted by the assembly on March 19, 1682. 
The first three articles of 1663 were compressed into the first of 
1682; important changes were introduced of which the general effect 
was to make the statements of doctrine more positive and to widen 
their application. 
The core of the first article was a declaration that kings and princes 
were subject to no ecclesiastical power in temporal matters.53 Reges 
et principes had significantly replaced the Rex Christianissimus of 
1663, and an attempt was made to limit the force of papal counter­
measures by denying Rome the rights of deposition or of dispensation 
from obedience. The second article was remarkably imprecise: an 
admission of the pope's plena potestas was inconsistently linked with 
approval of the Council of Constance. Moreover, the French church 
"does not approve" the opinion of those who wished to limit the force 
of the decrees of that council. It follows that the assembly neither 
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approved nor condemned this opinion, and the second article survived 
these contrived ambiguities as no more than the general expression of 
a Gallican sentiment. The same doubt surrounds the third article, the 
uncertainties of which would forbid a rigorous interpretation of the 
rules, usages, and customs of the French kingdom and church, which 
were to remain inviolate.54 A general principle was drawn from this 
particular statement, but the rules, customs, and institutions 
remained undefined. 
These first three articles dignified with official approval a widely 
held but loosely articulated and carelessly defined body of Gallican 
opinions. They paled into insignificance beside the terse clarity of 
the fourth, which declared that although the pope had the principal 
part in questions of faith, his judgment was irreformable only if the 
church accepted it.55 In 1663 the Sorbonne had simply ruled that it 
did not regard the doctrine of papal infallibility as being de fide. The 
Article of 1682 ruled positively that the pope's judgment was not 
irreformable.56 In 1663 the Sorbonne was expressing a weighty 
opinion on a disputed point; in 1682 the assembly of the clergy 
claimed to determine the dispute. The Declaratio of 1682 was a state­
ment by the bishops, and therefore enjoyed an importance and an 
authority that could be assumed by no private statement, even one 
made by so venerable a corporation as the Sorbonne. Equally signifi­
cant was the undoubted enthusiasm of the king for the enforcement 
of acceptance of the Articles throughout his dominions. The differ­
ences between the statements of 1663 and 1682 reveal the deteriora­
tion in these years of relations between the king and the French 
church on the one hand and the pope on the other. 
The year 1682 was the most critical of the century in the history 
of the relations of church and state in France. All the bishops who 
had taken any part in the assembly were now publicly committed to 
the policy of Harlay de Champvallon, who was left in complete 
control of the proceedings. The king signed an edict demanding that 
the Articles must everywhere be registered and taught and that 
every candidate for a degree in theology must subscribe to them. 
The pope acted with equal speed and thoroughness, sending to the 
assembly on April 2 a brief annulling all its decisions and lamenting 
the threat to the integrity of the faith.57 The clergy replied in May 
with a brusque affirmation of independence ("L'Eglise Gallicane se 
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gourverne par ses propres loix") and a protest at the pope's attack on 
church and state: " . .  . The most ancient rights of the Church, 
and the most firmly established customs of the State are being openly 
violated."58 The policy of Rome, they declared, would overthrow at 
once monarchy and episcopacy: no bishop, no king.59 
The battle could no longer be limited to words, and in September, 
1682, the pope decided to refuse bulls of institution to all who had 
taken part in the assembly; the king therefore determined to recom­
mend to the pope for preferment none who had been absent from 
the assembly. The deadlock was complete and the moderates dis­
mayed: Bossuet sought, in his Defensio Declarationis Cleri Gallicani 
(written in the years 1683-85 but not then published) to rescue 
Gallican and Catholic principles from the confusion of battle and to 
reconcile them in a positive ecclesiology that would embrace both 
pontifical and episcopal power. But neither Louis nor Innocent could 
afford to see this deadlock indefinitely prolonged: it weakened the 
moral position of the crown, robbed it of the invaluable source of 
patronage guaranteed by the Concordat of 1516, and left dioceses 
without bishops in the years when the campaign against the Hugue­
nots was being intensified. Louis certainly hoped that this campaign, 
and more especially the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, would 
give as much pleasure to Innocent as to Bossuet.60 The pope remained 
unimpressed by Louis's efforts to prove his orthodoxy at the expense 
of the Protestants, and supported Camus at Grenoble in his de­
nunciations of conversion by violence.61 The parlement felt justified 
in complaining bitterly in 1688 of the pope's ingratitude.62 It professed 
yet greater indignation at the insult to the sovereignty of the king of 
France implied by Innocent's abolition, in May, 1687, of the am­
bassadorial franchises in Rome.63 Innocent had already warned Louis 
of his probable excommunication. The procureur-general made a 
shrill appeal: "Alleging that he refers his said appeal on this matter 
as also on others which he reserves the right to explain to the first 
Council that shall be held, being the truly sovereign and infallible 
tribunal of the Church, to which its visible Head is subject together 
with its other members."64 Denis Talon, the avocat-general, warned 
the pope that if he continued to act on new and erroneous opinions 
and to use his spiritual authority against Lavardin, the king's am­
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bassador acting under royal orders, it might become necessary to 
revise the Concordat.65 Louis was busily soliciting in support of an 
appeal to a general council the opinions of parlement, the universities, 
and the clergy. Colbert de Croissy mounted a great press campaign 
against Rome, denouncing Innocent as a Jansenist, a Quietist, and an 
ally of the heretic William of Orange.66 When the pope died in 
1689, the worst of the polemical storm was over. The danger of 
schism had perhaps never been very real, and the violent sentiments 
of 1688 were soon forgotten.67 The exaggerations of propaganda 
nevertheless left their mark and suggested immoderate precedents 
to eighteenth-century imitators. 
Louis and his advisers calculated in 1688 that the certain hazards 
of pressing any further their policy against Rome were greater than 
the probable advantages. International complications were becoming 
more serious each month, and the king was anxious to reduce tension 
wherever he could. His advisers were disturbed by a growing under­
current of criticism in France and knew that the perpetuation of an 
open quarrel with Rome must nourish this disaffection. Both Louis 
and Innocent XII, who succeeded Alexander VIII in 1691, hoped to 
secure the neutrality of Italy in the enlarging international conflict. 
It was no change of heart but a calculation of political advantages 
that brought Louis, in the autumn of 1693, to a decision to suspend 
the disputes with Rome. His position had by then been shaken by 
the disastrous harvest of 1693, and the concessions he made were 
considerable.68 
Louis XIV was saved from the indignity of a direct renunciation of 
his opinions by confining his public statements to a bare assurance 
that the royal edict of March 22, 1682, would no longer be enforced 
in France.69 "I have given the necessary orders terminating the en­
forcements of those matters which past circumstances had obliged 
me to include within my edict of 22nd March 1682 touching the 
declaration made by the Clergy of France."70 Could any retraction 
be more impenitent? The edict of 1682 is clearly described as in­
evitable, and all Louis now conceded was that it should no longer 
be observed. It is not surprising that the bishops had to go a little 
further than this. Each bishop signing the letter to the pope lamented 
anything done in the Assembly of 1682 that displeased the pope and 
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added that nothing that might be construed as a decree relating to 
ecclesiastical power and pontifical authority should, in fact, be treated 
as a decree.71 
Even this declaration was neither wholehearted nor precise: 
quidquid could mean much or little, and all that the bishops effec­
tively said was that they had not produced decrees on ecclesiastical 
or papal authority. It follows that neither by the king nor by the 
bishops was there an explicit renunciation of the positions of 1682. 
Even the question of the regale was left unresolved. 
Bossuet was, perhaps too readily, convinced that nothing had been 
conceded to Rome and that the principles of 1682 stood quite 
unshaken by ten years of controversy and its conclusion.72 His own 
view of the relations of church and state remained both firm and 
moderate. In all his thought and writing the predominant notes were 
sanity, tradition, order, and clarity. He hated the extremes of ultra­
montanism and Protestantism; he rejected the conclusions of casuists 
as well as of Jansenists; he suspected the rationalism of the new 
philosophy as much as the dangerously formless and novel mysticism 
that he detected in the church. After the provisional settlement of 
the Gallican conflict, Bossuet became increasingly concerned with 
the dangerous excesses of mystical theology; his determination to 
remove these excesses brought a new factor into the relations of 
church and state. The seventeenth century was an age of renaissance 
in the spiritual life of French Catholics. The line between orthodoxy 
and heresy in the expression of a mystical experience is notoriously 
hard to draw, and the danger that spiritual abandon may insensibly 
decline into antinomianism was very real to a mind like Bossuet's. 
It was a tragedy that he should have detected this very danger in one 
of the greatest of his contemporaries, Fenelon.73 Madame de Main-
tenon recognized Fenelon as a serious political rival and found in 
Bossuet a ready ally: it has even been argued that the quarrel that 
Bossuet forced upon Fenelon did not grow from a difference of 
religious opinion at all.74 Bossuet, the indefatigable and erudite 
champion of order, was convinced that the perverse theses of Molinos 
were corrupting, through the sinister influence of Madame Guyon, 
the brilliant and refreshing mind of Fenelon.75 Molinos had taught 
that a soul completely abandoned in prayer to God should grow 
into a state of complete indifference to its own salvation or damnation, 
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and a complete detachment from the ministrations of the church, 
from the sacraments, from dogmatic systems, and from moral precepts. 
In the pure love of God there could be room for no consideration save 
that of God himself. These, at least, were the terms in which the 
problem presented itself to Bossuet, and he, with the king and 
Madame de Maintenon, resolved to extinguish these errors. 
This resolution modified the relations of church and state in 
France: the king was now prepared to accept the pope as an ally 
against the Quietists—as he had been an ally against the Jansenists 
in the i66o's—in spite of the fact that the whole purpose of royal 
policy in the meantime had been to abbreviate papal power. No one, 
unless immediate purposes were served, was less devoted to le 
gallicanisme du roi than the king himself. 
It had been generally hoped that the conclusions of the irenic 
commission at Issy would detach Fenelon from the doctrines of 
Malaval, Molinos, and Madame Guyon. Unfortunately, the desire to 
accommodate Fenelon had produced loose wording in the drafting 
of the articles, of which he took advantage two years later by pub­
lishing Les Maximes des Saints (1697). This ill-advised attempt to 
define what the archbishop of Cambrai took to be the authentic tradi­
tion of Christian mysticism was interpreted by Bossuet as an act of 
bad faith and a revival of doctrines already condemned by Rome.76 
A bitter quarrel raged for two years, throwing into relief the irrecon­
cilable minds and tempers of Fenelon and Bossuet; it was arrested 
only by the decision of the pope.77 Fenelon had so few doubts of 
the defensibility of his own position that he appealed to Rome; like 
St. Paul, he found little reason to be content with the result. In his 
letter to Innocent XII, dated April, 1697, he submitted the Maximes 
to papal judgment, renouncing as abominable the Quietist teachings of 
Molinos. Fenelon thought that although the conclusions of Issy were 
in themselves sound and acceptable, they had since been miscon­
strued as an attack upon 'Tamour pur de la vie contemplative." Bossuet 
rejected this defense, and Fenelon was commanded to leave the court; 
Louis was anxious that the pope should reach a decision as soon as 
possible and urged the necessity of "a clear and precise judgment on 
a book which inflames and a doctrine which divides his kingdom." 
The bull of 1699 condemned not only the general tone of the 
Maximes but also twenty-three propositions drawn from the work.78 
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Louis expressed his pleasure at so correct a decision but demonstrated 
his loyalty to one of the great principles of 1682 by accepting Bossuet's 
argument that the force of the bull in France should depend upon 
its formal reception.79 A copy of the bull was sent to all the arch­
bishops "so that joining their voices to the authority of the judgment 
of our Holy Father the Pope, the co-operation of these powers may 
totally stifle the innovations which wound the purity of the faith." 
The king made it equally clear that he enjoyed in his own right the 
power to preserve this purity.80 Bossuet and Louis had been glad to 
accept the decision of Rome against Fe"nelon, but they had no inten­
tion of paying for this help with the liberties of bishops or of 
the crown. 
This working alliance of king and pope was the most conspicuous 
result of the pacification of 1693. From that settlement the Jansenists 
were excluded, and now found themselves, as in the 1650's and 
166o's, exposed to the united enmity of pope and king. The king had 
already in 1679 broken the spirit if not the letter of the Clementine 
Peace by reviving the persecution of Port-Royal: the Jansenist con­
fessors were withdrawn and the doors closed to novices or postulants. 
The toleration of Jansenist opinions outside the convent depended 
upon the continued acceptance of the distinction of droit and fait 
and upon official acquiescence in "respectful silence" as an adequate 
response to the question of papal infallibility in matters of fact. This 
acquiescence the enemies of Jansenism were determined to dissolve. 
They found a powerful ally, anxious to redeem his disgrace, in 
Fenelon.81 He could not be blamed if he saw in the ruin of Jansenism, 
of which he was genuinely suspicious, an opportunity to damage those 
wrong-headed enemies who had effected his own condemnation. 
Quietist and Jesuit now worked together to enlist the king, by an 
appeal to his unconcealed hatred of Jansenism, against Noailles 
(Harlay's successor as archbishop), the Gallicans, and the Jansenists 
themselves. It is a maneuver of this kind that makes it impossible to 
represent in simple or constant terms the relations of church and 
state under Louis XIV. 
The tactics for the first phase of this renewed attack on the 
Jansenists were simplified by the fact that Noailles, while he was 
still bishop of Chalons, had approved the second edition of the Reflex-
ions morales sur le Nouveau Testament by the Jansenist Quesnel; 
yet in the following year, as archbishop-elect, he had condemned 
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a book written by another Jansenist, Barcos. This evident inconsis­
tency was skilfully exploited by the anonymous author of the Proh­
leme ecclesiastique in 1698: since the doctrine of the two works is 
substantially the same, he asked, which Noailles is to be believed? 82 
Jansenism was brought back into the center of theological discus­
sion. Old but unsolved questions were resurrected, and the Sorbonne 
found, in the cas de conscience of 1701, that a priest could give abso­
lution to a penitent admitting some scruple over the droit and fait 
as well as some sympathy with other Jansenist principles.83 This 
decision was promptly attacked, and the publication of the bull 
Vineam Domini in 1705 overthrew it: the Peace of 1668 was finally 
destroyed. Louis XIV, who had never had any patience with Jan­
senists, had been pressing for a bull, always provided "that it should 
be made in agreement with me and that it contain no term which 
might prevent its publication in my kingdom."84 
The bull was, in fact, prepared in consultation between Versailles 
and Rome, and every precaution was taken in France to avoid a 
dangerous precedent destructive of the liberties of the French church. 
Clement XI was understandably irritated by the endless repetition 
of this theme. Louis reminded the clergy, in his letter to the assembly, 
that they should take care to observe "the forms established by the 
said decrees and by the usage of the Gallican Church."85 He was 
equally explicit in instructing the parlement that they were to regis­
ter Vineam Domini only "if it appears to them that there is in the 
said constitution in the form of a Bull nothing contrary to the sacred 
decrees, canonical constitutions, rights and pre-eminences of our 
Crown or the Gallican Church."86 
Neither parlement nor the clergy neglected these instructions; the 
assembly observed, in the letter to the bishops, that the clergy of 
the French church did not execute the pope's orders but judged and 
pronounced in partnership with him. The bull against the Jansenists 
was received with the same caution as that against the Quietists; but 
the force of Gallicanism was weakened by the reception within a few 
years of two important bulls carrying papal definitions of doctrine. 
Louis was not to find it easy to balance his zeal for the purity of the 
faith with care for his own rights and those of his courts and bishops. 
The difficulty of reconciling these diverse interests increased in the 
last years of the reign and appears especially in the negotiations lead­
ing to the bull Unigenitus. The Jesuits were determined that the 
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doctrines that Noailles had unwisely approved in Quesnel's Reflex-
ions morales, and that restated at great length the objectionable 
substance of the Five Propositions, should be condemned with all 
possible solemnity. Louis, sharing this determination, asked the pope 
for a bull and expected to be consulted about its contents. Clement, 
on the other hand, wished his brief of 1708 to be taken as final, 
although it had condemned the doctrine of Quesnel only in general 
terms and had never been received in France. The king maintained 
diplomatic pressure, and, after many delays, the pope yielded and 
published the bull Unigenitus in the autumn of 1713. Although the 
French minister in Rome had been consulted, an advance copy had 
not been sent to Versailles. Louis's enthusiasm for a definitive con­
demnation of Quesnel had led him to ignore the Gallican principles 
he had often professed. His insistence on getting the bull was to 
occasion a long struggle in which many of the crown's natural allies 
in the parlement and among the clergy learned to resist the king's 
will. The fifty years of the personal reign of Louis XIV had seen 
most possible, and many improbable, groupings in ecclesiastical poli­
tics: king, pope, and Jesuists against the Jansenists; king, Jesuits, and 
Gallicans against pope and Jansenists; king, Gallicans, and Jansenists 
against Quietists; king, Quietists, Jesuits, and pope against Jansenists. 
To this restlessly shifting pattern was now added one last refinement: 
king and pope against Jansenists and Gallicans.87 The collision over 
Unigenitus was to make a profound impression on the history of the 
eighteenth century. 
Some attempt was made by Louis to soften the offense of Unigen­
itus to minds disposed to view with alarm the reception of a third 
important definition of doctrine by the pope. The king, in the letters 
patent, emphasized that he had himself asked the pope for a judg­
ment against Quesnel's book. Parlement was again asked, before 
registering the bull, to be satisfied that it infringed the rights neither 
of the crown nor of the French church.88 Parlement found no fault 
with the form of the bull but did insist that acceptance of it by the 
French bishops must precede registration. The king called together 
all the bishops who happened to be in or near Paris or Versailles, 
but this somewhat makeshift assembly, instead of accepting the bull 
promptly and gratefully from the hands of Clement and Louis, 
LOUIS XIV AND THE CHURCH 259 
appointed a commission that proceeded to a leisurely examination of 
each of the one hundred and one condemned propositions. Rome 
was quite unwilling to admit any right in the assembled bishops tc 
meddle in this way with a final decision. Cardinal Noailles, angry 
at what he took to be a Jesuit plot to humiliate him, formally pro­
posed that to the bull should be prefaced the interpretation placed 
upon it by the bishops' commission. He failed to persuade the assem­
bly to accept this provocative tactic, and therefore drew up, in col­
laboration with seven of his episcopal supporters, a declaration: "We 
demand that there be given to the Court of Rome no just reason 
for supposing that we act only as simple executors of its decrees."89 
The dissidents were exiled to their dioceses by a lettre de cachet, 
and the report of the commission included no more than a mild 
defense of the rights of bishops to judge with the pope in matters 
of faith. The conduct of the parlement was, in the king's eyes, no 
more satisfactory: the bull was registered on February 17, 1714, but 
in profound silence. The Sorbonne in March accepted the bull only 
after stormy sessions and forceful expressions of dissent.90 The reign 
ended with Gallicans in parlement and in the Sorbonne challenging 
the policy of a king who had failed, in this last episode of the reign, 
to reconcile independence of Rome with devotion to the Roman faith. 
Louis's understanding of religion and philosophy was painfully 
limited and his policy in these matters dictated by a passionate hatred 
of dissidence or novelty.91 He intended, as God's vicegerent, to extir­
pate heresy and error from his kingdom; the task proved far beyond 
his powers. His chances of success would have been greater if the 
partnership of church and state, or rather of pope and king, had 
been more stable. That partnership was strained both by the oppor­
tunism of Louis's policy and by his ambition to claim for himself 
universal power. The resistance to the claims made under royal 
inspiration in the assembly of 1682 has been interpreted as the first 
symptom of opposition to the so-called absolutism of Louis le Grand.92 
The king's own reaction, in 1688, to papal hostility constituted a 
dangerous precedent to which may be referred not only the contro­
versies of 1718 but also the affair of the billets de confession and 
even the Civil Constitution of the clergy: in the irony of history, 
Louis had himself forged "les armes qui devaient frapper plus tard 
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l'organisation eccle'siastique de la monarchic"93 Even in the per­
secution of self-confessed heretics, Versailles and Rome were not 
united: the revocation of 1685 marks the furthest advance of the 
militant Counter Reformation and of royal absolutism, but the pope 
soon lost his enthusiasm for the king's policy. 
Louis had attempted to impose upon France a policy by which 
orthodox Catholicism was maintained with the support of a pope 
who must nevertheless be kept firmly in his place. Papalists, Galli­
cans, Jansenists, Quietists, Cartesians, and Protestants all learned to 
fear a priest-king who fought to arrest the birth of the eighteenth 
century. Some, like Harlay, supported the monarch for reasons of 
private interest; others, like Bossuet, because they shared his con­
victions but not his ignorance. It was Louis's misfortune to rule 
through years of rapid intellectual change: "Most Frenchmen thought 
like Bossuet. Suddenly they think like Voltaire; a revolution has taken 
place."94 Louis had so identified church and state in France that 
the philosophes were to associate them under a like condemnation. 
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The Court and Capital of

Louis XIV: Some Definitions

and Reflections

OREST RANUM 
N OT since the days of Etienne Marcel and the Hundred Years' War was the presence of the royal family in Paris so necessary 
to maintain urban tranquillity and to conduct a war. Even Louis 
XIII's minority, hectic as it was, had posed less of a threat to the 
crown than the robe and sword rebellion of the Fronde. After all, 
Marie de' Medici and Concini at least had the parlement's support, 
whereas Anne and Mazarin did not. 
Louis XIV grew up a Parisian of sorts because the Fronde forced 
his mother to reside there. Long stays at Fontainebleau or St. Ger­
main, hunting and playing with gentle girls and boys, were out 
of the question for him because his "family," consisting of Anne, 
Mazarin, and his brother Philippe, dared not leave Paris very often. 
Anne and Mazarin were not prisoners, technically speaking—no 
more than Henri III had been in his last days; but every move they 
made with the boy king started plots and rumors, and caused the 
prices paid for rentes to drop. So Louis knew the Louvre and the 
Palais Royal as home; and since he was the prince of landed aristo­
crats, living in the city came to be something he disliked, though 
this would be difficult to prove from what he said or wrote concern­
ing his distaste for the city. The aristocratic tradition and Louis's own 
actions speak louder than his words. Gentlemen and kings were at 
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home on their rural domains in good company, and those who lived 
in the capital in the seventeenth century did so out of the necessity 
of attending court, rather than by choice. But only when the Fronde 
became too dangerous, or when epidemics came too close, was Louis 
hustled into the country. 
In the later Middle Ages, French kings still considered the Louvre 
a tolerable place to live in the winter; but political conditions per­
mitting, they usually preferred to reside near, but not in, Paris. 
Charles V built and lived in the Hotel St. Pol, a pleasant country 
place outside the walls surrounded by gardens and monastic lands 
and situated in the marais, or fourth arrondissement. Charles VI also 
lived here before the Parisians enveloped the area. Then, after 1407, 
when the crown acquired the Hotel des Tournelles in the same 
neighborhood, several kings made this comfortable (for those times 
at least) and fanciful flamboyant gothic palace their sejour ordinaire. 
In the sixteenth century Henri II stayed there quite often; and it 
was close by that he was struck dead in a playful jousting match 
held on the Rue St. Antoine, which was something like a country 
road then. Obviously, jousting and hunting could not be done in 
the narrow streets of Paris; and no French monarch, least of all the 
Bourbons, ever lost the aristocratic appetite for daily outdoor sports. 
Queens, especially foreign queens—and this includes nearly all 
French queens—also played a part in shifting the monarch's habitual 
residence out of the center of town. Catherine de' Medici built the 
Tuileries out into the fields and far beyond the walls; and in the 
midst of the monasteries far south of the capital's walls, Marie de' 
Medici built the Luxembourg. So to make country living more acces­
sible, Anne, too, ordered the Tuileries remodeled and an open, 
spacious double residence built within the walls of the old castle at 
Vincennes for escaping the unpleasantness of Paris. But none of 
these places was much lived in, perhaps because the family had 
become accustomed to living in the city. 
When the Frondes were over and war subsided, habit and interests 
still kept the court in Paris. Unlike Richelieu, Cardinal Mazarin 
could not build a whole town and a great chateau on his ancestral 
estates, because he did not have any; so for this reason he stayed in 
Paris, to spend hours arranging his collections of classical manu­
scripts, medals, books, paintings, furniture, sculpture, and tapestries 
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in the two buildings that we now recognize as the Institut and the 
Bibliotheque Nationale. And after Mazarin's death, Louis continued 
to live with Anne in Paris, but with more frequent jaunts to Fon­
tainebleau and St. Germain, until her death in 1666. 
Anne's death upset Louis very much. He underwent something 
resembling an emotional crisis that manifested itself in an aversion 
for Paris. He recorded his urge to flee among his most intimate and 
important thoughts, which were to be edited and prepared for the 
instruction of the dauphin, saying, " . .  . Being unable, after this 
misfortune, to bear the sight of the place where it had happened, 
I left Paris that very hour and withdrew first to Versailles. . . . "* 
This phrase, so full of emotion, expresses something deeper than a 
mere decision by Louis to follow the tradition of kings by leaving the 
scene of death. Louis's tenderness and love for Anne, and his grati­
tude to her for having relinquished power when he became a man, 
were very deep feelings. And though it may be argued that this urge 
to flee was only the consequence of shock and, therefore, momentary 
and of no consequence, I think Louis's activities in the years immedi­
ately following Anne's death indicate otherwise. 
In November, 1667, Louis, the queen, and the court took up resi­
dence in the Tuileries, intending to spend the winter there; but by 
late January, they were already installed at St. Germain.2 One year 
later, Louis tried living in Paris, again with the intention of staying 
all winter, with the same results. His final try came in 1671, and 
this time the departure for St. Germain took place in mid-February. 
These were busy years for the king, but why the change in plans? 
Why did he leave Paris before the winter was over? Never again 
did he make the capital his home, nor even try living in the new 
wing of the Louvre built in his own reign. Perhaps the palaces, 
gardens, paintings, and statues, and their association with the past 
and with people whom he had loved, caused him to lose pleasure in 
being there. 
Other things contributed to make Louis dislike Paris. The Sun 
King was always annoyed by petty quarrels between the guilds and 
corporations of Paris; and the longer he lived, the less willing he 
was to hear out their grievances or intervene personally in disputes 
over their privileges.3 And yet it would have been very difficult for 
him to have avoided these long and apparently numberless audiences 
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had he remained in Paris, because feudal custom prescribed that the 
hearing of petitions from the guilds in Paris was his duty. At Ver­
sailles he came to accept in person only statements of thanks from 
the guilds; and even these ceremonies became infrequent, probably 
because grievances might be insinuated into the eloquent prose read 
to celebrate his victories, grandeur, and glory. 
But more important than these reasons for leaving Paris was 
Louis's own love for the outdoors. He wanted forests, lakes, gardens, 
stables, and long allies around him, and space for all these things 
could be found no nearer to Paris than Versailles. The belt of mon­
asteries that surrounded the capital was in the hands of monks 
eager to sell the lands, but only at extortionate prices. Louis tried 
to buy Rueil, which was Richelieu's old country place, now known 
as Malmaison; but the cardinal's niece, the Duchesse d'Aiguillon, 
made it perfectly clear that she did not want to give it up, though 
she would bow to the royal will. She wrote Colbert: "The King is 
the master, and he who gave me Rueil so successfully taught France 
the obedience which it owes him, that His Majesty should not doubt 
mine."4 So the matter was dropped. That left St. Germain, which 
was remodeled a bit by adding a long terrace overlooking the Seine, 
but living quarters were too small; there was only Versailles. Louis 
XIII had been content to live with a few hunting friends, occupying 
Fontainebleau and St. Germain, and building his chateau de cartes 
at Versailles. Though scoffed at for putting up such a modest struc­
ture, he liked the little brick and stone building because it was near 
the deer and too small to house many courtiers. Louis XIII's somber 
personality, the wars, and especially the government conducted by 
devout ministers and social inferiors such as Mazarin, Le Tellier, 
Fouquet, and Colbert, had made French court life dreary and with­
out luster. Anyway, only a monarch, and a young, handsome, and 
energetic one at that, could have a court worthy of the name. 
In the early years I think that Louis held a great and lavish court 
because he wanted to make his subjects happy. His Memoires imply 
that this was his aim, and it was a good one. Frenchmen had not 
seen a king enjoy himself or entertain publicly in the manner worthy 
of his dignity since Henri IV, and this is what I think Louis set 
out to do. Then he realized in the 1660's that he could use the court 
for political purposes. 
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None of the old residences sufficed for the Sun King and his court. 
Room had to be found for hundreds of courtiers, musicians, actors, 
scientists, poets, historians, fencers, horsemen, cooks, and servants, 
whom he invited to attend him in the aristocratic way—but only so 
long as they wished, or kept, favor—and to follow him wherever he 
went. Also, none of the old buildings was in the latest style of archi­
tecture, which was a factor of much importance then when the 
aristocratic way was to have only the dernier cri. Louis was probably 
determined to keep up with his subjects, and if this was the case, 
it would explain why even Versailles was remodeled extensively sev­
eral times before his death. As to remodeling buildings other than 
those built at his command, Louis refused to demolish anything built 
by his ancestors. His order to preserve the chateau de cartes of Louis 
XIII gave Le Vau and later Hardouin-Mansart no end of difficulty, 
but it is still there today. 
Building Versailles became a passion. Neither "his" wars, as they 
were called, nor Colbert's opposition caused his interest to flag. Even 
distance from the work and other preoccupations did not keep Louis 
from thinking of Versailles. The letters to Colbert written by the 
king while campaigning in the Franche-Comte in 1667-68 are filled 
with questions, orders, and details about the masons, gardeners, and 
artists, who were always being urged to work faster. Obviously, Louis 
enjoyed building when Versailles began to take form, and this satis­
fied something in him that building in Paris had never done. 
With a new setting, Louis and his entourage developed a court 
ceremonial so different from that of his ancestors, either French or 
Spanish, that they were certainly not imitating some monarch in the 
recent past. In the sixteenth century his Valois forbears tried to 
"restore" feudal pageantry and courtly love by making it into a kind 
of fetish; but the Sun King, though respecting his own ancestry and 
aristocratic valor, showed no nostalgia for the Middle Ages. 
We do not know whether Louis understood the classical and 
mythological imagery that gives heavy intellectual baggage to all the 
artistic works at Versailles, but he was certainly in favor of it. His 
disapproval would have been enough to change the minds of all the 
tastemakers and artists. He called his gardens by their classical names 
and obviously liked being depicted as a Roman. Did he know much 
about the court life of the Caesars? Were the humanist descriptions 
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of and about the Romans and translations of ancient historians filter­
ing down into the minds of men who surrounded the king? Favorite 
courtiers were neither avid readers nor prolific memorialists, so it is 
difficult to discover what they knew of Rome. But one thing is clear: 
Colbert's conception of grandeur and his definition of a capital were 
Roman. Perhaps there was also someone near the king who supplied 
the notion of creating an imperial court. The enigmatic figure here, 
of course, is Louvois, whose influence on administration and the 
army has been studied, but whose role in the making of Versailles 
has been ignored. Certainly, Louis's decision to make him superin­
tendent of buildings, which he did in 1683 right after Colbert's 
death, would indicate that his taste was trusted as much as his 
bureaucratic talents were needed. 
But did Louis's subjects take their cue from somebody in the court 
when they began to erect monuments to his glory in the Roman 
style? Marshal de La Feuillade's own monument to Louis's glory, 
the Place des Victoires, was a brazenly unchristian, if not pagan, 
depiction of Louis as a king conquering all of Europe and subduing 
other monarchs. Then the great equestrian statue of Louis, the immor­
tal Roman done by Girardon for the Place Vendome, showed him as 
a haughty prince, with thin lips turned down and eyes coldly staring. 
These were the first lighted public squares, for dozens of lamps were 
to be kept burning every night so that the king's glory might always 
shine. But instead of seeing Louis as the Parisians saw him, let us 
look at the plans made by the city fathers of Poitiers for a similar 
monument. Their idea was: 
The ancients, who desired that the centuries to come should lose 
nothing of the great men whom Heaven made master from time to 
time, in order to serve as a model for others, were not satisfied with 
celebrating their heroes in the immortal writings that they have left 
us, they also wished to give us their concrete image, and by means of 
statues and medals that were devoted to them, to present them to our 
eyes as well as to our minds. . . . France, which had been a bit 
negligent in this matter until the present, is finally beginning to 
awaken and to acquire the good taste of the ancients under a happy 
reign that is causing the fine arts to flourish once more; and since 
France has never had a hero more worthy of immortality than Louis 
the Great. . . .s 
COURT AND CAPITAL 271 
Plainly the desire to emulate the Romans had sunk deeply into public 
minds, and for a purpose too. The Poitevins continued: 
That the statue which was the occasion for this ceremony should 
not only be an ornament for the city but that the inhabitants in addi­
tion should look upon it as their protecting god, and since it places 
them in a more personal way under the prince's protection. . . . 6 
Other elements were also adopted from the Romans, and there 
seems to have been no concern for how the divine character of their 
emperors7 and the divine right of kings might conflict. Seventeenth-
century Frenchmen saw them as complementary. 
The monarchy had changed, and though Louis never seems to 
have said how, his more perceptive subjects did. D'Argenson illus­
trates this when, after trying to figure out who had the right to put 
posts in front of his hotel in Paris, he wrote that in order to discover 
the different ranks and privileges of officials and gentlemen, one had 
to go back to the reigns of Charles V and Louis XI, "where ranks had 
not yet been confused as they have been since, though from no real 
inclination of the French, who naturally like to believe themselves 
equals and who only cede willingly before their sovereign, before the 
splendor of the royal majesty which darkens and humbles every other 
gloire."8 D'Argenson was a devoted royal official for whom all dis­
tinctions and rights emanated from the monarch, which was the old 
these royale argument; but he also was observing something more. 
For him the monarchy had established ranks, but now it was confus­
ing them and making them meaningless by raising itself so far above 
even the greatest subjects. Here we find the fundamental principle 
of Louis's court. He always paid more respect, formally at least, to 
a duke or a prince than he did to a seigneur or Colbert; but in mak­
ing everything turn round him and his pleasures at Versailles, Louis 
elevated a smile, a glance, or a courtesy from himself above all 
familial or personal honors. Saint-Simon noted: 
Never has there been anyone more gracious nor anyone who as a 
result has raised to such a degree the value of his favors; never has 
anyone sold his words for a higher price, even his smile and his very 
glances. He rendered everything precious by choice and majesty, to 
which the scarcity and brevity of his words added a great deal. 
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If he spoke to someone, whether about a question or about in­
consequential matters, everyone present looked at him, it was a 
distinction that was talked about, and which always conferred a 
sort of importance.9 
Winning a battle might prove less rewarding than a compliment. 
So splendor had a purpose, and its results were insured by the 
king's police—like surveillance of every detail of ceremonies at a 
court where even the most private act had been made a ritual. 
Colbert proposed that Louis give clothes to every person in his court,10 
with the purpose in mind, I think, of imposing uniforms, common 
styles of clothing, upon subjects of various ranks and distinction. 
Louis decided what everyone was to wear. Even in his old age, he 
battled against the fashion of wearing fabric buttons, mainly because 
he had not launched it.11 In the undeviating ceremonies at Versailles, 
he knew that everyone's gloire, wealth, or even piety, would be out-
dazzled by his own. But to say that he aimed to reduce the power 
of the nobility is to miss the point. I think he worked to confound 
the differences between them, and to make les grands just like the 
other gentlemen. 
Versailles was not the salon of France but of Europe. Louis com­
bined the forms of a feudal court with those of the salon. He did 
for monarchy what Lorenzo de' Medici and Federigo of Urbino had 
done for the patrician republic. Artists, poets, and playwrights could 
mingle with princes under the glare of a king whose own dignity 
made everyone else's seem insignificant. The Sun King did every­
thing he could to impress; it was his devoir. Surrounded by cardinals, 
ambassadors, les grands, philosophers, and artists, Louis attained the 
greatest prestige that any monarch could have. He realized that he 
could overpower his subjects with hospitality and intimidate foreign 
princes with splendor. "Hospitality" was what Louis considered it to 
be, though courtiers found life at Versailles very costly. But had not 
Louis's own carefree attitude about the cost of splendor set the style 
for those who sought favor? And furthermore, was not the denigra­
tion of money the aristocratic way, and the superiority derived from 
having ruined a few creditors still sought after? 
St. Evremond gave a public definition of the court as "un extrait 
de tout le royaume: tout ce qu'il y a de plus fin et de plus pur s'y 
rencontre."12 Louis would have liked that definition had he known 
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it. There is nothing feudal about it; the curia regis seems distant 
indeed, nor is there any reference to regional or social distinctions. 
The tout is remarkably ambiguous, in a way dehumanized, and yet 
obviously referring to people of rank or cultural distinction. 
I have found no private definitions that are as abstract or idealistic 
as St. Evremond's. For, numerous as they are, those I have seen 
emphasize the artificiality and masking of personalities that was the 
court. La Fontaine wrote: 
Je definis la cour un pais ou les gens

Tristes, gais, prets a tout, a tous indife'rens;

Sont ce qu'il plait au Prince, ou s'ils ne peuvent l'etre,

T&chent au moins de le paroistre.13

Individual expression, and even amusement, were restrained by what 
the king wanted everyone to do. He was freer in the early years, 
quite prudish and pious later on. La Bruyere called the court a 
"marble edifice" where the pursuit of favor brought out the sordid 
aspects of everyone save those having grandeur or self-assurance. Like 
D'Argenson, he believed that Louis's greatness diminished that of 
others: "There is nothing like the prince's presence to make certain 
courtiers ugly: I can scarcely recognize their faces; their features are 
altered, and their countenance is degraded. Proud and superb people 
are the most undone. . . . " 14 This artificiality went beyond devious­
ness, ambition, and dishonesty to include crude pretentiousness in 
culture: "With five or six artistic terms, and nothing more, one poses 
as a connoisseur in music, painting, buildings, and in good eating."15 
And La Bruyere sensed the loss of liberty for some courtiers: "A 
man, if he lives at home in his province, lives free, but without sup­
port; if he lives at court, he is protected, but he is a slave: one com­
pensates the other."16 Here was a commentator suffering not a bit 
from nostalgia for the Middle Ages; but even more, La Bruyere's 
study of the classics gave him a knowledge of psychology that per­
mitted him to record men's motives and selfishness at court. His view 
of men is not unlike Machiavelli's, though the Caracteres lacks a 
political program. But he was off in a corner so far as Louis and the 
court were concerned, an amusing and harmless writer. 
During the years of spending and youthful debauching, it was 
not difficult for Louis to attract and hold his guests; but when he 
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grew older, more concerned about good morals, and impoverished by 
wars, he lost control. The court lost luster and interest for those who 
would not stoop to the cheapest devices of seeking favor. Versailles 
was like a play sponsored by a millionaire who never allowed it to 
close. The extended visit became too long, the entertainment became 
somewhat out-of-date, or so it was thought; but rather than change 
with the times Louis went on from ceremony to ceremony, and later, 
from mourning to mourning, until his own body gave out. 
Paris had always been a threat, but in the last two decades of the 
reign its parties, plays, banquets, and salons became the enemy for 
the king of Versailles. He began to insist that courtiers not go to 
Paris by merely frowning at them and grimacing at those who talked 
about what was going on in the capital; when he discovered that 
they were still going, he decided to set an example, which was the 
usual device for enforcing laws in the ancien regime, by forbidding 
the fils de France to go to Paris.17 His ministers went the few miles 
only infrequently, and then they would write about the city's prob­
lems as if they had no firsthand knowledge of conditions there. 
Louis had long since decided not to go himself. From 1671 to 
1693 he attended only twenty ceremonies there; and he did not 
come to the capital again until 1701, after which he visited there 
only four more times until his death in 1715. This was an extra­
ordinary change from the habits of his ancestors. He had made the 
court and the capital two distinct institutions, with the former the 
center of power, favor, and style. He had given the court everything 
he could to make all seem to emanate from the king, and he gave it 
a physical home that it occupied nearly without interruption until 
the dissolution of the monarchy. Diderot, or a collaborator, observes 
this change in the article on cour in the Encyclopedic, where it is 
defined as "always the place which a sovereign inhabits; it is com­
posed of princes, princesses, ministers, grands, and principal officers. 
It is therefore not surprising that it is the center of a nation's polite­
ness.'' The court was no longer an occasion but a place, and it is 
worthwhile to notice the change in the order of those who attended. 
Ministres were placed before les grands, not carelessly, but deliber­
ately—though unconsciously, I think, indicating the loss in prestige 
of the great aristocracy. 
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Louis XIV's court had made a difference. His predecessors had 
influenced manners in parts of the realm, but Louis, through Ver­
sailles, made that influence felt throughout Europe. The Encyclopedie 
article continues: "Politeness continues there through the equality in 
which the extreme grandeur of a single person holds all those who 
surround him, and taste there is refined by a continual use of the 
superfluities of fortune." This public definition differs little from 
D'Argenson's comment on what Louis's gloire was doing to distinc­
tions of rank, or La Bruyere's, on manners; but the article went on 
to add the private definition of artificiality—after quoting Montes­
quieu's definition of air de la cour as the "exchange of its natural for 
borrowed grandeur"—as "the seductive varnish under which are hid­
den ambition in laziness, baseness in pride, the desire to become rich 
without working, the aversion for truth, flattery, treason, the aban­
doning of all obligations, the scorn for the duties of a citizen, the fear 
of the virtues of the prince, the hope in his weaknesses, etc. . . .  " 
This is not far from charging that the courtier is a traitor. He is 
described as a worthless hanger-on without distinction of his own, 
title, battles won, prayers said, or artistic accomplishments. Louis's 
gloire had outshone them all, to leave the aristocracy naked, a caste 
of privileged whose own merits were lost. They were useless as 
citizens, so it would be easy to condemn them as anachronistic com­
mentators on services they never performed. Elements of the notion 
that Frenchmen had in 1789 of the court and the useless nobility 
were already present, and it took Marx in 1848 to generalize the 
courtier into the whole feudal nobility that lived on the earnings 
of others. 
The historians of Paris who wrote in the first half of the seven­
teenth century usually begin with a description of the city as it was 
under the Romans, and then bog down in the controversy over the 
meaning and origin of the name of Paris. What did Paris mean, they 
asked, and from what language or word did it come, and why did 
the Roman name of Lutetia go out of use and come to be replaced 
by Paris?18 
These questions interest us now only because they enable us to 
discover that the sense of time was changing in Europe, and that the 
new perception of the past made possible through the study of the 
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origins and different meanings of words and their usage was trickling 
down to local history. Chronicle did not begin to change into history 
for the study of his city until Abbe Du Breul (1528-1614)19 strove 
to discover the meaning of its name. He understood only very poorly 
the techniques of etymology, but for his subject he was a pioneer 
who applied new methods of textual criticism to the history of his 
town. It was simple to argue that what Romulus was to the Romans, 
Paris was to the Parisians, but could not something more be learned:1 
Who was Paris, or what was he—a god, a tribe, a man, an angel, 
or a king? 
Having successfully dealt with this type of question, Du Breul 
described Paris as the sejour ordinaire of French kings, the city of 
Saints Genevieve and Denis, and the location of many ancient reli­
gious, educational, and judicial establishments. He had no notion of 
it as a capital, nor did he make any comparisons between it and 
ancient Rome. But by about 1675 Paris-the-capital and Paris-the-new-
Rome had both become somewhat worn cliches for bureaucrats as 
well as poets. What had caused this change? 
I cannot add to the known explanations of why during the Renais­
sance men became fascinated by the literature, lives, and history of 
the ancients; but I can illustrate very sketchily its influence on Paris. 
Again we are confronted by the French obsession for everything 
Roman.20 
The confusion of ancient, medieval, and contemporary symbols 
did not seem to shock the makers of the siecle classique. The title 
page of Saulmaise's edition of the Historiae Augustae Scriptores VI 
bears a remarkable engraving of the coat of arms of Paris, which is a 
sailing ship at sea, depicted as a kind of Roman warship with a great 
bird as its bow, armed by dozens of cannon, and piloted by a buxom 
lady dressed in Roman armor. The sails are sprinkled with fleurs de 
lis, and the word "LUTETIA" is engraved just above the waves. 
This kind of blending of ancient and contemporary sources and styles 
is also found in the first descriptions of Paris as a capital. 
In 1667 the Abbe de Villeloin brought out a French translation of 
the same work, thought then to be a collection of ancient historians 
writing on the lives of Roman emperors, and dedicated it to the king. 
Opposite the dedicatory page is a sunburst with the visage of a man 
engraved inside it, and beneath it the lines: 
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Soit que Ton me compare au bel Astre du Jour,

Ou que de cent Cesars, la grandeur je surpasse:

Soit que de mes rayons tous les autres j'efasse [j'^fface]:

Je puis suffire a tous par crainte ou par amour.21

In his preface Villeloin does not suggest that Louis could learn from 
the Roman emperors, because he had to imply that the king's wisdom 
was already great; but he hoped that the king would find his work 
useful for identifying certain antique coins in the royal collection.22 
But more important, anyone who reads about the emperors would 
scarcely have failed to be impressed by the political, religious, and 
cultural importance of Rome, the center of all things for the empire 
in the second and third centuries. His translations seem to me to be 
very free; for example, he writes of maitres des requites under the 
Roman Empire, includes Crespin's music for Marcus Aurelius' mili­
tary song, and cites the Fronde in the index to describe a Roman 
revolution under Emperor Florianus in 276 A.D. This casualness, 
I think, was typical of not only translators but also artists, poets, and 
statesmen, who sought conceptions that they could impose upon Paris 
to glorify Louis XIV. Certainly, the medieval notion of Paris as the 
bonne ville, or most-favored city, was not adequate for men searching 
and trying to do the latest thing or to be modern. 
Colbert was a very sensitive administrator who took interest in 
the architecture, art, and sculpture of his contemporaries. I think he 
was doing more than merely repeating what someone else had said 
when he wrote to Bernini that the King wanted to preserve the recent 
additions to the Louvre because they had been "built after the first 
plans made in the time of the first men of the world who lifted archi­
tecture from the tomb in which the barbarism of the Goths and the 
centuries which followed had buried it. . .  . "2  3 As founder of an 
academy in Rome and patron of many artists, we can be sure that 
he must have had a fine sense of taste combined with a feeling of 
his countrymen's inferiority in artistic matters. But both of these 
characteristics were less important than his desire to serve Louis, and 
in doing so, identify himself totally with the interests of the state.24 
His imagination enabled him to conceive of a capital that would 
have political preponderance in the state and be a model of design 
and beauty for every other city. 
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We can grasp this imagination, I think, from his enthusiasm for 
everything about the new Louvre. After having received Bernini's 
first design in 1664, Colbert replied: 
It is certain that there is nothing more beautiful, more grand, more 
magnificent than this design, and which better reflects the grandeur 
of the kings for whom it is destined. One could even truly say that 
the ancient Greeks and Romans never invented anything which 
showed more taste for fine architecture and which at the same time 
had more grandeur and majesty.25 
This was certainly an extraordinary compliment to Bernini, but it 
also signifies something more. Colbert did not lose sight of the 
purpose for which the building was intended. Art was not for its 
own sake but for Louis's sake, and for that reason it had to be of the 
best.26 Obviously, Paris was for him still to be the sejour ordinaire of 
French kings. 
In what must have been a hastily prepared outline of plans, jotted 
down in 1669, we can see the almost poetic vision that he had of 
the capital: 
Water at Versailles—consequences for St. Germain 
Grand terrace to finish 
Gardens likewise 
The Louvre to continue everywhere 
Arch of Triumph for the conquests on land 
Observatory for the heavens 
Pyramids, difficulty in executing them 
Grandeur and Magnificence.27 
Was it an accident that in a somewhat incoherent outline Colbert 
would write "Grandeur et Magnificence" after his plans for Paris, 
rather than after what the king had ordered to be done at Versailles? 
Colbert either could not see, or he refused to believe, that the king's 
passion for building Versailles made the execution of his own grand­
iose plans impossible. He hurried masons and architects to finish the 
so-called Perrault colonnade of the Louvre, and he planned to 
demolish the houses he would have the crown purchase that stood 
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between the new colonnade and St. Germain-rAuxerrois in order to 
construct a public square; but by this time his own passion for Paris, 
rather than the king's, was urging him on. Had not Louis already 
made it clear to Colbert that Versailles would be his principal 
interest? Did Colbert still hope to convince Louis that he should 
live in Paris? 
Colbert had already done everything a servant-minister could do 
to induce Louis to give up making a great chateau out of Versailles. 
He began as early as 1665 by pointing out all the disadvantages of 
the site; but its unevenness and wet, lowland quality, so unfavorable 
for building solid foundations, proved to be nothing more than a 
challenge for Louis, rather than a liability.28 Then Colbert appealed 
to the king's sense of purpose. He wrote Louis in the same year that 
Versailles might well be a concern of his for entertainment and 
pleasure, but that it certainly would contribute little to his gloire.29 
Colbert hoped that his appeal to the king's dignity and sense of 
duty might influence him to renounce his projects for building 
Versailles. But what was Colbert thinking when he implied that 
living in the Louvre was more glorious than living at Versailles? 
Then he continued: 
To conciliate all things, that is to say to give to the glory of Your 
Majesty what it ought to possess and to his diversions as well, he 
could have all the accounts for Versailles promptly closed . . . and 
then apply himself completely to finishing the Louvre, and, if the 
peace continues for a long time, raise the public monuments which 
bear the glory and grandeur of Your Majesty farther than that 
which the Romans built in the past.30 
Colbert had a vision of Paris that Louis did not share. 
He had proposed a new kind of gloire to the King, but Louis 
rejected it and built Versailles. For Colbert, a capital was to be the 
residence of kings, where every monument, church, and institution 
was to be dedicated to the king's glory and would serve as a memorial 
to remind succeeding generations of his immortality. As minister, he 
had founded in Louis's name the new academies of Inscriptions, 
Science, Arts, and Architecture in Paris to be vehicles for the king's 
patronage. Even the manufactures royales, such as the Gobelins, 
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and the new hospitals, such as the Salpetriere, were all considered 
by Colbert as monuments to the king's glory. And all this was in 
Paris, because a city as capital served a purpose. 
In the ancien regime education,31 law enforcement, and even tech­
niques of manufacture were believed to be best inculcated through 
setting perfect examples that everyone could imitate. For Colbert and 
many of his contemporaries,32 Frenchmen had to be educated and 
foreigners intimidated by the splendor and wealth of a capital. This 
was his fundamental purpose for building monuments, founding 
academies, and subsidizing manufacturers; without good examples, 
the haphazard confusions and poor taste of the past could not be 
swept away. A capital had a function. 
From whom else could or should the initiative for building a new 
city come but from Louis le Grand} With the king in the capital, and 
the best officers, artists, scholars, scientists, and engineers serving him, 
all Frenchmen and even Europeans could learn of Louis's immortality, 
taste, obedience to his own laws, and could become prosperous in 
the way that he and the Parisians were. Colbert wrote his son, 
Seignelay: "Paris being the capital of the kingdom and the sejour of 
the king, it is certain that it sets in motion the rest of the kingdom; 
that all internal affairs begin with it."33 This was his own conviction 
and political advice to his son, who was to succeed him in his office 
and serve a great king as he had. So he set about to make Paris a 
capital and worked to realize this aim until his death in 1683. 
Louis's decision to build and hold court at Versailles hindered but 
did not deter Colbert from attempting to transform Paris into a 
monument. After all, Louis would not live forever, but Paris as the 
new Rome was to last an eternity. In 1676 Colbert undertook to 
establish a new program of public works for the city, and he wrote 
the following edict in Louis's name: 
After having given peace to our people by the strength of our arms, 
we have considered the public works and everything which could 
serve the conveniences of our realm as an object worthy of our 
attention, and we have done the same for our fair city of Paris, so 
that the capital of our State can better make its grandeur known to 
foreigners, by the number and bounty of its works, and mark the 
happiness of our reign to posterity.34 
COURT AND CAPITAL 2 8 ] 
There follows a long list of quais to be built, streets to be paved, 
buildings and fountains to be repaired, and other projects to be 
carried out by the prevot des marchands. Colbert established the first 
all-city plan for public works in Paris. The idea and purpose of a 
capital were now established in France. Succeeding generations had 
only to work for their realization, and Paris did become an example 
for other states and even other continents. 
In 1692 an official inquired about cutting off the facade of a 
building on the rue St. Germain and commented: "We have con­
sidered this new plan for the city drawn up by the inspector of 
buildings of the city as one of the great designs which it takes centuries 
to carry out, which often never are completely executed."35 But from 
then on, there were laws, plans, and inspectors to oblige architects, 
kings, emperors, and prime ministers to respect a classical style in 
Paris and follow standards of symmetry and order. 
Under Colbert and Louvois Paris became a new Rome, or at least 
it must have looked that way to anyone coming from a medieval or 
even Renaissance city. This was because of the monumental character 
of the public buildings. The city gates of St. Bernard, St. Martin, and 
St. Denis became great arches of triumph decorated with bas-reliefs 
in the Roman style. These sculptures must have annoyed foreigners 
because of the humiliating fashion in which their homelands were 
depicted as being subjugated by lions or trampled on by Louis, naked 
and in the guise of the god Hercules. 
The new Rome included the Invalides, Salpetriere, the Observa­
toire, three massive stone aqueducts and numerous fountains, the 
Pont Royal—the first stone arched bridge to span the Seine un­
supported by an island, the squares of Victoires and Vendome, and, 
of course, the Perrault colonnade of the Louvre. All were not done in 
exactly the same style, but their ornamentation, massiveness, and 
classical inspiration made a harmonious ensemble to celebrate the 
majesty and glory of the King. 
Not everyone was impressed. Every traditional criticism made 
against monuments and their makers was leveled at the new Rome. 
Some said the buildings were stylistically mediocre and poorly con­
structed, others complained that their high cost made taxes too high 
and that the poor and sick had been given short shrift because 
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ministers had vied with each other in eulogizing the king in stone. 
Such criticisms were to be expected, but not the kind made by 
La Bruyere. For him Paris was still not a real capital. He thought 
that men in the future would scoff at the feeble efforts to build a 
Rome in his own generation: 
We who are so modern, will be ancient in a few centuries . . . 
[and] one will hear talk of a capital of a great kingdom where 
there were neither public squares, nor baths, nor fountains, nor 
amphitheaters, nor galleries, nor porticos, nor promenades, which 
was nevertheless a marvelous city.36 
Was La Bruyere serious? I think this "modern" who had no nostalgia 
for ancient Rome nor sense of inferiority vis-a-vis the greatest ancient 
authors, was objectively recognizing the progress that had been made, 
and that there was still much to be done. Paris might not be perfect, 
but it was nevertheless a ville merveilleuse. 
How much Paris changed during the reign is difficult to say.37 
Even the notion of it as a bonne ville continued to influence the ad­
ministrators of the city. In 1672, after having grandiosely described 
how the monarchy had caused the city to prosper, Colbert tried to 
stop Paris from growing because he feared it might experience "le 
sort des plus puissantes villes qui ont trouve en elles-mesmes le 
principe de leur ruine."38 Had something been learned from the 
ancients? I doubt it. 
Efforts to stop the growth of Paris had been made before through 
fear of popular riots and insurrection. Colbert, La Reynie, D'Argenson, 
and Seignelay, all strove to improve law enforcement and to reduce 
the causes of crime in the city; but despite their hard work, humanity, 
and genuine concern that justice be done and people cared for, the 
problems grew more serious. The years of poor harvests, high bread 
prices, plagues, extreme cold (1709), and misery from unemployment 
put Louis's ministers to a real test. Even a cursory reading of their 
letters makes one admire their diligence and intelligence in coping 
with problems that were not only extremely dangerous to the welfare 
of the state, but also to their own lives, property, and families. 
These commis sought precise information on the number, location, 
and needs of the poor, so that resources could be used for the benefit 
of as many as possible.39 They tried to regulate bread prices by 
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selling royal bread below cost in an effort to bring prices down;40 
and they inspected prisons, hospitals, and courts to see that no one 
was locked up untried, or mistreated. Hospitals were akin to prisons 
in those days because beggers, vagabonds, and thieves who had com­
mitted petty crimes in order to obtain money for food were locked 
in with the sick. Conditions were lamentable indeed, but no one can 
say that Louis's ojficiers did not strive to improve them. 
What the king himself knew about these problems is difficult to 
determine. I sense that he was not given the police reports and poor-
lists to read for himself, at least late in the reign, and that his 
ministers sheltered him from the most terrible facts. Instead, Louis 
was read D'Argenson's police reports,41 which dealt with cases where 
individuals had committed a crime or broken the moral codes of the 
time. Saint-Simon implies that the king's interest in the details of 
crimes, sexual offenses, and violations of religious laws was porno­
graphic42 because of the suggestive style in which they were written; 
but he either did not know about, or chose to ignore, the care that 
Louis took to see that justice was done. But why did D'Argenson 
bother to inform the king of these minor individual offenses, which 
must have been a very small number of those committed in a city 
with a population of half a million1? I do not know, but perhaps Louis 
thought the Parisians were now almost free from corruption, more 
chaste and prosperous than in the period a quarter-century before 
when he saw them last. Had he nourished a vision of an obedient 
and affluent Paris, or was such a vision cultivated in his mind by 
his ministers? They may also have been protecting a very old man 
from the truth. Several times, guards were sent out on the highways 
where Louis was to pass, to arrest or otherwise dispose of any beggars, 
and sickly or maimed subjects, so that they would be out of sight when 
the king went by.43 Louis did not know about the sufferings of his 
subjects in the last years of his reign. And he knew little about Paris. 
Even his ministers went to Paris so infrequently that they were upset 
by the dirty and poorly lighted streets.44 
Louis's last years were sad ones. Courtiers tried to console a man 
who grieved for the loss of his loved ones but who remained outwardly 
serene. The rhythm of ceremonies set in motion a half-century before 
went on. Paris was ignored to the end. The capital was like a vast 
mausoleum waiting to proclaim his immortality. 
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Myth and Politics: Versailles

and the Fountain of Latona

NATHAN T. WHITMAN 
"Versailles, ce serait le palais d'Apollon."—La Fontaine 
A LTHOUGH the palace and gardens of Versailles constituted 
•*• *- the primary stage on which was enacted the grandiose drama 
of the age of Louis XIV, vivid descriptions of it, as apart from mere 
itineraries, are surprisingly rare. Perhaps the two most engaging are 
those by La Fontaine and Mile de Scudery, both of whom penned 
their accounts in 1668.1 La Fontaine utilizes the pleasant artifice of 
an excursion into the country by four friends who seek to combine 
the enjoyment of nature and a not too oppressive solitude with a 
reading of the romance of Cupid and Psyche. The place they choose 
to visit is Versailles, and La Fontaine's classical baroque recapitulation 
of Apuleius is gracefully interspersed with poetic delineations of the 
contemporary royal domain. Scudery's account, although embroidered 
with some highly artificial touches of amorous interplay, is basically 
what it purports to be—a little tour of Versailles for the edification of 
a casual and presumably feminine public. 
Consonant with her inclusive purpose, the lady does describe the 
interiors and their furnishings in some detail, but she concedes that 
the chateau itself is rather small and that the ultimate beauty of 
Versailles resides in the gardens. She likes the diversity of vistas and 
levels and fountains, of rustling foliage and splashing water, and at 
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one point atop the fer a cheval her enthusiasm breaks through her 
usual preciosity and she exclaims, "Tout y rit, tout y plait, tout y 
porte a la joie. . . .  " 2 La Fontaine expresses a similar delight but 
rather more quickly; jocularly pleading ignorance of Oriental fabrics, 
he dispenses with the chateau and its furnishings in one brief sentence 
and wisely expends his poetic talents on extolling the summer beauty 
of its setting. For both authors Versailles is essentially a pleasure 
garden wherein one could find refreshment and enhancement within 
a deliberately ordered realm that sought to evoke harmonious images 
of an earthly paradise. Not yet had Versailles become the overwhelm­
ing embodiment of the centralized power of the emerging nation-state, 
a symbol whose formal impact was to be felt from St. Petersburg 
to Washington. 
However, the concept of Versailles as a representational stage does 
permeate the description of the domain drawn up by the royal 
historiographer, Andre Felibien, in 1674.3 His account is dry, factual 
—an inventory of objects and materials, an official guidebook rather 
than a subjective appreciation. Now it is a matter of an objective 
program that unifies and gives cerebral meaning to the entire complex. 
"First of all it is well to note that just as the sun is the device of the 
king and as the poets equate the sun and Apollo, so there is nothing in 
this superb residence that does not refer to this divinity: hence, since 
all the images and ornaments that one sees are not placed haphazardly, 
they have reference either to the sun or to the particular locations in 
which they have been set up." 4 The Apollonian nature of the program 
and its relation to the king could not be stated in more unequivocal 
terms, although as the book unfolds it is apparent that Felibien 
mercifully leaves the precise interpretation of most details to the 
individual visitor. 
A program as such was unknown to Mile de Scudery, whose 
embarrassing laudations of the king, the queen, and even the dauphin 
are all too obvious set-pieces inserted somewhat randomly into her 
pastoral descriptions. Although she mentions that the king has already 
given orders for the chateau to be enlarged, she apparently knows 
nothing of any intention to alter the still basically verdant character 
of the domain. La Fontaine is much better informed. If both authors 
are delighted by the grotto of Thetis beside the chateau and describe 
it in considerable detail—indeed, La Fontaine has part of his reading 
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take place within its cool depths—only the poet discusses the sculp­
tural group of Apollo and the attendant nymphs. Likewise, in the 
basin within the jer a cheval, he accurately places the group of Latona 
and the peasants, and, farther to the west, at the head of the canal, 
the animated ensemble of Apollo driving the sun-chariot. In point of 
fact none of these statutes had been executed in 1668 and so La 
Fontaine depicts a future intention rather than an existing reality.5 
But if he thereby reveals his awareness of the great sculptural triptych 
that will form the nucleus of the program of Versailles, he still com­
prehends it as a graceful mythological explication of an enchanted 
realm, and the additional allusion to the king only adds another level 
of meaning to the varied modulations of a complex artistic entity. 
In short, as a sensitive and discriminating poet, heir to a long tradition 
of pastoral literature, La Fontaine interprets the projected sculpture 
humanistically and aesthetically rather than politically and didactically. 
However, such a cultivated attitude was almost certainly not shared 
by the sponsors of the project, Louis and Colbert. The latter had 
always viewed art as one of the many instruments of state policy,6 
and by 1668 the minister had been increasingly successful in per­
suading the king, basking in his recent victories over the Hapsburgs 
and anticipating ever greater glories, to adopt a like position. Un­
questionably, the doctrine of art as propaganda, soon to be so clearly 
enunciated by Felibien, must have been much involved in the new 
embellishments of Versailles. Not only the position and character of 
the patrons, the climate of ideas that surrounded them, and the 
scarcely coincidental signing in May of that year of the Treaty of 
Aix-la-Chapelle point to such a conclusion, but at least one of the 
sculptural groups provides similar evidence. For if the two extremes 
of the triptych are sufficiently general in theme to permit both a 
humanistic and a political interpretation, it is very difficult to account 
for the choice and the particular rendition of Latona and the peasants 
without recourse to a specifically didactic purpose. I believe that a 
stylistic and iconographic analysis will demonstrate that this group 
is only comprehensible in terms of the sociopolitical premises of the 
age of absolutism and is in fact intended as an almost threatening 
affirmation of the principle of divine-right monarchy. 
Like so much baroque art, even in its classical inflection in France, 
the Latona group is part of a larger entity and cannot be properly 
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understood apart from the setting that engendered it. Fortunately, a 
well-preserved topographical painting by the elder Pierre Patel pre­
sents a vivid image of the royal domain of Versailles as it appeared 
in 1668 (Fig. 3). For at least five years, intensive work had been 
carried out in the gardens: to the south (left of the chateau in the 
painting) an orangery was built into the hill in 1663 and a parterre 
created over it; immediately to the north, the grotto of Thetis was 
erected in 1665 and a sloping axial garden laid out that culminated 
in the circular fountain of the dragon. Simultaneously with this 
elaboration of the cross-axis, the major east-west axis was greatly 
strengthened: trees were planted to tautly frame the parterre im­
mediately in front of the chateau; at enormous expense and effort 
the slope separating the upper and lower gardens was pushed back 
to the east and given architectural form through steps and ramps. 
At the base and within the confines of this horseshoe a round basin 
was excavated, more parterres were laid out beyond the basin, and 
finally in 1667 the central allee leading to the old basin of swans— 
shortly to become the basin of Apollo—was considerably widened. 
The basin of swans defined the western extremity of the original 
garden created in the 1630^ under Louis XIII, but clearly the impetus 
of the enlarged axis would brook no such sudden termination. Hence 
in 1668 the colossal enterprise of the canal was undertaken, a great 
trench was dug, the adjacent marshes drained and planted, and soon 
a long planar sheet of water literally swept the eye to the limits of 
the horizon. The baroque garden had encompassed infinity, the 
Copernican universe had at last found artistic embodiment.7 
Such an amplified setting dwarfed the old chateau. In the autumn 
of 1668 Le Vau laid the foundations for a new building,8 and in a 
sense work never ceased until that chateau evolved into Hardouin-
Mansart's great palace of 1678 (Fig. 4). The architectural enlarge­
ment in turn led to renewed elaboration of the garden: the orangery 
was doubled in length, and the Lac des Suisses and the basin of 
Neptune gave unmistakable definition to a broadened north-south 
axis that echoed Mansart's new wings; a parallel axis in the great 
park was created by the cross-arms of the canal, which balanced the 
old menagerie against the new Trianon (see background of Fig. 9) 
and firmly integrated both into the geometric pattern of the whole 
domain.9 Thus the development of Versailles resulted from a con­
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tinuous interplay of architecture and landscaping—Le Notre's garden 
led to Le Vau's and Mansart's palace and that in turn back to the 
garden. The rearrangement of 1701, which permitted the place­
ment of the king's bedroom on the central axis of palace, garden, and 
city,10 was only the final, seemingly inevitable step in a dialectical 
process as beautiful in its way as a Euclidean proof or a Thomistic 
argument. 
Turning more specifically to the early development of the garden, 
one can discern a similar interplay. Not only do the accounts of 
1665 testify to intensified digging and planting but also to the con­
struction by Italian engineers of the pump and the water tower. 
These installations provided the necessary water and pressure for the 
new pools, and in 1666 the great jets were operating in the basin of 
the dragon, in the basin within the horseshoe, and in the old 
basin of swans.11 Significantly, in that same year Girardon and 
Regnaudin received payment for the plaster models of the marble 
sculpture planned for the grotto of Thetis,12 and the Marsy brothers 
appear to have obtained the commission for the dragon and its 
attendant figures.13 In short, the provision of water was a precon­
dition for focal features of Le Notre's garden, and both water and 
landscaping led to a demand for sculpture. Not surprisingly, the 
sculptural groups for the two pools on the main east-west axis were 
ordered in 1668;14 that is, after the widening of the central allee 
and the digging of the canal had provided, along with the jets, the 
proper revelatory setting for them. I emphasize this sequence of 
factors in order to correct the impression, current from Felibien down 
to modern guides and handbooks, that the intellectual program 
embodied in the subject matter of the sculpture either determined the 
organization of the domain or at least held primacy within it. This 
attitude, spread understandably by litterateurs, is simply not true. On 
the contrary, manifold technical and formal problems had to be met 
and solved before sculpture as a final decorative adjunct could be 
inserted into the comprehensive and total work of art that is 
Versailles. But once that moment had arrived, the question of a 
program becomes important and adds a final level of significance 
to a complex entity. 
The Apollonian program of Versailles is both too well known and 
too obvious to demand much comment. The solar reference was 
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established initially in the grotto of Thetis, where Apollo refreshes 
himself in the chamber of the sea goddess after the labors of the day 
(Fig. 5), a graceful allusion to the chateau as a place of relaxation 
and pleasure for the king, precisely corresponding to the earliest 
function of the domain. In his memoirs Charles Perrault, secretary 
of Colbert, claims credit for the iconography, an assertion that in 
view of his literary inclinations appears initially plausible.15 However, 
he then proceeds to impugn his own veracity by stating that he 
thereby wished to balance the image of the rising sun at the farther 
end of the Petit Pare, for the accounts clearly prove that Tuby's 
famous group of Apollo rising from the waters (Fig. 6) was under­
taken in 1668 and completely set up by 1671.16 Thus in direct con-
tradition to Perrault's statement it was the subject of the grotto that 
engendered that of the westernmost fountain, quite possibly at the 
suggestion of the so-called Petite Academie, whose four or five 
erudite members met frequently with Colbert to advise him on 
artistic matters.17 In any case Apollo and his train, originally in gilded 
lead and glittering in the morning sunlight that illuminated them 
from behind the chateau, provided a dazzling point of focus against 
the backdrop of the canal and announced immediately and unmis­
takably to every visitor that this was the palace of the sun. So soon 
was pleasure laced by the assertions of power. 
If the basin of Apollo and its sculpture was meant to be seen from 
afar, the same cannot be said for the pool at the base of the fer a 
cheval (Figs. 4 and 7). From the terrace before the chateau it is 
invisible, and nothing impedes the view along the great axis to 
Apollo and the canal. Only as one approaches the top of the stairs 
does one discover the basin and its sculpture. One pauses, one 
descends, one diverges of necessity from the central axis, one con­
siders the statuary, one turns and proceeds again down the great 
spine of the domain. Almost imperceptibly a transition has been 
made from the upper half of the garden proper to the lower half. 
In terms of the organization of the Petit Pare, this is the nodal area 
that binds together the whole and provides simultaneously a maximum 
of diversity and a maximum of comprehension. 
Since the sculpture for this important area was commissioned in 
the same year, 1668, as the Apollo rising, its subject matter must have 
been as carefully considered. It concerns Latona, the mother of Apollo 
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and Diana, and thus loosely conforms to the developing Apollonian 
program. However, it is more specifically narrative than the subject 
of the other two groups and illustrates the story, as recounted in the 
sixth book of Ovid's Metamorphoses, of how the weary Latona, 
pursued still by the jealous wrath of Juno, came with her children to 
a lake in Lycia and knelt to appease her thirst. But some peasants 
gathering reeds nearby prevented her, casting insults at her and 
muddying the water. Imploring their pity in vain, she invoked 
vengeance from the stars; and immediately the abusive peasants 
were transformed into croaking frogs, condemned to the watery 
element forever. 
The sculptors, Balthasar and Gaspard Marsy, have followed the 
Ovidian account very closely: the goddess kneels on a rock in the 
middle of the shallow pool (the elevating tiers are later; compare 
Fig. 9); she lifts her head to heaven and stretches out her right arm 
in supplication; with her other arm she grasps the infant Apollo, 
whose standing form balances in reverse that of his seated sister on 
the lower left.18 It is a correct classical composition, and despite the 
slight contrapposto of the goddess' body it is basically planar and 
intended to be viewed primarily from the front, although the out­
ward glances and gestures of the children are also quite compre­
hensible from the sides. Only the upraised arm of the goddess breaks 
the compactness of the group and, seen from most positions, wavers 
awkwardly in open space. The torso of the goddess may well be a 
thickened adaptation of the famous antique Venus discovered at 
Aries in 1651 and eventually transported to Versailles in 1684.19 An 
engraving of it by Claude Mellan was issued in 1669,20 at the very 
time that the Latona was under execution, and both its French 
provenance and its original identification by some antiquarians as a 
representation of Diana would have made it an appropriate model. 
Even the uncertain position of Latona's right arm may not be unre­
lated to the absence of precisely that member on the ancient statue. 
If the marble statue is a standard example of baroque classicism, 
the peasants belong to another tradition. Executed in that lead which 
was frequently employed in the early sculpture of Versailles, they 
deteriorated over the centuries and have been extensively restored. 
Even so, it is evident that they exhibit a sinewy naturalism, a spon­
taneity of gesture and movement, that is far removed from the 
idealism and rhetoric of the central group. Along with the expressive 
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croaking frogs, they are a product of the northern heritage of the 
Marsy brothers, who were born at Cambrai and never made the trip 
to Rome. Here they are working in two styles, and if those styles 
clash, that contrast may be appropriate to the confrontation described 
by Ovid. The gap in social rank of goddess and peasant is embodied 
in a stylistic discrepancy whose abruptness the highly structured 
society of the seventeenth century—and of Versailles in particular— 
must have intuitively comprehended and entirely approved.21 
But these leaden figures have another quality that differentiates 
them even more strongly from the prevailing mood of the major 
sculpture throughout the garden. With their huge gaping mouths, 
hands already turning into webbed claws, and, in two instances, 
life-size human bodies topped by reptilian heads, they give an impres­
sion that can only be called grotesque. Nor is it that form of the 
grotesque where the unpleasant is sublimated into the decorative, 
for these figures, which are of the same scale and on the same level 
as the observer, are softened by no graceful arabesques of curves, and 
are all the more disturbing—even frightening—for being so unex­
pected in this harmonious setting. So many more heroic or gracious 
themes from the Apollo myth could have been selected that one is 
constrained to uncover the motivation behind the choice of a subject 
whose connection with the Apollonian program, above all with the 
Apollonian spirit, seems more formal than efficient.22 
Latona as an independent subject for the visual arts had not been 
very common. Apart from a mediocre ceiling painting dubiously 
attributed to early Tintoretto,23 it hardly appears in sixteenth-century 
Italian art at all. Malvasia mentions a painting of Latona and the 
Lycian peasants by Annibale Carracci, as well as a very large one 
of the same subject by Guido Reni, executed for the king of Spain.24 
Unfortunately, both of these are lost, but at least the sources testify 
that the subject did figure in that interest in Ovid that characterized 
the circle of the Carracci and their followers.25 A mediocre canvas 
by one of these artists, Francesco Albani, now in the museum at 
Dole, is listed in the inventory of the French royal collection of 1683 
and may already have been owned by the king in 1668. Although 
it could have served as a stimulus to the choice of subject, sculpture 
and painting show no compositional relationship.26 
In France the story of Latona had not been singled out for sepa­
rate emphasis, and early representations of it appear to be confined 
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to popular illustrated editions of Ovid.27 At the very beginning of 
the seventeenth century it does occur in a more monumental format 
as a tapestry designed by Toussaint Dubreuil for the Plancken-
Comans workshop, newly established in Paris under royal patronage. 
But in this case also the Latona episode remains part of a narrative 
sequence, since it is only one of a series of ten tapestries that portray 
aspects of the myth of Diana. The cycle proved popular and is known 
in several sets originally scattered in various palaces. Although the 
Latona panel exhibits little resemblance to the later sculptural group, 
the several editions prove that the story had become well known in 
royal and aristocratic circles.28 However, it had nowhere been sub­
jected to the isolating medium of sculpture, either in Italy or France, 
and so the importance given to the theme in the gardens of Ver­
sailles remains unprecedented. In lieu of significant visual sources 
the explanation for its sudden prominence must be sought within 
the French social and political environment itself. 
Although on one level the solar program of Versailles may indeed 
represent in humanistic language a somewhat strained assertion of 
an underlying world order, it of course refers within the political 
sphere to the Sun King himself and to the unification and harmony 
that his anointed rule has bestowed upon the kingdom of France. 
From at least 1663 the conventional metaphoric image of Apollo 
as emblematic of beneficent power and reason, previously utilized in 
panegyrics honoring various outstanding men, had been reserved 
exclusively to Louis XIV, a mythic inflation that was immediately 
given wide currency through medals, prints, and paintings.29 Hence 
it follows that Latona, who here wears a diadem, must be a mask 
for Louis's mother, Anne of Austria, regent of France during his 
minority, an inflexibly authoritarian daughter of the Spanish Haps­
burgs to whom the orphaned young king had been genuinely devoted 
and whose death at the Louvre in 1666 had plunged him into a 
paroxysm of grief.30 But this statue is more than a general memorial 
or conventional apotheosis, for unlike the images of Apollo in the 
grotto and at the head of the canal, Latona is presented within a 
precise narrative context. She clasps her children in a protective 
embrace and implores heavenly aid against the shrieking peasants. 
Fear engenders ferocity, and vengeance ensues in a direct and brutal 
manner. If on one level the fountain of Latona announces the pun­
ishment that will befall those who rise up against the divinely 
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appointed ruler and thereby seek to disrupt the cosmic order, on 
the level of the particular event in which the general principle is 
revealed, the allusion is to the war of the Fronde. The various stages 
of this long internal conflict as well as the complex social and eco­
nomic motivations underlying it are discussed at length in other 
sections of this volume. It is sufficient to recall here that after the 
death of Richelieu and Louis XIII an all-too-familiar pattern was 
re-enacted in France. The high nobility on the one hand and the 
urban middle class on the other sought to reassert their prerogatives 
against the encroachments of the increasingly centralized monarchy, 
now under the guidance of Mazarin and Anne of Austria. Exacer­
bated by the prolonged economic crisis of the seventeenth century, the 
situation continued to deteriorate until on August 26, 1648, the 
Paris mob rose in defense of the "liberties" of the parlement, and 
the queen regent was forced to concede certain rights to that body. 
Not that the situation was so easily alleviated, for a long period of 
bitter civil war ensued, and the young king and his mother were fre­
quently endangered and at times even virtual prisoners of one or 
another faction. Only in 1652 was a semblance of royal authority 
re-established; in actuality the social dissentions continued in less 
violent form throughout the decade, and may be said to have ceased 
only after the advent of the young king to full power following the 
Peace of the Pyrenees. To France then, as so often since, the only 
alternative to anarchy appeared to be absolutism. The whole internal 
policy of Louis XIV rested on that conviction. 
Although it was seldom mentioned during his reign and never in 
his presence, the king never forgot the tumultuous events of the 
Fronde nor the insults visited upon him at that time. On the occasion 
of his marriage in 1660, Louis, deliberately but with no word spoken, 
delayed for some days his solemn entry into Paris; on August 26 the 
members of the Parlement of Paris followed dutifully in the train 
of the king.31 In 1668, the very year in which the fountain of Latona 
was commissioned, his rule had been so completely secured that he 
ordered expunged from the records of the parlement certain decrees 
promulgated against royal authority during the period of the Fronde.32 
Where other rulers might have been content discreetly to forget, 
Louis still rankled at the memory of previous dissent. Dangeau 
recorded in his journal that when, on August 26, 1715, by fantastic 
coincidence (or was it by royal will?), the king lay dying, he sum­
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moned the officers of his household and placed his great-grandson 
and heir under their protection. "C'est un enfant de cinq ans qui 
peut essuyer bien des traverses, car je me souviens d'en avoir beaucoup 
essuye pendant mon jeune age."33 Sixty-eight years had passed and 
Louis still remembered the crises of his childhood. 
Thus when one recalls the public agitations that had convulsed 
the kingdom during Louis's minority and that, in his and many other 
eyes, justified the authoritarianism of which Versailles became the 
greatest symbol, it is not unreasonable to see in the fountain of 
Latona, illustrating the story of a beleaguered queen, a husbandless 
refugee with two defenseless children, a reference to those early 
disorders. In the fashion of the baroque period a mythological story 
is employed in order to raise reality to the plane of the universal— 
punishment from heaven will befall those who disrupt the conse­
crated order—but in this case both the particularity of the narrative 
and the harsh realism of the peasants point directly to a specific 
historical event, the Fronde, and even to those days of terrifying 
proletarian violence that inaugurated it.34 
A society, like an individual, has its repressions. Every early 
description of Versailles mentions the fountain of Latona, but in 
concise, objective terms that betray no hint of its significance. One 
must proceed by indirection. It will be recalled that the same sculp­
tors had also executed in 1666 the fountain of the dragon at the end 
of the north parterre (Fig. 8). The immemorial association of the 
north with water and darkness, with evil and irrationality, still pre­
vailed at Versailles, albeit, I suspect, somewhat with tongue in cheek. 
Hence the presence here of the dragon, along with the grotto of 
Thetis, the famous relief of the bathing nymphs—companions of 
Diana, goddess of the moon—and various statues of naiads and 
tritons.35 Needless to say, this dragon is not the cloud-dwelling Ori­
ental species but the Python, that monster born of the mud and 
slime whom Apollo, god of light, slew at Delphi. 
The image of the Python appears frequently in official French 
art of the period, nowhere more prominently than in the great stair­
case, the Escalier des Ambassadeurs, which functioned as the state 
entrance to Versailles until its demolition in the eighteenth century. 
Its elaborate figural decorations were minutely explained in the 
Mercure galant of September, 1680: "He [Louis] put an end to the 
civil wars. . . . These revolts are represented in the opposite picture 
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by the serpent Python, because it derived its origin solely from the 
coarse impurities of the earth and because it was pierced almost at 
birth by the arrows of Apollo, who in this subject represents the 
person of the king."36 There is no concealment here: the king 
restores order by destroying the monster of civil rebellion. 
By analogy the dragon in the northern garden must have much 
the same significance. Indeed, in the official account of the splendid 
fete held at Versailles on July 18, 1668, in order to celebrate the 
triumphant conclusion of the War of Devolution, one reads that the 
ceremonies began with a promenade by the king and his court 
through the garden. 
After their majesties had made a tour of the large parterre, they 
descended onto the grassy one which is beside the grotto, where 
after having considered the fountains which embellish it, they paused 
particularly to look at the one which is at the bottom of the Petit 
Pare on the side with the pump. In the middle of the basin can be 
seen a bronze dragon, who pierced by an arrow seems to vomit blood 
through his jaws, hurling into the air a gush of water which falls 
back as rain and covers the whole basin. Around this dragon there 
are four little cupids on swans each of which produces a large jet 
of water and swims toward the edge as if to escape. . . . 37 
It is like a ritual. The victorious king, the living Apollo, stands silently 
with his court contemplating the dying dragon. No elucidation is 
given beyond the dry description; none was needed. 
I believe the same—for contemporaries—self-evident significance 
informs the fountain of Latona, only there the explicit visual refer­
ence to proletarian revolution, the deep-seated fear of any aristocratic 
society, was too terrifying to permit any verbal comment whatso­
ever, direct or indirect.38 In the dragon, by contrast, the antago­
nistic forces are not spelled out but are suavely abstracted into a grace­
ful and conventional image. The social psyche has convinced itself 
that all is well by transforming evil into an ornamental arabesque. In 
the fountain of Latona such a playful stylization does not occur, the 
social sublimation is curiously tenuous, the specific threatens uncom­
fortably to break through the worn veil of the universal. It is why that 
fountain strikes a dissonant note amid the surrounding harmonies of 
Versailles. 
The changes made in the fountain by J. Hardouin-Mansart, signifi­
cantly an architect and not a sculptor, helped to lessen this dissonance 
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(Figs. 7 and 9). In 1680 the marble group was elevated to become 
the apex of a polychromed series of diminishing, circular tiers.39 As 
a result, the goddess is aggrandized at the expense of the Ovidian 
account, which explicitly places her just above the level of the 
water. Since both the spectator and the peasants must now look up 
at Latona, the impression of hierarchy is increased and the positive 
sense of danger of the original grouping is transformed into impotent 
menace. Finally, the goddess is turned a full one hundred and eighty 
degrees so that her gaze follows rather than counters the relentless 
outward movement of the central axis (Fig. 10); she becomes an inte­
gral part of the architectural domination of the garden by Mansart's 
immense palace rather than a suppliant turned toward it. Through 
these three devices of enrichment, elevation, and reversal the archi­
tect has diminished the original narrational emphasis and sought to 
fuse the goddess and her tormentors into the unified generality of 
Versailles. He has not quite succeeded. In point of fact only the 
removal or drastic alteration of the peasants and frogs could have 
eliminated the dissonance entirely, and that step seems never to have 
been contemplated. 
It is unlikely that the king would have permitted such a trans­
formation. In his own brief guide to the gardens of Versailles he 
wrote as the second of twenty-five terse orders: "II faut ensuite aller 
droit sur le haut de Latone et faire une pause pour considerer Latone, 
les lezards, les rampes, les statues, l'allee royale, TApollon, le canal, 
et puis se tourner pour voir le parterre et le chateau." 40 One does not 
need such a directive, one is literally impelled to this spot from which 
one can most vividly comprehend the total domain, where one senses 
most strongly the subjugation of the individual to the arrogant sweep 
of the palace. And it would have been congruent with Louis's 
unswerving belief in his monarchal mission that he would have 
wished the visitor also to contemplate at this pivotal point a monu­
ment that celebrated in the mythic imagery of the seventeenth cen­
tury the triumph of divine order and justice over the forces of anarchy. 
In 1648 the Parisian mob had risen, and Charles I of England had 
been arrested; in 1647 the Neapolitan masses had revolted against 
Spain; in 1641 the estates of Catalonia had renounced their union 
with Castile. Indeed, the decades from 1640 to 1660 had witnessed 
violent upheavals against constituted authority throughout Europe. 
But the sun had risen, the miasma of rebellion had been dispersed, 
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the natural ordering of society had been restored. Such was the 
assurance—and the warning—of the fountain of Latona. By 1668 
the age of absolutism had dawned; by 1680 it had triumphed.41 
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Louis XIV and Absolutism

HERBERT H. ROWEN 
I  the "discussion without end"1 that is history at its best, or at Nleast at its liveliest, there are many forms of debate. Perhaps the 
most practiced of these in recent years has been that method of 
historical controversy which consists in finding the mote in the 
adversary's eye; that is, in demonstrating that his questions and his 
judgments about the past are conditioned by his interests and his 
commitments in the present. We are, I am sure, familiar with the 
transformation of mote into beam that occurs as one crosses the 
dividing aisle of politics and ideology. Yet, although historical debate 
in this mold has proved immensely fruitful, I should like to come at 
my problem in this paper as a controversialist, to be sure, but under 
the aegis not so much of the sociology of knowledge as of linguistic 
analysis. If I shall split hairs en quatre, en huit, and perhaps en seize, 
it will be because I am persuaded that the principal barrier to a 
profitable study of the absolutism of the Old Regime and, more 
specifically, of Louis XIV consists at the present time not in inade­
quate identification of the linkage between the different interpre­
tations of absolutism and the various "present days"2 of their 
propounders but in the tangled meanings of the key words we use 
in discussing absolutism. 
It is commonly taken for granted that absolutism and Louis XIV 
form a perfect equivalency. I deny that this equation is satisfactory 
not because I hold that it should read "Louis XIV and absolutism 
are not equivalent" but for two other reasons. First, absolutism his­
torically was defined tofit the case of Louis XIV, so that defining 
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the policies and activities of the Sun King in terms of absolutism is 
pure circular reasoning, which brings us back to where we started 
knowing no more, although perhaps thinking we do. If the term 
"absolutism" is to be useful, we must define it as a broad historic 
phenomenon rather than according to the traits of a single monarch; 
and it does no good to say that he was typical or representative, for 
that is just what we have to prove. Second, whether or not absolutism 
was so single or specific a phenomenon as is usually assumed, it is 
beyond doubt that the word itself has been used in a variety of ways. 
It has come to mean such varied things as "unlimited power," "power 
uncontrolled by subordinates or those acted upon," "monarchical 
power in the absence of a representative or legislative assembly," 
"power founded upon divine right," "totally effective power," and 
"tyrannical power," not to speak of whatever meaning may be ascribed 
to the word in such a historical illiteracy as "feudal absolutism," that 
phrase dear to the hearts of editorial writers. Our problem, however, 
is not to determine what the "true" meaning of absolutism is but to 
examine its many meanings in the light of the historical experience, 
and with clearer and sharper meanings to grasp the events and pro­
cesses more precisely and more profoundly. 
The historical picture of absolutism as it has come down to us 
rests upon one or more of eight main interpretations or approaches. 
The first of these is the "national monarchy" concept. It equates 
the absolute monarchy of the Old Regime with the nation-state 
so familiar to nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe. In it the 
monarch is seen as the symbol and embodiment of the nation as 
well as its agent. A great deal of French historical writing, particu­
larly of traditionalist and royalist persuasion, has been written in the 
spirit of this conception. In these works Louis XIV, in his character, 
his purposes, and his achievements, is portrayed as the very quintes­
sence of France. 
The second of these themes may be called the concept of the 
"personal state," because it sees the king of France, and none more 
so than Louis XIV, as the symbol and agent of the state. The king 
is the state incarnate: L'Etat, cest moi, in the phrase attributed to 
the youthful Louis XIV. When the king acts, he acts not on his 
own behalf but on that of the French state; when he amasses glory 
and becomes the Grand Monarch, it is really not the king but the 
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French state that achieves glory and grandeur. This notion at first 
glance may seem to be only the first theme restated in equivalent 
words, but it is so only for the proponents of the national-monarchy 
concept. It may actually be held quite independently of the national-
monarchy theory. 
Indeed, the personal-state concept of the monarchy will often be 
found linked to a third concept, that of "reason of state" or the state 
as pure power. For this school, political questions concern power— 
who rules whom, and how—and everything else is ideology and 
mystification. For it the problem of the nature and character of abso­
lute monarchy requires essentially nothing more than the identifica­
tion of the who, the whom, and the how. Absolutism then means 
that it is the king who rules everyone else, and special emphasis is 
given to the role of the professional administrators and the profes­
sional soldiery as the instruments of royal power. 
The fourth theme is that of the king of France as, in Richelieu's 
phrase, the "first gentleman" of France. The kings of France, includ­
ing Louis XIV, are portrayed as really members of the class of the 
nobility, whom economically and politically they both lead and serve. 
The role of the royal court as the locus of the interconnection 
between king and nobility receives emphasis as a consequence of 
this interpretation. 
Against this theme may be set its polar opposite, which holds 
that the king was indeed the leader of a class of French society but 
that that class was the bourgeoisie, not the nobility. This concept 
stresses the alliance between crown and town. The upholders of 
this interpretation of the absolute monarchy give particular attention 
to the higher personnel of the royal government, whom they portray 
as bourgeois par excellence. They also view Colbertian mercantilism, 
especially the high protective tariffs and the measures in support of 
industry, as expressing the same policy of favoring the interests of 
the bourgeoisie. 
Both of these last conceptions of absolutism—that the crown was 
the representative of the nobility or of the bourgeoisie—may be seen 
as special cases of the general thesis that the monarchy embodied 
the French nation, depending upon which of these social classes is 
taken as being especially and quintessentially national. 
The sixth important interpretation of royal absolutism is the "divine 
right" theory. It sees the essence of absolute monarchy in the belief 
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and the practice of the doctrine that the king is the living image of 
God and his lieutenant upon earth. The king receives his power 
directly from God in order to serve the general welfare, the good 
of his subjects, the interests of the state. But in serving that purpose, 
the king is responsible to God and to God alone, but not to subjects 
or fellow monarchs or pope. Any resistance to the royal authority 
is a crime against God himself. We observe, of course, how this 
doctrine can flow into one of the interpretations of royal power 
sketched earlier. 
The seventh interpretation we shall have to consider is the polar 
opposite of divine-right theory. It is the view that royal absolutism 
was nothing more than despotism, a rule triply tyrannical in that it 
was not derived from the consent of the people; it was exercised 
arbitrarily, that is, independently of the control of the people and 
according to the whim of the king, and it was employed against the 
people's interest and welfare. This doctrine has been held by both 
royalists and republicans—by republicans because of the very nature 
of their first principles, and by those royalists who uphold the tradi­
tion of constitutional and limited monarchy, whether in its old 
"estates-state" 3 form or its modern parliamentary one. 
The eighth and last interpretation to come under our critical eye 
is what we may call the "personal and anecdotal" school. It is repre­
sented in particular by that special variety of history the French call 
histoire d'alcove, but it also includes the kind of biography written 
to delectate readers in search of melodrama or comedy—history in 
the style of light fiction. In these works the king may be the all too 
human protagonist or he may be the deus ex machina; but it is only 
personal relations that are considered, not social or political institutions 
and processes. 
The present problem in the study of the absolutism of Louis XIV 
is that none of these approaches is adequate in itself and that no 
combination of them is adequate either, particularly since some are 
contradictory to others. Indeed, I suspect that the doldrums into 
which the study of this subject has fallen in recent decades—at least 
in comparison with the study of many other problems—is in part 
accounted for by the state of uncertainty that this confusion creates. 
Criticism of established interpretations may serve to guide new 
research and lead to new interpretations, hopefully more coherent 
and better founded on the evidence. 
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Before venturing to suggest new approaches, I must indicate where 
I feel the present interpretations of the absolutism of the Old Regime 
and of Louis XIV in particular are at fault. 
The national-monarchy theory fails in a number of respects. There 
is a difficulty with the very word "nation." The proponents of this 
interpretation do not distinguish between two different kinds of 
nation. I do not mean the "two nations"—the haves and the have­
nots—of nineteenth-century politics, for the point of that distinction 
was that the nation, the accepted be-all and end-all of politics, was 
in fact split asunder; I mean rather the nation as a basic ethnic-
linguistic entity—the "folk" in the extended sense—and the nation 
as a political entity—the subjects of a given state. The modern 
nation-state concept, of which the national-monarchy interpretation 
is a special case, equates the ethnic-linguistic nation and the political 
nation as either existing fact or something to be brought about. But 
the merger of these two quite distinct groups, and of the concepts 
corresponding to them, was the result of a process that in France 
culminated only with the Revolution of 1789 and was still very far 
from complete in the seventeenth century. This process of the forma­
tion of the elements of the modern nation-state in the early modern 
period has not been much studied. The relationship of the dynastic 
monarchs, with their supranational character and connections, to 
the nation—however defined—is still less studied or understood. 
The so-called empire of Charles V is the classical case of the tension 
between dynasty and nation; but ought not the whole question of 
the Spanish Succession during the reign of Louis XIV be restudied 
without the inhibitions of nation-state assumptions? In any event, it 
is clear that it is not only anachronistic to assume that the equation 
of ethnic-linguistic and political nations had been brought about by 
the seventeenth century but that countervailing attitudes and prac­
tices remained very strong, particularly as part of the dynastic system 
of power-holding. 
The personal-state interpretation of absolutism, which sees the king 
as the personal symbol and the agent of the state, does not suffer 
from the anachronism of the national-monarchy school. The person­
alism of the monarchy of the Old Regime, and of Louis XIV above 
all others, is overwhelmingly evident. But we must ask whether in 
fact it was not the state that was the agent and the instrumentality 
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of the king, not the other way round. This is the patent meaning of 
the immense bulk of narrative evidence that has come down to us. 
The difficulty lies rather with the doctrinal evidence, which does 
usually put state before king. It is undeniable that doctrine affected 
practice, but it must not be forgotten that practice also very largely 
defined the specific range and content of meaning given to theoretical 
statements. The problem for historical research is not to prove the 
primacy of practice over theory or of theory over practice but to 
demonstrate the interaction between them in concrete circumstances 
and in specific institutions. To say that the king was the state is not 
to say that the king was nothing more than the state incarnate, nor 
is it to say that the state was nothing more than the king's will 
transformed into political institutions and actions. 
The reason-of-state approach to the absolute monarchy also identi­
fies the king with the state, but it is concerned not with the person­
alism of his rule but with its efficacy. This interpretation is often 
paraded as the epitome of hard-headed realism above all considera­
tions of morality. Proponents of the reason-of-state approach to the 
study of absolute monarchy take particular pleasure in what we may 
call the "Machiavellian" rights of the state and the monarch, that 
is, the doctrine that in pursuit of the interests and the safety of the 
crown and the state, the king has the right to trample all other rights. 
In its starkest form this is an assertion, explicit or (more usually) 
implicit, that the ethical value of the state is higher than the tradi­
tional norms of Western civilization. However, as Meinecke and 
Mosse have shown, the doctrine of reason of state has more often 
been upheld by those who defend the traditional ethic but assert 
that the state, in serving the higher good, is entitled to employ the 
devices of "holy pretence."4 This problem of "holy pretence" cannot 
be wholly solved by historical investigation and analysis, for it is 
ultimately a case for casuists, a study in ethics. But where the "holy 
pretenders" at least admit that their problem is ethical, the "pure 
Machiavellians" believe that they have risen above ethics. But not 
only is their doctrine arrant political moralizing draping itself as 
objective science; even worse is their tendency to treat the state as 
a mystic entity and to assume that the eternal existence, the nature, 
and the worth of the state are all self-evident. But is this not self-
mystification with new idols? 
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But, shorn of this Machiavellian moralism, the reason-of-state 
approach does have an important contribution to make to our under­
standing of the workings of absolutism: like the personal-monarchy 
interpretation, it draws our attention to the role of the state as the 
instrument of royal policy. But it is not enough simply to see the 
state in this light. It is also necessary to examine the relationship 
between the interests of policy and the interests of the instrumen­
tality by which they are to be achieved—a relationship that may be 
one of mutual reinforcement, or independence, or even antagonism. 
The studies of Roland Mousnier and Martin Gohring on venality of 
office5 are particularly significant as contributions to the understand­
ing of this question. Yet, when all this is said, it must be added that 
this is a problem of the history of political power in general, not of 
absolutism as such, except in so far as the relationship is shaped and 
shaded by other characteristics of absolute monarchy. 
The historians who emphasize the state-as-power in the study of 
absolutism and disregard the problem of political morality bring out 
clearly the role of the instrumentality, but at the expense of neglect­
ing the problem of the purposes for which the state is used. They 
avoid the pitfalls of facile political moralizing, but at the expense 
of committing the fallacy of reduction—that is, they treat all the 
diverse aspects of the reality of a great historical institutions as 
"essentially" or "ultimately" or "really" forms of a single "funda­
mental" and "underlying" factor. But we cannot gainsay the fact 
that the ethical element was in fact present for the absolute monarchs 
and their ministers, and notably for Louis XIV and his officials, in a 
way that cannot be reduced to mere aspects of power. In this regard 
our problem is not to find spurious explanations but, as Meinecke 
taught us in his work on reason of state, to show the actual relation 
of the ethical element to the other elements in the historical picture. 
The concept of the king as the leader of the nobility was originally 
the republican-liberal vision of the nineteenth century but has become 
now the baggage chiefly of those unrepentant believers in nineteenth-
century categories and theories, the Marxists. This doctrine is over­
laid with naive moralizing in addition to being beside the point. 
Need it be said that the historian's work does not consist centrally 
in placing the right people in the slots of "good guys" and "bad 
guys"? Granted that moral judgment is sometimes quite to the point 
in history, it should follow, not precede, description and analysis. 
L O U I S X I V A N D A B S O L U T I S M 3 0 9 
Furthermore, it is a most dubious bit of aprioristic judgment to 
assume that "the" nobility are the good guys or the bad guys per se. 
In any event, the theory of the king as the leader of the nobility, 
however apt it may or may not be to the situation in some other 
European countries or in France itself after 1789, too blatantly 
disregards the central characteristics of political history in France 
before the Revolution—that it was in the first instance a struggle 
between the crown and elements of the nobility, that the opponents 
of the crown were primarily nobles, though not the nobility as such, 
the nobility as a class. Narrative history has usually not fallen into 
this error; it is hard to conceive how anyone telling the story of 
particular political events in this period could build an account of 
them on any other basis. But historians engaged in analysis and 
evaluation of the absolute monarchy have managed to an astounding 
extent to act as if the evidence of narrative history did not exist. 
The result has been a failure of analytic history that ought to serve 
as a warning to those adepts of the behavioral-science method in 
history who sniff at the history of events. If they do, they do so at 
their own peril. If events are not behavior, what is? 
As for the contrary school, which holds that the absolute monarchy 
was the servant of the bourgeoisie, it is guilty of reading back 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century attitudes and assumptions into the 
seventeenth century. But what is the evidence for a revival of the 
old alliance of crown and town that occurred now and then during 
the medieval period? There is the assertion that the higher personnel 
of the royal administration, including the ministers and secretaries of 
state, were bourgeois. That a substantial number of higher officials 
in fact had non-noble antecedents is indisputable, but this in no 
wise proves that they remained bourgeois. It is also indisputable that 
through the purchase of offices that carried with them the grant of 
noble rank, as well as by direct ennoblement for such as the Colberts 
and the Le Telliers, the Lionnes and the Pomponnes, great servants 
of the crown were elevated to the ranks of the nobility. Envy of 
their rapid rise was hardly absent, especially among those whose own 
families had made the same upward journey in recent generations, 
like Saint-Simon; but there was also eagerness, even among families 
of ancient lineage, to join forces by means of marriage with these 
powerful new nobles. Beyond this is the fact that these men were 
first and foremost royal servants; their class status flowed from that 
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fact and did not cause it. The king sought for his ministers not 
burghers but servants (it may be recalled that this is the primary 
meaning of the term "minister") who were totally dependent upon 
him for their power and their prestige, unlike great noblemen of long 
lineages and vast properties. Furthermore, the very term "bourgeoisie" 
in its nineteenth-century meaning is suspect in the seventeenth 
century. The nineteenth-century bourgeoisie included businessmen, 
rentiers and urban landlords, and members of the liberal professions; 
it was the class of wealthy and well-to-do commoners. The con­
stituent elements of that class were present in seventeenth-century 
France, to be sure, but there was very little of that easy flow of per­
sons from one subgroup to another that gave essential unity to the 
larger, inclusive group. Money, important as it was, did not open 
almost all doors, as it did two centuries later. If businessmen were 
the key element of the bourgeoisie (and this is an indisputable com­
monplace of our historical vocabulary), then we may note that they 
provided very few recruits for the royal service, except through the 
means of purchased office, and then at the cost of the loss—the 
desired loss!—of commoner status. Businessmen, on the other hand, 
were certainly concerned with the economic policy of the state, 
notably tariffs and subsidies. But Cole's work on Colbert6 has made 
it amply clear that French mercantilism was on the whole feared 
and even opposed by businessmen as an interference with their 
trade, and that Colbert had in mind the prosperity of the nation 
not as a good in itself but as a means of improving the tax base of 
the royal revenues. In a word, the relations between wealthy com­
moners and the state in seventeenth-century France do not add up 
to a picture of Louis XIV as the servant of the bourgeoisie. 
As for either the nobility or the bourgeoisie being quintessentially 
national, these are merely cases of the perennial tendency in political 
debate to portray one's own group as being the paragons of all virtues, 
the chosen folk. But this is merely vainglory mixed even more with 
self-deception than the deception of others. From the point of view 
of history, such assertions are unproved and unprovable. 
The interpretation of absolute monarchy that equates it with rule 
by divine right, although it has been the special darling of makers 
of textbooks, has actually relatively little to contribute to our picture 
of absolutism. At most, divine-right doctrine is concerned with stating 
the arguments in justification of the regime; when, as in Bossuet's 
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Politique tiree des propres paroles de I'Ecriture Sainte,7 it does 
descend to specific description and analysis of absolute monarchy, 
the argument curiously turns out to be more utilitarian than theo­
logical in character. But the central fact about the theory of divine 
right is that it is not essentially a theory concerned with monarchy 
at all but is a bulwark of any and all legitimate government. Not 
only is this admitted by Bossuet himself, but it is striking and thought-
evoking to observe that Bossuet's contemporary congeners in the field 
of political theory in the Dutch Republic used arguments almost 
identical to his to defend the absolute sovereignty of the provincial 
estates.8 Bossuet, like James I before him, in defending absolute 
monarchy against rival forms of rule, was arguing not for the legiti­
macy of political power—the "powers that be" of Scripture—as such, 
for this needed no proof in his age, but for the legitimacy of a par­
ticular royal individual's possessing that power by historical right 
derived from inheritance or indeed even from conquest. The equation 
of absolute monarchy and government by divine right appears to 
be largely due to the dominance won in political thought in the 
eighteenth century by Locke's critique of divine-right doctrine, the 
form of justification of absolutism favored by the Stuarts. 
As for the view that absolute monarchy was simply tyranny, it 
can be neither wholly accepted nor wholly rejected. First of all, the 
sense of law in the absolute monarchy was very strong: the king 
ruled by law, and he could change law only piecemeal and within 
pre-established patterns. Yet, government by a man who can change 
the laws himself is in a real sense government of a man and not of 
law. But to assert that all rightful government must rest upon the 
specific consent of the people is to make a metaphysical, not a his­
torical, statement. Many governments acknowledged as legitimate in 
the seventeenth century by their subjects as well as by other rulers 
did not derive their powers from the consent of their subjects, either 
in their origins or in their own time. Indeed, the seventeenth-century 
definitions of tyranny were either "rule by usurpation" or "rule against 
the interests and welfare of subjects." Usurpation required no defini­
tion, although disputed successions and elections showed that mis­
understandings and resulting wars could still arise. The problem of 
royal arbitrariness was similar: the king's right to make policy was 
unquestioned, although whether he was obligated to consult others 
and accept their counsel was disputed vigorously. Louis XIV was 
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certain that he ruled for the interests and welfare of subjects, as 
did all other monarchs of the Old Regime. The simple, difficult 
question that remained open was, Who defined those interests and 
that welfare? 
As for the school of personality and anecdote, its limitations and 
flaws are only too apparent to present-day historians, with their 
proper concern for the structural elements and the processes of his­
tory, and I shall not expatiate upon them. Much, perhaps most, of 
what falls under this rubric is nothing more than the production of 
variously erudite "Walter Winchells." Nonetheless, the work of such 
writers as W. H. Lewis shows that the personal and the anecdotal 
approach is not necessarily valueless and reminds us, as we often 
need to be reminded, of the humanity of kings and their ministers, 
who were usually just ordinary men in extraordinary places. 
Thus far, I have been a critic. Changing my role, I should like 
now to suggest positive guidelines for a better picture of absolutism. 
First, we must re-examine the term "absolute monarchy" itself. 
The word "absolutism" is a modern invention, dating back in English 
apparently only to 1830 and meaning simply the system of absolute 
monarchy as unlimited royal power, with overtones of tyranny and 
despotism. But the term "absolute" was still employed in the seven­
teenth century primarily in its scholastic sense of "unconditioned, 
full, complete." Absolute monarchy therefore meant pure monarchy, 
unmixed with any other forms of government. The equation of such 
"pure" monarchy with tyranny, as the arbitrary use of power for 
self-advantage, developed out of the arguments of opponents. How­
ever, whether or not tyranny is a necessary and inevitable conse­
quence of pure monarchy, it is not the same thing. We must keep 
in mind, too, that there is no such beast as unlimited political power, 
royal or not; it is always fenced in, even if the bounds are only 
approximate and customary. Absolute monarchy acknowledged many 
more fundamental laws than those made explicit in the work of 
political theorists. The structure of society and property as well as 
the moral universe of traditional Christianity were all outside the 
proper field of action of royal power. The absolute rulers claimed 
not the power to do anything but only all legitimate political power; 
they claimed exclusive sovereignty. It is undoubtedly true that sover­
eignty brings with it the power to define just where its proper field 
of action ends, as well as the temptation to extend that field; but 
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the absolute monarchs, unlike a later species of potentate, did not 
deny the existence of things beyond their rightful power. 
Second, we must remember that absolute monarchy was the 
product of a particular historical situation, not of abstract theory; 
and its character was defined by that historical situation. The abso­
lute monarchs in Europe in the early modern epoch were the result 
of the victories of the princes over competitors for power in the 
state. The absolute monarchy was the existing government shorn of 
the participation of these rivals in power; something had been taken 
away rather than added. This is recognized by Emile Lousse, who 
recently defined absolutism as the "estates-state" minus the estates.9 
This is a very significant contribution to our understanding of abso­
lute monarchy as a general European phenomenon, but it remains 
too narrow, particularly in the archetypal case of France. 
The institutions of the estates, or representative assemblies, had 
largely withered away in France by the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, but the state was not yet distinctly or clearly an absolute 
monarchy. The rivals of royal power who still struggled for a share 
in the sovereignty, in practice if not always in theory, were the 
nobility, especially the magnates, les grands. Their assertion of a 
birthright to participate in political power has been treated by most 
historians as a senseless anachronism out of tune with the times, a 
foolish claim by a foolish class concerned only with its own interests 
and not with the general welfare. This all may be true, although it 
requires proof; but the nobility nonetheless acted on the principles 
of this asserted birthright and sometimes died for it. It was not until 
this claim of the nobility was defeated—decisively and, so it seemed, 
once and for all—in the Fronde that the absolute monarchy emerged 
in all its purity and all its power under Louis XIV. 
Nor were the almost extinct estates and the quite active nobility 
the only rivals of the crown. The governmental administration itself, 
whose striving toward bastard feudalism in the form of venal office 
was given royal sanction with the Paulette under Henri IV and con­
firmed by his next two successors, was a claimant for a right of 
autonomous participation in the sovereign power no less than an 
agency of the crown. 
It is important to observe that these three overlapping groups— 
estates, nobility, and administration—together formed what we may 
call the "political class" of early modern France, the total group of 
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those other than the king who were involved in the making and the 
carrying out of the actions of state, those who in the terms of a 
recent historical conference were both "gouvernes et gouvernants", 
the governed and the governors.10 It need hardly be added that the 
people—the common people—were not yet part of the political class 
and that their intermittent violent action was a problem for politics 
but not a part of politics. 
To summarize this guideline for the study of absolutism, we 
may say that absolutism arose from the victory of the prince in the 
Renaissance monarchy over the rival "governed governors" of the 
political class. 
But in itself this guideline, although necessary, is not sufficient. 
It does not bring out another element in absolute monarchy, that 
the absolute monarch was also the ''complete dynast." Absolutism 
historically was the consequence of the triumph of dynastic mon­
archy. It came about when the hereditary king was able to enforce 
the claim to sole legitimate ownership of the sovereign power (as 
an entail from his family and a fief or office given by God), to 
the exclusion of all other claimants to participate in the sovereignty 
by right, especially by right of inheritance. In one sense, dynastic 
monarchy was still medieval, in that it represented the triumph of 
one element of the medieval hierarchy—the prince—over other ele­
ments—notably, the baronage and the towns. But in another sense, 
it shed the essentially medieval characteristic of conditionality; it 
became psychologically an alodium, a freehold that the owner might 
use and abuse according to his sole pleasure. This change, I suggest, 
was the result of the permeation of the entire fabric of society by 
alodial attitudes and practices within the forms of a decayed and 
almost totally discarded feudalism. The king saw no reason why he 
should be more limited in the enjoyment of what was his—the 
state—than subjects were limited in the enjoyment of what was 
theirs—private property.11 
Absolute monarchy also obviously included the element of person­
alism. L'Etat, c'est mot meant that the political process peaked in 
the single person of the king, that the king was no mere symbol or 
figurehead like Bagehot's Victoria. On the contrary, he was centrally 
necessary to the functioning of the state, either as the creator and 
upholder of the principal minister, like Louis XIII, or as his own 
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principal minister, in the fashion of Louis XIV. It may be remarked 
that for Louis XIV, monarchy was not truly complete unless there 
was no Richelieu, no Mazarin, however great had been the services 
of these ministers to the cause of absolute monarchy. 
What were the consequences of absolute monarchy as we have 
delimited and defined it? 
First was the distortion of the relationship between the king and 
the political class. Some of the political class slid into a parasitical 
dependence upon the crown. At worst, politics degenerated into mere 
intrigue; at best, it became political debate without the opportunity 
for the debaters to test theory by personal political experience. None­
theless, the political class remained inevitably the foundation of the 
power of the crown; its weakness ultimately became the weakness 
of the crown. 
Second, the monarchs of the eighteenth century were so transfixed 
by the image of the Grand Monarch that they were unwilling and 
unable to undertake an effective transformation of both state and 
society to meet new needs. 
Lastly, exaggerated personalism became a central part of the image 
of absolute monarchy. In this as in much else, Louis XIV ought to 
have been a warning no less than a model. The doctrine that the 
state existed for the service of the ruled, although never called into 
doubt in political theory in this time, was too obviously contradicted 
by the use of the state for the personal advantage of the monarch. 
Thus, by providing an object of reprehension, the Grand Monarchy 
also tended to shape the character of the opposition to it. 
Notes in this paper shall mention only works specifically referred to. Otherwise, 
each paragraph would require reference by the score at the very least, and the 
apparatus would balloon into a major bibliography of sources and studies. In any 
case, the writer's analysis and judgment, although fed by a hundred streams, are 
his own; responsibility for what he takes and what he discards, no less than for 
what he adds, must therefore be his own too. 
1. P. Geyl, Napoleon: Voor en tegen in de Franse geschiedschrijving (Utrecht, 
1946), p. 5; Olive Renier, in her English translation, Napoleon For and Against 
(New Haven, Conn., 1949), translates "discussie zonder einde" as "argument 
without end." 
2. J. H. Hexter, "The Historian and His Day," in Reappraisals in History 
(Evanston, 111., 1961), pp. 1-13. 
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3. "Estates-state" is abominable English, but how else is one to translate the 
German Stdndestaat, which is just what I mean? I shall be thankful to the master 
of English phrase who can do better. 
4. Friedrich Meinecke, Die Idee der Staatsrdson in der neueren Geschichte 
(Munich and Berlin, 1925); George L. Mosse, The Holy Pretence (Oxford, 1957). 
5. Roland Mousnier, La Venalite des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII 
(Rouen, 1946); Martin Gohring, Die KmterkdufUchkeit im Frankreich (Berlin, 
1938). 
6. Charles Woolsey Cole, Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism (2 
vols.; New York, 1939). 
7. Bossuet's posthumous work has never been translated into English in its 
entirety, although fragments appear in books of readings. 
8. See especially E. H. Kossmann, Politieke theorie in het zeventiende-eeuwse 
Nederland (Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Weten­
schappen, afd. Letterkunden, nieuwe reeks, Vol. LXVII, no. 2 [Amsterdam, i960]). 
9. Emile Lousse, "Absolutisme, droit divin, despotisme eclaire," Schweizer 
Beitrdge zur Allgemeine Geschichte, XVI (1958), 91. This passage was translated 
by Heinz Lubasz in his The Development of the Modern State (New York, 1964), 
P- 43­
10. The title of a joint session of the Societ6 Jean Bodin and the International 
Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary Institutions, held 
in Brussels in June, 1961. 
11. See my "L'Etat c'est a moi: Louis XIV and the State," French Historical 
Studies, II, (i96i)> 83-98. 
Some Problems in Tracing the

Intellectual Development of

Louis XIV from 1661 to 17151

ANDREW LOSSKY 
T O AVOID a misunderstanding that the title of this essay may-suggest, let us point out at once that Louis XIV was not an 
intellectual in the true sense of the word. Though endowed with an 
intelligence above the average (and here we venture to disagree with 
Saint-Simon's appraisal), the king laid no claim to be either an 
original or a profound thinker, let alone a professional philosopher. 
In his Memoires, written when he was barely thirty years old, Louis 
spoke with the weariness of a schoolboy of "some dark and thorny 
regions of science . . . where the mind attempts with effort to raise 
itself above its reach, most often to accomplish nothing; their use­
lessness, at least their apparent uselessness, repels us as much as their 
difficulty." 2 But, illustrating Descartes's famous dictum, Louis thought 
himself abundantly provided with good sense. This was rather im­
portant, since "the principal function of kings is to let common sense 
work, and it always works naturally and without strain."3 Louis XIV 
found many occasions to congratulate himself on faithfully dis­
charging the principal duty of his office; this is, in fact, the main 
theme of his Memoires. True enough, the same Memoires contain 
some passages from which it appears that the "bon sens" did not 
always operate with such ease; less than ten years after completing 
the main body of the Memoires, the king drafted some pages on the 
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difficulties and torments of decision-making.4 Yet, to the end he 
remained an apostle of common sense; only to give it effect, he put 
more and more emphasis on continuous and unremitting application 
to his work. 
A man of action, believing in rational common sense, seldom has 
an elaborate and consistent philosophical system worked out to the 
last detail. But he cannot fail to have a set of assumptions, or "mood­
thoughts," that may or may not be consistent with one another, and 
that form the basis of most of his conscious actions. To the process 
of decision-making of such a person we cannot deny the name of 
thought, though it is not of the same quality as the ratiocination of 
a philosopher. It is legitimate for a historian to inquire into this 
domain, for there is no other way to understand the idiosyncrasies 
of his actors. In the case of Louis XIV such an inquiry is made possible 
by the fact that the king liked to reason things out, either in oral 
discussions or on paper; as he himself said, it helped him to clarify 
his own mind when he had to express his thoughts in words. 
Louis XIV looked upon himself as an incarnation of classicist 
reason. All might change around him, but the king remained always 
the same, upholding, under God's dispensation, the immutable prin­
ciples of reason and justice, a vigilant guardian of the interests of his 
state. Since Louis sincerely believed that he was cast for this role, 
he convinced most of his contemporaries that this was indeed a 
faithful representation of him. The same impression, moreover, was 
passed on to many of the historians who have written about him. This 
is not the place to discuss the historiography of Louis XIV. Let us 
merely note that to most historians, regardless of whether they have 
praised or damned Louis, the king remained a static figure throughout 
his personal reign. G. Lacour-Gayet, in his L'Education politique de 
Louis XIV, has shown how the king had got to the point where we 
find him in the 1660's; regrettably, however, he never followed up 
his work to show Louis's further growth. Lavisse, in Volumes VII and 
VIII of his Histoire de France, gives an excellent panorama of the 
whole period, in which the king receives the attention that he 
deserves. The reader cannot fail to be taken in by Lavisse's picture 
of the monarch growing old and more devout; but, apart from this, 
there seems to be very little change in Louis's outlook and ideas. 
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Yet, no one denies that changes were occurring in the France of 
Louis XIV. Since the first half of the reign was spectacularly success­
ful and the second half just as obviously unsuccessful, it is generally 
taken for granted that these changes were for the worse. Many ex­
planations have been advanced to account for the deterioration of 
Louis's fortune: the king's health, absolutism becoming "overripe" 
and drying up initiative in the country, irresistible trends and forces 
changing the face of Europe. The royal advisers also figure prom­
inently: thus Colbert's influence is usually supposed to have been 
good; Louvois's, evil; Madame de Maintenon's, either good or evil, 
depending on the historian's predilections and degree of acquaintance 
with her.5 In most of these interpretations, however, it is tacitly 
assumed that the king's own basic ideas—if he had any—remained 
the same from 1661 to 1715. 
To suffer no alteration in one's beliefs in the course of fifty-four 
years of adult life is a sign either of extreme stupidity or of grave 
mental derangement. Since neither of these descriptions fits Louis 
XIV, we can take it for granted that changes did in fact occur in 
his thinking. The problem, therefore, is to detect and to define them. 
At this point we must admit that if we adhere rigorously to the 
formalist method of research, the sources available to us may appear 
to be inadequate both in their quantity and in their quality. Un­
fortunately for us, members of the conseil d'en haut guarded well 
the secret of the deliberations in that body, which seem to have been 
remarkably free and candid. No minutes were kept of their meetings. 
For the early 1660's the papers of Colbert and of others contain 
summaries of several conversations held in the council. We also 
have the Journal of Torcy from November, 1709, to May, 1711, 
where he reports what was said there. For the rest we have only a 
few scattered glimpses of the proceedings in the king's council. The 
king, however, liked to let his trusted subordinates know the reasons 
for his decisions, and in his correspondence we find a number of 
arguments and digressions on various subjects, with the aid of which 
it is possible to reconstruct some of his assumptions and mental 
processes. Leaving aside for the moment the question of authenticity 
of royal correspondence, let us note that it contains one group of 
letters that forms a class apart. Between 1701 and 1715 Louis XIV 
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sent over five hundred letters to his grandson, Philip V of Spain, 
whom he tried hard, though with little success, to teach the art of 
kingcraft.5a Here, if anywhere, we can come close to the real thought 
of Louis XIV. 
Unlike Philip II or William III, Louis XIV rarely held the pen 
in his hand. Instead, he preferred to dictate his memoranda or to 
give orally the substance of the amendments and insertions to be 
made in the dispatches. The main autographic writings that remain 
from Louis XIV comprise his guide to the gardens of Versailles; 
some military memoirs of the war of 1672-78 (of little interest); the 
"Metier de roi" (1679); short letters to persons in his immediate 
entourage; the advice to Philip V in December, 1700, and some of 
the subsequent confidential letters to him; and a draft of a harangue 
(1710); to these we must add the purely formal messages of con­
gratulation or condolence to the other reigning monarchs. Most of 
the letters in this last category were not even written by Louis him­
self but by special secretaries, like Rose or Torcy, who were skilled in 
counterfeiting the king's hand. Even the bulk of the Memoires was 
penned, not by the king, but by Perigny or by Pellisson, a fact that 
has led some critics to attack their authenticity. 
The autographic material we have enumerated is clearly inadequate 
for an analysis of Louis's ideas, especially if we wish to follow their 
evolution throughout his reign. Before embarking on such an enter­
prise, we must cast off the fetters of indiscriminate and hypercritical 
formalism, which can be as noxious to history as is naive credulity 
or carelessness. That Louis XIV was not the clerk who wrote out 
every word of his Memoires and of every letter that he signed does 
not mean that his role in their composition was perfunctory. The 
various drafts of the Memoires and of the more important outgoing 
dispatches contain many marks of the king's pencil. Sometimes, Louis 
merely changed some expressions, for he was an accomplished stylist; 
elsewhere he deleted whole passages, or altered or expanded a para­
graph. It is fairly obvious that wherever we find the king's pencil or 
pen at work, we have a document whose final version Louis 
fully approved. 
This is not all, for there are many documents not marked by 
Louis's pencil that, nevertheless, can be attributed to him. When any 
matter of importance was decided in the council, the minister con­
cerned drafted the king's letter. Sometimes he did it in the king's 
INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF LOUIS XIV 321 
presence; in the later part of the reign one or several ministers would 
repair to Madame de Maintenon's room in the evening, where they 
would do their homework under the king's eye and in consultation 
with him; sometimes these sessions were indistinguishable from the 
regular meetings of the council. At other times the minister would 
bring his finished draft to the king, who would read or listen to it 
and then either approve it as it stood or order some changes to be 
made; these changes would then be inserted in the minister's hand. 
It is not always possible to ascertain whether a substantial alteration 
in the draft originated from Louis or from his minister, or from a 
consultation between them. But in most cases there can be little 
doubt that the final product was fully approved by Louis; this is 
especially true of the passages that were added on as amendments. 
Occasionally, one comes across a dispatch that has been completely 
rewritten, sometimes in the sense opposite to the original draft; this 
was usually the result of lengthy deliberations in the conseil 
d'en haut.& 
The true authorship of the king's letters hinges on the nature of 
relations between Louis and his ministers: did the ministers shape 
the royal mind and express their own ideas in the letters they drafted, 
or were they merely the mouthpieces of the king? Louis himself 
entertained no doubts on that score: it was he who moulded his 
counselors, and he himself was the ultimate author of the good 
advice that came to him. The function of the ministers was to give 
candid advice and then to find the suitable expedients to carry out 
the royal decision, seeing to it that no detail or difficulty was over­
looked. The actual situation was not quite so simple, for most of 
Louis's ministers, with the exception of the colorless Phelypeaux 
family, were strong men who held well-defined views of their own. 
Lionne, Le Tellier, Colbert, Seignelay, Croissy, Louvois, Pomponne, 
Torcy, Beauvillier, and Desmaretz were not mere file clerks. Since 
these advisers were more or less evenly distributed throughout the 
reign, the belief that Louis was served by capable ministers in the 
first half of his reign and by feckless time-servers in the second half 
lacks foundation, unless we choose to single out Colbert for a 
solitary pedestal.7 
In the first half of his reign Louis seems to have kept or chosen 
his ministers because their main ideas were consonant with his own; 
in the second half, because they reflected some aspect of his person­
322 LOUIS XIV AND THE CRAFT OF KINGSHIP 
ality, which, in maturing, had become more complex and liable to 
combine contradictory elements. The king, however, did not expect 
his servants to agree with him in all matters; what he demanded of 
them was loyal and prompt compliance with his decision once it was 
made. Torcy's Journal records many instances in which he disagreed 
with his master,8 and, in the earlier part of the reign, there are indi­
cations that Lionne did not always agree with the king. But when it 
came to writing the royal letters, the same Torcy or Lionne faithfully 
followed Louis's decisions and views. This could hardly have been 
otherwise, for Louis would not have been slow to discover his 
minister's deviation and to correct it. Yet, the degree of Louis's super­
vision varied from department to department and from one period of 
the reign to another. Only in foreign affairs did his attention remain 
constant throughout. 
The supervision of the king explains why the changes in ideas 
underlying his letters did not always coincide with changes in the 
ministry; this is a further indication that these ideas belonged mainly 
to Louis, at least by adoption. Against this it may be argued that one 
of the most striking changes came about when Colbert de Croissy 
replaced Pomponne as foreign secretary in November, 1679. But the 
change in the king's ideas that resulted in Pomponne's dismissal had 
occurred before that date.9 Moreover, in the first few months after 
Croissy had taken over Pomponne's job, the number of corrections 
in the drafts drawn up by the minister increased drastically. More 
often than not, these corrections altered the mode of expression 
rather than the basic meaning of the document: Croissy's original 
words were often appallingly brutal and insulting, whereas the final 
versions stated the same thing in courteous, though forceful and 
unambiguous, terms. Since these corrections, just as the original drafts, 
are in Croissy's hand, we cannot affirm with certainty that Louis was 
the author of them all. Yet, the corrections often bear the imprint of 
the royal style, and we are probably witnessing the lessons of polite 
international intercourse that the king administered to his servant. 
Of course, Louis did not read all of the letters that all of his 
secretaries wrote. But we can assume that he read those of them in 
which an important new departure was made; at other times he 
proceeded by the method of spot-checking, which he recommended in 
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his Memoires. There were some departments that he always kept 
under close surveillance: he never let foreign policy out of his hands, 
and the same is true, to a lesser extent, of army administration. In 
the other departments, as has been said before, the degree of his 
attention varied in different periods of the reign. For instance, in the 
several versions of the memoirs for 1661, it is stated that "no matters 
of real consequence" passed through the hands of the secretaries of 
state for the royal household and for Huguenot affairs.10 Between 
them these two secretaries were responsible for much of the internal 
administration of the realm. It is unlikely that Louis would have 
rated their departments so low in the later 1670's. When Louis liked 
and trusted the archbishop of Paris, as he did Francois de Harlay 
(1671-95), this prelate was in fact the king's minister for ecclesiastical 
affairs and received many confidential communications from Louis. 
Needless to say, no such good relations existed between Louis and 
Harlay's successor, Cardinal de Noailles, who was strongly suspected 
of Jansenism. In the later years the functions of a minister for 
ecclesiastical affairs were in practice exercised by the king's confessor, 
Pere La Chaize, although Bossuet continued to set the ideological 
tone in these matters. In the last ten or fifteen years of Louis's reign, 
some of the late-comers to the ministry, like Desmaretz or Voysin, 
developed a new manner of writing, which was in striking contrast 
with the style of Colbert, Le Tellier, or even Louvois. Whereas these 
early ministers had ascribed all decisions and directives to the king, 
many of the later ones developed the habit of writing and issuing 
orders in their own name; their occasional references to the king 
sound like afterthoughts.11 However, this was not true of Torcy, the 
foreign minister; in his department Louis's presence remained un­
diminished and constant to the end. In the documents dealing with 
foreign affairs, we thus have a source of more or less uniform value for 
tracing Louis's intellectual development throughout his reign. It is 
mainly on impressions gathered from this source that the following 
sketch is based; it is necessarily incomplete. 
We can classify Louis's beliefs into three categories, considering 
not their contents, nor the intensity with which they were held, but 
only their persistence. The king held some of his beliefs and attitudes 
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fairly consistently throughout the personal reign; others underwent 
one or two major changes; still others changed at relatively frequent 
intervals, leaving, nevertheless, a distinct imprint on his policy. 
Among the permanent elements of Louis XIV's idiosyncrasy was 
the belief in the "natural order of things," which God had established; 
it comprised a set of norms reflecting the ideal state of the world. 
These norms, however, were not self-enforcing; they required either 
a human agency or a special intervention of the Divine Providence to 
make them operative. But the Divine Providence usually worked 
through intermediary agencies, by endowing some persons with 
certain gifts: "God does not do our work without us."12 The "natural 
order of things" could best be discovered by reason, and, in this sense, 
Louis remained a rationalist all his life. The application of reason 
demanded incessant labor on his part, which consisted largely in 
gathering information, for "he who is poorly informed cannot help 
but reason poorly."13 Louis's rationalism also showed itself in his 
faith in calculation in mathematical or mechanical terms. The "geo­
metric spirit" pervaded his personal tastes and his view of human 
nature, and it inspired his predilection for siege warfare. The same 
spirit also resulted in perfectionism, which at times bordered on in­
decision : the king did not like to act rashly, before all the pieces were 
set in their appointed positions on his chessboard. When, on a few 
occasions, he took precipitate action, the results were usually harmful 
to him; these deviations from the path of reason occurred mainly in 
the later 1680's when he was passing through a period of confusion. 
Louis did not have a high opinion of human nature. Man was 
above all an egoistic creature, whose chief drive was to procure private 
advantage for himself and to gratify his passions that sprang from his 
unreasonable nature. Most of man's actions, however, were controlled 
by the two mainsprings of fear and hope; the latter, depending on 
man's inclinations and social status, assumed the form of ambition, 
vanity, or greed, or a combination of these vices. The art of governing 
or of influencing people consisted in a large measure of applying 
these stimuli in the right dose and at the proper time. Though some 
of Louis's worst miscalculations can be traced to this naive, mechan­
istic view of human nature, he persisted in it; in fact, it deepened 
toward the end of his life, to the dismay of some of his most devoted 
servants, like Torcy, who complained bitterly about the king's cynicism 
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and distrust.14 In what measure these attitudes were real or affected 
is hard to tell; the evidence is contradictory. 
Louis's belief in royal absolutism was closely connected with his 
view of human nature. A private individual, if allowed any share 
in the sovereign power, was bound to misuse it, that is, to divert 
it to serve his personal ends and to the detriment of the public good. 
Even if he turned out to be that rare bird, a man of integrity, his 
virtue could not long withstand such a temptation unless his master 
watched closely over him, ever ready to apply the standard stimuli. 
The prince, therefore, had no right to alienate any part of his sover­
eign power, for fear that society would disintegrate into "a thousand 
tyrannies," so oppressive to the common man. As for the prince, his 
own self-interest, regardless of any other considerations, induced him 
to work for the public good, since the good of the state made for the 
glory of the prince. An absolute monarch, brought up in sentiments 
of honor, jealous of his glory, endowed with intelligence, and addicted 
to hard work, was bound to rule for the public benefit. Even if he 
was stupid, indolent, or vicious, his rule was preferable to that of a 
thousand tyrants: the harm inflicted by the latter was so much more 
difficult to repair, as Louis knew from his own experience during the 
aftermath of the Fronde. These were the theoretical grounds for 
Louis's dogged pursuit of absolute sovereign power. 
There was one permanent element in the policy of Louis XIV that 
is apt to confound all attempts to find any neat formula explaining his 
behavior (it may also raise some doubts about the sincerity of his 
attachment to some of his principles): Louis XIV was an opportunist. 
At least, an element of pragmatism was always present in his policy 
to a greater or lesser degree. In his Memoires Louis repeatedly pro­
claimed that reason of state was the first of all laws; in following its 
dictates, the prince had to adapt his conduct to changing circumstances 
and to the spirit of the times, and, if necessary, do violence to his 
natural inclinations in order to derive the greatest possible benefit for 
his state from every turn of events.15 
Opportunism, however, can never be an absolute rule of behavior, 
for it must always serve some fixed end. Thus Louis held an un­
shakable belief in God; in the "natural order of things"; in the rightful 
pre-eminence of France and of the Bourbons in Christendom; in reason 
of state serving the public good; and in royal absolutism. These dis­
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parate elements formed an integral whole in his mind, and a clash 
between any two of them was unthinkable to him. Louis preached 
opportunism only in the sphere of those principles that were designed 
to serve this set of values. But even here, he was not a wholly con­
sistent votary of opportunism, for in nearly every major decision his 
motives were mixed. For example, the Cretan expedition of 1669, 
though it was undertaken partly for unadulterated religious motives, 
was also necessary to discharge the king's obligations to God and to 
enhance his reputation in Christendom. In 1683, had Louis been an 
out-and-out opportunist, he would have crushed the emperor, who was 
hard pressed by the Turk; yet, the Most Christian King did not do 
it. When Louis had concluded that the regime set up by the Edict of 
Nantes was an evil, there was no major external obstacle to prevent 
him from revoking it outright well before 1685; for instance, right 
after the Peace of Nijmegen in 1678. Likewise, the recognition of the 
Old Pretender as King James III of England in September, 1701, was 
not a purely opportunist move, even though it could be argued that 
it improved Louis's standing with Pope Clement XI, whose support 
was necessary to strengthen the Bourbon hold on the Spanish mon­
archy and to buttress their position in the Mediterranean generally. 
But, at that time, the French king stood well with the pope anyhow, 
for Clement XI feared the Hapsburgs more than the French. It can 
further be argued that Louis's quixotic measure was not only un­
necessary but harmful, since it was apt to cause complications away 
from the main theater of action, which was in the Mediterranean area. 
These examples, and many others, indicate that Louis was fairly 
moderate in his opportunism; the record merely shows that in espous­
ing different principles he never lost sight of the interests of his state 
as he understood them, and that these interests influenced some of 
his changes. This, however, does not warrant the conclusion that 
Louis's principles served him only as a hypocritical cover. 
We have discussed some of the main, permanent features of Louis 
XIV's thinking. Most of them helped to shape the form of his beliefs; 
but this form could accommodate many different contents, which 
could exist harmoniously together, succeed one another, or clash and 
produce confusion. Three of Louis's beliefs underwent major changes 
or received a new emphasis in the course of his reign: the doctrine 
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of the "true maxims of state," the concept of the fundamental laws, 
and the appraisal of the role of Providence in human affairs. 
From the "natural order of things" one could deduce certain "true 
maxims" for every community or geographical area. If faithfully 
followed, these maxims would procure the community the greatest 
benefits that it was capable of receiving. Prior to the Peace of 
Nijmegen, Louis held that the "true maxims of state" could change 
with the times. In the 1680's, however, he acted for the most part 
on the assumption that the "true maxims of state" were immutable. 
But the ossification of at least one compartment of the royal mind 
did not last very long. In the 1690's, and especially toward the end 
of his reign, Louis had managed to free himself from this rigid 
doctrine; and the "true maxims" once again came to express the 
living, and changing, interests of the state.16 
The notion of the fundamental laws of the state was perhaps not 
wholly absent from Louis's mind at the beginning of his personal 
reign; but it was overshadowed by other interests and considerations, 
the first of which was to destroy all obstacles to the free exercise of 
sovereign power, which was then to be used to reform the realm and 
to bring it into line with the "natural order": " . .  . Since the main 
hope of [accomplishing] these reforms rested on my will, their first 
prerequisite was to make my will quite absolute . .  . [at the same 
time letting it be known] that though I rendered account to no one, 
I nonetheless governed myself by [the precepts of] reason."17 In 
consonance with this line of thinking was Louis's conviction, re­
peatedly proclaimed in the Memories, that he was the only depository 
of all property in the realm, a part of which he left in the usufruct 
of his subjects; hence he had an inherent right to tax all his subjects, 
lay and ecclesiastical, at will. He was also the sole source of equity, 
of "my justice," as distinct from that enforced by the courts. All of 
this is a far cry from the situation in 1710, when the Sorbonne was 
asked whether the king had the right to levy the dixieme on his 
subjects; much to Louis's relief, the answer was in the affirmative. 
The king's concern for fundamental law began to grow in the 
1680's and reached its peak in the early 1700's. It is possible that it 
had an influence on his vacillating procedure in revoking the Edict 
of Nantes. At least, it can help to explain his psychological need to 
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show to himself that this edict no longer served any purpose, since 
virtually all the Huguenots had been converted; strange as it may be, 
Louis seems to have believed that this was indeed so in 1685. There 
is not much doubt that Louis's concern for fundamental law was 
spurred on by his interest in claiming the whole of the Spanish 
succession for the dauphin; this question began to preoccupy him 
seriously about 1685. It cannot be stressed too often that the dauphin's 
claim, as far as Louis XIV was concerned, was not based on the 
Spanish failure to pay the dowry of Queen Maria Theresa. Nor was it 
based on the testament of Carlos II. It rested on the fundamental 
laws of the Spanish monarchy, which could not be set aside by any 
testament, renunciation, or treaty. According to the doctrine of funda­
mental law, which is here closely bound with the divine right of 
kings, a reigning monarch could abdicate, but could not change the 
law of succession. By 1688 Louis envisaged that if Carlos II left no 
children after him, the dauphin would take over the Spanish mon­
archy, and then arrange, in concert with his eldest son and with the 
various cortes, the transference of the succession to his second son. 
Thereafter, if either of the two branches of the Bourbons died out, 
the other would be able to succeed it. The inconvenience of heedless 
adherence to the strict dictates of fundamental law was all too obvious 
to Louis; hence, the elaborate scheme to transfer the Spanish mon­
archy to the Due d'Anjou. At no time did Louis entertain the 
chimerical notion that a Spanish monarch could reside in France, or 
vice versa. The idea of fusion of the two monarchies found currency 
only among some French merchants and some later historians. 
With regard to the role of Providence, there is very little that we 
can say at this time, not because the subject is unimportant, but 
because we know so little about Louis XIV's religious beliefs beyond 
the obvious fact that he believed in God, subscribed to the standard 
dogmas of the Catholic church, and disliked extremist movements, 
whether of the Jansenist or of the Quietist variety. As sovereign, and 
as God's vicegerent in France—the first realm in Christendom—he 
often quarreled with the pope and held the papacy, as a human insti­
tution, in low esteem.18 There was, however, at least one perceptible 
change in Louis's religious views. In his Memoires the king, from time 
to time, paid obeisance to Divine Providence, usually in a rather 
perfunctory manner; but in the drafts of this work he repeatedly 
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struck out or toned down many of the passages dealing with Provi­
dence.19 On the contrary, in Louis's correspondence during 1702-12, 
Providence became the decisive factor in human affairs; all events 
were in the hands of God, who disposed them for our benefit; it 
remained for us to worship God's judgments without murmuring.20 
When exactly this change in Louis's thinking came about is hard 
to determine. In the letters that his secretary, Toussaint Rose, wrote, 
imitating the king's hand, the theme of Providence is scarcely de­
tectable prior to the spring of 1676; in May of that year it makes 
itself felt apropos of the capture of Bouchain by the French, and 
then it becomes ever more prominent in 1677 and 1678.21 This 
piece of evidence would become significant if it could be proved that 
Louis set the tone of his formal letters of acknowledgment sent in 
response to messages of congratulation he received on his victories; 
in the absence of such a proof, its value must remain in doubt. 
Side by side with these big shifts in Louis XIV's thinking, it is 
possible to distinguish a number of relatively smaller changes that 
allow us to discern at least nine periods in his personal reign. The 
first of these is the early formative period, extending from the death 
of Mazarin to about 1665-66, that is, to the time when the king 
began a more or less systematic ordering of his ideas. In the early 
1660's many of Louis's traits that later became marked were present 
in inchoate form. This was the time of the first joys of power and of 
the first assertions of sovereignty. The theme of fundamental law 
most unexpectedly cropped up in Louis's immediate entourage, to 
disappear just as quickly.22 There were elements of opportunism and 
of royal Gallicanism, encouraged both by Lionne and Colbert. Toward 
the very end of this period the king developed a certain curiosity for 
history and arranged to receive some instruction in this subject. But 
his interest in it was hardly profound; history provided some knowl­
edge useful in peace and in war, and a number of examples for the 
pursuit of virtue.23 "Virtue" was of paramount importance to Louis 
in this period: it showed the path to glory and to the pinnacle of 
success. The achievement of Charles V and of Philip II haunted him 
in 1661-62: through their extraordinary virtue these two monarchs 
had managed to raise Spain to a station above that warranted by 
the natural order of things.24 Louis's "vertu" was thus synonymous 
with Machiavelli's "virtu." 
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In the second period (1666-73) w  e meet the "classical" Louis 
XIV, who is the model for the standard portrait of his admirers. This 
is the Louis of the Memoires, who had more or less put his ideas in 
order. The themes of natural order, of common sense, and of mathe­
matical perfectionism reached their full development. It was also the 
time when the assertion of absolutism proceeded according to plan 
and culminated in 1673 *n t n  e virtual suppression of the right of 
parlementary remonstrance. 
The third period extends roughly to the end of the war in 1678. 
One of the key figures in it was Pomponne, who, with the backing 
of the king, developed the principle of opportunism that he erected 
into a consciously held doctrine. More than ever before, considerations 
of legitimism were explicitly put aside and replaced by those of naked 
expediency.25 Probably, both Louis and his minister were put on this 
path by the French failure to overwhelm the Dutch Republic in 1672, 
in spite of all the well-laid plans and thorough preparation. Never­
theless, Pomponne did not lose sight of the system of Europe. France 
to him was merely the chief member of the community of European 
states, not an entity apart from it nor its oppressor. It was within 
this system that Pomponne played his game of procuring for his 
country the greatest possible advantages, but always in such a way 
so as not to damage, let alone destroy, the fabric of Europe. This is 
what gained for Pomponne the reputation of being a moderate as 
well as an honest man. But Louis XIV seems to have traveled much 
farther than Pomponne along the road to reckless opportunism, and 
this is what was probably at the bottom of the divergence between 
the king and his servant. Most of Louis's charges against Pomponne 
have a hollow ring,26 except the accusation that the minister failed 
to press every claim that Louis could have derived from his military 
and diplomatic superiority in 1678-79. 
The fourth period covers most of the decade of the 1680's and is 
rather complex, with overtones of incipient confusion. The decade as 
a whole was characterized by the activities of Colbert de Croissy and 
of Louvois.27 We have already noted the temporary ossification of 
the doctrine of "true maxims of state" in this period. The other 
salient feature, especially of the early years of the decade, was the 
preoccupation with limited strategic objectives on the French frontiers. 
The rounding off of French territory through "reunions" was based 
INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF LOUIS XIV 331

mainly on positive customary law and on purely legalistic interpreta­
tion of treaties and of other documents. In all of this we can detect 
the work of Colbert de Croissy—a forceful and rather unscrupulous 
lawyer, whose sole interest was to win lawsuits for his client and to 
score points against the other side, and who was utterly oblivious of 
all other considerations. The same narrow legalism appeared in the 
French dealings with Pope Innocent XI; it was only two decades 
later that Louis XIV and his entourage realized that "the maxims of 
France" in matters ecclesiastical were best left undefined if they were 
to be an effective shield against papal pretensions. Moreover, the 
violent measures and arrogant language of Colbert de Croissy and of 
Louvois were in strange contrast with the very limited and modest, 
not to say petty, aims pursued by the French government in the 1680's. 
These policies were carried on in utter disregard of the system of 
Europe, and even of the broad international interests of France. As a 
result, France was but a passive observer of the momentous changes 
in central, southeastern, and northern Europe: the first successful 
counteroffensive of the Christian states against the Turk; the gradual 
transformation of the Hapsburg state into a great military monarchy; 
the reform of the Swedish realm along new lines; and the re-entry 
of Russia into the system of Europe. For France her virtual absence 
from the scene of these great events entailed the crumbling of her 
system of alliances on the Hapsburg borders. At the same time, 
France's nearsighted isolationism helped to bring about a split of the 
European system into three more or less independent zones: the west, 
the north, and the southeast; this division was to subsist until the 
end of Louis XIV's reign. 
In spite of what has just been said, let us note that in 1682 Louis 
raised the siege of Luxembourg, apparently so as not to impair the 
concerted effort of Europe in repelling the Turkish onslaught. But 
in the next year, he destroyed whatever advantage he might have 
reaped from this gesture: he invaded the Spanish Netherlands before 
the Turks had been driven away from the walls of Vienna. Shortly 
thereafter, his interest in fundamental law began to make itself felt. 
This development cannot be connected either with Colbert de Croissy 
or with Louvois; it is hard to ascribe it to the chancellor, Michel Le 
Tellier, or to any of the other intimate advisers. The first impetus may 
conceivably have come from Bossuet; but in the absence of any 
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evidence to support such a hypothesis, the most likely explanation 
is that this was a spontaneous growth in the king's mind, prompted 
by his interest in the Spanish succession. It is worth noting that in 
pursuing this great aim, Louis showed himself moderate in his 
methods as well as in his words. Whatever the origins of the funda­
mental law theme or of Louis's outburst of magnanimity in 1682-83, 
these developments did not fit in well with Louis's other assumptions 
at the time and contributed to the mounting confusion in his mind 
and in his policy. 
This leads us straight into the fifth stage in the evolution of Louis 
XIV—the period of total confusion from early 1688 to 1691, which 
landed him in the Nine Years' War (1688-97), commonly called the 
"War of the League of Augsburg.'' While the king sought to dis­
engage himself in the east in order to concentrate on wooing Spain, 
he allowed the small military operation that he undertook against 
Philippsburg at the end of September, 1688, to be escalated into a 
major war, and finally he managed to get himself embroiled with 
Spain in 1689. According to Louvois, the little war in the east was 
to have lasted four months; it lasted nine years. France was militarily 
unprepared for a big war;28 her diplomatic preparation for it had 
been even less adequate: she had virtually no allies. While Louis 
posed as an international champion of the Catholic cause, his relations 
with the Holy See were of the worst, and he had incurred a secret 
sentence of excommunication by Innocent XL In one respect only 
can Louis be absolved of the charge of improvidence: few rational 
men could have foreseen in 1688 that William Ill's expedition to 
England would be anything but political suicide. The French king 
was therefore quite right in not interfering with his enemy's enterprise. 
Heedless violence is not an uncommon reaction in a proud man 
caught up in the coils of his own contradictions. Of Louis's advisers 
only Louvois believed in premeditated, systematic violence as an 
effective instrument of policy: sufferings inflicted on enemy subjects 
would induce them to press their sovereigns to comply with French 
desires. As for Colbert de Croissy, his brand of violence was that of 
the tongue rather than of action, except on a small scale, for instance, 
in taking up the cudgels in Hendaye's quarrel with the Spanish city 
of Fontarabia, which had been going on for several decades. Louis 
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XIV himself did not subscribe wholeheartedly to the favorite methods 
of either minister; occasionally he seems to have held them in check. 
Yet, in the 1680's, acts of violence committed, or at least authorized, 
by Louis XIV were on the increase. Although the systematic burning 
of dwellings in the Spanish Netherlands in 1683-84 bears the distinct 
imprint of Louvois, most of the other violent proceedings—the destruc­
tion of three-quarters of the city of Genoa by bombs fired from the 
French fleet in May, 1684, the massacres of the Vaudois in Savoy 
in 1686, the fantastic schemes in 1687-89 to browbeat Pope Innocent 
XI (only a few of which were put into effect)—appear to be irrational 
outbursts, with little or no premeditation. The devastation of the 
Palatinate, which has made more noise than Louis's other acts of 
violence, was also one of such outbursts. But at least it can be ex­
plained by fear: the French government suddenly found itself on 
the verge of a major war, for which it was unprepared, and its first 
reaction was to cut its enemies' lines of communication, regardless 
of political consequences or of moral considerations. 
We could lengthen the list of inconsistencies and of acts of 
violence of Louis's administration in the later 1680's; but it would 
add nothing to the impression that the confusion in Louis's mind and 
his tantrums, especially toward the end of the decade, bordered on 
mental derangement; they were quite out of keeping with Louis's 
character during the rest of his reign both before and after the 
1680's. Fortunately for the king and for his state, this condition did 
not last long. Even while he himself was hitting out indiscriminately 
in all directions, Louis XIV was capable of giving advice full of good 
sense and moderation to his weak-minded English cousin, James II. 
And, of course, he could not help being disappointed in his own 
servants, Louvois and Colbert de Croissy, in the first place. But 
something had happened to Louis: he could not bring himself to 
dismiss them as he had dismissed Pomponne in 1679. It was death 
that relieved him of Louvois on July 16, 1691. 
The sixth period in Louis's development extends from 1691 until 
about 1696. Its primary theme was the liquidation of the legacy of 
the 1680's. Within a week after the death of Louvois, the king called 
Pomponne back into the conseil d'en haut. Though Croissy retained 
the secretaryship of state for foreign affairs and his place in the 
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council, Pomponne's hand was soon felt. Beginning with 1691, we 
can discern in the French foreign relations a policy rather than a set 
of erratic expedients. 
There was another change in 1691: the Due de Beauvillier joined 
the king's council a few days after Pomponne. Pomponne and 
Beauvillier resembled each other in their judicious, mild temperament 
and in their polished manners. Both were gentlemen, even great 
lords, rather than assiduous clerks. Both believed in the system of 
Europe, though Beauvillier was apparently inclined to lay more stress 
on fundamental law as its basis. However, in matters ecclesiastical, 
which at that time were of paramount importance for the internal 
structure of France, the two men stood for opposite tendencies. 
Arnauld de Pomponne certainly was not an out-and-out Jansenist; 
nevertheless, by his education, family ties, and personal tastes he was 
drawn to that movement. His children were brought up as moderate, 
but devout, Jansenists (among them was the future wife of Torcy). 
Beauvillier, on the other hand, had strong Quietist leanings, as his 
religious writings indicate. He was a close friend of his brother-in-law, 
the Due de Chevreuse, also a Quietist. Both Beauvillier and Chevreuse 
were continuously in touch with Fenelon, and openly proclaimed their 
attachment to him, even when Fenelon was a persona non grata 
at court. 
The ministerial shake-up of 1691 was significant of Louis's state 
of mind, because the king was well acquainted with Pomponne and 
Beauvillier and with their views. Thus there was nothing fortuitous 
about the opposite tendencies for which they stood being brought 
in simultaneously into Louis's inner council. Moreover, this en­
franchisement of opposite views was not a passing phenomenon, for 
it subsisted almost to the end of the reign. Did the king try to institu­
tionalize, and thereby to put into more orderly channels, the con­
fusion of his own mind, or did he seek to dominate his council that 
much more effectively by maintaining discordant views in it? For the 
years 1691—96 we cannot answer this question with any certainty. 
But taking the period from the 1690's to 1715 as a whole, it is fairly 
clear that Louis sought to assert his control, as well as to gain informa­
tion, by encouraging disputes between the ministers in his presence. 
In his Memoires Louis had said that rivalry between the ministers 
helped to unite the full authority of the master in the king's person.29 
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The Memoires, however, are apt to be a misleading source for the 
later part of Louis's reign, unless they are corroborated by other 
evidence. In this instance we can draw on Torcy's Journal for an 
account of the sessions of the council in 1709-11. Torcy's descriptions, 
as well as some fragmentary indications in the dispatches, show that 
the clash between opposite views in the royal council was open and 
strong, that the king's decisions, after he had heard the debates, were 
indeed his own, and that he did not side consistently with any one 
adviser or group of advisers. No doubt, the king's view of human 
nature was partly responsible for his technique of arriving at decisions: 
one self-interest would cancel out another. This system could not guar­
antee Louis from vacillation and even from taking contradictory 
measures; but it did safeguard his personal exercise of the 
sovereign power. 
To return to the years 1691—96: the task of liquidating the legacy 
of the 1680's was facilitated by French military victories in the Low 
Countries31 and by a series of diplomatic successes in Italy. These 
successes began in 1692 and culminated in the Peace of Turin in 
June, 1696, which exploded the anti-French coalition. At the same 
time the center of French political attention shifted definitely from 
north to south, from the Holy Roman Empire to Italy and Spain. Louis 
could thus afford to be moderate in his peace aims in the north 
while being victorious in the field in that quarter; with regard to 
Spain, his policy had been moderate throughout the Nine Years' War 
anyway. The king achieved this position of strength by following the 
restrained opportunism of Pomponne. Yet, at the same time, the 
theme of fundamental law and legitimacy was on the rise, which 
made it difficult for Louis to bring himself to recognize the kingship 
of William III. A further element of confusion continued to plague 
Louis's ecclesiastical policy. Admittedly, the theological quarrels that 
agitated the church of France in the 1690's were involved enough to 
have taxed the ingenuity of a professional theologian: it is enough 
to mention the ever-changing nature of the Jansenist movement and 
the Quietist scare. Since most of these issues carried political over­
tones, the king could not afford to ignore them, even if he had 
wished to do so. But the persistent confusion in the royal head, now 
heightened by confusion built into the council, resulted in such ill-
considered measures as the appointment of De Noailles to the see of 
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Paris in 1695. Only in one respect did Louis succeed in solving the 
ecclesiastical imbroglio: he cut the Gordian knot of his relations with 
the Vatican by a virtually total surrender to the pope in 1693. True 
enough, the pope was no longer Innocent XI but Innocent XII. 
The seventh period covers the time from the last stages of the 
negotiations at Ryswick to the acceptance of the will of Carlos II 
of Spain. The theme of legitimacy, though not altogether discarded, 
was overshadowed by a concern for the system of Europe, within 
which France would occupy a place of honor but not of hegemony. 
This was the background of the Spanish partition treaties and of the 
close co-operation between Louis XIV and William III. Such a policy 
was clearly inspired by Pomponne. This minister, freed from inter­
ference by Croissy, who had died in 1696, and ably seconded by his 
son-in-law, Torcy, was now in a position to make his ideas prevail.32 
The king, for his part, wished above all to avoid getting involved in a 
war like the one from which he had just extricated himself; and he 
was glad to take shelter in Pomponne's ideas, for they seemed to 
guarantee him from precisely such a predicament. Moreover, the 
Spanish partition treaties held out the prospect of a considerable 
accretion of French territory and power without overturning the 
European system. The Spanish partition policy was Pomponne's 
greatest achievement in diplomacy, as well as his swan song. He died 
in September, 1699, when the Second Partition Treaty had already 
taken shape in its main outlines. 
It was not Pomponne's fault that the will of Carlos II put such a 
severe strain on his policy. In fact, Carlos's will made the policy of 
partition virtually unenforceable, not by the bequest of the Spanish 
monarchy to the Due d'Anjou (which was, indeed, highly desirable 
for a smooth working of the partition policy), but by the clause that 
transferred the entire succession to Archduke Charles if the grandsons 
of Louis XIV refused to accept the inheritance in its entirety. The 
adamant refusal of the Austrian Hapsburgs to consider any division 
of the inheritance at this time was well known. The French rightly 
judged that to enforce the partition treaty, it would have been 
necessary to conquer all of the far-flung lands of Spain, and then to 
proceed to dismember them. The best military opinion of the time 
held that France stood little chance of winning such a war, in which 
the Spanish nation (that is, the political classes of Spain) would be 
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on the opposite side; and, anyway, Louis's object was to avoid a war. 
It is to the honor of Louis XIV and of his council that it took them 
several days of deliberation to reach this embarrassing conclusion: 
their first decision had been to adhere to the Second Partition Treaty. 
Apparently, it was Torcy who first saw the absurdity of such a course 
and began to argue for an acceptance of Carlos Us will. The irony 
of it all was that neither Louis XIV nor his counselors believed in 
the validity of this will: no legitimate king could alter the law of 
succession by such a document. But the will could be used as a 
powerful propaganda weapon to misguide the Spanish public, and, 
as such, it was feared by the French. 
Under the circumstances there was only one thing that Louis XIV 
could do, which was to take a strong stand on the issue of funda­
mental law and legitimacy. The various tactical mistakes that he 
committed in pursuing this course, leading to the outbreak of the 
War of the Spanish Succession (which could have been avoided, or 
at least localized), need not concern us here. We have already dealt 
with some of the aspects of Louis's preoccupation with fundamental 
law in the second half of his reign; what we should note here is the 
intensity of this reaction, which forms the main theme of the eighth 
period of his reign, until about 1712. Louis's belief in Providence 
reached its greatest intensity at the same time (1702-12). Of the 
many examples of Louis's preoccupation with fundamental law, let us 
cite his injunctions to Philip V to govern himself in accordance with 
the laws and maxims of Spain, the safeguarding of Philip's right of 
succession in France, and the recognition of the Pretender's royal 
title.33 Later on, it was felt necessary to maintain that Francis Rakoczi 
was not really a rebel, but a defender of the ancient constitution of 
his land; to the best of my knowledge, no such arguments had been 
invoked before, in order to justify French aid to the Sicilian rebels 
in the 1670's or to the remnants of "Cromwell's faction" in England. 
To have been so thoroughgoing, the resurgence of the fundamental 
law theme must have answered a deeply felt need of Louis's mind. 
There was, however, at least one deviation from the general course: 
after the battle of Almanza in 1707, Louis encouraged the revolu­
tionary schemes of the court of Madrid to introduce Castilian laws 
and form of government in Aragon and Valencia. But, in 1711, after 
Philip's second reconquest of Spain, Louis took up the defense of 
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Aragonese laws against the threat of Castilianization; he recommended 
to modify only those of the privileges of Aragon, and later of Barcelona, 
as were directly harmful to royal authority and to the whole state, 
and were therefore contrary to nature. 
The transition from the eighth to the ninth period in Louis's 
development was not as abrupt as that of 1700. In this last period 
the preoccupation with fundamental law was tempered by other 
considerations and inclinations: by historical reasoning, rational an­
alysis of existing conditions, a grain of opportunism, and humanity. 
For the first time all these elements were combined in the spirit of 
compromise, not of confusion. 
French military defeats and deaths in the royal family made it 
impossible for Louis to adhere strictly to the fundamental laws not 
only of Spain but even of France, without endangering the very 
existence of his state. First, he had to press Philip to abandon most 
of his kingdoms, satisfying himself with a small state in Italy; failing 
this, he had to insist that Philip give up his right of succession in 
France. Of course, if one chose to stand firmly on the ground of 
divine-right constitutionalism, one could maintain that Philip's re­
nunciation of his right to succeed to the French crown was null and 
void, though it was drawn up in strong terms and duly registered in 
the Parlement of Paris. Whether Louis, at the back of his mind, 
regarded it as such, we shall never know for certain; here, more 
than ever, he would have needed to exercise all his powers of dis­
simulation if this were so. Judging by the appearances, however, 
Louis sincerely believed that the renunciation was valid, for it had 
been inspired by Divine Providence.34 Moreover, Louis knew that 
Philip's accession to the French throne might well spark a general war 
in Europe, and even civil wars in Spain and in France; all of this he 
was determined to prevent at almost any price. 
Philip V's renunciation of his rights to the French crown and the 
series of deaths in Louis's family in 1711-14 brought the question of 
French succession to the forefront. The situation became critical in 
May, 1714, when the Due de Berry, Louis's third grandson, died 
leaving no son. There was little hope that the sickly four-year-old 
child, the future Louis XV, would be spared. The next lawful heirs 
after him were Philip V of Spain and his two sons, followed by 
Louis's nephew, Philip of Orleans, and his son, and then several 
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young princes of the Conde* branch. The inconvenience of Philip V's 
succession was clear, and the extinction of the other lines was a 
distinct possibility. The Capetian dynasty would then come to an 
end in France. The election of a new dynasty would have necessi­
tated a convention of a body like the Estates General. Barring a 
miracle, such a body was certain to undo the work of the three 
Bourbon kings. It was apt to inaugurate aristocratic rule in France, 
and to set up institutions limiting the powers of the monarch. To 
Louis, this meant government by pressure groups, which would 
ultimately have reduced the realm of France to anarchy and degraded 
it to the status of England, or even of Poland. Louis had already 
firmly rejected the English proposals that the Estates General be 
convened to confirm Philip V's renunciation—proposals as naive as 
they were insulting to Louis. 
It is against this background that we must interpret the edict of 
July, 1714, declaring the Due du Maine and the Comte de Toulouse, 
Louis's illegitimate sons, capable of succession to the crown after the 
princes of the blood. At about the same time, Louis drew up his 
will, which was dated August 2, 1714. In it the king enjoined his 
great-grandson to repair as soon as possible any degradation that might 
occur during his minority in the status of the Due du Maine. In 
the same document the king also appointed the future Council of 
Regency, seeking thereby to ward off the more imminent danger of 
aristocratic government during the coming minority. Not that the 
king had much faith in the efficacy of all these measures; but to avert 
the calamities threatening his realm, he had to erect every barrier 
he could devise, however, unconstitutional or feeble. 
Military defeat was not the only reason that made Louis press his 
grandson to give up some of the Spanish lands. As early as 1703, he 
began to urge Philip to cede the Spanish Netherlands to the elector 
of Bavaria. In this he was moved not only by the strategic need to 
keep this prince fighting on the Bourbon side, but also by the lessons 
of history: the Burgundian lands of Spain had been the main reason 
for Franco-Spanish enmity in the past. A complete liquidation of 
this heritage would help to prevent the same kind of enmity from 
arising between the two branches of the Bourbons in the future. 
Though historical thinking had not been entirely alien to Louis XIV 
before, it had appeared only sporadically and seldom left a significant 
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mark on him. Traces of such thinking can be seen in some passages 
of his Memoires and, more clearly, in his analysis of the Franco-
Spanish relations undertaken in the mid-1680's, when he wished to 
compose the differences between the two countries. It is not clear 
whether it was Torcy, an addicted student of history, that now guided 
the king on the path of historical speculation. The fact remains that 
toward the end of Louis's life, a historical view of the changing scene 
became an ingredient of his thought. It showed itself in his approach 
to Vienna in 1715, when he sought an alliance with the Austrian 
Hapsburgs. The only trouble with this policy was that neither the 
contemporary statesmen nor Louis's immediate successors possessed 
his penetration; the great diplomatic revolution had to wait until 
1756. Yet, it is remarkable that at no time was the mind of Louis 
XIV so clear as in the last year of his life. 
Though Louis had not been a total stranger to enlightened 
humanity, this feeling finally broke surface toward the end of his 
life. Nowhere did it appear more clearly, and to his greater credit, 
than in the intercession he made for the citizens of Barcelona in 1714. 
Philip V intended to stage a general massacre in that city as soon 
as it would fall into his hands. The old king was outraged by his 
grandson's callousness, and told him so in two forceful letters.35 To 
appreciate the full import of Louis's plea for clemency, we must 
consider that there was no doubt in his mind that Barcelona was 
guilty of rebellion against its lawful sovereign; to Louis, the perpe­
trators of such an action were always "infinitely criminal." 
One further remark needs to be made. It concerns Louis's personal 
character rather than the contents of his ideas. A reader of the king's 
Memoires cannot fail to be impressed by some penetrating passages; 
but he will also find it difficult not to be suffocated in the fumes of 
the incense that the brash young man keeps burning before his own 
image. The panegyrics addressed to him by great and small men in 
every walk of life, and the palace of Versailles, where every courtier, 
every picture, every ornament, every statue, and almost every tree 
was dedicated to the single theme of the worship of Louis—all this 
should have redoubled Louis's propensity for self-adulation. It did 
nothing of the sort. Instead, as the king grew old, wisdom and even 
humility gradually replaced the themes of pride and self-worship in 
his words and actions. It is one of the ironies of human affairs that 
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so many historians have sung the praises of Louis XIV for the first 
part of his reign and have deprecated him for the second. 
The picture of Louis XIV that emerges from this sketch is not a 
tidy one. It was not meant to be, for our main purpose has been to 
show that behind the impassive classical facade he presented to the 
world, Louis was a human being, as full of contradictions, passions, 
and confused thoughts and feelings as other mortals. 
1. This essay summarizes some of the conclusions of the book I am preparing 
on the political beliefs of Louis XIV. 
2. " . .  . Quelques endroits obscurs et e"pineux des sciences . . . ou l'esprit 
tache a s'elever au-dessus de sa portee, le plus souvent pour ne rien faire, et dont 
l'inutilite", du moins apparente, nous rebute autant que la difficult6" (Jean Longnon 
[ed.l, Memoires de Louis XIV [Paris, 1927], p. 22; Charles Dreyss [ed.], Memoires 
de Louis XIV pour Vinstruction du dauphin [2 vols.; Paris, i860], II, 428 [hereafter 
cited as Dreyss (ed.), Memoires de Louis XIV]). 
3. "La fonction des rois consiste principalement a laisser agir le bon sens, qui 
agit toujours naturellement et sans peine" (tbidJ). 
4. Commonly known as the " Reflexion sur le me*tier du roi"; see Longnon (ed.), 
Memoires de Louis XIV, pp. 280-82; Dreyss (ed.), Memoires de Louis XIV, II, 
518-21. See also note 9 below. 
5. The problem of Madame de Main tenon's influence on Louis, and vice versa, 
is rather complex. She changed, as did Louis himself, in the course of their married 
life. Though there are instances where their opinions differed, Philip V of Spain, 
who knew Maintenon well, wrote to Cellamare in 1715 that she was "unicamente 
vinculada a la voluntad y gusto del Rey Christianisimo" (A. Baudrillart, Philippe 
V et la cour de France [Paris, 1890-1901], I, 648 [hereafter cited as Baudrillart, 
Philippe V]~). Maintenon's full correspondence, especially for the later years, would 
have made an excellent source for a study of Louis XIV. But in 1713 she burned 
many of the king's letters to her; and in the following year Louis did the same with 
her letters to him. It is also regrettable that the critical edition of her letters under­
taken by Marcel Langlois (Madame de Maintenon, Lettres, Vols. II-V [Paris, 
I935-39l) stops in 1701. Some of Maintenon's letters for the 1700's are scattered in 
several fonds of the Manuscripts Department of the Bibliotheque Nationale; even 
these few letters are of great interest, and show her familiarity with what went on. 
5 a. A. Baudrillart tracked down a total of 538 letters of Louis XIV to Philip V; 
401 of them, addressed to Philip or to Queen Marie Louise of Spain, are at present in 
the Archivo Historico Nacional in Madrid, Estado, Legajo 2,460 his (transferred from 
the General Archives of Alcala de Henares); only five of the letters in this bundle 
date from before June 26, 1703. Some of Louis's letters to Philip are in the collection 
of the Due de la Tremoille. The Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Paris have 514 drafts and copies of Louis's letters to his grandson. They duplicate 
the vast majority, though by no means all, of the originals in Madrid. For further 
discussion of these materials see Baudrillart, Philippe V, I, 11-15, and A. Baudrillart, 
Rapport sur une mission en Espagne aux Archives d'Alcala de Henar&s et de 
Simancas (Paris, 1889), pp. 25, 49-70. 
6. See, for instance, Louis XIV to the Comte d'Avaux, ambassador at The 
Hague, September 2, 1688, Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris, 
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(hereafter cited as A.A.E.), Correspondance Politique, Hollande, Vol. 155, fols. 
351-54; this letter, bearing many alterations and pencil marks, is the one that 
instructed D'Avaux to declare to the Estates General that Louis had an alliance 
with James II of England. Another example is the letter to the Comte de Briord, 
also ambassador at The Hague, dated November 10, 1700, but obviously sent a little 
later (ibid., Vol. 190, fols. 14-17); it informed Briord of the death of Carlos II of 
Spain and of Louis's decision to reject Carlos II's testament and to adhere to the 
Second Partition Treaty. However, the draft of this letter was rewritten at least 
twice, and in the final text the theme of adherence to the Partition Treaty is much 
less prominent than in the original version. 
7. A history of the Colbertian myth would provide a most instructive insight into 
the "middle-class interpretation of history" fashionable in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. 
8. See F. Masson (ed.), Journal inedit de Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de 
Torcy (Paris, 1884), passim. 
9. In this connection it is interesting to note that Louis's original draft of the 
"Reflexion sur le metier de roi" had been written in the present tense; see Biblio­
theque Nationale, MS Fr. 10,331, fols. 125-30. An exact copy taken from this draft 
exists in A.A.E., Memoires et Documents, France, Vol. 297, fols. 206-10. At a later 
date the section dealing with Pomponne's inadequacy was changed over into the past 
tense, the accusations against Pomponne were toned down considerably, and the 
whole document was given the form in which it is usually published. This correction 
of the original text was made by a trembling hand, probably when the king was 
already old. The "Metier de roi" was thus originally a memorandum of the king 
to himself on what to do about Pomponne, who had ceased to satisfy him—an 
instance of the king trying to clear his ideas by expressing them. It was against 
Louis's principles to consult his advisers on matters of appointment or dismissal of 
the ministers and other very high officials, and hence he had to have recourse to pen 
and paper; see Longnon (ed.), Memoires de Louis XIV, pp. 228-29, 271; Dreyss 
(ed.), Memoires de Louis XIV, II, 238-39, 341-42 (cf. ibid., pp. 22-23). 
10. Longnon (ed.), Memoires de Louis XIV, p. 30; Dreyss (ed.), Memoires de 
Louis XIV, II, 391. 
11. This is an aspect of the much wider and little-investigated process of 
administrative decentralization that set in during the last two decades of Louis's 
reign. The king conferred more and more initiative on his trusted advisers and 
ambassadors. At the same time the intendants were beginning to behave like 
full-fledged governors of provinces, and even the governors, whose office until 
then had been mainly honorific, were beginning to acquire a certain stature in 
the administration of the provinces. Anyone reading the day-to-day correspondence 
of the intendants and governors in the early 1700's cannot fail to be struck by 
the difference in tone between these letters and similar documents for the 1670's. 
12. Longnon (ed), Memoires de Louis XIV, p. 118; Dreyss (ed.), Memoires de 
Louis XIV, II, 565. 
13. A draft for the Memoires of 1666; see Dreyss (ed.), Memoires de Louis XIV, 
II, 95 (cf. ibid., p. 429); Longnon, (ed.), Memoires de Louis XIV, p. 23. 
14. See, for example, Torcy, Journal, p. 172 and passim. 
15. See, for example, Longnon (ed.), Memoires de Louis XIV, pp. 43, 113-14, 
117-18, 208; Dreyss (ed.), Memoires de Louis XIV, I, 229; II, 444, 561-62, 564-65; 
(cf. ibid., II, 104-9). Most of these passages appear in the later Pellisson version 
of the Memoires. The inspiration of Machiavelli is fairly obvious. On Machiavelli's 
influence on Louis XIV's MSmoires see Paul Sonnino, "The Dating and Author­
ship of Louis XIV's Memoires," French Historical Studies, III, No. 3 (Spring, 
1964), 303-37­
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16. On Louis's doctrine of "true maxims" see my article, "'Maxims of State' 
in Louis XIV's Foreign Policy in the 1680's," in William III and Louis XIV: 
Essays by and for Mark Thomson, ed. J. S. Bromley and R. Hatton (Liverpool, 
Eng., 1968). 
17. " . .  . Que pour ne rendre raison a personne je ne me gouvernais pas 
moins par la raison" (Longnon, Memoir-es de Louis XIV, pp. 20-21; Dreyss, 
MSmoires de Louis XIV, II, 382-83). This text is Pellisson's, and dates from 
about 1670. 
18. A promising beginning of an inquiry into some of Louis's religious views 
has been made in Jean Orcibal's Louis XIV contre Innocent XI (Paris, 1949) 
and Louis XIV et les Protestants (Paris, 1951), and in Paul Sonnino's Louis XIV's 
view of the Papacy (1661-1667) (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966). 
19. For example, in the draft of the Memoires for 1661, prepared by Pellisson 
about 1670-71 (Bibliotheque Nationale, MS Fr. 10,332), there were eleven references 
to Providence. Five of them received the king's special attention: three passages 
were suppressed entirely (fols. 16, 23, 290-91; in this last case an entire long 
section on belief in God was suppressed [fols. 268-92]); one passage was 
drastically curtailed, so that only its weaker part remained (fols. 231-33); and 
one passage bears the mark of the king's black pencil (fol. 35). 
20. For examples of Louis's stress on Providence in 1702-12, see Baudrillart, 
Philippe V, I, 116-17, 121, 259, 276, 499. 
21. See copies of the royal letters "de la main" written by Rose in 1674-78, 
Bibliotheque Nationale, MS Fr., Nouv. Acq., 20, 215. 
22. Colbert recounts how on November 11, 1661, the day the dauphin was 
born, news was brought from Spain of the death of the only son of Philip IV 
(the future Carlos II was to be born a little later): the dauphin "etoit ne par ce 
moyen heritier naturel et legitime des deux couronnes de France et d'Espagne" 
(A.A.E., Memoires et Documents, France, Vol. 296, fol. 90). Since Colbert 
himself was the last person on earth to have bothered about fundamental law 
and legitimacy, it is improbable that this reflection originated with him; how­
ever, we cannot impute it with any certainty to the king either. 
23. Dreyss (ed.), Memoires de Louis XIV, II, 96. 
24. See Louis's reflections in his council in October-November, 1661, as re­
ported by Colbert: Bibliotheque Nationale, MS Clairambault, Vol. 485, fols. 
54-56, printed in P. Clement (ed.), Lettres, instructions, et memoires de Colbert 
(8 vols. in 10; Paris, 1861-82), VI, 490. The reader should, however, be warned 
that in editing Colbert's notes for the history of the king, Clement changed the 
order of several paragraphs and altered some expressions. As a result, his text 
is more orderly than the original Colbertian document. See also A.A.E., Memoires 
et Documents, France, Vol. 296, fols. 89-94. Cf. Longnon (ed.), Memoires de 
Louis XIV, pp. 54-55, 87-88; Dreyss (ed.), Memoires de Louis XIV, II, 452, 542 
(cf. ihid., pp. 16-17). 
25. This development can be traced, for instance, in A.A.E., Correspondance 
Politique, Liege, Vols. 8, 9, 13, and Supplement, Vol. 1. In the years 1676-79, 
which this correspondence covers, Liege was undergoing a series of revolutionary 
upheavals. The Archivo Historico Nacional in Madrid holds several bundles of 
letters of Louis XIV and of his ministers to the rebel Senate of Messina in 
1674-77 (Estado, Legajo 2264): they reflect the same assumptions. 
26. For example, in the "Metier de roi" Louis said that he disliked Pomponne's 
style of writing; but, as we have seen above, he apparently had no more reason 
to be satisfied with Croissy's style in the first months of his ministry. The other 
charges, like lack of diligence or of "capacite" (this last expression was later 
struck out by the king), were just nebulous expressions of general disagreement. 
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2,7. Without going into the controversy over the role of Louvois, let us point 
out that we know much about his military activity, thanks to Rousset's works; 
we also know that his manners were brusque. But of Louvois's actual political 
role we as yet know next to nothing; no doubt the difficulty of deciphering his 
handwriting is partly responsible for this state of affairs. 
28. Recently my own impression of French unpreparedness for a big war in 
1688 has been borne out by the findings of Geoffrey W. Symcox, who engaged 
in research in the Parisian archives on relations between Louis XIV and James 
II in 1688-92; it appears that the French navy, like the army, was caught unpre­
pared in 1688, and was reduced to hasty improvisations. 
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The Sun King's Anti-Machiavel

PAUL SONNINO 
L OUIS XIV was an earnest person who did not find it necessary to examine himself very closely. Reared by a loving mother, 
furnished with a practical education by Mazarin and by the royal 
tutor, Bishop Perefixe, the young king readily accepted the world as 
an eminently sensible place. That futile revolt of the parlements and 
of the great nobles, the Fronde, may have caused him to reflect on 
the merits of absolute monarchy; but, by the same token, it failed to 
stir in him either a hatred for the nobility or an obsessive fear of 
revolution. If he learned how to deceive, as in the arrest of the 
Princes de Conde and de Conti, the experience did not necessarily turn 
him into a compulsive dissimulator. When he was studying the his­
tory of France, the very name of do-nothing kings and of mayors of 
the palace would distress him, and he selected his vigorous grand­
father, Henri IV, for emulation. Yet, Louis dutifully married the 
Spanish Infanta, Maria Theresa, and managed to balance patience 
against an increasing confidence in his own capacities until March 9, 
1661, when Cardinal Mazarin's death inaugurated the personal reign. 
The king's approach to life was to be conceded if not applauded 
by all his intimates during the early years when he was his own 
master. Still, there was a challenge in testing himself, and his rela­
tionships, under the new conditions. He desired to be a model son, 
dutifully submitting to Anne of Austria's occasional reproaches in 
private, while exacting in return her total abstention from political 
intrigue. To all who demonstrated their friendship and loyalty, he 
was eager to reciprocate abundantly. He was hard put to contain 
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his youthful and warm-blooded passions, but he intended to keep 
them from interfering with the craft of kingship. Louis had suc­
cumbed to Mile de la Valliere prior to November, 1661, when the 
dauphin was born. In 1662 the affair became public knowledge, but 
he persisted in confining it within his self-imposed limits. Time was 
to bring increased assurance. The year 1665, marked by the serious 
illness of his mother, presaged a new emancipation. He had also to 
consider his son's education, and he himself was approaching a mile­
stone on the road to maturity: he would reach his thirtieth year 
in 1667. 
The king's notions on government were also to be applied rather 
successfully during the formative stages of his own administration. 
Louis aspired to restore the French monarchy to its natural perfec­
tion. This meant affording his people the respite of peace, re-estab­
lishing the crown's financial stability, relegating the parlements and 
great nobles to their proper functions, and ridding the church of its 
Jansenist trouble-makers. These tasks proceeded apace, save for the 
last, which ran into numerous stumbling blocks. The restoration of 
order, however, was merely the basis for more glorious excursions 
into the realms of foreign policy and war. Even during the period 
of domestic reform, occasions for international prestige, such as aveng­
ing insults to French ambassadors in London and at the Holy See, 
or for territorial acquisition, such as the treaties for Lorraine and for 
Dunkirk, seemed to arouse the greatest enthusiasm in him. In 1662 
the king proudly adopted the sun disk as his emblem, but, once 
again, the year 1665 stands out. That year, Philip IV of Spain died, 
leaving his disintegrating monarchy virtually defenseless. For the 
time being, an Anglo-Dutch war restricted Louis's freedom of action, 
but the Sun King could still view the advent of his thirtieth year 
as coinciding with a new and higher stage in the evolution of 
his designs. 
Such a man is not a questioner but a justifier. He can be expected 
not to produce confessions in the grand manner but, rather, descrip­
tions of his calling and how he had mastered it. Louis began early 
to prepare his vindications. On the very first day of the personal 
reign, he summoned his secretary, President Rose, and dictated to him 
the deathbed counsels of Cardinal Mazarin.1 The matters brought 
up by the cardinal, relating mainly to domestic order and to the 
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need for personal rule, were to find their way into the king's own 
Memoires. Late in 1662, moreover, Louis's financial expert, J. B. 
Colbert, attempted to secure a historian for the king's personal ser­
vice. It may not be pure coincidence that in March, 1663, a certain 
President de Perigny emerged from obscurity to become a lecteur 
du roi. Nevertheless, it was Colbert who, shortly thereafter, assumed 
the task of chronicling the reign. In April he began to keep a journal 
that he subsequently extended into historical notes covering the years 
1661 to 1664.2 The work centered on Louis, stressing his intelligence, 
dedication, and admirable qualities. It described the domestic and 
international situations when he assumed personal control, outlined, 
in the spirit of Mazarin's counsels, the major policy decisions, and 
diligently recorded the principal events of the reign. But the year 
1665, so central in other respects, also saw Colbert's efforts assume 
a different character. At that time he constructed a two-part docu­
ment intended specifically for the king's own Memoires.3 In the first 
section, which analyzes the international scene when Louis began 
the personal reign, the king speaks in the first person and addresses 
himself to his son. The moment was at hand for a preliminary 
accounting in anticipation of much greater triumphs. 
Early in 1666, the personal and the political united to introduce 
the new setting. On the one hand, Anne of Austria died; on the 
other, Louis intervened in the Anglo-Dutch war. Almost immediately 
thereafter, we encounter the king giving direct attention to his 
Memoires. He began to keep brief notes, or feuilles, on current 
events. Periodically, he transmitted these to Perigny, who emerges at 
this point as his principal collaborator, for insertion into a work book, 
or registre. The feuilles and the more extensive registre contain both 
events and reflections. Perigny used the registre as his principal source 
in drafting short segments of text, which he would later present for 
Louis's scrutiny. In this manner the Memoires for 1666 gradually 
took shape, and assumed the form of contemporary history teaching 
by example. 
That same year found the king, fully emancipated, squabbling 
with his brother, the Due d'Orleans. But he may also have sought 
to find a new authority in the judgment of history by consulting 
such works as Machiavelli's The Prince and the Discourses on the 
First Ten Books of Titus Livy. The registre contains specific refer­
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ences to these two works, and the entire Memoires not merely demon­
strate a knowledge of history but emerge as an implicit commentary 
on that frequently misunderstood Italian thinker. 
Meanwhile, Colbert's previous work was applied by Perigny to 
the compilation of texts for the years 1661 and 1662. He also 
labored on portions of a text for 1665. Although these are now par­
tially or totally lost, it is clear that they described the condition of 
France and of Europe at the beginning of the personal reign—Louis's 
assumption of power, his policies, and his experiences. The emphasis 
was on administrative, financial, and judicial matters, along with 
some consideration of religious, foreign, and military affairs. The 
king's confidence in Perigny may be weighed by the fact that in 
September, 1666, he designated this little-known man as tutor to 
the dauphin. 
In 1667 Louis appeared to break off his affair with Mile de la 
Valliere and to center his attentions on the long-anticipated war 
against Spain. But the feuilles and the registre thrived on the War 
of Devolution. The king's thoughts were echoed by Perigny, who 
began the first full text for 1666 with the words, "In the first part 
of these memoires, which contains nearly five years, I have described 
to you in what manner I had conducted myself during the peace, 
and in this second one, I intend to show you how I have acted in 
war."4 He was to prepare two such texts and a revision for 1662. 
Although the year 1668 saw the feuilles and the registre abandoned, 
Perigny worked on three texts for 1667 and one for 1668. Then, 
around 1669 or 1670, came a revision for 1661 as well as a third 
text for 1666. 
These efforts were interrupted by Perigny's death in September, 
1670; but even then, Louis showed no intention of putting aside 
his Memoires. The king quickly found a new collaborator in Paul 
Pellisson, a former Protestant, who enjoyed some reputation as a 
panegyrist and historian. Louis and his neophyte assistant under­
took a new revision of the Memoires for 1661, in which many addi­
tions, reminiscences of youth, evaluations of people, and reflections 
on religion bear the king's direct imprint. Still another minor revi­
sion followed, but the new collaboration proved short-lived. Louis had 
resumed his feuilles in 1670 and 1671, but in subsequent years, he 
turned almost exclusively to the chronicling of his military campaigns. 
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The king saved these documents with his most personal papers for 
over forty years, a token of their importance for him. Only in 1714, 
in the twilight of his reign, did he seem about to destroy them. 
Instead, he gave the manuscripts to Marshal de Noailles, who subse­
quently deposited them in the Royal Library. Gradually, the docu­
ments have come to light. In 1767 the Abbe d'Olivet issued a 
corrupted segment of Pellisson's revision for 1661, naming Pellisson 
as the author.5 Two editions that appeared in 1806, however, are of 
considerably greater value. The first, that of Gain-Montagnac, relied 
on the manuscripts and trumpeted Louis XIV as the writer.6 The 
second, the Grouvelle edition, is unsurpassed in its choice of texts.7 
The editor possessed copies that are now lost, such as a last section 
of the Memoires for 1661 and the revision of the Memoires for 1662. 
Grouvelle believed that the king had labored alone between 1666 
and 1670 and was only later assisted by Pellisson. 
This progress could not withstand the onslaught of nineteenth-
century criticism. To Charles Dreyss belongs the credit for discover­
ing the collaboration of Perigny. To him, also, attaches the stigma, 
in his edition of the Memoires,8 of having misled posterity for over 
one hundred years. Dreyss used all the scholarly apparatus of his age 
to advance the implausible and demonstrably wrong thesis that the 
second part of the Memoires, the texts for 1666 to 1668, was written 
prior to the earliest texts for 1661 and 1662. The first part, he 
claimed, had been a mere afterthought, corrupted, moreover, by the 
futile efforts of the incompetent Pellisson. We find him condemning 
the work and the style of his own hero, Perigny, on the mistaken 
belief that it was Pellisson's. The edition seems to concern itself with 
everything except Louis. 
Nevertheless, Dreyss's conclusions have matched brilliantly both 
the monarchist suspicion that great kings are beyond literature and 
the republican conviction that wilful tyrants live only on borrowed 
thoughts. Longnon's recent and readable editions, therefore, have 
been greeted with hostility, or at best sullenly ignored.9 
In view of the scarcity of Louis's handwriting on the manuscripts, 
however, it is understandable that questions should arise regarding 
the authorship of the Memoires. The feuilles, in the king's own hand, 
are undoubtedly authentic, and it is evident that Louis transmitted 
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information to Perigny for insertion into the registre. But what of 
the reflections and the references to Machiavelli's works, and what 
of the actual texts in which statements are amplified, changed, and 
even eliminated? 
Some of the reflections are ascribable to the king, others are 
avowedly Perigny's; and there are still more, such as the Machiavelli 
notations, whose precise authorship is still uncertain. Yet we may 
recall the circumstances that made Louis turn to history. He studied, 
say the Memoires for 1666, "even the most remote times."10 The 
Prince and the Discourses offer just the approach to statecraft and 
warfare, along with verdicts on historical figures, that might have 
aroused the king's enthusiasm. The author, moreover, draws heavily 
from classical antiquity. Louis missed Machiavelli's point repeatedly, 
as might be expected of an inexperienced reader with strong precon­
ceptions. The king inadvertently or deliberately distorted this invet­
erate republican and religious utilitarian in order to exalt absolute 
monarchy and the true faith. Louis, notwithstanding his own moral 
fervor, also failed to recognize the same quality in Machiavelli. But 
all the reflections and notations whose authorship is ambiguous appear 
more trustworthy if one examines the actual texts, which betray the 
king's presence in a variety of ways. 
They point up events that Louis considered worthy of note and 
of reflection. Late in 1661, in London, a dispute over precedence 
between the French ambassador and his Spanish counterpart, Baron 
de Watteville, had erupted into a street battle between their retainers. 
Colbert's historical notes, as might be expected, go into some detail 
on this matter. At the first news, Colbert relates, the king assembled 
a special council, which unanimously advised a policy of modera­
tion. Louis, however, overrode them on the grounds that the occasion 
was ideal for a significant diplomatic triumph. Indeed, he brought 
such pressure to bear that Philip IV was obliged to recall Watteville 
and to concede a public declaration that Spanish ambassadors would 
no longer contest precedence with the French. Colbert's account of 
the council meeting was used in preparing the Memoires for 1661. 
Had it been repeated verbatim, this would still provide an insight 
into the king's character. However, in the text the description is 
embellished by Louis's highly personal and self-congratulatory reflec­
tions on the affair, which include extremely interesting considerations 
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on the relationship between justice, honor, and utility.11 If Perigny 
was the author of these reflections, he had managed to grasp the 
king's policies better than any of his contemporaries. 
The documents also show how carefully Louis supervised the 
preparation of successive texts. In the years 1664 and 1665 the 
Sorbonne condemned two books that supported the doctrine of 
papal infallibility. Pope Alexander VII asked the king to have the 
censures withdrawn, and when Louis refused to comply, the pope 
took matters in his own hands. In June, 1665, he issued a bull 
condemning the Sorbonne. The Parlement of Paris thereupon re­
taliated with a condemnation of the bull. The king appeared to be on 
the verge of another crisis with the papacy. 
At that point Cardinal de Retz, the enfant terrible of the Fronde, 
who had been relegated to an aimless existence in Rome, sought to 
make himself useful. He attempted, in greatest secrecy, to arrange 
a compromise between the Holy See and the Sorbonne. Louis acceded 
to the proposal, which had the effect of relaxing tensions, although 
nothing ever came of it.12 Thus, on February 14, 1666, the king 
handed some notes to Perigny from which the collaborator made the 
following inaccurate entry in the registre: 
Order to Cardinal de Retz to settle amicably with the Pope 
whatever problems there might be with that court; believing that 
with the great affairs that might arise for me, it was desirable to 
have its favor.13 
Louis would never have displayed such confidence in the old rebel. 
Perigny continued to give the impression that the cardinal was a 
plenipotentiary in the first full text of the Memoires for 1666. The 
king must have carefully scrutinized this text, because the section 
on Retz was subsequently corrected so as to read: 
Meanwhile, I charged Cardinal de Retz with seeking ways in 
Rome, where he was, to settle the problems of the Sorbonne, seeing 
that since he was himself one of its doctors, he would be more 
likely to find some reasonable solutions.14 
It is also true that Louis's offhand statements managed to find their 
way into the texts. Late in 1667, he was back from a successful 
campaign in the Spanish Netherlands, marred only by the necessity 
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of abandoning the siege of Dendermonde. The exuberant king found 
an occasion to wax philosophical, and Perigny did not fail to 
preserve it: 
It is hard to see to everything at once! He who is charged with 
a private affair often blames the sovereign for not furnishing him 
with everything that he desired for his purposes. But he does not 
consider how many things there are to do at once, that it is 
necessary to take care of all of them, and that whoever would give 
too abundantly to one, would inevitably be lacking toward the 
others. 
This is a reflection that the King has made to me, conversing 
casually today, September 12. It should be placed somewhere in the 
present or in the following years. 
In the same conversation, on the retreat from Dendermonde, the 
King indicated to me that he believed it to be his most virtuous 
action of the entire campaign.15 
Perigny had already completed most of the first full text of the 
Memoires for 1666, but he found a place there to insert Louis's re­
flection, with much embellishment.16 On the other hand, the assertion 
about Dendermonde appears in the Memoires for 1667, where the 
king says of the reversal, "I have regarded it as the only action of 
this campaign in which I had truly put my virtue to the test."17 This 
last example reinforces Louis's claim to the many personal statements 
that are found in the Memoires, and notably, in the closely supervised 
Pellisson revision for 1661. 
The king, therefore, gave Perigny the substance of the Memoires. 
He may well have reflected on Machiavelli with him, and probably 
chose from Colbert's historical notes what matters were to be inserted. 
He carefully checked successive texts. We can be confident that it is 
he who speaks whenever we find expressions of his own feelings. In 
the Memoires for 1661 he tells his son that he is leaving him "the 
means to correct history if it should go astray and misunderstand, 
from not having fully penetrated into my plans and into my 
motives."18 What reasons have we to doubt him? 
Louis's principal concern in his Memoires is with man and the 
state. He sees human nature as constant, insisting that men are 
corrupt and naturally bent toward their own particular advantages. 
All the same, they fall into different categories. Age and temperament 
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affect their behavior. The king speaks with understandable forebear­
ance about youth, "an age when it is usual to love only pleasure."19 
On the other hand, he displays an equally comprehensible impatience 
with crusty old age. The elderly Chancellor Seguier was "reputed to 
be lacking in firmness,"20 and the Comte de Brienne, secretary of 
state, was "old and conceited." 21 Men, of course, also vary in intelli­
gence, but Louis sees social class as creating the most profound 
character distinctions. The mass of men seek only what is useful and 
pleasant. They enjoy criticizing what lies beyond their competence 
and at such times deserve to be ignored. An assembly of bourgeois, 
the king notes, is "easy to mislead and to intimidate."22 All this 
implies that the bourgeoisie, with rare exceptions, should be kept 
within its established functions. The Memoires, however, present 
man's condition as an axiom rather than as a cause for censure. Louis 
prizes humanity for what can be done with it and yearns for its 
ultimate approbation. He also manifests especially warm sentiments 
for the nobility. He takes pleasure in their society. He wishes to 
reserve even the junior army posts for them. The king delights in 
relating how the Comte de La Feuillade came to the defense of his 
honor against a detractor in Spain.23 Both Machiavelli and Louis are 
humanists, but the Italian moralist's admiration for the natural 
aristocrat gives way in the king to a predilection for the hereditary one. 
It should surprise no one that Louis's conception of society is 
organic and corporate. "All these different conditions," according to 
him, "are united to each other only by an exchange of reciprocal 
obligations/'24 The king also points out that, "the more exhausted 
the provinces are by the soldiers or by anything else, the less capable 
they are of contributing to the other public burdens." 25 Thus "it is a 
great error for princes to appropriate certain things and certain persons 
as if they were theirs in a different fashion from the rest of their 
empire." 26 This attitude, however, serves mainly to justify the pater­
nalistic obtrusiveness in taxation, commercial regulation, and sumptu­
ary laws that manor and town had bequeathed to the monarchy. 
Indeed, Louis hastens to add that a king should be "the incorruptible 
judge and common father of all."27 Louis also displays an immense 
respect for tradition. True, he believed the laws and institutions of 
his own time to be corrupt and in need of restoration. Nevertheless, 
any departure from tradition was the exception, and had to be justi­
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fied by kings, at least in their own minds. "What they seem to do 
sometimes against the common law," he explains, "is based on reason 
of state, which is the first of all laws by common consent."28 Louis 
reveres another form of tradition in religion, although he saw the 
church, too, as suffering from decay. Corruption had been responsible 
for the spread of Protestantism. It was probably at the root of the 
current Jansenist difficulties. All this suggests that if gross clerical 
abuses were eliminated, heresy would gradually vanish and religious 
unity could be restored. A particular merit of Christianity was that 
it taught submission to authority. "Those who would inquire into 
past times," the king reflects learnedly, "will easily see how rare, 
since the coming of Jesus Christ, have been those ghastly revolutions 
that occurred so often under paganism."29 Once more, Machiavelli 
and Louis agree in their respect for tradition, their consciousness of 
decay and their awareness of religion as a political force. Yet the 
Italian, in the final analysis, is a radical seeking to escape his time. 
The king is basically a conservative. 
Man's inclination toward self-interest would make democracy 
synonymous with anarchy, and Louis does not even deign to mention 
this type of popular rule. But the Memoires make his contempt for 
any form of limited government abundantly clear. The king displays 
some irritation at the fact that the house of France no longer retains 
the Imperial title, but he finds consolation in describing the Holy 
Roman Emperors as, "captains-general of a German republic."30 On 
the other hand, Louis feels sympathy for Charles II of England, since, 
"this subjection that makes it necessary for a sovereign to take orders 
from his people is the worst calamity that can befall a man of our 
rank."31 As to popular assemblies, "it is interest alone, whether private 
or of the state, that guides their conduct."32 Nor was the papacy 
spared this kind of analysis. It was dominated by persons "not born 
to greatness," and "able to sustain neither the brilliance that adorns 
it nor the storms that can threaten it."33 Such reasoning also explains 
the drawbacks of prime ministers, whose private origins make their 
positions insecure and introduce personal considerations into their 
decisions. It follows, therefore, that the most effective government is 
one in which the supreme authority resides in the person of a heredi­
tary monarch. He alone "has no fortune to establish but that of the 
state, no acquisition to make except for the monarchy, no authority 
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to strengthen other than that of the laws, no debts to pay besides 
the public ones, no friends to enrich save his people." 34 Here Machi­
avelli's subtle republicanism is opposed by the king's unequivocal 
advocacy of absolute monarchy. 
Louis's traditionalism takes nothing away from his hierarchical and 
authoritarian conception of society. Nor does it prevent him from 
asserting that "kings are absolute lords and naturally have free and 
full disposition of all the goods possessed by clergymen as well as by 
laymen, in order to use them at any time as wise administrators, that 
is, according to the general need of their state."35 Tradition, more­
over, requires animation if its effects are to persist. "Private indi­
viduals," he says, "seem to find a well beaten path to wisdom by 
observing the public ordinances . . . the fear of punishment and the 
hope of reward are constant aids to them in their weakness."36 It is 
the function of a king to "play on these great springs" 37 for the com­
mon welfare. Machiavelli makes much the same point, but one sus­
pects that Louis also relishes the quasi-providential flavor of adapting 
vice to the service of virtue. It was all part of "exercising a divine 
function here below."38 
Finally, the breadth of a king's perspective permits him to compen­
sate for the special interests of those who advise or appeal to him. 
This type of motivational arithmetic was almost second nature to 
Louis. It pervades the Memoires and elucidates his famous statement 
that "the function of kings consists primarily of using good sense, 
which always comes naturally and easily."89 To act rationally, more­
over, is to do "as time and circumstances require."40 Machiavelli, in 
his even more famous reflections on free will versus fortune, con­
cluded that men are incapable of changing their temperament to fit 
the times. The king seems to fly in the face of this conclusion by 
insisting that this is precisely what a capable ruler must do.41 
Louis's conservatism may well have been abetted by his immense 
pride in the French monarchy. He lauds the amiable informality that 
exists between the king and its nobility. The parlements, astonish­
ingly, also come in for his praise. "If age is venerable in men," Louis 
remarks, "it appears all the more so to me in these ancient bodies." 42 
He also values the traditional privileges of the Gallican church, in so 
far as they protected the monarchy and its church from the incursions 
of the Holy See. Machiavelli, of course, emphasized the independence 
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of the nobility and the autonomy of the parlements in eulogizing 
the French monarchy. The king could scarcely have done more to 
distort him. 
It is to be expected that when society lacks the proper leadership, 
state and church should falter. Quite consistently, Louis claims to 
bear no animosity for the Fronde. Moreover, "in reviewing history, 
there is hardly an order in the kingdom, nobility, clergy, or third estate 
that has not fallen at some time or other into terrible lapses from 
which it has recoiled."43 Finally, of course, a king who harms his 
subjects weakens himself. Thus Louis's goal is merely, "to reduce all 
things to their natural and legitimate order/'44 and, "restoring the 
purity of the laws and the general discipline in my state."45 Even 
this, however, was to be undertaken with great caution. When, 
during a lull in the preparation of the Memoires, Perigny submitted 
a high-minded proposal for the reform of the clergy, the king's 
response was to the effect that one had to improve gradually on his 
times.46 In occasional moments Louis does give way to a vision. He 
looks forward to a day when extreme poverty will be banished from 
his realm. He notes, in passing, the desirability of integrating areas 
that are culturally French, such as Artois and Franche-Comte, into 
the monarchy. Throughout, he expresses confidence that his efforts 
will be durable and that the dauphin will never experience dis­
obedience or rebellion. But then, the king recalls that "the most un­
scrupulous political thinkers, the least affected by principles of equity, 
of goodness and of honor seem to have predicted immortality for 
this state."47 Louis is still much closer in mentality to Machiavelli 
than he is to the idea of progress or to modern nationalism. 
The king attached great weight to foreign relations, one of his 
major concerns. The starting point of his diplomacy was the character 
and interests of the various powers. With this in mind, he did every­
thing possible, through negotiation and bribery, to keep together 
those whose interests coincided with his own and to spread confusion 
elsewhere. In this regard, the Memoires contain the very key to 
Louis's foreign policy. There he discloses that "the state of the two 
crowns of France and of Spain is such today and has been such for 
a long time in the world that it is impossible to raise one without 
humbling the other, which has almost nothing else to fear."48 This 
"essential jealousy" and "permanent enmity"49 is a matter of self­
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defense and excuses even the violation of solemn treaties. The 
Spanish monarchy being a Hapsburg state, moreover, the king seems 
to encompass the Austrian and Imperial branch of the family in his 
enmity. This attitude accounts for his constant probing against the 
Hapsburgs and suggests that he was still aiming at the Spanish 
Netherlands in 1672, when he launched his invasion of the 
Dutch Republic. 
The Franco-Spanish pendulum dominated and affected all other 
relations. The English were "the old and irreconcilable enemies of 
France,"50 but their sale of Dunkirk and the defects in the structure 
of their government seemed to preclude the renewal of their menace. 
The Dutch merchant oligarchs, though old allies of France, desired 
only "to maintain their commerce and to humble the house of 
Orange."51 Their frequent failure to demonstrate the proper gratitude 
and confidence was only to be expected, but it nevertheless irritated 
Louis. For Sweden, another old ally, he displays considerably greater 
forebearance. His interest in Polish affairs rises when he has nothing 
better to do. The Memoires are virtually silent on the proper relation 
between France and the papacy, probably because the king had such 
poor success in imposing his will upon it.52 On the other hand, they 
indicate a most surprising approach toward that "uncivilized nation,"53 
the Ottoman Empire. In noting the "distance and the intractable 
character of this nation,"54 Louis seems to exclude it from the 
European state system. 
The king also talks much about war. He describes the reviews that 
he held in preparation for the War of Devolution, taking the occasion 
to emphasize the importance of military discipline. He lays great 
stress on providing his soldiers with adequate pay. Louis's aim is to 
keep peacetime conditions in France from being disrupted by war, 
since subjects should be left to carry on their labors and pay taxes 
while a king pursues his military objectives. But the Memoires are 
hardly a manual of strategy. Louis does point up the uncertainty of 
sea engagements and shows a predilection for sieges. He provides an 
enthusiastic account of his successful campaign in the Spanish Neth­
erlands and gives himself the credit for the project of attacking 
Franche-Comte. But the king never goes beyond such maxims as, 
"the success of a siege almost always depends on the proper choice 
of attacks."55 
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Louis hardly dispenses kings from human emotions, notwithstand­
ing their special capacities for exercising good sense. He comes back 
repeatedly in the Memoires to the problem of controlling one's in­
clinations. He delights in demonstrating how he has restrained his 
thirst for military glory, what measures he has taken to resist flattery, 
and the ability to contain his resentment in the interest of policy. 
The feelings, however, are not criticized in themselves. He regrets 
the necessity for kings to repress their openness for the sake of 
secrecy. He confesses his affection for Mile de la Valliere, though 
insisting that such relationships must be kept separate from affairs 
of state.56 Nor can he entirely disavow "that secret inclination of 
most magnanimous souls for arms and for those in this profession." 57 
There is, finally, a passion to which he eagerly surrenders, the desire 
for renown and for glory. 
Was Louis engaging in Baroque rhetoric? Or had he sensed, 
perhaps, that the mass of men and the church had interests of their 
own and that the monarchy actually resided in the finances, the court, 
and the army? Is it possible that despite his grandiose conceptions an 
implicit awareness of the limitations to his power stalks his con­
servatism, here combining, there separating, public good and the 
desire for personal glory? The Memoires leave one asking whether 
it is frustration rather than wisdom that makes him combat the same 
emotions he cultivates. He seems to require, in order to reconcile 
state and king, a notion of higher utility based on intangibles. Perhaps 
this explains Louis's discovery that "the rules of justice and of honor 
almost always lead to utility itself,"58 or his assertion about kings that 
"their constant desire for glory makes them disregard their own 
interest m many cases. 
Just as utility blended into honor, the natural was permeated by 
the supernatural. Divinity had established the natural order of things. 
It did not usually tamper with it, "and when It wants to make a 
king fortunate, powerful, supported, and respected, Its most normal 
course is to make him wise, clear-sighted, fair, vigilant, and indus­
trious." 60 The order, however, which at every moment brings together 
an infinite number of circumstances, is itself beyond the manipulation 
of men. Indeed, "the entire art of politics consists of playing on 
circumstances";61 and moreover, "the caprice of fate, or rather that 
wise Providence that rules supreme over our interests for purposes 
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beyond our comprehension, chooses sometimes to deflate the pomp 
of the loftiest men, in order to oblige them, in the midst of their 
greatest advantages, to recognize the source of all their blessings and 
to merit, through a continual avowal of their dependence, the 
assistance necessary for the success of their plans."62 Machiavelli's 
Goddess of Fortune seems barely recognizable in the garb of the 
Virgin Mary! 
If Providence facilitates the trend of events, does not God expect 
the recipient of His assistance to seize the occasion and to carry out 
the divine purpose? Louis indicates that his very first successes in 
kingship made him "as deeply struck as I have ever been by the 
desire to serve Him and to please Him."63 The Memoires lead one 
to wonder if there were moments, in the king's later reign, when he 
might have assumed the obligation of being an instrument of the 
divine will. After the profitable Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, concluded 
in 1668, he sent an expedition to the relief of Crete against the 
Turks. After the Treaty of Nijmegen, complemented by the reunion 
of Strasbourg in 1681—indeed, at the height of his power—he re­
voked the Edict of Nantes. Louis XIV may have known less about 
his own future than he transmitted to the reader of his Memoires. 
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Louis XIV and Reason of State

WILLIAM F. CHURCH 
' I ' HERE is nothing more fascinating in the political thought and 
•*• practices of the Age of Absolutism than the ways in which 
rulers and men of principle wrestled with the problem of reason of 
state. First appearing in Italy during the sixteenth century, the phrase 
ragion di stato and its linguistic equivalents rapidly became current 
in the languages of Western Europe and were utilized to signify a 
means-end rationality according to which the good of the state took 
precedence over other values in the conduct of political affairs. The 
essential issue, therefore, was that of defining legitimate policy for 
the benefit of the state and the extent to which rulers might violate 
accepted canons of justice and right in advancing the interests of 
their realms. In a sense, the fundamental problem of reason of state 
is as old as government within a civilization that recognizes the 
existence of higher law; but the exact combination of factors 
that prevailed in the seventeenth century—the definitive emer­
gence of strong states in a society that continued to hold legal, 
moral, and religious values in high esteem—rendered the problem 
peculiarly acute. 
From the vantage point of the twentieth century, it seems clear 
that the intellectual dilemma that is presented by reason of state 
is insoluble in absolute terms unless one frankly adopts a specific, 
a priori set of values and judges all acts of government accordingly. 
Since the emergence of the European system of sovereign states, not 
only have rulers and thinkers oscillated violently between extremes 
of Christian idealism and Machiavellian expediency when expressing 
their ideas concerning justifiable policy; experience has also shown 
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that their views have been strongly influenced by such practical, 
transitory factors as conditions within society, the effectiveness of 
governmental institutions, policies of neighboring rulers, and national 
experience in the immediate past. The element of principle is always 
present and sometimes determinative, but even the most high-minded 
observers have usually been willing to compromise with the ineluctable 
demands of necessity. This being so, the role of the historian of 
reason of state is necessarily limited to analyzing the views and 
practices that prevailed in any given time and place. He should 
assume a relativist position in which he attempts in so far as possible 
to recapture the mentality and experience of the period regarding 
this perennial problem and to view it according to the canons of the 
age itself without, however, ignoring the implications of his findings. 
In this essay it is proposed to examine those elements of Louis XIV's 
thought and governmental policies that indicate the manner in which 
he understood and applied the doctrine of reason of state. However, 
since Louis's absolutism represented the fruition of many long-term 
developments, both theoretical and practical, it is necessary to approach 
the subject by sketching the contributions of several earlier generations 
in this area. 
The social and legal structure of seventeenth-century France and 
the acknowledged rightful relations within it were essentially those 
that stemmed from the immediate past. French society was both 
hierarchical and corporate in structure, a vast composite of individuals 
and groups that occupied varying positions in the social pyramid and 
enjoyed correspondingly divergent rights and privileges. Key indi­
viduals and families in various segments of the nobility and a host of 
religious, professional, and territorial bodies or "corporations," often 
of very intricate structure, possessed special rights that in theory 
reflected their contributions to the life of the whole. Although the 
favored position of many had originated in privileges granted by the 
crown, the vast majority on all levels of society regarded their rights 
as grounded in customary law and defensible in the courts, a fact that 
was confirmed by centuries of legal practice and tradition. This was 
especially true of property rights, a category that was then considerably 
more extensive than in recent times. 
Superposed upon this society stood the French monarchy, which 
was absolute in the sense that it possessed a monopoly of govern­
mental authority and suffered no coercive limitation by any human 
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agency. The king alone held complete, undifferentiated public power; 
all acts of government were done either by him in person or by his 
agents in his name. The rights, powers, and transmission of the crown 
were likewise grounded in law, the fundamental laws of the French 
monarchy. The French nation was therefore organized according to 
two spheres of legal right, public and private. Each was grounded in 
accepted law that in theory prevented the encroachment of one 
party upon the rights of the other. France may be said to have 
possessed a genuine constitution that, although unwritten and fre­
quently uncertain, was sanctioned by tradition and innumerable 
practices.1 The whole was infused with concepts of justice and 
equity, since all assumed that human law was at least consonant with 
natural and divine law, which limited the actions of all men. The 
king, as the divinely chosen ruler, had an especial obligation to 
conform to higher principles because of the nature and sanctions of 
his office. 
Relations between states and princes, on the other hand, were 
considerably more indeterminate both as regards concepts of right 
and the proper conduct of policy. It was customary for the French 
to insist upon the complete independence of their king from both 
pope and emperor, a fact that signaled at once the absence of royal 
responsibility to any earthly power and the breakdown of universal 
Christendom. Principles of international law were extensively de­
veloped in the writings of theorists during the seventeenth century, 
but had only minimal influence upon the conduct of foreign affairs. 
The sovereigns and diplomats of the period acquired much experience 
in handling the many intricacies of international relations, and a 
number of diplomatic practices developed in consequence; but 
accepted canons of right and justice in the field developed slowly. 
The most specific controversies concerning the respective rights of 
sovereigns dealt with competing claims to border territories, where a 
hodgepodge of conflicting local customs, often feudal in origin, served 
as the only guides to legality and where the distinction between public 
and private law was frequently uncertain. Outright aggression and 
the violation of sworn agreements were invariably condemned, but 
beyond such general principles there was little to give sovereigns 
pause. It would seem, therefore, that concepts of legal right and 
justice, so essential to any definition of legitimate governmental 
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policy, rested upon a firm foundation within the French state but 
were much less certain in interstate relations. 
The concept of divine-right absolutism that prevailed when Louis 
XIV assumed the reins of government preserved these ideas of right 
but also embodied principles that greatly extended the scope of the 
king's discretionary power. This momentous development in political 
concepts had resulted from an earlier series of challenges to the 
French monarchy, and embodied thinking men's desires for order and 
stability through increased royal competence. It is well known that 
Jean Bodin initiated the process by developing his theory of royal 
sovereignty for the purpose of strengthening the monarchy during 
the chaotic Wars of Religion. Discarding the older idea that the 
ruler merely held a series of "marks of sovereignty," Bodin redefined 
the royal authority as a natural and necessary body of power that was 
held by the king alone in all true monarchies. The definition of the 
royal authority as a series of specific powers or ''marks of sovereignty" 
was traditional and was preserved by Bodin in his Methodus ad 
facilem historiarum cognitionem (1566), but in his Six Livres de la 
republique (1576), he altered his position. Sovereignty for him now 
included not only the older prerogatives of administration and adjudi­
cation but also legislation, the needed instrument through which the 
ruler might make new laws to meet new situations. The king's power 
to legislate necessarily placed him above customary law, Bodin held, 
but he preserved the rights of the subjects, specifically those in 
property, by giving them a basis in natural law. Hence his insistence 
upon consent to extraordinary taxation. Bodin's followers seized upon 
his concept of royal sovereignty as the required mechanism for 
strengthening the monarchy but extended it further by giving it a 
basis in divine right. In this context the sovereign who wielded newly 
expanded power became God's chosen and anointed, whose rule was 
both divinely authorized and inspired. The inevitable tendency was 
to expand the king's rightful prerogative even further. The pre­
cariousness of Bodin's grounding of popular rights in natural law was 
amply demonstrated by the fact that insistence upon consent to tax­
ation all but disappeared in French political writings early in the 
seventeenth century. Natural, divine, and fundamental law remained 
as limits upon royal policy, but customary law, which guaranteed 
the rights of the subjects, was now subordinated to the royal dis­
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cretion. This concept of divine-right sovereignty, first developed by 
spokesmen for the politique party, became the predominant, quasi-
official view of monarchy under Henri IV and provided the basic 
framework for speculation concerning the royal authority and justi­
fiable policy throughout the seventeenth century.2 
The ministries of Richelieu and Mazarin witnessed further expan­
sion of the doctrine of absolutism and the appearance of the first 
extensive debates in France concerning reason of state. For Cardinal 
Richelieu the interests of the state took precedence over all legally 
based rights and privileges, which might therefore be sacrificed, if 
necessary, for the good of the whole. Richelieu justified this position 
by frankly supporting the concept of two levels of right and justice. 
Subjects were bound by established law and the rules of judicial pro­
cedure, but the state, because of its unique role in human society, was 
endowed with a superior morality that exempted the ruler's policies 
from the canons of ordinary justice.3 Matters of high policy, Richelieu 
held, were understood only by kings and their ministers; subjects 
should not concern themselves with the mysteries of state but should 
remain passively in their stations and willingly sacrifice their lives and 
goods as dictated by their divinely appointed ruler. Richelieu's applica­
tion of these principles assumed many forms: not only extensive 
strengthening of administrative controls over the populace but elim­
inating members of the royal family from positions of political 
influence; financially exploiting the clergy; placing new restrictions on 
the nobles and executing several after trial by special commission; 
crushing the Calvinists' strongholds; merciless suppression of popular 
revolts; extensive increases in the burden of taxation; and, most im­
portant, the involvement of France in the Thirty Years' War in 
alliance with Protestant powers. For the first time in the history of 
France, she experienced the fruits of reason of state. 
Richelieu and his supporters seem to have believed that all such 
measures were justified because the purposes of the state embodied 
the highest values that might be realized in mundane society. Far 
from rationalizing his efforts simply in terms of state power and 
Machiavellian expediency, Richelieu regarded himself as leading and 
disciplining the French nation in such manner that it might achieve 
its true potential and live in accordance with the highest principles. 
The French state was truly Christian because of the religious nature 
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and traditions of its monarchy, its long and heroic support of the 
cause of Christianity since the days of the crusades, its continued 
close ties with the Church of Rome, and the type of leadership that 
it afforded its subjects. In this sense the cause of France was the 
cause of religion, and policies that were undertaken in the interest 
of the French state redounded to the benefit of Christianity and 
embodied the highest good. That Richelieu, Father Joseph, and a 
host of their supporters understood and justified the cardinal's policies 
in these terms is clear from their actions and published statements.4 
Indeed, such should in no way be surprising, since the concept of the 
lay state, deliberately divorced from religious considerations, lay far 
in the future. 
During Cardinal Mazarin's ministry widespread reaction to the 
failure of the jurists and nobles to check the expansion of royal power 
during the Fronde extended the recognized sphere of royal discretion 
even further, not by the introduction of new concepts, but by reitera­
tion of now-familiar ideas and a general, massive sentiment in favor 
of strengthening the monarchy. In the extensive literature that was 
written for the benefit and instruction of the young Louis XIV, the 
divine right of kings was developed to the furthest limit by repeated 
emphasis upon the divine choice of the individual ruler, his con­
sequently vast prerogatives, and his responsibility only to God.5 The 
mysteries of state were comprehended only by the sovereign. In his 
extraordinary wisdom, he might dispose of the lives and goods of 
his subjects, dispense with established law, and otherwise exercise 
great discretionary power as required by necessities of state. Remark­
ably, the argument from the religious purposes of the state sharply 
declined during this period; major emphasis upon higher values was 
evident only in the constant reminders that the sovereign was subject 
to divine and natural law and was responsible only to God. In any 
case, it is evident that when Louis XIV assumed personal control of 
the French government in 1661 and chose to follow the precepts of 
reason of state as guides to policy, he was merely applying in practice 
many of the precepts that had been developed during several 
generations of French thought and experience, and, indeed, was 
attempting to govern in the manner that was expected of him. 
This extension of royal competence before Louis XIV's reign took 
place in a society that continued to adhere to concepts of legality, 
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right, and justice, and whose very structure was founded upon the 
same. Royal discretionary acts and the rights of the subjects frequently 
clashed, but they were antithetical only in the sense that they repre­
sented different elements within the same flexible system of state 
organization. The constitution of the French state provided ample 
basis for both public and private spheres of legal right, although the 
manifold developments of the age caused much greater emphasis to 
be placed upon the powers of the crown. Chronic unrest among the 
lower classes, intermittent armed rebellion by the nobility, and con­
stant threats of invasion from abroad caused thinking men to seek 
greater stability and security through the only available instrument, 
strong monarchy. It was an age, furthermore, that knew only pure 
monarchy, that is, a governing organ that held all public authority 
and simultaneously wielded legislative, administrative, and judicial 
power, often through the same body of officials. No division of powers 
limited the action of the crown; the subjects enjoyed the benefits 
of no representative institutions of consequence nor any recognized 
right of resistance. In such a context it was inevitable that the tra­
ditional legal and institutional guarantees of popular rights should 
prove inadequate barriers to royal encroachment. 
If pursued indefinitely, the constant expansion of the royal 
discretion could lead to despotism and the complete negation of 
popular rights, even concepts of justice and equity. This was realized 
by many who nonetheless recognized the necessity of strong monarchy. 
Charles Loyseau, the ablest French jurist during the first generation 
of the century, held that kings enjoyed power over the lives and 
goods of their subjects, and might levy taxes and send men to war 
as needed for purposes of state; but since the subjects were free men 
and enjoyed legal ownership of their property, the king should use 
his power with reason and justice. If he merely followed the dictates 
of his discretion, he would reduce his subjects to slaves and confiscate 
property unjustly.6 Bernard de La Roche-Flavin, in his famous work 
on the parlements, said that the king of France was not absolute in 
the sense that his will was law; only Asiatic tyrannies were of that 
nature.7 In 1615 the remonstrance that the Parlement of Paris sub­
mitted to the regent Marie de' Medici protested against counseling the 
young king to initiate his reign with so many acts of puissance 
absolue, since good kings used it but rarely. Although royal power 
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was absolute, it should be used with moderation in order that it might 
long endure.8 Omer Talon, the very able avocat general in the Parle­
ment of Paris during mid-century, thoroughly accepted the concept of 
divine-right sovereignty but insisted that despotism was of a different 
nature and that established law not only was the foundation of states 
but obliged the ruler to protect his subjects.9 Bishop Bossuet, the 
quasi-official spokesman for the crown on many matters during Louis 
XIV's reign, sharply differentiated between absolute and arbitrary 
monarchy. Under the latter the subjects were slaves, and all property 
belonged to the prince; he might dispose of their lives and goods as 
he saw fit, since there was no law but his will. In absolute monarchy, 
on the contrary, the prince remained within the limits of law and 
permitted legal redress to subjects who had been despoiled of their 
property.10 In spite of constant emphasis upon the broad discretionary 
powers of the crown, there was a strong, continuing tradition that 
absolute monarchy should remain within the limits of law and 
morality. The temper of France during the better part of Louis 
XIV's reign, however, emphasized the powers and prerogatives of the 
sovereign rather than his limitations. The great question was how 
Louis XIV would exercise his vast power and whether, in applying 
the doctrine of reason of state, he would fundamentally alter the 
nature of the French monarchy. 
There is no doubt that Louis XIV was familiar with the rationale 
of reason of state. Both the phrase and the concept had become 
widely current before his time and were increasingly prevalent during 
his reign.11 Although Louis XIV, like Richelieu, was primarily a man 
of action rather than abstract ideas, he always held to certain general 
principles in affairs of state. His religious convictions, although limited 
and in many ways deficient, were sufficiently strong for him to per­
ceive the effects of divine favor or disfavor in the varying fortunes of 
his undertakings and, more important, to ensure that he was always 
conscious of his responsibility to God. He seems genuinely to have 
believed that "if we fail to fulfill his designs, He may allow us to fall 
into the dust from which He raised us."12 Also, there is no doubt 
whatsoever that he was determined to fulfil his obligations as king 
as he understood them. From his dramatic entree en scene in 1661 
to the sentiments that he expressed on his deathbed, he sought first 
and foremost to discharge the responsibilities of his "profession of 
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king." Of course, he regarded himself as divinely appointed to rule, 
an image of God on earth. "He who gave kings to men desired that 
they be respected as his lieutenants, reserving to Himself alone the 
right to judge their conduct."13 Kings were "living images of Him 
who is most holy as well as most powerful."14 Divine inspiration 
automatically followed. The justice "that God placed in the hands 
of kings [is] like a participation in his wisdom and power."15 The 
mysteries of state were known and understood only by the king. 
"The people over whom we reign, not being able to grasp the nature 
of affairs, usually reach decisions on the basis of what they see about 
them."16 The government of kings might appear tyrannical when 
it was merely in accordance with reason of state, which the people 
do not comprehend. "The people suffer more by resisting than sub­
mitting even to the bad rule of kings over whom God alone is judge, 
for that which kings occasionally seem to do contrary to common 
law is founded on reason of state which all agree is the first of the 
laws but the most misunderstood and obscure to those who do 
not govern."17 
All these ideas concerning monarchy had repeatedly been expressed 
earlier in the century, and Louis XIV merely followed an established 
pattern when he adopted them. In one important respect, however, 
his understanding of kingship embodied significant deviation from 
earlier concepts. This was his strong tendency to equate his personal 
interests and glory with those of the state. The view was not unknown 
in earlier periods of French history, since it was a natural concomitant 
of monarchical rule; but it reached its furthest development under 
Louis XIV, and may be regarded as the logical end product of 
personal absolutism. Indeed, it seems to have been in the nature 
of things during the reign of the Sun King—he who had been 
taught from infancy that he was divinely chosen to rule and who 
knew himself only as king. Since his public capacity was the essence 
of his being, and he was the focal point of all patriotic sentiment, he 
instinctively associated his glory with that of the state. Louis XIV 
regarded himself as doing much more than merely governing his realm. 
In a very real sense he set the ideal toward which his subjects should 
strive and led them to higher things.18 He absorbed their wills in all 
public affairs and epitomized the life of the state. He symbolized and 
personified the state and its purposes, and was identified with it in 
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this sense. Such is the meaning of the various texts that are frequently 
quoted in support of the apocryphal "L'Etat c'est moi." "When the 
state is one's concern," Louis said, "one works for oneself. The good 
of the one gives rise to the glory of the other."19 Also, Bossuet: "All 
the state is in him; the will of the people is contained in his."20 
Within the context of Louis's own thought and that of his age, these 
could only mean that Louis absorbed unto himself all leadership and 
public significance of the state and that he symbolized its existence, 
purposes, and higher meanings. They were never intended to mean 
that Louis was the entire state or that it was his personal possession.21 
Although Louis XIV regarded his personal interests and glory as 
intimately allied with those of the state and guided his policies 
accordingly, he was capable of differentiating between himself and 
the state. "The interest of the state should take precedence,"22 he 
held, and from the context he clearly meant that in case of divergence 
the royal desires should give way to state interests. On his deathbed 
he uttered the famous words, "I depart but the state will always 
remain."23 Louis's supreme position as sovereign of France and symbol 
of her greatness caused him instinctively to co-ordinate his personal 
prestige and interests with those of his realm, but he never claimed 
that they were identical in all respects. In spite of great expansion of 
the royal prerogative, Louis's insistence upon his unique understand­
ing of the mysteries of state, his associating his personal glory with 
the interests of the state, and his symbolic expression of its higher 
meanings, his position merely represented the logical conclusion of 
divine-right sovereignty. The fundamental concept of two spheres 
of legal right survived,24 although the major developments of the 
age and Louis's own ideas extensively subordinated the private to the 
public. The basic principle of reason of state may therefore be said 
to have won widespread acceptance in the sense that predominant 
opinion held the interests of the state to be superior to those of any 
of its parts and willingly accorded Louis all necessary authority to 
implement this doctrine. In the hands of a Louis XIV the position 
contained the potentialities of despotism, and, if applied to the hilt, 
would have fundamentally altered the nature of the French monarchy 
and the customary constitution. As Louis himself recognized, how­
ever, there is a great difference between abstract theories and the 
active management of government.25 We shall now briefly examine 
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how he applied these ideas in practice. In analyzing Louis XIVs 
concept of reason of state as it is evidenced by his policies, we are 
concerned primarily with his motivation rather than the extent to 
which he was successful in achieving his objectives. His actual accom­
plishments in many areas varied greatly according to a myriad of 
circumstances, as many special studies have made clear. 
Louis XIVs direction of internal affairs according to the precepts 
of reason of state was made possible by the vast growth of the royal 
bureaucracy that took place during his reign. In his intense desire 
to fulfil his role as king, Louis realized the absolute necessity of 
efficient organs of government that would render his will effective 
throughout his realm. He consequently embarked upon a policy of 
administrative reform and state-building that was so extensive that 
it established the form of the French government until the Revolution. 
Essentially, Louis's work took the form of building a body of expert, 
professional commissioners who were directly responsible to him and 
increasingly displaced the older, established officials, who enjoyed 
varying degrees of independence in their functions. His reasons for 
choosing professional experts as his ministers and secretaries of state, 
developing an elaborate bureaucracy, regularizing the system of in­
tendants, creating an efficient police, and, in certain respects, building 
a large standing army were substantially the same: to bring all 
elements of the nation increasingly under royal tutelage. The result 
was two distinct and potentially antithetical developments during 
the period: a vast increase of personal power in the hands of the 
king, but also a massive growth of the impersonal, administrative state. 
The essentially divergent nature of these trends, however, was 
apparent only to a minor extent while Louis XIV was at the helm, 
since he successfully retained control over much of the vast system; 
and the concentration of effective power in his hands actually in­
creased as the reign advanced. At no time was there any question of 
Louis's legal right to take these many steps to increase his power 
over his subjects, since the development of instruments of govern­
ment was strictly a royal prerogative. The issue, therefore, was not 
Louis's authority to develop mechanisms of power, but the use that 
he made of them; that is, the nature of the policies that his 
administrative system was designed to render effective. 
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The intendants were by far the most significant arms of Louis 
XIV in controlling his realm, and the gradual consolidation of their 
position and powers typified the evolution of the royal administration. 
As directly authorized royal commissioners, they exercised undiffer­
entiated power in their provinces, and may literally be said to have 
served as agents of reason of state. Their commissions, which were 
revocable at will, varied according to the necessities of government 
and the fluctuations of royal policy; but they were always very ex­
tensive, and were frequently expanded as the occasion required. The 
vast extent of the intendants' activities at once reflected and imple­
mented Louis XIV's concept of state-building, namely, that the surest 
means of strengthening the state lay in maximum discipline and 
control by his administrators and autocratic leadership by himself. 
This authoritarian philosophy was founded upon the assumption that 
all phases of human existence might be improved and rendered more 
meaningful under a regime of sharp regimentation, which it was 
the monarchy's chief purpose to provide. A mere listing of the 
intendants' activities is sufficient to indicate the type of administra­
tive tutelage that they sought to establish. As supreme local adminis­
trators, they exercised police power, raised military forces, managed 
a variety of public projects, regulated the intricacies of agricultural, 
industrial, and commercial activity, enforced censorship, and other­
wise controlled manners and morals. They administered the financial 
affairs of cities and communities; they assigned and collected taxes, 
particularly the extraordinary levies that were created in this period; 
they exercised broad judicial powers in both civil and criminal cases; 
and occasionally, they undertook such unusual but significant func­
tions as placing an entire province on a war footing or enforcing 
the many measures against the Huguenots, not only the revocation of 
the Edict of Nantes but also the extensive series of edicts before and 
after 1685. 
When to the powers of the intendants are added those of the 
Paris police, masterfully directed by La Reynie and D'Argenson, as 
well as the peacetime activities of Louvois's army, the vast adminis­
trative controls that were available to Louis XIV readily become 
apparent. Extensive and varied friction between the intendants and 
local administrative personnel was inevitable, since the system super­
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posed a new category of officials upon established organs and under­
mined the functions and privileges of older royal officials, municipal 
authorities, guilds and other professional bodies, religious and edu­
cational groups, local parlements and estates. Opposition ranged from 
passive resistance to open revolt, but all were faced with the fact that 
the intendants wielded regal power and might, in the king's name, 
override local rights and privileges. Like the authoritarian concept 
of rightful government upon which it was based, the system con­
tained the potentialities of despotism. In practice, these were fre­
quently unrealized as in Marseilles, which preserved the great 
majority of its privileges,26 and in Alsace, where the more draconian 
provisions of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes were never 
applied.27 The system nevertheless produced a Lamoignon de 
Basville, whose reputation for tyranny in Languedoc was proverbial 
in his own time.28 The intendants' activities and their consequences— 
administrative tutelage over extensive segments of national life and 
the controls and exploitations that were thereby made possible— 
were among Louis XIV's most significant applications of the doctrine 
of reason of state. 
Specific illustrations of these policies may be chosen from three 
representative areas; taxation, justice, and the subordination of all 
social classes to the crown. Of these, taxation was doubtless the most 
sensitive, since it touched property rights and many entrenched 
privileges throughout the social hierarchy. Louis XIV may have 
believed that he was "born to possess all and command all,"29 but 
in practice this meant utilizing the vast human and material resources 
of the nation to support the many projects that he conceived for the 
good of the state. The long, miserable financial history of the reign 
need not be recounted here, but it should be noted that in two 
instances Louis attempted to go beyond the traditional patchwork 
of levies and expedients and to make good his claim that "kings are 
absolute lords (seigneurs) and by nature have full and free disposition 
of all property, both lay and ecclesiastical, to use as wise stewards, that 
is, according to the needs of their state."30 First, he attempted to 
establish his position as direct lord (seigneur) over all landed property 
in the realm. This was an extension of the feudal principle, nulle 
terre sans seigneur, and would have eliminated at a stroke all alodial 
holdings, which were especially numerous in the pays de droit ecrit?1 
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The idea was not new, and had been unsuccessfully attempted in 
1629 and 1641. In his edict of 1692 Louis claimed that immediate, 
universal lordship over all lands in the realm Qdirecte universelle) 
was an inalienable right of the crown, and that no alodial holdings 
would be recognized without proof of royal grant.32 Although this 
was merely an extension of an ancient principle, widespread changes 
in land tenure and alteration of property rights would have resulted 
in the southern provinces. These, however, offered considerable suc­
cessful resistance, and alodial holdings survived, although diminished, 
until the Revolution.33 
Much more revolutionary were the implications of Louis XIV's 
two wartime taxes, the Capitation (1695) anc^ t n  e Tenth (1710), 
which were based upon the subjects' ability to pay and were in 
theory applied to all without regard to social status. No issue of 
popular consent was involved in these instances, since the provincial 
estates presented little trouble and the parlements were legally re­
quired to register all edicts without remonstrances. These levies, 
therefore, literally embodied Louis's claim to dispose of all subjects' 
property at will for the good of the state. Reason of state has no 
clearer practical application in the period. Had these two taxes 
become permanent in their original form, much would have been 
altered both in government finance and social relationships. The 
Capitation, however, survived in very attenuated fashion, and the 
Tenth lasted only a few years. The record of these levies demonstrates 
that even the monarchy of Louis XIV, with its great administrative 
power, was unable to appropriate subjects' property at will and to 
render the doctrine of reason of state effective in this most important 
area. The result was that the eighteenth-century monarchy chronically 
lacked adequate financial strength, and continued along the well-worn 
path of fiscal palliatives and expedients until these led to its downfall. 
The evolution of judicial institutions during the reign of Louis 
XIV clearly illustrates his determination to subordinate all older, 
established bodies that might limit his authority and to increase his 
personal control over his subjects. For a variety of reasons, Louis 
intensely disliked the parlements and the jurists generally. He never 
forgot their actions during the Fronde, and he regarded many of the 
parlements' claims as encroachments upon his sovereignty.34 Also, he 
could not but remember the extreme difficulty that he had experi­
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enced in securing a verdict of guilty in the trial of Fouquet before a 
hand-picked commission of judges.35 He consequently determined to 
destroy the parlements' political powers and to reduce them to mere 
tribunals for trying cases between subjects. This he did in a series 
of edicts that culminated in 1673 and required the registration of all 
new laws before remonstrances were made.36 The latter, of course, 
disappeared, and thereafter until the end of the reign, there was no 
check whatsoever upon royal legislation, including tax edicts. The 
great codes of law—civil (1667), criminal (1669), commercial 
(1673), and others—that were promulgated during the reign were 
framed only partially with the co-operation of the jurists and were 
imposed upon the courts by royal fiat. Not surprisingly, Louis 
attempted as far as possible to exercise justice in person according to 
the doctrine of justice retenue. He carefully reorganized the system 
of receiving and handling petitions (placets), occasionally rendering 
decisions himself.37 More important, he made extensive use of lettres 
de cachet for a variety of reasons, frequently condemning the victims 
to arbitrary imprisonment for indeterminate periods.38 He also did 
not hesitate to evoke cases of note from the parlements for trial before 
the conseil d'en haut or the conseil des parties.39 And he repeatedly 
broadened the judicial powers of the intendants, who thus became 
special agents of justice retenue, giving them decisive advantage over 
the parlements and other local courts. In these ways, Louis sub­
ordinated the established judicial organs to the supremacy of the 
crown and placed himself as far as humanly possible in immediate 
control over the dispensing of justice. The judicial defenses that 
traditionally protected the rights of the subjects were correspondingly 
weakened, opening the way for any policy that might be in the 
interests of the state. 
In the eyes of Louis XIV and his ministers, the subordination of all 
social classes and groups to official controls was the sine qua non of 
strengthening the state and guiding it toward higher ends. All 
elements of the social hierarchy, he believed, were obligated to con­
tribute not only to the life of the whole but to the maintenance and 
grandeur of the monarchy.40 It was therefore quite logical that he 
should feel free to utilize the human and material resources of his 
realm for the good of the state as he interpreted it. His efforts along 
 377 LOUIS XIV AND REASON OF STATE
these lines, however, differed considerably among the various social 
classes. Regarding the clergy, only limited changes were made in 
their position during the reign because earlier, extensive application 
of the principles of Gallicanism had given the king essentially what 
he wanted of the first estate relative to appointments, jurisdiction, 
and taxes. The king chose the great ecclesiastics of the French church, 
distributed its benefices, controlled the creation and dissolution of 
monastic orders, and enforced discipline in their houses. Through 
constant use of the appel comme d'abus, the parlements drew so many 
cases from the ecclesiastical courts that Louis felt it necessary to 
protect the latter's jurisdiction over purely spiritual matters.41 
From the standpoint of the hard-pressed royal administration, levies 
on ecclesiastical wealth were doubtless the most important matter 
at issue. As we have seen, Louis claimed to be absolute lord over all 
property, lay and ecclesiastical, that he might use for the good of 
the state. He thus denied the immunity of clerical wealth from royal 
taxation, and, indeed, insisted that the first obligation of its holders 
was to contribute to the prince in support of the general good of the 
realm.42 In practice, however, Louis's policy was limited to little 
more than extending the traditional levies. The ancient droit d'amor­
tissement was regularized and more efficiently collected.43 The 
Assembly of the Clergy periodically granted the don gratuit, a contract 
that called for an annual payment of 1,300,000 livres. To this were 
added other temporary payments from clerical wealth in times of 
crisis, such as the Capitation and the Tenth. These payments were 
a major resource of the monarchy, and were utilized for any and all 
purposes of state. Though the parties to the contract were hardly 
equal, the clergy successfully preserved the legal fiction that the don 
gratuit was a gift rather than a tax. The monarchy, however, had 
effectively established the principle that the wealth of the clergy might 
be tapped by the state in case of need. The most specific extension 
of a traditional levy took place in 1673 when Louis decreed the 
application of the regale to the entire realm, thereby closing a gap in 
the rights that had been accorded the French king by the Concordat 
of 1516.44 There is no need to recount the extensive struggle to which 
this gave rise. It is sufficient to note that Louis eventually forced the 
acceptance of the regale by both pope and clergy. Although these 
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developments indicate extensive subordination of the first estate to 
the monarchy, there is no doubt that the clergy were the least 
exploited among Louis's subjects.45 
Louis XIV's major objective regarding the nobility was not, as in 
the case of the clergy, control of a vast institution and its material 
resources but the subordination of an influential social caste and the 
exploitation of its personnel for purposes of state. After the failure 
of the Fronde and the building of Versailles, the great nobles and 
their families willingly accepted royal invitations (i.e., commands) 
to take up residence at court, where they lived on pensions, gifts, and 
such favors as benefices for their younger sons and doweries for their 
daughters. Louis's phenomenal memory enabled him to know and 
keep watch over thousands personally. Many of the most prestigious 
nobles of France were brought under surveillance, frequently becom­
ing mere adjuncts to the brilliant life of Versailles. Furthermore, the 
noble caste was increasingly a royal creation, a product of ennoble­
ment by the crown. In this instance as in so many others, Colbert 
transformed a royal prerogative into an important source of revenue. 
After extensive inquiry into the legitimacy of existing titles of nobility 
throughout France, Colbert ordered in 1661 the quashing of thousands 
of false titles unless proper payment was made.46 Later ministers did 
not hesitate to sell hundreds of titles during times of crisis: 500 in 
1696, 200 in 1702, and to all Inspectors General of the Navy and 
Galleys in 1704.47 Louis XIV, like Richelieu, urged the wealthier 
nobles to enter commerce by making it possible for them to do so 
without losing caste,48 but the effort was a failure. The great majority 
of nobles found their only reason for existence to be service in the 
military establishment, that is, under the command of the Sun King, 
who squandered their lives in his wars for personal glory and state 
interests. In his relations with the nobles, Louis undoubtedly benefited 
from the traditional ties of fealty that bound king and vassal, but he 
transformed these into a king-subjects relationship of which he was 
the only beneficiary. The result was that the nobles were quite de­
pendent upon the royal will and found no opportunities for self-
fulfilment except those that the king might provide for purposes 
of state. 
As for the third estate, we have noted how the intendants increas­
ingly sought to subordinate the cities and towns by managing their 
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financial affairs, dictating the choice of local officials, applying rigor­
ous codes to industry, regulating commerce, exercising combined 
police and judicial functions, and otherwise bringing urban life under 
administrative controls. A massive decline of municipal independence 
and initiative occurred at the precise moment when France increas­
ingly needed these to strengthen her position as a great power. Louis 
and Colbert, however, understood only one approach to strengthening 
the state, that through further regulation by royal commissioners. In 
one area, urban finance, such measures were doubtless justified. In 
his intense desire to place the nation's financial affairs on a firm 
footing so that Louis might enjoy massive support for his vast under­
takings, Colbert undertook to systematize the chaotic financial admin­
istration that prevailed in most local communities. Through a series of 
edicts that was not completed until the last year of his life, he created 
an elaborate system through which the intendants might control all 
aspects of municipal finance.49 More efficient handling of local affairs 
was assured, though at the cost of omnipresent administrative tutelage. 
Once initiated, moreover, the attempts to extend further controls 
over the cities seemed to develop endlessly. In 1687 an edict pro­
hibited municipal officials' bringing cases to court without the in­
tendant's permission.50 In 1690 and 1691 royal procurers were estab­
lished in all cities and towns to oversee the immediate handling of 
all municipal affairs and "to propose and require all that will be for 
the good of His Majesty's service and the public utility."51 In 1692 
the offices of mayors and assessors were made venal, removing them 
from control by the community;52 ten years later, mayors and per­
petual syndics were even created in rural communities that had 
lacked them heretofore.53 And in 1699, a generation after La Reynie 
had organized his highly efficient Paris police, the system was 
extended throughout the realm by wholesale creation of lieutenants-
general of police and their aides in all important centers.54 A host 
of officials who were responsible only to the crown and who usually 
held venal offices spread over the face of the land for the sole purpose 
of increasing the centralization of power and rendering effective the 
sovereign's will.55 
It was the peasantry that Louis XIV exploited most extensively 
when he sacrificed his subjects' lives and goods for the interests of 
the state. The massive increases in taxation that his administrative 
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system made possible fell chiefly upon the defenseless tillers of the 
soil. Not surprisingly, the reign was punctuated by a series of 
peasant uprisings, since they bore the major burden of Louis's many 
ventures. Louis believed, furthermore, that the lower classes generally 
were obliged to sacrifice their lives for the defense of the realm as he 
might dictate. As his wars became more costly and the traditional, 
voluntary system of recruiting for his vast armies proved insufficient, 
Louis took the momentous step of initiating compulsory military 
service. First organized by Louvois in 1688, the system required 
each parish to send one recruit, who was elected by the inhabitants 
and assigned to a special unit of provincial militia.56 The men were 
later chosen by lot in the presence of the intendant. The system 
lasted in one form or another until 1697, but was revived in 1701 
and was utilized through the entire War of the Spanish Succession. 
This time the intendants were directed to assign levies according to 
the number of inhabitants and to supervise the formation of a 
specified number of companies.57 These were merged with the regular 
forces and were assigned to combat duty outside the borders of the 
realm. All distinction between the regulars and the militia was 
quickly lost, and the system became the primary means of securing 
replacements for the royal armies.58 The numbers thus recruited 
were, of course, dictated by the crown. This was the first massive 
application of the principle of compulsory military service as the 
king might decree. Truly, the lives and goods of the peasantry were 
increasingly subject to Louis's disposal to use as he would. 
Through these diverse mechanisms Louis XIV sought in varying 
degrees to subordinate all social classes to the purposes of the state 
and to exploit them accordingly. In Louis's hands, his nationwide 
administrative system became a vast instrument for making available 
the human and material resources of the realm, directing it toward 
feats of greatness and implementing the doctrine of reason of state. 
Louis XIV's foreign policy was, in certain respects, even more 
representative of his understanding of reason of state than were his 
achievements in state-building within the borders of the realm. On 
the basis of the record it seems that the major function of his strong 
administrative apparatus was mobilization of the nation's resources in 
support of his ventures abroad. Not only were these his major concern 
during the better part of his reign, they were also closest to his heart 
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because they permitted innumerable feats of glory, enhanced his 
personal renown, and enabled him to appear upon the vast European 
stage as leader and defender of the most powerful nation in Christen­
dom. Glory, he readily admitted, was the ruling passion of his life; 
it required not only constant solicitude but perpetual augmentation if 
it were to endure.59 Military conquests and the acquisition of territory 
were among its more important elements, he held, since he was highly 
conscious of the relative power and prestige of all European monarchs 
and constantly sought to exalt the Bourbons and their realm in 
Europe's affairs. Dynastic rivalry of this type was never absent from 
his calculations. It should be emphasized, however, that to a large 
extent Louis regarded his acquisition of glory as the logical con­
comitant to his fulfilling his vast responsibilities as sovereign of 
France. Since he acceded to the throne according to the combined 
dictates of fundamental law and divine decision, he was personally 
obligated to provide France with the finest governmental leadership 
both by masterful exercise of the royal prerogative and by defending 
his realm against all enemies. Far from being his to dispose of at 
will, his powers were a trust that he held during his reign and was 
duty-bound to exercise in the interests of the state to the best of 
his abilities. At his death he was similarly required to transmit the 
crown and his realm intact to his successor. Fulfilment of his obliga­
tions as sovereign was therefore as vital an element of his glory as 
his acquisition of personal renown. Indeed, the two were frequently 
synonymous in his eyes. His resulting foreign policy assumed many 
forms, ranging from aggressive war and feats of prestige to more de­
fensive measures, especially late in the reign; but all were alike in 
that they embodied Louis's understanding of legitimate policy for the 
benefit of the realm and its sovereign. Throughout his many wars he 
closely equated his personal glory with the interests of the state and 
sought simultaneously to increase the power and prestige of both, 
since he regarded the distinction between them as minimal in most 
matters of policy. As sovereign of France and symbol of her greatness, 
he instinctively held that in foreign affairs, "when the state is one's 
concern, one works for oneself. The good of the one gives rise to 
the glory of the other."60 
Not even Louis XIV, however, claimed that war was a good in 
itself, a normal condition in human relations. Like all responsible 
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sovereigns, he instinctively adopted the position, later associated with 
the name of Clausewitz, that war is a continuation of policy by other 
means, an instrument for achieving a given end. It was Louis, of 
course, who determined the ends to be achieved, but he was highly 
conscious of the question whether he might justifiably use force for 
his purposes. On many occasions he attempted to place his actions 
in the most favorable light by issuing official explanations of his 
aggressions. Regarding the thorniest problem of interstate morality, 
the sanctity of treaties and sworn agreements, Louis adopted a posi­
tion that was at once realistic and high-minded. 
Although integrity requires that a prince always keep his word, it 
is not prudent to rely absolutely on that of another. . . . There is 
no clause so clear that it does not undergo interpretation, and as 
soon as anyone decides to retract it, he easily finds a pretext for 
doing so. Everyone arranges treaties according to his present inter­
ests . . . but when the reason that occasioned the promise is no 
longer, there are few who will keep their promises.61 
On the other hand: 
All the virtues find in themselves their own reward and felicity that 
never depend upon the success of the measures they counsel. . . . 
Above all others, integrity or good faith . . . has a special quality 
which causes it to be recognized by the least enlightened, and has 
powerful charms that cause it to be loved by all the earth. The 
world, however corrupt, holds it in such veneration that those who 
are least inclined to practice it are constantly obliged to imitate it 
so as to avoid being completely banished from all society. . . . Not 
without reason may one say that this virtue is esteemed, since only 
through its ministrations does the world receive all that is agreeable 
and advantageous. It is she who establishes commerce among nations, 
places society in cities, maintains family ties, and nourishes love and 
confidence between princes and subjects.62 
It is quite understandable that whenever Louis thought he had right 
on his side, he stressed the fact and attempted to make the most of 
it. Early in his reign, however, the all-important circumstance was 
that there was little but his self-restraint to limit his aggressions. The 
manner in which Louis XIV's foreign policy and wars evidenced his 
understanding of reason of state will now be briefly examined. Again, 
we are more concerned with Louis's motivation than the success of his 
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policies. Since space permits consideration of only a very limited 
selection of relevant materials, it seems more pertinent to examine 
Louis's reasons for resorting to war than the many concessions and 
alterations of policy that were forced upon him by his increasingly 
powerful enemies during the latter part of his reign. 
From the first year of his personal rule ( I 6 6 I )  > Louis XIV made 
it clear that he would preserve his freedom of action regardless of 
any prior commitments. Proceeding on the assumption that "the con­
dition of the crowns of France and Spain is such today and has been 
so for long that one may not rise without lowering the other,"63 he 
held that neither party was entirely bound by its agreements, yet he 
attempted to appear in the right whenever possible. After unsuccess­
fully complaining to Madrid concerning twenty-six infractions of the 
Peace of the Pyrenees, Louis wrote to D'Estrades in London that 
Spanish violation of the Peace authorized him to do the same by 
aiding the Portuguese in their struggle against Spain. But Louis's 
action was 
with this difference much to my advantage, that the Spanish having 
been the first to break their word which they could not do without 
blame, I would on the contrary be fully justified both before God 
and my own conscience which would reproach me with nothing in 
this regard because I merely imitated the example that the Spanish 
gave me, and because that in their procedure which was pure lack 
of faith was for me a rendering of justice to myself which no one 
might reasonably condemn.64 
Several years later, when D'Estrades was stationed in Amsterdam and 
was negotiating with John de Witt, Louis wrote to his ambassador 
that "these words, clear rights, which he [De Witt] used are a delib­
erate subterfuge, since there are hardly any in the world so clear, in 
any dispute whatsoever, that do not have some exceptions and con­
trary reasons which each accepts as good according to his passion or 
interest and uses against the other party."65 During the Anglo-Dutch 
War of this period, Louis surveyed the diplomatic situation and, 
despite its embarrassments, sided half-heartedly with his Dutch allies, 
"to whom my word was pledged."66 
That the legal justifications of Louis XIV's first war, the so-called 
War of Devolution (1667-68), were discussed so extensively indi­
cates that both he and his natural enemies had considerable respect 
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for the legal principles involved. Early in 1667, Louis ordered the pub­
lication of the important Traite des droits de la reine tres-chretienne 
sur divers etats de la monarchie d'Espagne67 as an official pronounce­
ment justifying his invasion of the Spanish Low Countries. Louis's 
objective, the author disarmingly claimed, was not to acquire new 
domains or additional glory but to uphold the rights of the queen 
according to law. Throughout the work the emphasis is upon the 
element of legal right. The first part argues that the queen's renunci­
ation of her heritage at the Peace of the Pyrenees was invalid both 
because of the unpaid dowry and because her action ran counter to 
the fundamental law of all monarchies. Members of royal families 
are born to rule as subjects are born to obey; neither may surrender 
or discard this obligation since fundamental law binds rulers and 
subjects alike. The second portion maintains that the hereditary 
transmission of the rights and powers of sovereignty was regulated 
by custom, in this case the custom of the duchy of Brabant that 
specified that the children of the first marriage should receive the 
entire heritage by right of devolution. "When there is no particular 
law [such as the Salic Law] for a sovereignty and it is nevertheless 
necessary to regulate its rights and succession, what other rule can 
one follow but that of the law and custom of the province?"68 Such 
was his argument for elevating a local custom into a law of succes­
sion for the sovereign authority, a position that had a certain justi­
fication in many Hapsburg territories where the distinction between 
public and private law was very loosely defined. The emphasis, there­
fore, was upon the inalienable rights of the queen and Louis's obli­
gation to enforce them in spite of the provisions of the Peace of the 
Pyrenees. "May he [Louis] do better as the father of the nation than 
to maintain its laws inviolate so that none may derogate from 
them for any reason and the sovereign and the people are equally 
subject to them?"69 
Quite by accident, it would seem, there appeared almost simul­
taneously Antoine Aubery's very different treatise, Des justes preten­
tious du Roi sur VEmpire,10 which blatantly proclaimed Louis XIV's 
rights to most of the German Empire and could hardly have been 
officially inspired. Writing on a subject "which concerns no less the 
expansion than the reputation of the state,"71 Aubery claimed that 
the monarchy of Louis XIV was the same as that of Clovis, that the 
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larger part of Germany was the patrimony and heritage of the French 
princes, and that Charlemagne possessed Germany as king of France 
rather than as emperor. Aubery was patently justifying massive 
French conquests in Germany, particularly when he concluded that 
heaven had blessed Louis and his queen with a dauphin "to whom 
everything seemed infallibly to promise in the years to come both 
supremacy over the earth and universal monarchy."72 Reaction in 
Germany was understandably intense, and the embarrassed royal 
council felt it necessary to condemn Aubery's book and to confine 
him for two months in the Bastille, where, however, he was visited 
by the most distinguished persons in the realm. His punishment 
was indeed minimal, and his book was read throughout Europe. 
The most important answer to these and similar French pamphlets 
was the influential Boucher d'etat et de justice, by Baron Lisola, the 
most indefatigable of Louis XIV's critics.73 The French publications 
were mere excuses for war, he insisted, and taking his cue from 
Aubery, he turned against Louis the charge that the French had 
long used against the Hapsburgs, that of seeking universal mon­
archy.74 He then argued the legal case at length. French entry into 
the Low Countries would be a violation of the Peace of the Pyrenees 
no matter what claims were made; throughout the work he insisted 
that the sanctity of treaties was fundamental to international peace. 
The queen's renunciation was valid, both because it was incorporated 
into sworn agreements between sovereigns and because she had 
received adequate compensation without the unpaid dowry.75 Spanish 
holdings, moreover, must remain intact according to the inalienability 
of the royal domain. It was specious to argue that a local custom 
applied in this instance because "how can one make a public and 
fundamental law of a custom which is not universal nor established 
by the sovereign, and which is attached to particular circumstances 
of properties and places?"76 Both the Peace of the Pyrenees and 
relevant law undercut the French position, Lisola maintained in a 
powerful presentation of his case. Turning to more practical matters, 
he insisted that the greatest danger lay in French willingness to intro­
duce uncontrolled force into Europe's affairs. Because of the scattered 
nature of her holdings, Spain was strong in defense but weak in 
attack, with the result that the Spanish rulers always observed treaties, 
preferred religion to reason of state, ruled according to law, and never 
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made alliances with the Turk.77 The French, on the other hand, 
manipulated all peace settlements to their advantage, had "the interest 
of the state as their unique rule without being limited by the sanctity 
of treaties, the good of religion or ties of blood or friendship," and 
made alliances with the Protestants and the Turk.78 These were the 
principles of conquerors, he concluded, calling for unity among those 
threatened by French aims for universal monarchy. The debate was 
continued in a lengthy series of pamphlets and treatises, most of 
which were devoted to refinements of the legal issue.79 In Louis's 
motivation legality was undoubtedly secondary to his desire for con­
quests and glory, yet it is noteworthy that he embarked upon his 
foreign ventures in an area where he believed legal claims to justify 
his ambitions. 
After his initial military successes, Louis XIV's attitude toward the 
other European powers hardened, although he continued to make 
full use of legality whenever possible. His seizure of Lorraine in 
1670 was justified, he claimed, by the Peace of the Pyrenees, which 
authorized French occupation of the province in case Duke Charles 
IV moved against French interests.80 The duke had, in fact, offended 
Louis by recruiting troops and attempting to enter into anti-French 
diplomatic arrangements. When the emperor indicated that he might 
intervene in favor of the duke, Louis declared, "Lorraine belongs to 
me today because of many entirely legitimate titles, as much because 
of our treaties as by right of conquest." 81 The emperor was offered 
the choice between Louis's enmity or friendship, accompanied by 
this threat: "The more affairs I enter into, the more glory I shall 
have if I am able to handle them properly, and whoever has good 
troops and funds for this purpose . . . should not be angered when 
others furnish him [the occasion for] this, especially when he may 
thereby acquire glory."82 As so often, Louis combined legal argu­
ments with the use of force in his expansionist policies and his 
search for personal renown. 
The Dutch War, on the other hand, was one instance in which 
Louis XIV embarked upon an aggressive war quite without benefit 
of any legal or moral justification. The interests of the realm were 
involved to the extent that the prevailing mercantilist philosophy 
justified economic war against the commercially powerful Dutch, and 
the religious achievements of Catholic France might be enhanced by 
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attacking a nation of heretics. Nevertheless, the primary reasons for 
the war lay in Louis's personal motivation. In a well-known memoir 
that he probably dictated late in 1673, he stated that the basic cause 
of his aggression was the ingratitude and unbearable vanity of the 
Dutch.83 The Dutch owed their freedom to French aid first against 
the Hapsburgs and then against the English, but had never given 
the French any aid in return. During the War of Devolution the 
Dutch had been the prime movers in organizing opposition to the 
French. "I confess that their insolence stung me to the quick and I 
was ready, at the risk of whatever might happen to my conquests in 
the Spanish Low Countries, to turn all my forces against this arro­
gant and ungrateful nation."84 He nevertheless adopted a more pru­
dent course, made an honorable peace, and postponed the punishment 
of this perfidious people until he had adequately prepared the diplo­
matic situation. "Ambition and glory," he added, "are always excus­
able to a prince, particularly one who is young and as well treated 
by fortune as was I. Moreover, I adequately demonstrated by my 
subsequent conduct that I practiced vengeance only for reprisals and 
in order to maintain the glory and reputation of my realm."85 Even 
in this war, which he undertook for highly personal reasons, he asso­
ciated these with the interests of the state. As the war became Euro­
pean in scope and inevitably began to exhaust his resources, Louis 
became more moderate in his objectives, yet he never lost his sense 
of mission and self-righteousness. Writing to Colbert from the camp 
at Falais, he expressed the hope that "all will go well and that God 
will aid me as He has done until this hour. He knows that my 
intentions are just and that I hope for peace as I should." 86 Surely 
this was more than a mere rhetorical flourish. The cost of the war 
and its frustrations subsequently forced Louis to realize that the 
advantages of peace with honor would outweigh the repute to be 
acquired through further glorious deeds. In his instructions to his 
plenipotentiaries at Nijmegen, he wrote that "although the people's 
interest is to free themselves from taxes by means of peace while that 
of the prince is to preserve his reputation and authority through 
war,"87 his emissaries should urge William of Orange to make peace 
because of its utility to him. The interests of his own realm, however, 
Louis interpreted in a highly personal manner. Early in the peace 
negotiations, he made it clear that French economic advantage vis­
388 LOUIS XIV AND THE CRAFT OF K I N G S H I P 
a-vis the Dutch was one of his least concerns,88 and in fact he bar­
gained away Colbert's protective tariff against Dutch imports. Much 
more significant in his eyes were his territorial gains, of which he 
preserved the greater part in the Peace of Nijmegen. After the event, 
he wrote that in making peace, "the public good . . . took prece­
dence on this occasion over the gain and personal glory that I found 
in the continuation of the war."89 The distinction seems to have been 
meaningful to Louis, at least in times of stress. At all events, he knew 
that his successful conquests in the face of a European coalition had 
raised him to new heights of power and prestige. For Louis XIV 
this was sufficient justification for the use of force, as he interpreted 
the doctrine of reason of state. 
During the interval of relative calm that followed the Peace of 
Nijmegen, Louis XIV pursued his expansionist policy by annexing 
border areas to which he held various claims under existing law and 
treaty agreements. His purpose was to acquire strategically important 
points on his most vulnerable frontiers, but he took great pains to 
publicize the legal bases of his moves. The major treaties in force— 
Miinster, Pyrenees, Aix-la-Chapelle, and Nijmegen—gave Louis ex­
tensive rights over Alsace and a number of other border territories with 
their dependencies.90 His decision was merely to apply these provi­
sions to the letter. If he could establish the dependence of additional 
territories upon those that he already held, he could justifiably extend 
his sovereignty over these adjacent areas, in effect expanding the 
realm. After investigation of the matter by some of the ablest jurists 
in France, Louis authorized the courts in several border areas to 
examine local tenurial rights that might subordinate additional areas 
to his control and to pronounce accordingly. In most instances the 
established courts sufficed for the purpose, although a special cham­
ber was attached to the Parlement of Metz. Beginning in 1679, these 
courts initiated a series of decrees that effected the "reunion" of large 
numbers of dependencies with the French realm. The royal chamber 
in Metz was especially active; during its brief existence it issued 
dozens of decrees that brought small but significant border areas 
under French control.91 
The work of the Chambers of Reunion has frequently been con­
demned as mere subterfuge, a cloak for further French aggression; 
but this view ignores the fact that the proceedings were quite sound 
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according to contemporary law, judicial practices, and relevant treaties. 
That Louis was not only an interested party but also assigned juris­
diction to the courts and enforced their decrees is an inadequate basis 
for criticism, since the crown combined within itself both executive 
and judicial powers, and the age possessed no arbitration by supra­
national bodies. No alternative procedures were possible. Furthermore, 
Louis was interested only in establishing his sovereign authority over 
these areas, not immediate ownership. He sought merely to incorporate 
them into the realm and to subject them to his rule, as was demon­
strated by his requiring oaths of homage and fealty and establishing 
administrative and military controls, but he did not attempt to dis­
place local property rights. Upon annexation, provincial rights and 
privileges were invariably confirmed.92 Rather than legal chicanery 
to cover further aggressions, the reunions should be viewed as Louis's 
taking advantage of the explicit provisions of relevant treaties and 
the tangled legal situation on his frontiers to extend his sovereignty. 
The resulting expansion of the realm was quite justified, he felt, 
both by law and the requisites of military strategy. Reason of state 
in this instance, as in so many others during the reign, found both 
a legal and practical justification. The climax of the movement 
occurred with the occupation of Strasbourg, which followed the same 
pattern. After a favorable decree by the Superior Council of Breisach, 
Louis circulated about Europe a statement that the treaties of Miinster 
and Nijmegen had given him "absolute sovereignty" over all Alsace, 
including its capital, and that he was about to enforce his rights.93 
After brief negotiations with the city authorities, Louis accepted their 
proferred terms of capitulation in which he was recognized as Stras­
bourg's "sovereign lord and protector" and confirmed most of the 
city's traditional rights and privileges,94 whereupon he entered his 
new domains with greatly panoply. All but a small portion of his 
gains through the reunions were confirmed to him by the Truce 
of Ratisbon. 
Louis XIV's stated reasons for undertaking the War of the League 
of Augsburg and that of the Spanish Succession, the longest and 
bloodiest of his reign, fall into the familiar pattern that combined 
royal prestige, the interests of the Bourbon family, and those of the 
state, although in very different ways. In 1688, when Louis was at 
the height of his power, in command of a magnificent military force, 
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and faced with no well-organized coalition of hostile powers, it is 
not surprising that he adopted a hard line in dealing with the other 
sovereigns of Europe. In that year he issued a memorandum in which 
he attempted, with small success, to place the onus of renewed hos­
tilities upon the emperor by arguing the necessity of preventive war.95 
Louis frankly admitted that it was to French interests to resume hos­
tilities against the Imperialists before they overcame the Turk and 
were free to turn against France, but he insisted that the aggressive 
intent was the emperor's rather than his. He also stressed his deter­
mination to defend the rights of his sister-in-law in the Palatinate 
and his own in the archbishopric of Cologne. He offered to send 
plenipotentiaries to Ratisbon to negotiate outstanding difficulties; but 
if his offer was refused, the responsibility for forcing him to take up 
arms would fall upon the emperor, who had failed to take advantage 
of Louis's proposals for a durable peace. The argument was hardly 
convincing and merely served to place Europe on notice that Louis 
was again about to embark upon major hostilities. In this instance 
there seems little justification for aggression other than Louis's deter­
mination to take calculated advantage of certain momentary develop­
ments and to use them as excuses for strengthening his position at 
the expense of neighboring states. His calculations, of course, were 
completely upset by developments in England and the broadening 
of hostilities. Exhaustion of his resources finally forced him to make 
major concessions at the Peace of Ryswick, although he had the 
satisfaction of retaining Strasbourg. Louis's reliance upon force as 
an instrument of policy regardless of its justifications had clearly 
caused him to overreach himself at the cost of great losses and 
suffering throughout the nation. 
Very different were the antecedents of the War of the Spanish 
Succession. After Louis XIV had agreed to two partition treaties 
whose purpose was peaceful solution of the problem of the Spanish 
inheritance, Carlos IFs will confronted Louis with an impossible 
situation in which war seemed inevitable no matter what course he 
might pursue. He consequently chose to follow the dictates of honor, 
conscience, and family responsibility by accepting the Spanish heri­
tage for his grandson, the duke of Anjou, who thereby became Philip 
V of Spain. Having made the decision, Louis understandably gloried 
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in the event, which he regarded as a heaven-sent opportunity to fulfil 
his role as sovereign of France and head of the Bourbon dynasty. 
There is every reason to take at face value his famous words: "Gentle­
men, here is the King of Spain. Birth called him to this throne as 
well as the former king by his testament; the entire nation desired it 
and urgently requested it of me. It was the dictate of heaven; I 
granted it with pleasure."96 The entire procedure seems to have been 
predicated upon the assumption that the crowns of France and Spain 
would never be united in the same person, since this was specifi­
cally debarred by Carlos IFs will.97 Within a matter of weeks, how­
ever, Louis issued a declaration restoring the rights of Philip V and 
his heirs to inherit the French throne.98 Although Louis doubtless 
believed this to be justified both by reasons of state and family inter­
est, it was one of the major blunders of the reign, since it raised the 
specter of Franco-Spanish union and was an important factor in 
bringing about the massive coalition that faced France in the War 
of the Spanish Succession. Louis's motivation is nevertheless quite 
understandable when one recalls his intense pride as head of the 
house of Bourbon and his determination to bring it all possible honor, 
not to mention his reluctance to violate the fundamental law of suc­
cession to the French throne. The declaration pleaded the necessity 
of following divine choice of rulers on earth (surely a vital principle 
with Louis) and his obligations as king and father. The strength of 
Louis's dynasticism and paternalism was such that he was willing to 
risk a disastrous war rather than diminish the rights of the Bour­
bons.99 But the position could not be maintained in the face of his 
many enemies. In 1713, after years of bloodshed, famine, and national 
exhaustion had taken enormous toll and it had become clear that 
permanent separation of the two crowns was essential to peace, a 
great ceremony was held in the Parlement of Paris annulling the 
decree of 1700 and providing for perpetual exclusion of Philip V 
and his heirs from the French throne. The speech by the avocat 
du rot emphasized that this was a violation of fundamental law but 
the sacrifice was necessary for the good of the state.100 Once more, 
disaster had demonstrated to Louis that the rights and prestige of the 
Bourbons were of less moment than the national interest and that 
political necessity might require personal sacrifices of the reigning 
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family. This was consistent with Louis's concept of justifiable policy, 
although he had always been reluctant to recognize any divergence 
between his personal prestige and the interests of the state. That 
their essential disparity should have been most conclusively demon­
strated in the war that Louis tried most extensively to avoid and 
during which he offered major concessions in order to preserve the 
territorial integrity of his realm is one of the ironies of the period. 
Long before the close of hostilities, however, criticism of Louis's poli­
cies was rapidly gaining momentum. A new era was dawning in 
French opinion, and not the least of its sources was long experience 
with the ways in which Louis XIV, the greatest of absolute monarchs, 
had chosen to implement the doctrine of reason of state. 
Even this brief survey of Louis XIV's wars reveals much concerning 
his fundamental motivation. Many factors may have impinged upon 
his frequent decisions to resort to force as an instrument of policy: 
the influence of key ministers, strategic considerations, diplomatic 
developments, and the fortunes of dynastic rivalry, not to mention 
such latent pressures as international economic friction and the avid 
desire of the French nobles to distinguish themselves. The one major 
constant, however, was Louis's concept of kingship and his determina­
tion to fulfil it to the hilt. All other factors, even the chronic Bourbon-
Hapsburg rivalry, varied with the situation of the moment; Louis's 
ideology alone gives consistency to the pattern of events. Since he 
firmly believed that he was divinely appointed to rule without human 
limitation, was endowed with special knowledge of the mysteries of 
state, symbolized the state and led it to greater achievements, he 
necessarily assumed responsibility for all policy decisions and regarded 
himself as answerable only to God and his conscience. His account­
ability to God he seems never to have forgotten, although its immedi­
ate import was often neutralized by his enormous pride and self-
righteousness. Of more practical significance was his respect for law 
and justice, as evidenced by his efforts to demonstrate the legality 
of his actions and his attempts to abide by the terms of sworn treaties. 
One authority on the period goes so far as to maintain that Louis 
never deliberately broke a treaty commitment.101 This, of course, is 
strictly untrue, since he repudiated a number of sworn agreements, 
notably the partition treaties of 1698 and 1700.102 His desire to find 
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a legally sound basis for his policies was apparent in his handling of 
the War of Devolution, the reunions, and the War of the Spanish 
Succession, although the Dutch War and, to a lesser extent, the 
War of the League of Augsburg illustrate his willingness to resort to 
force for more personalized reasons. 
That Louis XIV closely associated the interests of his state with 
the honor and glory of the Bourbons and conducted his foreign policy 
accordingly was in the nature of things, since his divinely bestowed 
"profession of king" combined supreme authority over the state with 
headship of the reigning family. The two were but different elements 
of the enormously significant role that it was his destiny to perform. 
The equation between state interests and the glory and prestige of 
the Bourbons was never total, however, and repeated disasters increas­
ingly forced Louis to recognize that the general good was greater 
than anything centered in himself. In the final moments of his life, 
he seems to have realized the massive extent of his errors of policy. 
In his last words to the dauphin, he all but rejected war as a justi­
fiable instrument because of the burden that it imposed upon the 
people. "Do not imitate me in war; try always to maintain peace 
with your neighbors, to spare your people as much as you can, which 
I have had the misfortune not to be able to do because of necessities 
of state."103 The latter he still recognized, although he now took the 
position that war was a last resort, something to be avoided at all 
costs. Even more indicative of his disillusionment was his rejection 
of kingly glory as sufficient reason for war in his written instructions 
to the dauphin. "Always prefer peace to the uncertain events of war, 
and remember, my son, that the most brilliant victory is always too 
costly when it must be bought with the blood of your subjects. Never 
shed it, if possible, except for the glory of God."104 Long and increas­
ingly disastrous experience with the fruits of his personalized orienta­
tion of reason of state had clearly altered his concept of justifiable 
policy. He seemed almost to anticipate the inspired words with which 
Massillon prefaced Louis's funeral oration in the Sainte-Chapelle: 
"Only God is great."105 
A few words should be added concerning the reactions of con­
temporaries to Louis XIV's policies and understanding of reason of 
state in order to place these in the perspective of the period. It is 
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well known that Louis's many wars and their increasing cost in lives 
and suffering were subjected to extensive condemnation, first in 
Germany and the Netherlands and later in France. These criticisms 
ranged from satire, invective, and outright hatred to more philo­
sophical analyses of Louis's violations of the principles of justice and 
morality. Dozens of writers vented their spleen upon Louis's policies, 
but for our purposes it is sufficient to analyze the relevant ideas of 
two men: Leibniz and Fenelon. Although very difficult in back­
ground, intellectual position, and objectives, both men were close 
observers of contemporary affairs, had first-rate minds, and may be 
regarded as spokesmen for large bodies of opinion.106 
Leibniz' criticisms of Louis XIV's policies were but a small part 
of his political thought, which, in turn, was but a minor element in 
his vast range of intellectual activities. The richness of his mind 
ensured that his critique of Louis's policies would be among the 
most penetrating of the period. His most important work along these 
lines was his Mars Christianisshnus,107 a semi-satirical but deadly 
serious treatise in which he went to the heart of the problem of reason 
of state. The theme of the book is the universality of justice and 
Louis's violation of it by conducting French foreign policy as though 
he were exempt from its limitations. ''Although these principles 
undoubtedly bind ordinary men," Leibniz wrote with telling irony, 
"there is a certain law, superior to all others and yet consonant with 
sovereign justice, which exempts the king from observing them. It 
must be recognized that the just know no law, and he who has 
the authority of extraordinary power is exempt from universal and 
humane obligations by virtue of his commission."108 In making this 
charge, Leibniz was quite correct. For several generations the pro­
ponents of reason of state had held it to be axiomatic that there were 
two levels of justice, one for the populace and a higher one for the 
state, and that rulers, who alone understood the mysteries of state, 
might legitimately conduct their affairs according to this higher moral­
ity. Measures that were criminal among the people were quite justi­
fied when undertaken in the interests of the state. Leibniz had 
clearly put his finger on the most questionable aspect of the entire 
position. From this standpoint, he continued, justice is whatever bene­
fits the stronger. "It must be admitted that he [Louis XIV] uses his 
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power with great moderation, since he has the right to carry out 
anything that enters his head, provided that it augments his gran­
deur." 109 It was impossible, Leibniz insisted, to justify French aggres­
sions by appeal to ordinary law, and he cited violations of the treaties 
of Miinster and the Pyrenees, the seizure of Lorraine, the Dutch War, 
and the occupation of Strasbourg and other Imperial territories.110 
But God, he concluded, treats all equally and "never distinguishes 
between a king and a peasant except to augment his punishments 
in proportion to the greatness of sinners and the nature and con­
sequences of their crimes."m Through his philosophical approach 
Leibniz succeeded in throwing into stark relief the major doctrinal 
weakness of reason of state. For those who thought like him— 
and there were many—Europe's sufferings stemmed essentially from 
Louis XIV's deviations from the fundamental canons of justice and 
Christian morality. 
Fenelon likewise believed in the universality of justice according 
to immutable Christian principles; it was the foundation of his entire 
political system. Kings and peasants are alike before God, he held, 
and he did not hesitate to exhort the Duke of Burgundy, "Do you 
sufficiently understand all the truths of Christianity? You will be 
judged according to the Gospel like the least of your subjects."112 
Unlike Leibniz, however, Fenelon was not content merely to assert 
that right should prevail, and he wrote a series of works in which 
he articulated his political ideals in great detail. The king he regarded 
as little more than a servant of the people. "The condition of the 
king is very unhappy. He is the slave of all over whom he seems to 
rule; he is made for them; he owes himself entirely to them; he is 
burdened with all their needs; he is the man of the people and of 
each in particular."113 Specifically, he was compelled to rule accord­
ing to established law and to render law effective in society. "The 
authority that he seems to have is not his; he may do nothing for his 
glory or his pleasure; his authority is that of the laws; he must obey 
them. Strictly speaking, he is merely the defender of the laws in 
order to cause them to rule; he must constantly watch and work to 
maintain them; he is a slave who sacrifices his repose and liberty for 
the liberty and happiness of the public."114 Fenelon was absolutely 
uncompromising in this. For him, the ruler was but a divinely 
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appointed instrument whose reason for existence was preservation of 
the law and advancement of the general welfare, but who had little 
significance in and of himself. 
The common Father of the great [human] family confided his chil­
dren to the sovereign only to make them happy; He desires that 
a single man, through his wisdom, serve the happiness of many men, 
not that the many, through their misery, serve to flatter the pride of 
one. God did not make him king for himself. He is king only to 
belong to the people, and he is worthy of royalty only to the extent 
that he effaces himself before the public good.115 
Gone was most of the traditional grandeur of monarchy, and in its 
place Fenelon would substitute a humble, devoted ruler whose policies 
were always guided by religion and justice and who recognized that 
he was a mere servant of the general welfare. 
With such high ideals as his frame of reference, it is not surprising 
that Fenelon found ample reason to formulate many penetrating 
criticisms of Louis XIV and his policies. In fact, Louis seemed to 
deviate from Fenelon's concept of true kingship in almost every 
essential. Fundamentally, Louis was at fault because he was not a 
true Christian: 
You do not love God; you do not even fear Him with the fear of a 
slave; it is hell and not God that you fear. Your religion consists 
only of superstitions and petty, superficial practices. . . . You are 
scrupulous about bagatelles and hardened to terrible wrongs. You 
love only your glory and your comforts. You view everything in 
terms of yourself, as though you were God on earth and all others 
had been created merely to be sacrificed to you. On the contrary, 
it is you whom God placed on earth for your people. But alas! You 
understand nothing of these truths.116 
A more devastating criticism from Fenelon's standpoint would be 
difficult to imagine. He was convinced that Louis's lack of religious 
morality had caused him to abandon the way of true kingship and 
to follow instead the dictates of personal pride, the antithesis of 
Christian humility. Louis's thirst for personal glory Fenelon repeat­
edly denounced,117 and he consequently condemned most of the 
policies that Louis held to be justified by his egocentric version of 
reason of state. In domestic affairs Fenelon intensely disliked Louis's 
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exploitation of the resources of the realm for personal purposes and 
insisted that a true king would abide by the laws that protected the 
subjects' property, taking the latter only when it was clearly required 
for the public good. "Have you never taken anything from one of your 
subjects by mere act of authority, contrary to the laws? . . . Have 
you thoroughly examined the true needs of the state in comparison 
with the distress that taxes cause before imposing them upon your 
people?"118 "The people's goods should be used only for the true 
benefit of the people themselves."119 The rule of law above arbitrary 
royal discretion he instinctively associated with the public good and 
the supremacy of Christian morality. 
It was Louis XIV's wars that drew most of Fenelon's fire. He 
repeatedly insisted that wars for territorial expansion and the mon­
arch's prestige were the negation of true kingship since they sub­
ordinated justice to royal pride. "Have you never called a necessity 
of state something that served merely to flatter your ambition, such 
as a war for conquest and glory? Have you never called your pre­
tensions public necessities?"120 The argument that the personal glory 
of the sovereign was an asset to the state and a sufficient reason for 
war clearly carried no weight with Fenelon. Furthermore, the con­
cept of two levels of morality, so fundamental to reason of state, he 
found abhorrent. "A poor wretch who steals a coin on the highway 
in his great need is hanged, but a man who makes conquests, that 
is, who unjustly subjugates a province of a neighboring state, is 
treated as a hero! . . . To take another's field is a great sin; to seize 
a province is an innocent and glorious act! Where are ideas of 
justice? Will God judge in this manner? . .  . Is justice no longer 
justice when the greatest interests are involved?"121 Fenelon's rejec­
tion of this basis of reason of state was total. He believed that the 
Dutch War embodied all these evils and was the source of all the 
later wars that had reduced France to ruin.122 Similarly, the dynastic 
interests of the Bourbons were no excuse for war. "It may be 
merely a question of some claim to a succession which concerns you 
personally; your people have no real interest in it. What is it to them 
if you acquire another province?"123 Fenelon, in fact, all but rejected 
war as a justifiable instrument of royal policy. "All things considered, 
there is almost no war, not even a successful one, that does not bring 
more evil than good to the state. One has only to consider how it 
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ruins families, the number of men it causes to perish, how it ravages 
and depopulates the countryside, disrupts the state, degrades the laws, 
permits license, and how many years are required to repair the 
damage wrought by two years of war to good state policies."124 The 
only just war for Fenelon was one that was waged in order to prevent 
a lawless, tyrannical neighboring ruler from gaining overwhelming 
strength. When confronted with such a threat, resort to arms was 
justified.125 In taking this position, Fenelon clearly had in mind the 
plight of Louis's enemies and went far toward justifying their cause. 
Fenelon similarly condemned all acquisitions of territory, such as 
the reunions and the seizure of Strasbourg.126 The argument that 
frontier areas might be taken for strategic reasons he found valueless, 
both because annexations were unjust and because the principle 
might be extended to justify seizures as far as the borders of China.127 
As for treaties between states, their object should be to restore peace 
rather than to permit the victors to exploit the vanquished.128 Treaties 
should be couched in the clearest possible terms and should take 
precedence over all local customs—an obvious reference to the War 
of Devolution.129 In view of these statements it is not surprising that 
Fenelon insisted on the restitution of all territories that had been 
unjustly acquired—in effect, all of Louis XIV's conquests.130 There 
is a strong element of Utopian idealism in many of Fenelon's recom­
mendations, combined with a complete unwillingness to recognize 
that political necessity might require a less principled and more 
practical type of policy, given the conditions of seventeenth-century 
interstate relations. The essence of his position was nevertheless quite 
unchallengeable, since it represented fearless application of Christian 
principles to Louis XIV's policies, especially his wars. The result 
was a devastating critique of Louis XIV's understanding of reason 
of state. 
Few among Louis XIV's critics during the latter part of his reign 
were as thorough-going as Fenelon, either because they examined 
only limited aspects of Louis's government or because they were more 
willing to compromise with the principles of Christian morality. 
Fenelon nevertheless spoke for a large body of opinion, particularly 
the massive reaction against the great human sacrifices that Louis's 
wars had entailed. In this there was general agreement among all of 
Louis's major critics—Fenelon, Saint-Simon, Boulainvillers, Bayle, 
Vauban, Boisguillebert—regardless of their areas of special concern. 
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All deplored the incredible suffering that the wars had inflicted upon 
the nation, and not one, significantly, was willing to accept the argu­
ment that they were justified either by political necessity or the 
requirements of royal prestige. To this extent there was a general 
rejection of Louis XIV's concept of reason of state. It is noteworthy, 
however, that among Louis's critics there were no French jurists 
of stature. The concept of divine-right absolutism was largely their 
creation, since it stemmed essentially from Bodin's theory of royal 
sovereignty as altered in later juridical writings to include significant 
expansion of the royal discretion. Subsequent writers such as Bossuet 
may have added further refinements, but the foundations were laid 
by the jurists in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. 
From the standpoint of accepted legal concepts, Louis XIV was 
entirely within his rightful sphere of competence when he embarked 
upon those measures that were most criticized, specifically his wars. 
The legal definition of the royal prerogative provided no substantial 
basis for questioning Louis's foreign policy. The result was that the 
most penetrating criticisms came from other quarters, from theo­
logians, philosophers, noblemen, economists, even military men. It 
was they who first voiced the widespread reaction against the con­
sequences of Louis XIV's implementation of reason of state. 
In conclusion, it should be noted that none of Louis XIV's critics 
questioned or sought to undermine the monarchy itself. Indeed, they 
may all be said to have favored absolute monarchy in the sense that 
none sought to diminish the sovereign authority or to divide it be­
tween the king and other governing bodies. They remained loyal to 
the only type of regime that they knew: monarchy in which the 
legally designated ruler held all public authority and assumed final 
responsibility for all acts of government. If they occasionally sug­
gested structural modifications in the governmental system, this was 
for the purpose of tempering the exercise of royal power rather than 
changing or reassigning power itself. Their quarrel was not with 
absolute monarchy but with the policies of their absolute monarch, 
that is, the manner in which Louis XIV implemented the monarchical 
principle according to his personalized version of reason of state. 
For several generations prior to 1661, a majority of thinking men 
had advocated increased royal power as the only means of ensuring 
order in French society, and had developed political concepts that 
attributed great discretionary power to the sovereign. Louis XIV 
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arrived, took them at their word, and provided France with the most 
thorough-going absolutism in her many centuries of monarchial rule. 
Its practical results, however, were massive exploitation of the human 
and material resources of the realm and a series of wars that inflicted 
upon it great suffering, bankrupted the royal government, and caused 
Louis to die generally hated. For all his efforts to justify his policies, 
the inescapable fact was that they had proved disastrous to the nation. 
The consequence was that before the end of his long reign, thinking 
men once more embarked upon the never-ending search for a 
principle of authority that would both ensure stability and advance 
the public good. This time they oriented their thought not toward 
increased royal power but toward maximum benefit of the people. 
Because of long experience with Louis XIV and his policies, they 
were convinced that there were better means of achieving the general 
welfare and that the royal government should be but an instrument 
toward that end. Rather than an object of adulation that was cloaked 
in mystery and stood far above human society, the monarchy came 
increasingly to be viewed as an organ whose purpose was public 
service and whose policies were to be judged accordingly. To this 
extent the experience of France during the reign of Louis XIV 
tended to undermine the ancient traditions of the French monarchy 
and to open the way for new concepts of rightful government. Such 
was the final historical import of Louis XIV's concept of reason 
of state. 
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Louis XIV: A Bibliographical

Introduction

J OHN C. RULE 
Because of the vast amount of material that is available on the reign of 
Louis XIV this select bibliography has for the readers' convenience 
been divided into the following major topics: I. Introduction to the Reign 
of Louis XIV: Surveys of Europe, General Histories of France, Biographies, 
and Memoirs; II. The History of International Relations and Politics; III. 
The Institutions of Government in Practice and Theory; IV. Social 
History; V. Economic History; VI. The Army; VII. The Marine; VIII. 
The French Colonies; IX. Religion; X. Literature and Ideas; XI. Science; 
XII. Education; XIII. Art and Architecture; XIV. Music. 
I. Introductions to the Reign of Louis XIV;

Surveys of Europe, General Histories of France,

Biographies, and Memoirs

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AIDS.—An indispensable guide to printed works written 
on the seventeenth century, both by contemporaries and later writers, 
has been compiled by Emile Bourgeois and Louis Andre in a series 
entitled Les Sources de I'histoire de France: XVII6 siecle {1610-1715) 
(Paris, 1913-35). 
An extremely useful critical guide to historiographical trends and to 
major recent works published on French history can be found in 
ha Recherche historique en France de 1940 a 1965, published by the 
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (Paris, 1965). An impor­
tant source of information on recent works that have appeared in the 
field of seventeenth-century French history are the notices appended to 
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the journal XVIIe siecle: Bulletin de la Societe d'Etude du XVIle Siecle 
(hereafter cited as XVlIe siecle'). Also helpful is the Bibliography of 
French Seventeenth Century Studies, published for the Modern Lan­
guage Association, French Group III, since 1953; its emphasis is on 
literary history, but it is useful for works on cultural and social history 
as well. 
Standard guides to works in the field have been compiled by E. Saul­
nier and A. Martin, Bibliographie des travaux publies de 1866 a 1897 
sur Vhistoire de France de 1500 a 1789 (2 vols.; Paris, 1932-38); G. Briere 
et al. (eds.), Repertoire methodique de Vhistoire moderne et contempo­
raine de la France (9 vols.; Paris, 1899-1932); P. Caron and H. Stein 
(eds.), Repertoire bibliographique de Vhistoire de France (6 vols.; Paris, 
1923-38); and G. Pages, L. Cahen, and M. Jayre (eds.), Bibliographie 
critique des principaux travaux parus sur Vhistoire de 1600 a 1914 en 
1932 et 1933 (3 vols.; Paris, 1935-37). More recently, volumes continuing 
the earlier series have appeared under the title Bibliographie annuelle de 
Vhistoire de France du cinquieme siecle a 1939 (Paris, 1953/54 )• 
A sporadically annotated but up-to-date compilation on modern history, 
containing sections on France, has been published by the Cambridge 
University Press as a companion to the New Cambridge Modern History, 
under the title A Bibliography of Modern History, ed. John Roach 
(Cambridge, 1968). 
HISTORIES OF EUROPE.—A comprehensive, if uneven, survey of Europe 
in its world setting is Volume V of the New Cambridge Modern History, 
entitled The Ascendancy of France 1648-88, ed. F. L. Carsten (Cam­
bridge, 1961). The French equivalent, in the "Peuples et Civilisations" 
series, Vol. X, Louis XIV (1661-1715) (3d ed.; Paris, 1949), is authored 
by Philippe Sagnac and A. de Saint-Leger, who find the nceud to Louis 
XIV's reign in the religious and political drama of the troubled years, 
1682-88; the work is curiously ambivalent in its evaluation of Louis XIV. 
Two other French series should be mentioned. The "Clio" series con­
tains a volume of Edmond Preclin and V.-L. Tapie, he XVlle siecle (2d 
ed.; Paris, 1949); it is an encyclopedic account with long if somewhat 
inaccurate bibliographies. In the series entitled Histoire generale des civili­
sations, edited by M. Crouzet, Roland Mousnier has a volume entitled 
Les XVIe et XVlle siecles: le progres de la civilisation europeenne et 
le declin de VOrient (1492-1715) (Paris, 1954; 3d ed., 1961). As a 
counterpoise to the French surveys, the student can turn to the new edi­
tion of the "Propylaen Weltgeschichte," Vol. VII, Von der Reformation 
zur Revolution, whose authors include Heinrich Lutz, Golo Mann, V.-L. 
Tapie, Adam Wandruszka, et al. (Berlin, Frankfort, Vienna, 1964); there 
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is a pertinent essay by Tapie" on "Das Zeitalter Ludwigs XIV." A useful 
synthesis is also offered in the American series edited by William L. 
Langer under the title Rise of Modern Europe, including, for this period, 
F. L. Nussbaum, The Triumph of Science and Reason, 1660-1685 (New 
York, 1953) and John B. Wolf, The Emergence of the Great Powers, 
i6$$-iyi5 (New York, 1951). 
HISTORIES OF FRANCE.—As an introduction to French history of the 
seventeenth century, there are two recent interpretative accounts that 
serve as welcome correctives to the older drum-and-trumpet histories: 
first, Robert Mandrou's contribution to the "Nouvelle Clio" series, La 
France aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siecles (Paris, 1967) (with a detailed, if 
largely unannotated, bibliography); and Pierre Goubert's Louis XIV et 
vingt millions de Frangais (Paris, 1966), consciously revisionist but bril­
liantly conceived. 
No student, however, can yet afford to overlook one of the classic 
twentieth-century accounts of the reign written by Ernest Lavisse in a 
contribution to a series he edited, Histoire de la France depuis les origines 
jusqu'a la Revolution, Vols. VII1, VII2, VIII1. The first two of these vol­
umes, detailing the reign from 1643 to 1685, were written by Lavisse, 
and smack of a strongly anti-Bourbon bias. The last volume, covering 
the concluding years, 1685-1715, was written by Lavisse in collaboration 
with A. de Saint-Leger, A. Rebelliau, and Philippe Sagnac (Paris, 1905-8). 
Among these authors, Saint-Leger and Rebelliau were a shade less hostile 
to Louis XIV's regime than Lavisse. 
A recent cogently written and intelligently organized guide to the 
reign is G. R. R. Treasure, Seventeenth Century France (London, 1966); 
unfortunately, the bibliography is carelessly compiled. A more elementary 
account, written primarily for language students, is John Lough, An Intro­
duction to Seventeenth Century France (London, 1954). Elegantly writ­
ten and handsomely illustrated is Georges Mongredien et al., La France 
au temps de Louis XIV (Paris, 1965). A rewarding synthesis of recent 
works on seventeenth-century France is crammed into a volume by 
Hubert Methivier, Le Siecle de Louis XIV (Paris, 1968); and for the 
background to 1660 there is Methivier's Le Siecle de Louis XIII (Paris, 
1964). 
BIOGRAPHIES OF LOUIS XIV.—A brief summary of the great biographers 
of Louis XIV is presented by Philip de Vries in Het Beeld van Lodewijk 
XIV in de Franse Geschiedschrijving (Amsterdam, 1948); it contains an 
adequate bibliography and a precis in French. Biographies of Louis XIV 
abound. Happily, we have a guide to recent biographies in John B. 
Wolf's article, "The Reign of Louis XIV: A Selected Bibliography of 
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Writings Since the War of 1914-1918," Journal of Modern History, 
XXXVI (1964), 129-32. A sympathetic reading of the reign is given by 
Pierre Gaxotte in La France de Louis XIV (Paris, 1946). Louis Bertrand's 
amateurish attempt at psychological portraiture (Louis XIV [Paris, 1924]) 
only points up the need for a competent study in that field. Readable, if 
unexciting historiographically, is W. H. Lewis, Louis XIV: An Informal 
Portrait (London, 1959). An engaging narrative, largely undocumented, 
is Philippe Erlanger's Louis XIV (Paris, 1965). David Ogg's Whiggish 
summary, Louis XIV, has been reprinted by Oxford University Press 
(1966) with a revised and serviceable bibliography by R. M. Hatton. For 
Louis's quite public private life a good guide is Georges Mongredien, 
La Vie privee de Louis XIV (Paris, 1938). John B. Wolf's Louis XIV 
(New York, 1968) provides a detailed account of Louis's personal and 
public life, garnished with vivid anecdotes and pungent insights. 
Two handbooks dealing with historiographical and interpretive prob­
lems are William F. Church (ed.), The Greatness of Louis XIV: Myth 
or Reality? (Boston, 1959), and H. G. Judge (ed.), Louis XIV (London, 
1965). 
Louis XIV'S MEMOIRS AND LETTERS.—Paul Sonnino has discussed the 
problems concerned with Louis XIV's Memoires in his article "The 
Dating and Authorship of Louis XIV's Memoires," French Historical 
Studies, III (1964), 303-37. Sonnino has promised for early publication 
a new translation and critical edition of the Memoires. LIntil it appears, 
we must content ourselves with the editions compiled by Charles Dreyss 
and Jean Longnon. In the 1920's three versions of the Memoires appeared, 
edited by Jean Longnon: first, Memoires pour les annees 1661 et 1666 
(Paris, 1923); second, an English translation of this edition by Herbert 
Wilson, entitled A King's Lessons in Statecraft: Louis XIV; Letters to 
His Heirs (London, 1924); and third, a more complete edition, Memoires 
de Louis XIV (Paris, 1927). Still valuable is the nineteenth-century com­
pilation of C. Dreyss (ed.), Memoires de Louis XIV pour Vinstruction 
du dauphin (2 vols.; Paris, i860). 
The archival collection of Louis XIV's letters written in his hand, 
dictated, or inspired by him is so vast that only a few of them have as 
yet been published. The most convenient edition is Pierre Gaxotte's 
Lettres de Louis XIV (Paris, 1930), containing 139 letters covering the 
period 1659-1715. Also important as a source of our knowledge of Louis's 
statecraft are his letters to his ambassador in Spain during the War of 
the Spanish Succession: Correspondence de Louis XIV avec M. Amelot 
1705-1709, ed. Girardot (Paris, 1864). 
Louis XIV AND HIS COURT.—The best introduction to the court life are 
the memoirs left by several of Louis's more perceptive and literate court­
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iers, the more famous being those of the Due de Saint-Simon and the 
marquises Dangeau and Sourches. The best edition of the memoirs 
of Louis de Rouvroy, due de Saint-Simon, is A. de Boislisle (ed.), 
Memoires de Saint-Simon (43 vols.; Paris, 1879-1930). The Journal of 
Philippe de Courcillon, the marquis de Dangeau, has been edited by 
E. Soulid et al. (19 vols.; Paris, 1854-1860). The Memoires of Louis F. 
du Bouchet, marquis de Sourches, have been edited by De Cosnac et al. 
(13 vols.; Paris, 1882-1893; with 'Table" by L. Lecestre, Paris, 1912). 
Indispensable as a guide to court life are the shrewd comments made by 
the elector of Brandenburg's representative in France, Ezechiel Spanheim, 
in his Relation de la cour de France en 1690, ed. Emile Bourgeois (Lyon, 
1900). For a background study of Spanheim see Victor Loewe, Ein Diplo­
mat und Gelehrter: Ezechiel Spanheim (1629-1710) (Berlin, 1924). 
Other memoirs of importance are Emile Magne (ed.), Lettres inedites 
a Marie-Louise de Gonzague, reine de Pologne, sur la cour de Louis XIV 
(1660-166'/) (Paris, 1920); Primi Visconti, Memoires sur la cour de Louis 
XIV, ed. J. Lemoine (Paris, 1909); and Thomas Chabod, marquis de 
Saint-Maurice, Lettres sur la cour de Louis XIV, 1667-1670, ed. J. 
Lemoine (Paris, 1930). 
Good secondary accounts of the court can be found in Jacques Levron, 
La Vie quotidienne a la cour de Versailles aux XVIle et XVIIle siecles 
(Paris, 1965), and Due de la Force, Louis XIV et sa cour (Paris, 1956); 
Marcel Langlois, Louis XIV et la cour (Paris, [1926]). The latter 
work identifies—not altogether successfully—Chamillart as the author of 
Sourches's Memoires. An informative essay concerning court etiquette and 
manners has been written by Henri Brocher, A la cour de Louis XIV: 
Je rang et Vetiquette sous VAncien Regime (Paris, 1934). 
THE LADIES IN LOUIS XIV'S LIFE.—Jules Lair, Louise de la Valliere et 
la jeunesse de Louis XIV (Paris, 1881); Pierre Clement, Madame de 
Montespan et Louis XIV (Paris, 1868); and A. Houssaye, Mile de la 
Valliere et Madame de Montespan (Paris, 1896), provide a detailed 
account of Louis's unofficial wives. Perhaps the most important female 
witness to the events at court during the last years of Louis XIV's life 
was his morganatic wife, Madame de Maintenon, whose Lettres have been 
edited by Marcel Langlois (4 vols.; Paris, 1935-39). Langlois has also 
written the best life of the marquise: Madame de Maintenon (Paris, 
1932). Another noteworthy life is J. Cordelier, Madame de Maintenon 
(Paris, 1955); also Louis Hastier, Louis XIV et Madame de Maintenon 
(Paris, 1957), in which the author questions the traditional date of 
Maintenon's marriage to Louis XIV. The problem of Maintenon's politi­
cal activities is treated by A. Baudrillart in "Madame de Maintenon, son 
role politique pendant les dernieres annees du regne de Louis XIV," 
Revue des questions historiques, XXV (1890), 101-61. 
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Louis XIV'S EARLY LIFE, THE FRONDES, AND THE 1650*5.—Although 
excessively favorable in its assessment of Cardinal Mazarin's achievements, 
still one of the best introductions to the "reign" of Mazarin and to the 
early years of Louis XIV's rule is the monumental work of P.-A. Cheruel, 
Histoire de France pendant la minorite de Louis XIV (4 vols.; Paris, 
1879-80), and its sequel, Histoire de France sous le ministere de Mazarin 
(1651-1661) (3 vols.; Paris, 1882). An invaluable source for the period, 
one on which P.-A. Cheruel based much of his work, is P.-A. Cheruel 
and G. d'Avenel's edition of Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin . .  . (9 vols.; 
Paris, 1872-1906). 
The Frondes.—A stormy chapter in recent historiography of French 
history centers around the background to, and the uprisings accompany­
ing, the Frondes, the civil wars that buffeted France from 1648 to 1653. 
An excellent guide to the political thought of the period, and at the same 
time a useful introduction to the historiographical trends (before 1952) 
is Ernst Kossmann's La Fronde (Leiden, 1954). Kossmann's first chapter 
introduces the reader to the general problems of the period and to the 
works of such historians as Cheruel, Henri See, and Paul Doolin. In 
addition to Kossmann's study, noteworthy are Louis Madelin's Une 
Revolution manquee. La Fronde (Paris, 1931), which pictures the Fronde 
as a fancy dress rehearsal for the French Revolution, and Paul R. Doolin's 
The Fronde (Cambridge, Mass., 1935), which places the uprising in the 
context of its constitutional setting. 
More recent works on the Frondes have stressed (1) the pan-European 
aspects of the mid-seventeenth-century revolutions and/or (2) the ante­
cedents to the French upheaval, with emphasis on the social and economic 
history of the times. In the first category is the excellent summary edited 
by Trevor Aston under the title Crisis in Europe, 1560—1660 (London, 
1965), which includes essays by E. J. Hobsbawm and H. R. Trevor-Roper 
on the "General Crisis" of the seventeenth century, with comments by 
Roland Mousnier and J. H. Elliott. These essays originally appeared in 
the journal Past and Present, Nos. 16 (1959) and 18 (i960), with com­
ments (in addition to those of Mousnier and Elliott) by E. H. Kossmann, 
E. J. Hobsbawm, J. H. Hexter, and Lawrence Stone. Trevor-Roper has 
since elaborated his essay in his work Religion, the Reformation, and Social 
Change (London, 1967), particularly pp. 1-89. 
The question of internal developments in France before and during 
the Fronde has recently been summarized by J. H. M. Salmon in his 
important article, "Venal Office and Popular Sedition in Seventeenth-
Century France," Past and Present, No. 37 (1967), pp. 21-43. Salmon 
gives us guidelines to follow in viewing the vast historical literature that 
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has appeared on the topic of the Fronde. He begins with the important 
article of Georges Pages, "La Venalite des offices dans l'ancienne France," 
Revue historique, CLXIX (1932), 477-95, followed by a review of the 
work of Roland Mousnier in La Venalite des offices sous Henri IV et 
Louis XIII (Rouen, 1945). Pages and Mousnier placed great emphasis 
on the dictatorial aspects of the government of the old regime, on the 
use of the commissaires under the administrations of Richelieu and 
Mazarin, and on the clash of interest between the officiers and the 
newer bureaucrats. Some of their conclusions were challenged by the 
Russian historian Boris Porshnev in his work Les Soulevements populates 
en France de 1623 a 1648 (Paris, 1963; Russian ed., Moscow, 1948; 
German ed., Berlin, 1954). Porshnev emphasized the class conflict pre­
ceding the Fronde of 1648, with particular reference to peasant leader­
ship; he also stressed the feudal-absolutist character of the French mon­
archy, that is, the "alliance-in-oppression" of the nobility of the sword 
and the officeholder. Mousnier took ten years to reply to Porshnev; 
when he did, he denied that the popular uprisings had been spontaneous, 
but rather, that they were often led by the local seigneurs and that there 
was less class conflict than Porshnev indicated. His conclusions are con­
tained in "Recherches sur les soulevements populaires en France avant 
la Fronde," Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, V (1958), 81­
113; and more recently in his Introduction to an edition of the Lettres et 
memoires adresses au chancelier Seguier (1633-1649) (2 vols.; Paris, 
1964). 
Other important works by, or inspired by, Mousnier are: Problerues 
de stratification sociale—deux cahiers de la noblesse, 1649-1651, by 
Mousnier, J.-P. Labatut, and Y. Durand (Paris, 1965); and the richly 
documented work of Jean-Paul Charmeil, Les Tresoriers de France a 
I'dpoque de la Fronde (Paris, 1964), which further demonstrates the clash 
between the venal officials and the commissaires. 
Two works that shed further light on the controversy over the Frondes 
are V.-L. Tapie's La France de Louis XIII et de Richelieu (Paris, 1952; 
rev. ed., 1967), one of the first works to summarize for a French audience 
Porshnev's conclusions and to comment upon them critically, and Robert 
Mandrou's Classes et luttes des classes en France au debut du XVIIe siecle 
(Florence, 1965), which asks significant questions of Porshnev's method­
ology. 
A further refinement of the Russian position has been offered by 
Mme A. D. Lublinskaya in Vnutrennjaja Politika Frantcuzkogo Absoljut­
izma, 1633-1649 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1966). A recent work by the 
same author is French Absolutism: The Crucial Phase 1620-1629, trans. 
Brian Pearce (Cambridge, England, 1968). 
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For England's impact on the Frondes the reader can consult the well-
documented work of Philip A. Knachel, England and the Fronde: The 
Impact of the English Civil War and the Revolution on France (Ithaca, 
N. Y., 1967). Insights into the political temper of the times can still be 
gained by a close reading in the great collection of political tracts edited 
by C. Moreau, Choix de Mazarinades (2 vols.; Paris, 1853). 
II. The History of International Relations and Politics 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL AIDS.—One of the best specialized 
guides to articles in the field of diplomatic history is Georges Dethan (ed.), 
Table generale et methodique de la revue d'histoire diplomatique depuis 
son origine (1887-1963) (Paris, 1965). Also important is the work by 
Emile Bourgeois and Louis Andre (eds.), Les Sources de Vhistoire de 
France: XVII6 siecle (1610-1715) QHistoire politique et militaire, Bour­
geois and Andre, (eds.) Vol. V, [Paris, 1926]). Indispensable for bio­
graphical information is L. Buttner and L. Gross (eds.), Repertorium der 
d i p l o m a t i s c h e n V e r t r e t e r a l l e r L a n d e r . . . ( 3 v o l s . ; B e r l i n a n d Z u r i c h , 
1936-1965). 
PRINTED SOURCES.—The instructions sent to the French ambassadors and 
ministers abroad during the period 1648-1791, with supporting documen­
tation drawn from the Archives des Affaires Etrangeres, is published in a 
continuing series under the general title Recueil des instructions donnees 
aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traites de Westphalie 
jusqu'a la Revolution francaise. The first volume appeared in 1879, and 
the latest, in 1965, the latter being the important instructions to England: 
Paul Vaucher (ed.), Recueil des instructions donnees . . . XXV-2 Angle­
terre III (1698-1791) (Paris, 1965). A convenient collection of treaties is 
contained in Henri Vast, Les grands traites du regne de Louis XIV (3 
vols.; Paris, 1893-99). 
GENERAL WORKS ON THE EARLY MODERN ERA.—Still of value for a 
general view of European diplomacy is Emile Bourgeois, Les Origines 
(1610-1789) QAanuel historique de politique etrangere, Vol. I [6th ed.; 
Paris, 1916]); and Max Immich, Geschichte des europdischen Staaten­
systems von 1660 bis 1789 (Munich and Berlin, 1905). An informative 
summary is Jacques Droz's Histoire diplomatique de 1648 a 1919 (Paris, 
1952). 
SURVEYS OF LOUIS XIV DIPLOMACY.—A noteworthy survey, more clearly 
related to the reign of Louis XIV, is Louis Andre", Louis XIV et VEurope 
(Paris, 1950), which contains an extensive, if cryptically cited, bibliog­
raphy. Andre" gives a sympathetic reading to Louis's foreign policy, 
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whereas Gaston Zeller presents a harsher judgment in his two volumes 
that appeared in the series "Histoire des relations internationales," (ed. 
Pierre Renouvin) under the title Les Temps modernes (2 vols.; Paris, 
1953-55), subtitled (Vol. I) De Christophe Colomh a Cromwell and 
(Vol. II) De Louis XIV a 1789. Zeller distils his views in the chapter 
"French Diplomacy and Foreign Policy in Their European Setting," in 
F. L. Carsten (ed.), The Ascendancy of France: 1648-88 (New Cam­
hridge Modern History, Vol. V [Cambridge, Eng., 1961]), pp. 198-221. 
Generally hostile to Louis XIV as a ruler, Zeller first clearly outlined 
his ideas in an important article, "Politique exterieure et diplomatic sous 
Louis XIV," Revue d'histoire moderne, VI (1931), 124-43. Less hostile 
to Louis XIV's policies are the views of Georges Pages, who, a genera­
tion before Zeller, summarized his point of view in a well-reasoned 
essay, "L'Historie diplomatique du regne de Louis XIV," Revue d'histoire 
moderne et contemporaine, VII (1905-6), 653-80. V.-L. Tapie provides 
us with a brief but useful analysis of foreign policy in the chapter <rNec 
pluribus impar," in Georges Mongredien et ah, La France au temps de 
Louis XIV (Paris, 1965), Ch. 7. Tapi£ asks such pertinent questions as: 
"Le sang et la gloire: les responsabilites du roi" "Frontieres naturelles ou 
Succession d'Espagne?" Tapie and others also give us a general view of 
diplomatic history in "Problemes de politique etrangeres sous Louis XIV," 
XVII6 siecle, Nos. 46-47 (i960). 
THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE IN THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV.—The best works 
dealing with the diplomatic practices of the age are C.-G. Picavet, La 
Diplomatie frangaise au temps de Louis XIV (1661-1715): institutions, 
moeurs, et coutumes (Paris, 1930); and an adjunct work, Camille Piccioni, 
Les premiers commis des affaires etrangeres aux iye et i8e siecles (Paris, 
1928). The insights vouchsafed by Picavet and Piccioni come in part 
from a close reading of the great classics of diplomacy written during the 
Grand Siecle: Rousseau de Chamoy, L'ldee du parfait ambassadeur, ed. 
Louis Delavaud (Paris, 1912); Francois de Callieres, On the Manner of 
Negotiating with Princes, ed. Stephen D. Kertesz; trans. A. F. Whyte 
(Notre Dame, Ind., 1963); and Antoine Pecquet, L'Art negocier (Paris, 
1737)­
STUDIES IN THE EVOLUTION OF LOUIS XIV'S DIPLOMACY.—There are 
many noteworthy studies directed toward specific periods of the age of 
Louis XIV that serve to provide a framework for tracing the development 
of diplomacy during that age. 
The Peace of Westphalia and Peace of the Pyrenees: 1643-1659.— 
The years in which Cardinal Mazarin directed French foreign affairs 
have not yet been treated in a comprehensive survey. The Treaty of 
Miinster, 1648, which codified, on paper at least, French holdings in 
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Alsace, is admirably dealt with in three major works: Max Braubach, 
Der Westfdlische Friede (Minister, 1948); Fritz Dickmann, Der West­
fdlische Frieden (Miinster, 1959); and Ernst Hovel (ed.), Pax Optima 
Rerum: Beitrage zur Geschichte des Westfdlischen Friedens, 1648 
(Miinster, 1948). A summary account, cogently and concisely analyzing 
the international situation, is Paul Vaucher, Etude sur la France de 1598 a 
1660 ("Les Cours de Sorbonne"; Paris, 1954). 
The myth that France at this time and in subsequent years lusted 
after so-called natural frontiers has been laid by Gaston Zeller in two 
articles: "La Monarchic d'Ancien Regime et les frontieres naturelles," 
Revue d'histoire moderne, VIII (1933), 305-31; and "Histoire d'une idee 
fausse," in his Aspects de la politique frangaise sous VAncien Regime 
(Paris, 1964), pp. 90-108. 
The diplomacy of the 1650's is surveyed through the eyes of the able 
diplomat Hugues de Lionne in Jules Valfrey's La Diplomatic frangaise 
au XVIIe siecle: Hugues de Lionne, ses ambassades en Espagne et en 
Allemagne . . . d'apres sa correspondence (Paris, 1881); and J. Valfrey, 
La Diplomatic frangaise au XVIIe siecle: Hugues de Lionne, ses ambassades 
en Italie 1642-56 (Paris, 1877). For Mazarin's interference in German 
internal politics, see P.-A. Cheruel, "La Ligue du Rhin," Seances et 
travaux de VAcademie des Sciences morales et politiques, XIV (1888), 
995-1065. Also of interest for the study of French aims in Germany is 
Claude Badalo-Dulong's Trente ans de la diplomatic frangaise en Alle­
magne. Louis XIV et VElecteur de Mayence (1648-1678) (Paris, 1956). 
Also Jules Bourelly, Cromwell et Mazarin . . . (Paris, 1886). 
Overtures to Aggression, 1661-1672.—The opening phase of Louis's 
diplomacy in the i66o's is studied by P.-A. Cheruel, "Politique exterieure 
de Louis XIV au debut de son gouvernement personnel," Revue d'histoire 
diplomatique, IV (1890), 161-73. 
The Sale of Dunkirk, 1662.—Clyde L. Grose has written two articles 
of note: "England and Dunkirk," American Historical Review, XXXIX 
(1933), 1-27; and "Dunkirk Money, 1662," Journal of Modern History, 
V (1933), 1-18. In France the problem has aroused the interest of 
Alexandre de St. Leger in "L'Acquisition de Dunkerque et de Mardyck 
sous Louis XIV en 1662," Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, 
II (1900-1901), 233-45. Detailed and reliable is Lucien Lemaire, Le 
Rachat de Dunkerque par Louis XIV (Dunkirk, 1924). 
The Crequi Affair: Louis XIV versus the Pope, 1662.—Paul Sonnino, 
in Louis XIV's View of the Papacy (1661-1667) (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, 1966), provides us with the latest interpretation (with biblio­
graphy). His work does not entirely replace Charles de Moiiy, Louis XIV 
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et le Saint-Siege. L'Ambassade du due de Crequi (1662-166$) (2 vols.; 
Paris, 1893). Interesting, too, is Charles Gerin, "L'Affaire des corses en 
1662-1664," Revue des questions historiques, X (1871), 66-147. 
The Question of Lorraine in the 1660 s.—See Gaston Zeller's exhaustive 
study, published with manuscripts, "Le Traite' de Montmarte (6 fevrier 
1662) d'apres des documents inedits," Societe d'archeologie Lorraine, 
LXII (1924), 1-74. 
The War of Devolution: Louis XIV versus Spain (1667-68).—Still the 
best introduction to the problem of Spain, the Spanish Low Countries, 
and the Spanish Succession is Francois A. M. A. Mignet (ed.), Negoci­
a t i o n s r e l a t i v e s a la S u c c e s s i o n d'Espagne s o u s L o u i s X I V . . . . ( 4 v o l s . ; 
Paris, 1835-42), which contains correspondence and memoir material. A 
basic work is Arsene Legrelle's La Diplomatie francaise et la Succession 
d'Espagne (4 vols.; Ghent, 1888-92); and the second edition (6 vols.; 
Braine-le-Comte, 1895-99). Legrelle excerpts many documents from the 
Archives des Affaires Etrangeres, valuable for the entire reign. Basic, too, 
is the Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne sur les affaires des Pays-Bas 
au XVIIe siecle, ed. H. Lonchay, J. Cuvelier, and J. Lefebvre (6 vols.; 
Brussels, 1923-37). There is no good modern work on the War of Devolu­
tion; one of the best guides is the anonymously published A Relation of 
the French King's Late Expedition into the Spanish Netherlands in the 
years 1667 and 1668 (London, 1669). 
The Triple Alliance of 1668.—An important source is The Works of 
Sir William Temple, Bart. (4 vols.; London, 1757), Temple being one 
of the chief architects of the Triple Alliance. Modern works of value are: 
Waldemer Westergaard, The First Triple Alliance 1668-1672 (New 
Haven, Conn., 1947); and Herbert H. Rowen, "John de Witt and the 
Triple Alliance," Journal of Modern History, XXVI (1954), 1-14. 
The Secret Treaty of Dover, 1670.—Basic is Sir Keith G. Feiling's 
British Foreign Policy 1660-1672 (London, 1930); and his article, 
"Henriette Stuart, Duchess of Orleans, and the Origins of the Treaty 
of Dover," English Historical Review, XLVII (1932), 642-45; also 
C. H. Hartman, Charles II and Madame (London, 1934); and the more 
recent, well-argued book by Maurice Lee, Jr., The Cabal (Urbana, 111., 
:9^5)> particularly Chapter 3. 
The Dutch War, 1672-1679: Its Origins.—The origins of this war are 
vigorously disputed by historians, who divide roughly between the eco­
nomic and the political determinists. The leader of the economic historians 
is Simon Elzinga, whose chief work is Het Voorspel van den Oorlog van 
1672 (Haarlem, 1926). His conclusions are anticipated by Elphege Fr6my 
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in "Les Causes economiques de la guerre de Hollande (1664-1672)," 
Revue d'histoire diplomatique, XXVIII-XXIX C1914-15), 523-51, who 
stresses the effects of the tariffs of 1664 and 1667. Elzinga summarizes his 
work and that of Fremy in "Le Prelude de la guerre de 1672," Revue 
d'histoire moderne, V (1927), 349-66. Henri See asks many of the same 
questions in "Que faut-il penser de l'oeuvre 6conomique de Colbert?", 
Revue historique, CLII (1926), 181-94. Herbert H. Rowen challenges 
the economic interpretation by placing his emphasis on the Franco-Dutch 
struggle for the Southern Netherlands: The Ambassador Prepares for 
War: The Dutch Embassy of Arnauld de Pomponne, 1669-1672 (The 
Hague, 1957). See also Rowen's valuable edition of Pomponne's account 
of his mission to The Hague, La Relation de mon ambassade en Hollande 
1669-1671 (Utrecht, 1955). 
Louis XIV versus the Dutch and Europe, 1672-1679.—The key figure 
in the alliances against Louis XIV from 1672 to 1701 was William III. 
The most recent and one of the best-balanced biographies of William 
III, recording in detail the events of the Dutch wars, the troubled years 
of the 1680's, and the War of the League of Augsburg, is Stephen B. 
Baxter, William III (London, 1966). Baxter draws extensively on the 
British and Dutch archives but, unfortunately, neglects the French, 
particularly the Archives des Affaires Etrangeres; his account of Louis 
XIV thus has a strange, rather lopsided effect reminiscent of the Whig 
histories of "Protestant" William. The older, 'standard" life of William 
is Nicholaas Japiske, Prins Willem III: De Stadhouder-Koning (2 vols.; 
Amsterdam, 1930-33); see also Nicholaas Japiske, Johan de Witt (Amster­
dam, 1915). Herbert Rowen promises us soon a reappraisal of De Witt. 
For the pamphlet campaign against Louis XIV a good summary work 
is P. J. W. van Malssen, Louis XIV d'apres les pamphlets repandus en 
Hollande (Amsterdam, 1936). One of Louis's most bitter foes among the 
foreign diplomats was Freiherr von Lisola, whose career is detailed by 
A. F. Pribram in Franz Paul Freiherr von Lisola . . . und die Politik 
seiner Zeit (Leipzig, 1894). 
The Dutch defense of Holland against the French is described by 
Mary C. Trevelyan, William HI and the Defence of Holland, 1672-1674 
(London, 1930); some of Miss Trevelyan's factual errors have been 
pointed out by Pieter Geyl in Kernproblemen von onze Geschiedenis 
(Utretcht, 1937). 
The Peace of Nijmegen, 1676-1679.—The standard work on the peace 
is P. Hoynck, Franhreich und siene Gegner auf dem Nymwegener 
Friedens-Kongress (Bonn, i960). A contemporary work of interest is 
found in Saint-Didier, Histoire de la negociation de la paix de Nimegue 
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1676-1679 (2 vols.; Paris, 1680), and in William Temple, Memoirs of 
What Past in Christendom from the War Begun 1672, to the Peace 
Concluded 1679 (3d ed.; London, 1693). A preliminary move to the 
peace is dealt with by Clyde L. Grose, 'The Anglo-Dutch Alliance of 
1678," English Historical Review, XXXIX (1924), 349-72. 
The "Reunions and the Vail of Strasbourg, 1679-1681.—A study of the 
reunions should be prefaced by an account of Pomponne's dismissal as 
foreign minister: C. Gerin, "La Disgrace de M. de Pomponne (1679)/' 
Revue des questions historiques, XXIII (1878), 5-70, and Herbert Rowen, 
"Arnauld de Pomponne, Louis XIV's Moderate Minister," American 
Historical Review, LXI (1956), 531-49. As to the role played by the 
ministers Louvois and Croissy in the reunions, see the conflicting inter­
pretations given by Emile Bourgeois, "Louvois et Colbert de Croissy (les 
chambres de reunion)," Revue historique, XXXIV (1887), 413-18; and 
Gaston Zeller, "Louvois et Colbert de Croissy (les chambres de reunion)," 
Revue historique, CXXXI (1919), 267-75. Still valuable is H. Kaufmann, 
Die Reunionskammer zu Metz (Metz, 1899). The best modern discussion 
of Strasbourg in this period is Franklin Ford, Strasbourg in Transition, 
1648-1789 (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), with an extensive bibliography. 
Also of interest for the German viewpoint is Erich Marks, "Ludwig XIV 
und Strassburg," in his essays Manner und Xeiten (Leipzig, 1922), pp. 
91-108; and for the French view, A. Legrelle, Louis XIV et Strasbourg 
(Paris, 1884). 
France and Europe, 1681-1688.—The Germanies are discussed in an 
older but still useful survey: B. Auerbach, La France et le Saint Empire 
Romain Germanique depuis la paix de Westphalie jusqu'd la Revolution 
frangaise (Paris, 1912). On French relations with Brandenburg see the 
useful monograph by F. Fehling, Frankreich und Brandenburg in den 
Jahren 1679 bis 1684 (Leipzig? I9°^)> a nd the more general works of 
Georges Pages, Le Grand Electeur et Louis XIV (Paris, 1905) and 
Contributions a I'histoire de la politique frangaise en Allemagne sous 
Louis XIV (Paris, 1905). The crisis year of 1683 has given rise to a vast 
literature: W. Platzhoff, "Ludwig XIV, das Kaisertum und die euro­
paeische Krisis von 1683," Historische Zeitschrift CXXI (1920), 377-412; 
R. Lorenz, Tiirkenjahr 1683 (rev. ed.; Vienna, 1944); John Stoye, The 
Siege of Vienna (London, 1964), with bibliographical references; and 
M. Vachon, "La France et L'Autriche au siege de Vienne en 1683," La 
nouvelle revue, XXIII (1883), 775-80. 
The Dutch position is treated by G. H. Kurtz in an important 
monograph, Willem 111 en Amsterdam 1683-1685 (Utrecht, 1928); and 
in the contemporary account Negociations de monsieur le comte d'Avaux 
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en Hollande . . . 1679-1688 (6 vols.; Paris, 1752-53). The Southern 
Netherlands are considered in A. Levae, Essai historique sur les negoti­
ations de la treve de vingt ans conclue a Ratishonne en 1684 (Brussels, 
1844)­
Turkey, Poland, and Sweden and their relations with France have 
been studied by K. Koehler, Die orientalische Politik Ludwigs XIV 
(Leipzig, 1907); S. Rubinstein, Les Relations entre la France et la 
Pologne de 1680 a 1683 (Paris, 1913); and Andrew Lossky, Louis XIV, 
William III, and the Baltic Crisis of 1683 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
1954). The latter provides extensive notes. 
A good introduction to the problems between England and Louis XIV 
can be found in Ruth Clark, Sir William Trumbull in Paris, 168$-1686 
(Cambridge, Eng., 1938), and in three important studies: Clyde L. 
Grose, "Louis XIV's Financial Relations with Charles II and the English 
Parliament," journal of Modern History, I (1929), 177-204; Robert H. 
George, "The Financial Relations of Louis XIV and James 11/' journal 
of Modern History, III (1931), 392-413; and Rene Durand, "Louis XIV 
et Jacques II a la veille de la Revolution de 1689," Revue d'histoire 
moderne et contemporaine, X (1908), 23-48. 
The War of the League of Augsburg, or the Nine Years' War, 1688­
1697.—One of the best introductions and reappraisals of the period is 
presented by Sir George Clark, "The Character of the Nine Years War, 
1688-97," Cambridge Historical Journal, XI (1954), 168-82. Clark's 
article supplements his earlier work The Dutch Alliance and the War 
against French Trade 1688-1697 (Manchester, Eng., 1923), which should 
be compared with John Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III, 
1689-1697 (Cambridge, Eng., 1953). Two works in German are im­
portant here: H. Ritter von Srbik, Wien und Versailles, 1692-1697 . . . 
(Munich, 1944); and the more balanced, wide-ranging study of Max 
Braubach, Versailles und Wien von Ludwig XIV bis Kaunitz (Bonn, 
1952). The latter provides an introduction to the problems of Franco-
Austrian relations down to the Diplomatic Revolution of 1756. The best 
general treatment in French remains A. Legrelle's La Diplomatic frangaise 
de la Succession d'Espagne (Ghent, 1888-92), Vol. III. 
Peace Negotiations, 1690-1700: The Congress of Ryswick and the 
Partition Treaties.—A fundamental work here is Mark Thomson, "Louis 
XIV and William III, 1689-1697," English Historical Review, LXXVI 
(1961), 37-58, reprinted in R. M. Hatton and J. S. Bromley (eds.), 
William III and Louis XIV. Essays by and for Mark Thomson (Liver­
pool, 1968) (hereafter cited as Hatton and Bromley [eds.], William III 
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and Louis XIV). Also of note is A. Legrelle, Les Conferences secretes 
de Diessenhoffen et Steckhorn 1694 (Braine-le-Comte, 1894), showing 
the importance of the Marquis de Chamlay as a diplomat; and Legrelle's 
Notes et documents sur la paix de Ryswick (Lille, 1894). The most 
thorough study yet made of the events leading to Ryswick is G. Koch, 
Die Friedensbestrehungen Wilhelms III in den Jahren 1604-1697 
(Tubingen and Leipzig, 1903). The military events are reviewed by 
J. de Beaurain, Histoire militaire de Flandre depuis Vannee 1690 jusqu'en 
1694 (2 vols.; Paris, 1755). Two source collections round out the picture 
of the peace negotiations and the partition treaties: Actes et memoir es des 
negociations de la paix de Ryswick (4 vols.; The Hague, 1699) and P. 
Grimbolt (ed.), Letters of William III and Louis XIV and of Their 
Ministers . . . 1697-1700 (2 vols.; London, 1848). 
The War of the Spanish Succession, 1700-1714.—The vastness of the 
literature on the War of the Spanish Succession is a bit overwhelming; 
therefore, I shall list only a few representative works. 
Several of the nineteenth-century multivolume general works on the 
period still serve as the best guides to Louis's diplomacy: Marquis de 
Courcy, La Coalition de 1701 contre la France (2 vols.; Paris, 1886); 
C. Hippeau, L'Avenement des Bourbons au trone d'Espagne (2 vols.; 
Paris, 1875); A. Baudrillart, Philippe V et la cour de France (5 vols.; 
Paris, 1890-1901), which was one of the first great works to make use of 
the Spanish archives; and Volume V of Arsene Legrelle (previously cited), 
La Diplomatic . . . de la Succession d'Espagne, (2d ed.). 
A recent, detailed study of the preliminaries to the peace, 1705-10, is 
J. G. Stork-Penning, Het Grote Werk; vredesonderhandelingen gedurende 
de Spaanse successieoorlog, 1705-10 (Groningen, 1958). Two other works 
of importance analyzing the negotiations that prefaced the war and the 
peace are Mark Thomson's "Louis XIV and the Origins of the War of the 
Spanish Succession," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Ser. 
5, IV (1954), 111-34; and his "Louis XIV and the Grand Alliance 1705­
1710," Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, XXXIV (1961), 
16-35; tneY have been reprinted in Hatton and J. Bromley (eds.), 
William III and Louis XIV. Both the Stork-Penning book and Thomson 
articles give new dimensions to the peace negotiations. 
The attitude of the French ministers toward the war can best be seen 
in G. Esnault's edition of Michel Chamillart, controleur-general des 
finances . . . papiers inedits (2 vols.; Paris, 1885), a nd Jean-Baptiste 
Colbert, marquis de Torcy, Journal Inedit, ed. Frederic Masson (Paris, 
1884). Valuable insights into French diplomacy, 1711-13, may also be 
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gained from reading in the Letters and Correspondence of the Rt. Hon. 
Henry St. John, Lord Viscount Bolinghroke, ed. G. Parke (4 vols.; 
London, 1798). 
Two specialized works concerning French foreign policy decisions on 
the eve of peace are Pierre Paul, Le Cardinal Melchoir de Polignac 
(1661-1741) (Paris, 1922), and John C. Rule, "King and Minister: 
Louis XIV and Colbert de Torcy," in Hatton and Bromley (eds.), 
William III and Louis XIV. 
The best work on the peacemaking, 1711-13, is still Ottokar Weber's 
Der Friede von Utrecht (Gotha, 1891). Weber completes his work on the 
peace congresses in his "Der Friede von Rastatt, 1714," Deutsche Zeitung 
fur Geschichtswissenschaft VIII (1890). 
One of the tangled problems left by the Utrecht settlement, a legacy 
of Byzantine diplomacy, was the question of the destruction of the port 
of Dunkirk, which is treated by A. P. Herlaut, "La Destruction du port 
de Dunkerque. Les Conflits diplomatiques franco-anglaises 1713-15," 
Revue du Nord, 2 (1925); and Alexandre de Saint-Leger, La question 
de Dunkerque et du canal de Mardyck 1709-15 (Paris, 1904). 
III. The Institutions of Government in Practice and Theory 
Histories of the great institutions and of the administration of France 
in the Grand Siecle, both in practice and in theory, make up one of the 
most important and sprawling fields of research that we shall review, 
at once enormous in its output and weighty in subject matter. 
THE PRACTICE OF GOVERNMENT.—An indispensable reference work is 
Marcel Marion's Dictionnaire des institutions de la France aux XVlIe 
et XVIIIe siecles (Paris, 1923). One of the latest guides to the insti­
tutions of France, with strong emphasis on administrative and economic 
history, is Jacques Ellul's Historie des institutions de I'Epoque Franque 
a la Revolution (Paris, 1962), with its extensive, if somewhat unreliable, 
bibliographies. Another important general study has been assembled by 
Georges Pages (ed.), Etudes sur Vhistoire administrative et sociale de 
I'Ancien Regime (Paris, 1938). 
THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE MONARCHY.—The institutions of the monarchy 
are brilliantly reviewed in a group of essays written by Edmond Esmonin, 
Etudes sur la France des XV11° et XVIlIe siecles (Paris, 1964). Reprinted 
in this massive collection are significant studies of the Dauphin6. An im­
portant review article that complements Esmonin's work is Philippe 
Sagnac's "Louis XIV et son administration d'apres des ouvrages et travaux 
re'cents," Revue d'histoire politique et constitutionelle, III (1939), 23-47. 
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One of the best introductions to the monarchy is Georges Pages's brief 
La Monarchie d'Ancien Regime en France (De Henri IV a Louis XIV) 
(Paris, 1928); Pages restated his conclusion in his Sorbonne lectures of 
1939, Les Institutions monarchiques sous Louis XIII et Louis XIV (Paris, 
reprinted 1961.) As Professor Moote notes in his essay in this book, 
Roland Mousnier, one of Pages's students and now holder of the chair of 
modern history at the Sorbonne, has modified the views of Pages, particu­
larly in his general history Les XVI6 and XVIIe siecles (cited previously) 
and in his article "L'Evolution des institutions monarchiques en France 
et ses relations avec l'etat social," XVIIe siecle, Nos. 58-59 (1963), pp. 
57-72. Another work of immense help to students, both by reason of its 
long bibliographical notes and challenging (but not unchallenged) thesis, 
is James E. King's Science and Rationalism in the Government of Louis 
XIV, 1661-1685 (Baltimore, 1949). 
One arm of the central government, the post office, has been studied 
in great detail by Eugene Vaille in his monumental Histoire generate 
des postes frangaises (6 vols.; Paris, 1947-55); of particular interest are 
Volumes IV and V, which recount the activities of Louvois and Torcy 
as head of the post. The secret-service activity of the post office is 
studied in E. Vaille's Le Cabinet noir (Paris, 1950). 
The King's Councils.—An important source work here is Jean de 
Boislisle (ed.), Memoriaux du conseil de 1661 (3 vols.; Paris, 1905-7); 
it should be supplemented by A. de Boislisle, "Les Conseils sous Louis 
XIV," in the appendixes of his edition of the Memoires of Saint-Simon 
(Vols. IV, V, VI, VII [Paris, 1884-90]), IV, 377-439; V, 437-82; VI, 
477-514; VII, 405-43. Another intimate glance into the council, written at 
the end of Louis XIV's reign, is Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Torcy, 
Journal inedits pendant les annees 1709, 1710 et lyn, ed. F. Masson 
(Paris, 1884). A further glimpse into the king's working habits, as seen 
by the Abbe Saint-Pierre at the beginning of the eighteenth century, is 
afforded us by Merle Perkins, "The Councils of Louis XIV," Trench 
Review, XXX (1957), 395-97. An important study of the king's council 
is Roland Mousnier, "Le Conseil du Roi, de la mort de Henri IV au 
gouvernement personnel de Louis XIV," Etudes d'histoire moderne et 
contemporaine, I (1947), 25-49. 
The king's ministers are treated in the aggregate by Paul Viollet in his 
diffuse work Le Roi et ses ministres pendant les trois derniers sidcles de 
la monarchie (Paris, 1912). A more recent survey of the social origins 
of the king's servants, including his ministers, is to be found in "Serviteurs 
du Roi," XVIIe siecle, Nos. 42-43 (1959). 
The vast correspondence carried on by the council of dispatches and 
the privy council in the monumental editions of A. M. de Boislisle (ed.), 
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Correspondance des controleurs-generaux des finances avec les intendants 
des provinces 1683-1715 (3 vols.; Paris, 1874-97); and A. M. de Boislisle 
(ed.), Memoires des intendants sur Vetat des generalites dresses pour 
I 'instruction du due de Bourgogne (Paris, 1881); and G. B. Depping 
(ed.), Correspondance administrative sous le regne de Louis XIV (4 
vols.; Paris, 1850-55). 
PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION: THE INTENDANTS.—In turning from the 
central government to the provinces, we must consider one of the most 
important historiographical and historical problems of the reign, i.e., the 
question of the origin and continuity of the intendant's office. The ques­
tion of the origins is well put by Edmond Esmonin in his essay "Obser­
vations critiques sur le livre de M. Hanotaux Origines de Vinstitution des 
intendants des provinces," in Esmonin's Etudes sur la France des XVlIe 
et XVIlIe siecles (Paris, 1964), pp. 13-17. The question of continuity 
is studied in the important articles of Gaston Zeller, "UAdministration 
monarchique avant les intendants," Revue historique, CXCVII (1947), 
180-215; and Roland Mousnier, "Note sur les rapports entre les gouver­
neurs de provinces et les intendants dans la premiere moitie du XVIIe 
siecle," Revue historique, CCXXVIII (1962), 339-50, and his "Etat et 
commissaire. Recherches sur la creation des intendants des provinces 
(1634-1648)" in Forschungen zu Staat und Verfassung: Festgabe filr Fritz 
Hartung (Berlin, 1958). The pioneering work of C. Godard, Les Pouvoirs 
des Intendants sous Louis XIV (Paris, 1901), is still valuable. The newer 
model of its kind, richly detailed and insightful, is Georges Livet, 
L'Intendance d'Alsace sous Louis XIV (1648-1715) (Strasbourg, 1956). 
Two other important recent works are: Henri Freville, L'Intendance de 
Bretagne (1689-1790) (3 vols.; Rennes, 1953); Emile Mireaux, Une 
Province francaise au temps du Grand Roi: la Brie (Paris, 1958). The 
question of military occupation and administration of conquered provinces 
is considered by Marquis de Roux, Louis XIV et les provinces conquises: 
Artois, Alsace, Flandres, Roussillon, Franche-Comte (Paris, 1938); and 
Georges Livet's important supplement to Roux, "Louis XIV et les 
provinces conquises," XVIIe siecle, No. 16 (1952), pp. 481-507. A 
more recent general survey of the problem is Vivian R. Gruder's The 
Royal Provincial Intendants: A Governing Elite in Eighteenth-Century 
France (Ithaca, N. Y., 1968), which contains materials on the seventeenth 
century. 
The Growth of Police Power.—Police power (other than that exercised 
by the intendants) is studied by Pierre Clement, La Police sous Louis 
XIV (2d ed.; Paris, 1866); and by J. Saint-Germain, La Reynie et la 
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police au grand si&cle (Paris, 1962). Details of police activities in Paris 
during the era of the Spanish Succession can be gleaned from the 
Rapports inedits du Lieutenant de Police, Rene d'Argenson (1697-171$), 
ed. Paul Cottin (Paris, 1891). 
CORPORATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE STATE.—The idea of corporation 
pervaded the thinking of many members of the ruling classes in the 
Ancien Regime and has been a topic of sustained interest since that day. 
Among the more important works on the subject, the best introduction, 
although it deals largely with the guild system, is Emile Coornaert, Les 
Corporations en France avant 1789 (Paris, 1941). Longer works are Fr. 
Olivier-Martin's L'Organisation corporative de la France d'Ancien Regime 
(Paris, 1938) and Emile Lousse's La Societe d'Ancien Regime: organisa­
tion et representation corporatives (Louvain, 1943). For a recent adapta­
tion of the corporative interpretation of society and government under 
the Old Regime see R. R. Palmer, The Age of Democratic Revolution 
(2 vols.; Princeton, N. J., 1959-64), I, 27 ff. Of importance for the guilds 
is E. Martin-Saint-Leon, Histoire des corporations de metiers depuis leurs 
origines jusqu'd lew suppression en 1791, avec une appendice de hihlio­
graphie critique par Emile Coornaert . . . (4th ed.; Paris, 1941). 
The Estates.—Prominent among the great corporative bodies were the 
estates (along with the parlements). Among the standard accounts are: 
Armand Rebillion, Les Etats de Bretagne de 1661 a 1789 (Paris, 1932); 
Prentout, Les Etats provinciaux de Normandie (3 vols.; Paris, 1927); and 
Emile Appolis's well-known study, "Les Etats de Languedoc au XVIIP 
siecle: comparison avec Etats de Bretagne," in Emile Lousse (ed.), 
L'Organisation corporative du moyen age a la fin de VAncien Regime 
(Louvain, 1937). 
The Parlements.—Franklin L. Ford offers a brief introduction to the 
"Sovereign Courts" and the "Right of Remonstrance" in Chapters III 
and V of his Robe and Sword: The Regrouping of the French Aristocracy 
after Louis XIV (Cambridge, Mass., 1953). Ford's work is also listed in 
this bibliography under Social History, where it more properly belongs. 
The standard work on the Parlement of Paris is E. Glasson, Le Parle­
ment de Paris, son role politique (2 vols.; Paris, 1901). The parlements of 
Brittany have been best served by historians: A. Floquet, Histoire du 
Parlement de Normandie (7 vols.; Rouen, 1840-42); and A. Le Moy, Le 
Parlement de Bretagne et le pouvoir royal au XVlIIe siecle (Angers, 1909). 
Lower Justice.—Still the best works on justice administered by the 
lower courts are Gustave Dupont-Ferrier's Les Officiers royaux des 
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baillages et senechausees et les institutions monarchiques locales (Paris, 
1902), and A. E. Giffard's Les Justices seigneuriales en Bretagne aux 
XVUe et XVIII* siecles (Paris, 1903). 
Sale of Office.—Associated with the general problem of the corporative 
interpretation of the state is the question of the sale of office. A general 
introduction to the problem can be found in K. W. Swart, Sale of Offices 
in the Seventeenth Century (The Hague, 1949); Martin Gohring, 
Die Amterka'uflichkeit im Ancien Regime (Berlin, 1938); andfinally, the 
massive thesis published by Roland Mousnier immediately after World 
War II (which deals largely with the period before 1650, but illumines 
the whole era of the Grand Siecle), La Venalite des offices sous Henri IV 
et Louis XIII (Rouen, 1945). 
THE THEORY OF GOVERNMENT.—Good—even adequate—accounts of 
divine right absolutism as practiced and as theorized in France are 
difficult to find. A beginning may be made by reading John Neville 
Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings (New York, 1965), with a per­
ceptive introduction by G. R. Elton. Two other works helpful as back­
ground reading are the brilliant essay by Marc Bloch, essential to the 
analysis of the "properties" of kingship, Les Rois thaumaturges, etude sur 
le caractere surnaturel attrihue a la puissance royale, particulierement en 
France et en Angleterre (2d ed.; Paris, 1961; first published, 1924); and 
Ernst Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies (Princeton, N. J., 1957), 
which explores the concept of the king's mystical eternal person and his 
earthly being. 
Basic to the understanding of the theory of absolutism are works by 
Frederich Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and 
Its Place in Modern History, trans. Douglas Scott (London, 1957); and 
Martin Gohring's Weg und Sieg der modernen Staatsidee in Frankreich, 
vont Mittelalter zu 1789 (Tubingen, 1947); also Henri See's rather dis­
appointing—because one expects more of it—Les Idees politiques en 
France au XVIIe siecle (Paris, 1923). 
The religious elements of political theory in the seventeenth century 
are outlined in W. J. Stankiewicz's Politics and Religion in Seventeenth 
Century France: A study of Political Ideas from the Monarchomachs to 
Bayle, As Reflected in the Toleration Controversy (Berkeley, i960), a 
book marred by its excessive dependence on political terminology made 
popular by Harold J. Laski. The political philosophy of the Huguenots 
is well detailed by Guy H. Dodge's The Political Theory of the Huguenots 
of the Dispersion, with Special Reference to . . . Pierre Jurieu (New 
York, 1947). 
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One of the best "critiques" of absolutism yet to appear is Fritz Hartung 
and Roland Mousnier's "Quelques problemes concernant la monarchic 
absolue," in Vol. IV of X Congresso Internazionale . . . Relazioni (Flor­
ence, 1956) (valuable as a historiographical essay). Also important are 
Fritz Hartung's statement in Enlightened Absolutism (Historical Associa­
tion pamphlet, London, 195O, and the perceptive articles by F. Dumont, 
"Royaute franchises et monarchic absolue au XVIIe Siecle," XVIIe Siecle, 
Nos. 58-59 (1963), pp. 3-29; and William F. Church, 'The Decline of 
the French Jurists as Political Theorists," French Historical Studies, V 
(1967), 1-40. 
The influence of Hobbes on France is treated by Andre Morize in 
"Thomas Hobbes et Samuel Sorbiere: Notes sur l'introduction de 
Hobbes en France," Revue germanique IV (1908), 195-204. 
Of studies on Louis XIV's concept of divine right absolutism, particu­
larly interesting are Georges Lacour-Gayet's enormously erudite analysis 
of the formation of Louis's thought in the second half of L'Education 
politique de Louis XIV (Paris, 1898; 2d ed., 1923) and Paul W. Fox, 
"Louis XIV and the theories of Absolutism and Divine Right," Canadian 
Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXVI (i960), 128-42, which 
is drawn, in part, from his unpublished doctoral thesis at the University 
of London, 'The Political Theory of Louis XIV." Also Emile Lousse's 
thoughtful "Absolutisme, droit divin, despotisme eclaire," Schweizer 
Beitrdge zur Allgemeinen Geschichte, XVI (1958). 
The principle of the king as "owner of the kingdom," in the sense that 
he owned it as a piece of property, is expounded by Herbert H. Rowen 
in "L'Etat c'est a moi: Louis XIV and the State," French Historical 
Studies, II (1961), 83-98. 
Bishop Bossuet (see also section on religion) is often referred to as the 
supreme exponent of divine right absolutism at Louis's court. Two 
excellent introductions to his political thought are: Jacques Truchet, La 
Predication de Bossuet (2 vols.; Paris, i960), Vol. II, Chap. X; and 
Truchet's edition of the Politique de Bossuet (Paris, 1966). 
IV. Social History 
INTRODUCTIONS TO FRENCH LIFE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.— 
Perhaps the best introduction to the general topic of social history is 
given by Philippe Sagnac in La Formation de la societe frangaise moderne 
(2 vols.; Paris, 1945-46). The first volume, La Societe et la monarchic 
absolue (1661-1715), concerns the reign of Louis XIV. Another over­
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view is contained in the varied essays contributed to the symposium 
"Comment les Francais voyaient la France au XVIIe siecle," XVIle siecle, 
No. 25-26 (1955). 
Sagnac's introduction and the symposium in this same issue of XVIIe 
siecle seem, however, somewhat old-fashioned when compared to the 
more recent work being produced in the field of social history, particularly 
the historiographical advances made by younger scholars, some of whom 
have been classed in the "new wave" of historians and many of whom 
are members of the Sixth Section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes 
at the Sorbonne and to the Annales: Economies—Societes—Civilisations 
(hereafter cited as Annales: E.—S.—C.) These "new" social historians 
are concerned—to list but a few categories—with problems of demography, 
class structure, popular (mass) culture, and social discontent. A con­
venient introduction to the problems that the "new" social historian faces 
and the fresh interpretations he suggests can be found in an exchange 
of views contained in the articles by Adeline Daumard and Francois 
Furet, "Methodes de l'histoire sociale: les Archives notariales et la 
mecanographie," Annales: E.—S.—C, XIV (1959), 676-93, which ex­
plores the mysteries of the notarial archives, including a discussion of 
statistical evidence that can be adduced through a survey of marriage 
contracts, inventories of wealth, wills, etc. 
The Daumard-Furet position is further elaborated in "Structures et 
relations sociales a Paris au milieu du XVIIP siecle," Cahiers des Annales, 
No. 18 (Paris, 1961); and articles in Revue d'histoire moderne et con­
temporaine, X (1963), 185-210, and Revue historique, CCXXVII (1962), 
139-54­
The Daumard-Furet analysis is scrutinized in the perceptive article 
by Jean Yves Tirat, "Problemes de methode en histoire sociale," Revue 
d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, X (1963), 211-18. Tirat poses the 
question as to whether any definitive methodological approach to social 
history has been or can be found. He cautions the reader to recall that 
statistics is still—and he hopes always will be—a handmaiden to history. 
His position is reviewed by A. Daumard and F. Furet in "Problemes de 
methodes en histoire social: reflexions sur une note critique," Revue 
d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, XI (1964), 291-98. 
Significant contributions to social history, conceived in the "new" social 
history, are Robert Mandrou's brilliant—if uncategorizable—works, 
Introduction a la France moderne; essai de psychologie historique (1500­
1640) (Paris, 1961), and the concise, clearly written review of "mass 
culture," De la culture populaire aux iye et i8e siecles (Paris, 1964). The 
last, and one of the most important sociohistorical works to appear in 
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France since World War II is the vastly erudite, remarkably well docu­
mented thesis by Pierre Goubert on Beauvais et le Beauvaisis de 1600 a 
1730. Contribution a I'histoire sociale de la France du XVlle siecle (2 vols.; 
Paris, i960). Goubert's study offers the reader "un raccourci" of French 
society as it existed between the rivers Somme and Loire. It is an 
indispensable study. 
Paris.—An intelligent-man's guide to the history of Paris is provided by 
Roland Mousnier in his Sorbonne lectures entitled Paris an XVlle siecle 
(3 fasc; Paris, 1961). Another indispensable history of the great city is 
Marcel Poete's Une Vie de cite: Paris, de sa naissance a nos jours (3 vols.; 
Paris, 1927-31), particularly Vol. Ill, La Spiritualite de la cite classique— 
les origines de la cite moderne—XVI6 et XVlle siecles. Delightful, too, is 
E. Magne's Images de Paris sous Louis XIV (Paris, 1939). 
POPULATION: THE PROBLEM OF DEMOGRAPHY.—Of all the fields within 
the area of social history, one of the most actively controversial is that of 
demography. Still useful for background reading is E. Levasseur's La 
Population francaise (3 vols.; Paris, 1889-92). Other important contribu­
tions are made by Philippe Aries, Histoire des populations franqaises et 
de leurs attitudes devant la vie depuis le XVllle siecle (Paris, 1948), 
M. E. Reinhard and A. Armengaud, Histoire generale de la population 
mondiale (Paris, 1961), and by Roland Mousnier, "Etudes par la popu­
lation de la France au XVIIe siecle," XVIIe siecle, 16 (1952), 527-42. A 
more erudite and detailed work is Roger Mols, Introduction a la demog­
raphie historique des villes d'Europe du XIVe au XVIIIe siecles (3 vols.; 
Gembloux, 1954-56). A challenging and brilliant excursion into the prob­
lems of the demographer is presented by Pierre Goubert in "En Beauvaisis: 
problemes d6mographiques du XVIIe siecle," Annales: E.—S.—C, VII 
(1952), 453-68. Goubert's work should be read in conjunction with 
Rene" Baehrel, "Statistique et demographie historique: la mortality sous 
l'Ancien Regime, remarques inquietes," Annales: E.—S.—C, XII (1957), 
85-98. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie's work on the effect of climate on 
seventeenth-century history is a summary statement of an important 
theme: "Climat et recoltes aux XVIIe et XVIIP siecles/' Annales: E.— 
S.—C, XV (i960), 434-65. 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF FRANCE.—An understanding of French social 
structure of the time can be gained through a reading of the following 
works dealing with the hierarchical groups. 
The Nobility.—A concise, general work that minutely describes the 
gradation of nobility in France is Philippe du Puy de Clinchamps, La 
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Nohlesse ("Que Sais-je?" series, No. 830 [Paris, 1962]). An excellent 
guide, also, is Francois Bluche and Pierre Durye, L'Anoblissement par 
charge avant 1789 (Paris, 1962). 
Fundamental questions on interpretations are asked by Marc Bloch 
in "Sur le passe de la noblesse francaise: quelques jalons de recherche," 
Annales d'histoire economique et sociale, VIII (1936), 366-78, and by 
Robert Forster in "The Provincial Noble: A Reappraisal," American 
Historical Review, LXVIII (1963), 681-91. Forster makes somewhat the 
same point in his general work, The Nobility of Toulouse in the 
Eighteenth Century (Baltimore, i960), particularly pp. 47-65. 
Two other fresh interpretative articles on the nobility are presented 
by Pierre Deyon, "A propos des rapports entre la noblesse franchise et la 
monarchic absolue pendant la premiere moitie du XVIIe siecle," Revue 
historique, CCXXXI (1964), 341-56, and his "Quelques remarques sur 
revolution du regime seigneurial en Picardie (XVIe-XVIIIe siecles)," 
Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, VIII (1961), 271-80. 
The Country Nobility.—This topic has been treated in rambling but 
still useful works by Pierre de Vassiere, Gentilshommes campagnards de 
Vancienne France (Paris, 1903; 2d ed., 1925), and Henri Frotier de La 
Messeliere, La Noblesse en Bretagne avant 1789 (Rennes, 1902). 
The Nobility of the Robe.—The best general introduction to the social 
problems of the robe is Franklin Ford's important summary, Robe and 
Sword: The Regrouping of the French Aristocracy after Louis XIV (Cam­
bridge, Mass., 1953), with a finely wrought "Essay on Bibliography." 
For a detailed study of the social class that made up the robe immedi­
ately after Louis XIV's death, see Frangois Bluche, Les Magistrats du 
Parlement de Paris au XVllIe siecle (1715-1771) (Paris, i960) and his 
L'origine des magistrats du Parlement de Paris . . . Dictionnaire genea­
logique (Paris, 1956). 
The Bourgeoisie.—Valuable for its methodological speculation (even 
though it deals largely with the eighteenth century) is Elinor Barber's 
The Bourgeoisie in 18th Century France (Princeton, 1956). Pierre 
Goubert provides a close study of Families marchandes sous VAncien 
Regime: Les Danses et Les Motte de Beauvais, (Paris, 1959). Another 
significant work is Jean Schlumberger et ah, La Bourgeoisie alsacienne; 
etudes d'histoire sociale (Strasbourg, 1954). Still useful is Charles 
Normand, La Bourgeoisie francaise au XVlle siecle, la vie publique, les 
idees et les actions politiques, 1604-1661. Etude sociale (Paris, 1908). 
The Peasantry.—Two detailed mises au point concerning the relations 
between bourgeois and landholding classes are Marc Venard, Bourgeois 
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et paysans au XVlle siecle. Recherche sur le role des bourgeois parisiens 
dans la vie agricole au sud de Paris au XVlle siecle (Paris, 1957), and 
Pierre Goubert's 'The French Peasantry of the Seventeenth Century: 
A Regional Example/' Past and Present, No. 10 (1956), pp. 55-77, a 
careful analysis of peasant class structure and landholding in the Beauvais 
area. Regional studies of importance are: Rene Baehrel, Une Croissance: 
la basse Provence rurale (fin du XVIe siecle—1789). Essai d'economie 
historique et statistique (Vol. I, Paris, 1961); Pierre de Saint-Jacob's 
Les Paysans de la Bourgogne du Nord au dernier siecle de VAncien 
Regime (Paris, i960); Michel Caillard et al., A trovers la Normandie des 
XVIle et XVIII6 siecles, with an introduction by Pierre Chaunu (Caen, 
1963). This last work provides a vivid description of the uprisings of the 
nu-pieds in the Basse Normandie. Chanuu provides an excellent intro­
ductory discussion of the use of "microhistory" in a social setting. Lastly a 
great work of synthesis as well as of profound research is E. Le Roy 
Ladurie, Les Paysans du Languedoc (2 vols.; Paris, 1966). 
Pauperism.—The very poorest segment of society, the paupers, is 
studied in P. Deyon, "A propos du pauperisme au milieu du XVIIe siecle," 
Annales: E.—S.—C, XXII (1967), 137-53. 
How disastrous famines affected the population is reviewed in the 
works of Paul M. Bondois, "La Misere sous Louis XIV. La disette de 
1662," Revue d'histoire economique et sociale, XII (1924) 53-118; Arthur 
M. de Boislisle, Le Grand Hiver et la disette de iyop (Paris, 1903); and 
Shelby T. McCloy, Government Assistance in Eighteenth-Century France 
(Durham, N.C., 1946), Chapter 1. 
V. Economic History 
GENERAL WORKS ON EUROPE.—Two of the best introductions to the 
sprawling field of the economic history of the Ancien Regime are the 
brilliant summary by Fernand Braudel in Civilisation materielle et 
capitalisme, XVe—XVIIIe siecle (Paris, 1967), and the indispensable, 
encyclopedic survey edited by E. E. Rich and C. H. Wilson, The Econ­
omy of Expanding Europe in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries 
(The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol. VI [Cambridge, 
1967]). A particularly valuable chapter in the latter work is one entitled 
"Prices in Europe from 1450-1750," by Fernand Braudel and Frank 
Spooner; it points up the latest advances made by economic historians in 
their study of business cycles, currencies, money markets, and the like, 
and is indispensable for the uninitiated. 
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GENERAL WORKS ON FRANCE.—The best general introduction to the 
economic history of France in the Early Modern Era remains Henri See, 
with Robert Schnerb, Histoire economique de la France (2 vols.; Paris, 
1939-43). Select articles of importance, showing the change in attitude of 
generations from Hauser to the scholars of the Sixth Section of the Ecole 
Pratique des Hautes Etudes (which has been discussed under Social 
History) are: Henri Hauser, "Les Caracteres generaux de l'histoire 
Economique de la France du milieu de XVIe siecle a lafin du XVIIP," 
Revue historique, CLXXIII (1934), 312-28; Fernand Braudel, "L'Econ­
omie francaise au XVIIe siecle," Annales: E.—S.—C, VI (1951), 65-71; 
Pierre Vilar, "Pour une meilleure comprehension entre economistes et 
historiens: tristoire quantitative'; ou, econometrie retrospective," Revue his­
torique, CCXXXIII (1965), 293-312. 
MERCANTILISM.—Historiographically the problem of mercantilism, both 
as a pattern of thought and of action, dominates later works on the 
seventeenth century. The great study in the twentieth century on the 
so-called mercantile system is Elie F. Heckscher's Mercantilism (2 vols.; 
Stockholm, 1931; translated into English by M. Shapiro, London, 1935; 
extensively revised by E. F. Soderlund, London, 1955). Heckscher saw 
mercantilism not only as a quest for opulence but also for power in 
itself; moreover, he believed that mercantilism served as a unifying force 
within the emerging nation-states. Heckscher's work contains several 
significant chapters on France, notably Vol. I, Chap. II, pp. 78-109; 
Chap. V, pp. 137-212; Vol. II, passim. Heckscher's conclusions have been 
questioned and refined by, among others, Heckscher himself, in "Revi­
sions in Economic History, V: Mercantilism," Economic History Review, 
VII C1936-37), 44-50; Herbert Heaton, "Heckscher on Mercantilism," 
Journal of Political Economy, XLV (1937), 371-93; Jacob Viner, "Power 
versus Plenty As Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries," World Politics, I (1948), 4-11; and by D. C. 
Coleman, "Eli Heckscher and the Idea of Mercantilism," Scandinavian 
Economic History Review, V (1957), 3-2.5. 
COLBERT AND COLBERTISME.—The great mercantilist statesman of France 
was Colbert, whose brand of mercantilism has been dignified by the 
term Colbertisme. How greatly Colbert was influenced by mercantilist 
thought (or Cartesian thought, for that matter) and how much by 
pragmatic considerations of state policy? 
As several historians have suggested, the best way of studying the 
genesis of Colbert's ideas is to probe the thought of his great predecessor, 
Cardinal Richelieu. Particularly germane is G. von Carlow's Richelieu als 
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tnerkantilischer Wirtschaftspolitiker und der Bergriff des Staatsmerkantil­
ismus (Jena, 1929), and Henri Hauser, La Pensee et Vaction economique 
du Cardinal de Richelieu (Paris, 1944). Also important, especially for con­
tinuity of thought in the seventeenth century, is Charles W. Cole, 
Mercantilist Doctrines before Colbert (New York, 1931). Of significance, 
too, in Colbert's thinking was the overriding considerations of war; for 
the general problem see the brilliant work by Edmund Silberner, La 
Guerre dans la pensee economique du XVIe siecle au XVlIIe siecle (Paris, 
1939). Valuable for the general pattern of Colbert's thought is Henri 
See's article "Que faut-il penser de l'ceuvre economique de Colbert?", 
Revue historique, CLII (1926), 181-94. 
Colbert's ideas can best be studied in their context. The only edition 
of Colbert's works pretending to completeness is Pierre Clement (ed.), 
Lettres, instructions et memoires de Colbert (10 vols.; Paris, 1861-83); 
and for an insight into the thinking of one of Colbert's most trusted 
advisers, the reader can turn to Jacques Savary's Le parfait negociant ou 
instruction pour ce qui le commerce . . . (in two books; Paris, 1675). 
The latter should be read with Henri Hauser's comment on Savary in 
Les debuts de capitalisme (Paris, 1931). 
Application of Colbertisme.—An excellent introduction to the practical 
side of Colbertian economics are Charles Wolsey Cole's three volumes, 
Colbert and A Century of French Mercantilism (2 vols.; New York, 1939) 
and French Mercantilism, 1683-iyoo (New York, 1943). Other valuable 
studies of Colbert's economic policies are found in Prosper Boissonnade, 
Colbert, le triomphe de Vetatisme, la fondation de la suprematie industrielle 
de la France, la dictature du travail (1661-1683) (Paris, 1932), and 
Boissonnade's early work, which serves as a preface to the above: Le 
Socialisme d'etat, Vindustrie et les classes industrielles en France—1453­
1661 (Paris, 1927). 
Government Taxes, Direct and Indirect.—An overriding consideration 
for Colbert and his successors was the problem of taxation and banking 
and credit. Still the best work on the taille is Edmond Esmonin, La Tattle 
en Normandie au temps de Colbert, 1661-1683 (Paris, 1913). The 
gabelle and the aides have been exhaustively studied by Eugene-Pierre 
Beaulieu, Les Gabelles sous Louis XIV (Paris, 1903), and Pierre Milne, 
L'lmpot des aides sous I'Ancien Regime (Paris, 1908). A more general 
account of taxation is included in Marcel Marion, Les Impots directs 
sous I'Ancien Regime principalement au XVllIe siecle (Paris, 1910). 
A useful and detailed study of Louis XIV's extrordinary tax, the capita­
tion, is made by Stanislas Mitard, La Crise financiere en France a la 
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fin du XVIIs siecle: la premiere capitation 1695-1698 (Rennes, 1934). 
The collection of taxes by the general farms is briefly reviewed (for 
Louis's reign) by George T. Matthews, The Royal General Farms in 
Eighteenth-Century France (New York, 1958), pp. 3-69. 
For the contribution of the clergy to the general welfare, consult the 
excellent older study of A. Cans, La Contribution du clerge de France 
a I'impot pendant la seconde moitie du regne de Louis XIV (Paris, 1910). 
Credit and Banking.—The study of credit during Louis XIV's reign is 
considered in a classic work by Germain Martin and M. Besanc.on, 
Histoire du credit en France sous le regne de Louis XIV (Paris, 1913). 
The Belgian historian, Paul Harsin, provides us with an indispensable 
study of Credit public et banque d'etat en France du XVIe au XVIII6 
siecles (Paris, 1933). One of the greatest works to appear in thefield of 
economic history is Herbert Liithy's Le Banque protestant en France de 
la Revocation de VEdit de Nantes a la Revolution (2 vols.; Paris, 1959­
61), Vol. I., Dispersion et Regroupement (1685-1730), which supplies 
in great detail a description of the Protestant banking cousinhood through­
out western Europe. A rather impressionistic study of one of those Protes­
tant bankers is made by Jacques Saint-Germain in his work: Samuel 
Bernard: le banquier des rots (Paris, i960). 
Commerce.—Colbert and his successors labored valiantly to rebuild 
France's commerce. Some of the pertinent problems of commercial his­
tory are discussed by Henri Se"e in "Quelques apergus sur le capitalisme 
commercial en France au XVIIe siecle," Revue d'histoire economique et 
sociale, XII (1924), 161-76. Colbert was always vitally interested in the 
expansion of French commerce. Histories of commerce include three 
classic works; E. Levasseur, Histoire du commerce de la France (2 vols.; 
Paris, 1911-12); P. de Segur-Dupeyron, Histoire des negociations com­
merdales et maritim.es de la France au XVIIe et XVIIIe siecles (3 vols.; 
Paris, 1872-73); and Paul Masson, Histoire de covimerce frangais dans 
le Levant au XVIIe siecle (Paris, 1896). This latter study has been in 
many ways superseded by the important work edited by Gaston Rambert, 
Histoire du commerce de Marseille (Vols. I-VII; Paris, 1949-66); see 
particularly Roger Paris, Histoire du commerce de Marseille, Le Levant, 
Vol. V (1660-1789) (1957), and Gaston Rambert, Histoire du commerce 
de Marseille, Vol. VI (1660-1789; Les Colonies') (1959). 
The commerce of two other great ports, Rouen and Le Havre, have 
recently been studied in a richly detailed work by Pierre Dardel, Navires 
et marchands dans les ports de Rouen et du Havre au XVIlIe siecle (Paris, 
1963). Bordeaux trade is the subject of an article by H. Enjalbert, "Le 
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Commerce de Bordeaux et la vie economique dans le Bassin d'Aquitaine au 
XVIIe siecle," Annales du midi, LXII (1950), 21-35. Important, too, is 
Robert Boutruche, Bordeaux de 1453 a 1715: Histoire de Bordeaux, ed. 
Charles Higounet, Vol. IV (Bordeaux, 1966). 
A classic study of internal commerce of France is found in A. P. Usher, 
The History of the Grain Trade in France, 1400-1j10 (Cambridge, Mass., 
1913). Specialized articles of interest include: Margaret Priestley, "Anglo-
French Trade and the 'Unfavorable Balance' controversy, 1660-1685," 
Economic History Review, 26. ser., IV, 37-52, and R. B. Grassby, 
"Social Status and Commercial Enterprise under Louis XIV," Eco­
nomic History Review, 2d ser., XIII (i960), 19-38, which underlines 
the growth under Louis XIV's aegis of the noblesse commergante. The 
importance of the local chambers of commerce and their representation 
on the Council of Trade (created in June 29, 1700) is treated by Warren 
Scoville in 'The French Economy in 1700-1701: An Appraisal by the 
Deputies of Trade," Journal of Economic History, XXII (1962), 231­
52. And finally, the impact of war on commerce: Gaston Zeller, "Le 
Commerce international en temps de guerre sous l'Ancien Regime," Revue 
d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, IV (1957), 112-120. 
For external tariff barriers, of importance is the article by Simon 
Elzinga, "Le Tarif de Colbert de 1664 et celui de 1667 et leur significa­
tion," Economisch-historisch Jaarboek, XV (1929), 221-73. 
Trading companies are ably treated by P. Boissonnade and P. Charliat, 
Colbert et la compagnie de commerce du nord, 1661-1689 (Paris, 1930), 
and the very solidly documented and detailed study, Henry Weber, La 
Compagnie francaise des Indes, 1604-1875 (Paris, 1904). Far slighter 
and less reliable is J. Chailley-Bert, Les Gompagnies de colonisation sous 
l'Ancien Regime (Paris, 1898). For Africa, there is P. Chemin-Dupontes, 
Les Compagnies de colonisation de VAfrique occidentale sous Colbert 
(Paris, 1903). Of Gaston Martin's numerous works on Nantes, one is 
particularly useful here: Nantes et la compagnie des Indes orientales, 
1664-1679 (Paris, n.d.). 
Agriculture.—One survey of note has appeared in recent years on 
agriculture per se: Soreau, L'Agriculture du XVIle a la fin du XVIII6 
siecle (Paris, 1952) (other studies on the peasant are listed under Social 
History). 
Industry.—An adequate bibliographical guide is provided by Germain 
Martin, Bibliographie critique de Vhistoire de Vindustrie en Trance avant 
1789 (Paris, n.d.). Germain Martin's work on La grande industrie sous 
le regne de Louis XIV (Paris, 1898) remains standard. An excellent com­
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parative work, rich in suggestions for further study, is John U. Nef, 
Industry and Government in France and England 1540-1640 (Phila­
delphia, 1940). Another comparative study of the highest order is J. 
Koulischer, "La grande industrie aux XVIIe et XVIIP siecles: France, 
Allemagne, Russie," Annales d'histoire economique et sociale, III (1931), 
11-46. For a review of pre-Colbertian industry, see Gaston Zeller, 
"L'Industrie en France avant Colbert," Revue d'histoire economique et 
sociale, XXVIII (1950), 3-20. 
More recently, several important studies have appeared on industry: 
P. Lion, La Naissance de la grande industrie en Dauphine (fin du XVlle 
siecle-1869) (2 vols.; Paris, 1953); Bertrand Gille, Les Origines de la 
grande industrie metallurgique en France (Paris, 1947); and the valuable 
work by the American economic historian, Warren Scoville, Capitalism 
and French Glassmaking (1640-1789) (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1950), 
and P. Sagnac, "L'Industrie et le commerce de la draperie en France a la 
fin du XVIIe siecle et au commencement du XVIIIe," Revue d'historie 
moderne et contemporaine, IX (1907-8). 
The enforcement of the Colbertian reforms is another interesting 
aspect of industrial history: F. Bacquie, Les Inspecteurs des manufactures 
sous VAncien Regime, 1669-1792 (Paris, 1927). 
CRISES.—The growth of industry and commerce led inevitably to the 
intensification of economic crises. The "general crisis" in the economy 
of France and Europe (directly related to Trevor-Roper thesis, cited 
under the "Fronde" in General Histories) is outlined rather more force­
fully than convincingly by E. J. Hobsbawm in "The General Crisis of 
the European Economy in the Seventeenth Century/' Past and Present, 
No. 5-6 (1954), pp. 33-74. Jean Meuvret has studied the periodic crises 
of food and grain in his "Les Crises de subsistance et la de"mographie de 
la France d'Ancien Regime," Population (Oct.-Dec, 1946), pp. 643-50. 
For an older interpretation of crises, dealing with the end of the reign, 
see Adolphe Vuitry, Le Desordre des finances et exces du speculation a la 
fin du re~gne de Louis XIV et au commencement du regne de Louis XV 
(Paris, 1883); and the revisions made on this theme by Roland Mousnier, 
"L'Evolution des finances publiques en France et en Angleterre pendant 
les guerres de la Ligue d'Augsbourg et de la Succession d'Espagne," 
Revue historique, CCV (1951) 1-23. An important methodological article 
is David S. Landes, "The Statistical Study of French Crises," Journal of 
Economic History, X (1950), 195-211. 
We cannot leave the topic of "crises" without mentioning the important 
work of F. C. Spooner in L'Economie mondiale et les frappes monetaires 
en France (1493-1680) (Paris, 1956), which treats not only the question 
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of coinage but the effect that increased flow of gold and silver had on 
French economy. Massive documentation and numerous illustrative charts 
distinguish this work. 
Prices and the Circulation of Money.—Closely related to economic 
crises is the circulation of money and the rise and fall of prices. The study 
of prices must begin with the great pioneering book of F. Simiand, 
Recherches . . . sur le mouvement general des prix du XVIe siecle au 
XIXe siecle (Paris, 1932); a disciple of Simiand, Ernest Labrousse followed 
within the year with a yet more statistically refined work, Esquisse du 
mouvement des prix et des revenues en France au XVIIIe siecle (2 vols., 
Paris, 1933). Although Labrousse draws many of his statistics from late 
eighteenth-century sources, his conclusions are well suited to describe 
seventeenth-century conditions. An important survey, contemporary with 
that of Simiand and Labrousse is Henri Hauser, Recherches et documents 
sur Vhistoire de prix en France de 1500 a 1800 (Paris, 1936). Of subse­
quent works, some of the more important have been those of Jean 
Meuvret, and we list but a few: "Les Mouvements des prix de 1661-1715 
et leurs repercussions," Bulletin de la Societe de Statistique de Paris 
(1944), 1-9; "Circulation monetaire et utilisation economique de la 
monnaie dans la France du XVIe et du XVIIe siecles," Etudes d'histoire 
moderne et contemporaine I (1947), 15-28; (with Michaline Baulant), 
Prix des cereales, extraits de la Mercuriale de Paris (1520-1698) (2 vols.; 
Paris, i960); also the significant work by Georges Freche, Histoire des 
prix des cereales a Toulouse (1650-1J15) (Paris, 1964). 
Critics of the Regime. Economic Reformers.—A provocative study of this 
problem is Lionel Rothkrug's Opposition to Louis XIV: The Political and 
Social Origins of the French Enlightenment (Princeton, N. J., 1965), 
which includes interesting observations on Christian agrarianism, anti-
mercantilist theory, militant secularism, with its "elaboration of anti-
Christian themes." There is an excellent bibliography. 
For the traditional economic reformers, the literature indicates at least 
two persons as important touchstones: The Marquis de Vauban (who is 
listed under "Military") and Pierre de Pesant de Boisguilbert. 
The best introduction to Vauban is his Projet d'une dixme royale, ed. E. 
Coornaert (Paris, 1933); also see George Michel, Vauban economiste 
(Paris, 1899), and the more recent and detailed article by Walter Brauer, 
"Quelques remarques sur Tceuvre economique de Vauban, Revue 
d'histoire economique et sociale, XXIX (1951), 8-25. 
Boisguilbert's great work Le Detail de la France is reprinted in E. 
Daire (ed.), Economistes-financiers au XVIlIe (2 vols.; Paris, 1943), Vol. 
I. Other works on Boisguilbert are Hazel Van Dyke Roberts, Boisguilbert: 
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Economist of the Reign of Louis XIV (New York, 1935); and A. Talbot, 
Les Theories de Boisguilhert et lew place dans Vhistorie des doctrines 
economiques (Paris, 1903). 
VI. The Army 
GUIDES.—Three guides to the archives of the Departement de la Guerre 
readily available are: Lt.-Col. de Buttet, "Les M6thodes de travail du 
Depot de la Guerre," Revue historique, CCXXVI (1961), 421-26; Claude 
Sturgill, "Bibliotheque du ministere des Armees," French Historical 
Studies, IV (1965), 108-10; and E. Rousset's more extensive article, "Les 
Archives de departement de la Guerre," Revue de Vintendance militaire, 
No. 18 (1950), pp. 69-91. 
BIBLIOGRAPHIES.—The best bibliography to the period is included in 
Andre Corvisier, L'Armee frangaise de la fin du XVlle siecle au ministere 
de Choiseul (2 vols.; Paris, 1964), particularly, I, 3-48. Also of value is 
Emile Bourgeois and Louis Andre (eds.), Les Sources de I'histoire de 
France au XVIle siecle (8 vols.; Paris, 1913-35), VII, 309 ff. 
GENERAL HISTORIES OF THE ARMY AND OF MILITARY LIFE.—Older but 
still useful as an impressionistic guide to the period is Albert Babeau, 
La Vie militaire sous I'Ancien Regime (3 vols.; Paris, 1889-90). The 
Hanotaux series offers an interesting overview: F. Reboul and J. Colin, 
Histoire militaire et navale . . . des croisade a la Revolution {Histoire de 
la nation frangaise, ed. Gabriel Hanotaux, Vol. VII [Paris, 1925-7]). A 
more detailed general account is contained in L. Jablonski, Des origines 
a Fontenoy (L'Armee frangaise a travers les ages, Vol. I [5 vols.; Paris, 
1890-94]). Conditions in the army during the Ancien Regime are 
described by Emile Simond, Histoire militaire de la France, 1643 a 1871 
(2 vols.; Paris, 1888-95) and by Leon Mention, L'Armee de I'Ancien 
Regime de Louis XIV a la Revolution (Paris, 1900). 
MILITARY REVOLUTION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.—The changes 
in military strategy and tactics, which reached a climax in the revolutions 
of mid-seventeenth century, are treated by Michael Roberts in his 
thoughtful essay (given as an inaugural lecture) The Military Revolution, 
1540-1640 (Belfast, 1956). This essay and his Introduction to his im­
portant volumes on Gustavus Adolphus, A History of Sweden, 1611-1632 
(2 vols.; London and New York, 1953-58) will serve the reader as a 
general introduction to the problem of the army in mid-century. Also 
useful for a general discussion of the seventeenth century are G. N. 
Clark, War and Society in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, Eng., 
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1958); and G. N. Clark, 'The Social Foundations of States," in F. L. 
Carsten (ed.), The Ascendancy of France 1648-88 (The New Cambridge 
Modern History, Vol. V [Cambridge, Eng., 1961]), pp. 176-97. 
THE ARMIES OF LOUIS XIV,—The historian concerned with the early 
years of the military history of Louis XIV's reign must still rely on the 
massive works of Louis Andre* and Camille Rousset. Rousset was the 
first historian to explore systematically the records of the Depot de la 
Guerre. His work, though now modified by the more recent interpretations 
of Louis Andre, is a mine of information; see Camille Rousset, Histoire 
de Louvois et de son administration politique et militaire (4 vols.; Paris, 
1862-63). Rousset placed too great an emphasis on the role of Francois-
Michel Le Tellier, marquis de Louvois, in the creation of the French 
army. Louis Andre, in two long works, redresses the balance by showing 
us the importance of Louvois's father, Michel Le Tellier, as minister of 
war. Andre's works serve as the best guide to the early years of the reign: 
Michel Le Tellier et Vorganisation de Varmee monarchique (Paris, 1906) 
and Michel Le Tellier et Louvois (2d ed.; Paris, 1943). 
Problems of recruitment during the last years of Louis XIV's reign 
are treated by Georges Girard, Le Service militaire en France a la fin 
du regne de Louis XIV: racolage et milice (IJOI-IJI$) (Paris, 1921); 
M. Sautai, Les Milices provinciales sous Louvois et Barbezieux 1688-gy 
(Lille, 1909) (though both are now partly superseded by Corvisier's 
work listed below); and by E. G. Leonard, in the opening chapters of 
his L'Armee et ses problemes au XVIIIe siecle (Paris, 1958), particularly 
pp. 1-98. By far the most significant study of the last years of Louis 
XIV's reign and the transition to the eighteenth century is the meticu­
lously researched and abundantly documented thesis of Andre Corvisier, 
L'Armee francaise de la fin du XVIIe siecle au ministere de Choiseul (2 
vols.; Paris, 1964). Written in the shadow of the "new wave" of histori­
ography in France, Corvisier stresses, like his mentors, the bureaucratic 
and social background to war. The defense of the frontiers marks an 
important chapter in the history of the reign; the most insightful intro­
duction to the topic is Gaston Zeller's L'Organisation defensive des 
frontieres du nord et de Vest au XVUe siecle (Nancy), 1928). Also of 
interest for letters that it publishes is H. Chotard, Louis XIV, Louvois, 
Vauban et les fortifications du Nord de la France (Paris, 1889). 
Perhaps one of the best ways to study the military history of the reign 
is to look at the memoir material, which is so rich that we can mention 
but a few here. One of the most important collections is that made by 
F. H. Vault and J. J. G. Pelet in Memoires militaires relatifs a la succession 
d'Espagne sous Louis XIV, extraits de la cour et des generaux (  n vols.; 
Paris, 1835-62). Individual memoirs and correspondence of importance 
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are: Memoires et correspondance du Marechal de Catinat, mis en ordre 
et publies d'apres les manuscrits autographes . . . , ed. B. Le Rouyer de 
Saint-Gervais (3 vols.; Paris, 1819); Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban, 
Memoires inedits de Marechal Vauban, ed. M. Augoyat (Paris, 1841); 
Claude L. H. Villars, Memoires du Marechal de Villars, ed. Charles J. M. 
Vogue (6 vols.; Paris, 1884-1904); and Charles J. M. Vogue (ed.), Villars, 
d'apres sa correspondance et des documents inedits (2 vols.; Paris, 1888). 
Special Services.—The services (infantry, engineers, guard corps, and 
health) have all been studied monographically in the last few years: J. 
Margerand, Armement et equipement de Vinfanterie francaise du XVIe 
au XXe siecles (Paris, 1945); A. Corvisier, "Les Gardes du corps de Louis 
XIV," XVlIe siecle, No. 45 (1959), pp. 265-91; Colonel Charles-Albert 
Lecomte, Les Ingenieurs militaires en Trance pendant le regne de Louis 
XIV (Lyon, 1954). 
Marshals and Generals.—Collective and individual studies of the great 
generals and marshals of the reign make up a vast literature. A barely 
adequate guide to the problem is L. Dussieux's Les grands generaux de 
Louis XIV (Paris, 1888). A more recent guide to the social origins of the 
great military figures is Andre Corvisier, Les Generaux de Louis XIV 
et leur origine sociale (Amiens, 1959). Individual studies are far more 
rewarding. Standard in the field are Camille-Georges Picavet's Les dern­
ieres annees de Turenne (1660-1675) (Paris, 1914); P. de Segur, La 
jeunesse du Marechal de Luxembourg, 1628-1668 (3d ed., Paris, 1904); 
P. de Segur, Le Marechal de Luxembourg et le prince d'Orange, 1668­
1678 (2d ed.; Paris, 1902); P. de Segur, Le Tapissier de Notre Dame, les 
dernieres annees du Marechal de Luxembourg, 1678-1695 (Paris, 1903); 
Emmanuel de Broglie's Catinat, I'homme et la vie, i6^y-iyi2 (Paris, 
1902) (barely adequate). 
Also of interest are Maxime Weygand's Turenne: Marshal of France, 
trans. George B. Ives (Boston and New York, 1930); Henri Malo, Le 
Grand Conde (Paris, 1937); and Claude Sturgill's Marshal Villars and 
the War of the Spanish Succession (Lexington, Ky., 1965), though the 
latter work should not be read without reference to a review by Andrew 
Lossky in the Journal of Modern History, XXXIX (1967), 175-78. 
Excessively chatty but one of the only studies of the subject is Charles 
Petrie's The Marshal Duke of Berwick (London, 1953). 
I have saved Marshal Vauban until last because the vast literature 
published about him could easily make up a special section. A first-rate 
introduction to his work and to his place in Louis XIVs reign may be 
found in Henry Guerlac's "Vauban: The Impact of Science on War," 
in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle, with Gordon 
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Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, N. J., 1944), pp- 26-48, with 
Bibliography. Guerlac discusses at some length Vauban's famous "three 
systems" and the Lazard challenge to his thesis (see below). For an 
understanding of his tactics read the marshal himself: Sebastien Le 
Prestre de Vauban, Traite de Vattaque et de la defense des places (2 vols.; 
The Hague, 1737-42); and George A. Rothrock's edition and translation 
of Vauban's A Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification (Ann Arbor, Mich., 
1968), with a perceptive "Bibliographical Essay," pp. 176-84. 
More general works of note are P. Lazard's Vauban, 1633-1707 (Paris, 
1934), a thorough and well-documented study (Lazard questions the use 
of the term "three systems" of fortifications as seen in Vauban's works); 
and Sir Reginald Blomfield's Sebastien le Prestre de Vauban 1633-ijoy 
(London, 1938) (well illustrated by the author's own sketches of Vauban's 
fortifications). Published posthumously is Alfred Rebelliau's discursive 
but insightful work, Vauban (Paris, 1962). Still the most extensive work 
is Albert de Rochas d'Aiglun, Vauban, sa famille et ses ecrits, ses oisivetes 
. .  . (2 vols.; Paris and Grenoble, 1910). 
VII. The Marine 
A concise, informative introduction to the subject is provided by 
Joannes Tramond in his Manuel d'histoire maritime de la France (Paris, 
1927). Still the classic work in the field, however, is Charles de La 
Ronciere's Histoire de la marine francaise (6 vols.; Paris, 1899-1932). La 
Ronciere is partial to Colbert and, conversely, hostile to the Phelypeaux 
clan, two of whose members become ministers of the marine after 1690. 
To La Ronciere and other interpreters of his school the years 1690-92 
mark a watershed in the history of the marine, with the days of French 
naval glory departing after the defeat of La Hougue and the espousal at 
the same time of the guerre de course. 
Other general works of note are G. Lacour-Gayet's survey of La Marine 
militaire de la France sous les regnes de Louis XIII et Louis XIV (Paris, 
1911); and E. Sue, Histoire de la marine franqaise au dix-septieme siecle, 
1653-1712 (5 vols.; Paris, 1835-37). M. Mollat, Les Sources de Vhistoire 
maritime du XVIe au XVIIle siecle (Paris, 1962). 
Monographic and specialized studies include Eugene L. Asher, The 
Resistance to the Maritime Classes: The Survival of Feudalism in the 
France of Colbert (Berkeley and Los Angeles, i960), an important work 
that stresses "the tenacity and the success with which royal reforms [in 
this instance, naval] were resisted" in France; it contributes excellent 
bibliographical references. A comprehensive guide to the problems of 
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recruitment, armament, naval depots, and so on, is found in Rene* 
Memain's La Marine de guerre sous Louis XIV. Le materiel: Rochefort, 
arsenal modele de Colbert (Paris, 1937), and his complementary work, 
Matelots et soldats des vaisseaux du roi: levees d'hommes du departement 
de Rochefort (1661-1600) (Paris, 1937). Paul W. Bamford, in Forests 
and Trench Sea Power, 1660-1789 (Toronto, 1956) offers a detailed 
analysis of problems of naval supply and administration. 
The guerre de course and privateering are treated in detail by Henri 
Malo in Les Corsaires dunkerquois et ]ean-Bart 1662-1702 (2 vols.; 
1913-14); Les Corsaires, memoires et documents inedits (Paris, 1908); 
and his La Grande Guerre des corsaires: Dunkerque (1702-1715) (Paris, 
1925). A recent work of importance on the subject is A. de Wismes, 
Jean Bart et la guerre de course (Paris, 1965). John Bromley has given 
us an admirable survey of the guerre de course in his chapter on "The 
French Privateering War, 1702-1713," in Historical Essays 1600-1750 
-presented to David Ogg, ed. H. E. Bell and R. L. Ollard (London, 1963), 
pp. 203-31. Also of importance is Leon Vignols, Un Produit social de la 
guerre: ftibuste et boucan (XVIe-XVWe siecles) (1928). 
Of special interest in the problem linked to the department of the 
marine is the "crisis of conscience and authority" that occurred in the 
French naval bureaucracy during the War of the Spanish Succession. 
This arise is carefully studied by Marcel Giraud in two brilliant articles: 
"Crise de conscience et d'autorite a la fin du regne de Louis XIV," 
Annales: E.—S.—C, VII (1952), 172-90, 293-302; and his 'Tendance 
humanitaires a lafin du regne de Louis XIV," Revue historique, CCIX 
O953)> 217-37. 
On the individual naval commanders a few studies are particularly 
recommended: A. Jal, Abraham Duquesne et la marine de son temps 
(2 vols.; Paris, 1873), whose biography Eugene Asher calls "the finest 
work . .  . of [a] great naval historian." A detailed study of Duquesne's 
Italian expedition can be found in E. Laloy, La Revolte de Messine, 
I'expedition de Sicile et la politique frangaise en Italie, 1674-78 (3 vols.; 
Paris, 1929). Noteworthy are Emmanuel de Broglie's Un grand marin 
Tourville, 1642-1701 (Paris, 1908), and Le Nepvou de Carfort, Histoire 
de du Guay Troiiin, le Corsaire (Paris, 1922). On Jean Bart refer to the 
works of Henri Malo mentioned above. 
VUl. The French Colonies 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AIDS.—Alfred Martineau, Paul Roussier, and Joannes

Tramond (eds.), Bibliographie d'histoire coloniale (1900-1930) (Paris,
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1932), is an indispensable guide of 700 pages, which can be supple­
mented by bibliographical articles scattered throughout the Revue 
d'histoire des colonies frangaises (published 1913-31); Revue d'histoire des 
colonies (published 1932-58); and Revue frangaise d'histoire d'Outre-Mer 
(1958 ). Also containing excellent bibliographical information is 
Frederic Mauro, L'Expansion europeenne (1600-1870) (Paris, 1964), pp. 
5-85. 
SURVEYS.—Perhaps the best general survey is Frederic Mauro's volume 
in the "Nouvelle Clio" series mentioned above. It has a valuable chapter 
on "Debats et combats: directions de recherche," pp. 265 ff. Mauro is 
very much a part of the "new wave" of French historians, and his inter­
pretations smack strongly of the heady wine of the Sixth Section of the 
Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes. A serviceable, if less exciting, overview 
is provided by J. Saintoyant, La Colonisation frangaise sous VAncien 
Regime (2 vols.; Paris, 1929), and by Herbert I. Priestley, France Over­
seas through the Old Regime (New York, 1939). Still useful is the series 
edited under the direction of Gabriel Hanotaux and Alfred Martineau, 
Histoire des colonies frangaises et de I 'expansion de la France dans le 
monde (6 vols.; Paris, 1929-34). 
POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE COLONIAL PROBLEM.—An excellent intro­
duction to the general problems of colonialism is Robert Boutruche, 
"Existe-t-il une continuity dans la politique coloniale de la France?", Revue 
historique, CLXXII (1933). Among the first explorations into the political 
background of colonialism was Louis Pauliat, La Politique coloniale 
sous VAncien Regime (Paris, 1887), followed in this century by a 
valuable sketch that focused on ministerial responsibility: Albert Duchene, 
La Politique coloniale de la France, le ministere des colonies depuis 
Richelieu (Paris, 1928). An important subject rather poorly treated is 
Yvonne Bezard's Fonctionnaires maritimes et coloniaux sous Louis XIV, 
les Begon (Paris, 1932). A subject of considerable importance is given an 
introduction by L.-B. May, "Nicholas Fouquet et la politique coloniale de 
Louis XIV," Revue d'histoire coloniale, XXXIII (1940-46), 70-83. 
COLBERT AND THE COLONIES.—An early work still worth consulting is 
E. Benoit du Rey, Recherches sur la politique de Colbert (Paris, 1902). 
Of interest, too, are Stewart L. Mims's Colbert's West India Policy (New 
Haven, Conn., 1912) and Paul M. Boindois, "Colbert et la question du 
sucre, la rivalite' franco-hollandaise," Revue d'histoire econotnique et 
sociale, XI (1923), 12-59. 
THE QUESTION OF SLAVERY.—A good introduction to the problem is 
Maurice Lengelle, L'Esclavage (Paris, 1962), and his article with the same 
title in Cahiers economiques, March, 1954, pp. 12-16. Basic is Gaston­
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Martin's Esclavage et colonisation. Histoire de Vesclavage dans les colonies 
frangaises (Paris, 1948). An important source collection can be found in 
L'Esclavage aux Antilles frangaises d'apres les documents inedits des 
Archives coloniales (Paris, 1897); also, Leon Vignols, "Une Question mal 
posee: le travail manuel des blancs et des esclaves aux Antilles (XVIIe-
XVIIP siecles)," Revue historique, CLXXV (1935), 308-15. 
The Asiento.—The basic works are G. Scelle, La Traite negieres aux 
Indes de Castille. Contrats et traites d'Asiento (2 vols.; Paris, 1906); L. 
Vignols, "L'Asiento franc,ais (1701-1713) et anglais (1713-1751) et le 
commerce franco-espagnol vers 1700 a 1730," Revue d'histoire economique 
et sociale, XVII (1929), 403-36. 
SPHERES OF INFLUENCE UNDER LOUIS XIV.—French colonial interest in 
the seventeenth century extended to three major areas: Africa, Asia 
(India), and North America. 
Africa.—Seventeenth-century French efforts to establish a permanent 
colony on Madagascar are discussed in R. Decary, "Les Etudes historiques 
sur Madagascar/' Revue d'histoire coloniale, XXXIV (1947), 9-21; L. 
Pauliat, Madagascar sous Louis XIV: Louis XIV et la compagnie des 
Indes orientales de 1664 (Paris, 1886); and J. Sottas, Histoire de la 
compagnie royale des Indes orientales, 1664-1719 (Paris, 1905). The 
best summary account of Madagascar's history is H. Deschamps, Histoire 
de Madagascar (Paris, i960). For Senegal see the excellent study of 
A. Delcourt, La France et les etahlissements frangais au Senegal entre 
1713 et 1763 . . . (Dakar, 1952). North African trade is treated by 
Paul Masson in Histoire des Etahlissements et du commerce frangais dans 
VAfrique harharesque 1560-1793 (Paris, 1903). 
Asia.—A detailed account, meticulously documented, is E. W. Dahl­
gren's Les Relations commerciales et maritimes entre la France et les 
cotes de VOcean pacifique (commencement du XVIIIe siecle) (Paris, 
1909); S. P. Sen, The French in India. First Establishment . . . (Cal­
cutta, 1947). 
The Americas.—There is no adequate general account of the Americas 
under Louis XIV, or, for that matter, under the Ancien Regime. Passable 
is the survey of Gabriel-Louis Jaray, L'Empire frangais d'Amerique, 1534­
1803 (Paris, 1938). Charles-Andre Julien's Les Frangais en Amerique 
1713-1784 ("Les Cours de Sorbonne" [2 fasc; Paris, 1955]) contains 
excellent bibliographies for the whole period of the Ancien Re'gime; also, 
Ch. de La Ronciere, Joannes Tramond, and Emile Lauvrier, L'Amerique 
QHistoire des colonies frangaises et I'expansion de la France dans le 
monde, Vol. I; published under the direction of G. Hanotaux and Alfred 
Martineau [Paris, 1929]). 
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West Indies.—An adequate survey is Louis-Philippe May, La France, 
puissance des Antilles (Paris, 1931). Still basic narratives are S. L. Mims, 
Colbert's West India Policy (New Haven, Conn., 1912), and Nellis 
Crouse, The French Struggle for the West Indies, 1665-1713 (New York, 
1943). Standard works in their fields are Cabuzel-A. Banbuck, Histoire 
politique, economique et sociale de la Martinique sous VAncien Regime 
(Paris, 1935); Louis-Philippe May, Histoire economique de la Martinique 
(1635-1763) (Paris, 1930); Maurice Satineau, Histoire de la Guadelope 
sous VAncien Regime (Paris, 1928); and Pierre de Vassiere, Saint-Dom­
ingue, la societe et la vie creole sous VAncien Regime, 1629-1789 (Paris, 
1909). Among the many works of Gabriel Debien, one of the best is 
his Le Peuplement des Antilles francaises au XVIIe siecle. Les engages 
partis de La Rochelle (1683-1715) (Cairo, 1942). An interesting article 
is L. Vignols, "Early French Colonial Policy, Land Appropriation in Haiti 
in the 17 and 18 Centuries," Journal of Economic History, II (1929), 
101-45. Liliane Chauleau provides a brilliant sketch of Creole social life 
and class structure in La Societe a la Martinique au XVIIe siecle (Caen, 
1966). 
Canada.—For a historical assessment see John C. Rule, "The Old 
Regime in America: A Review of Recent Interpretations of France in 
America," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., XIX (1962), 575-600. 
A brief documentary survey, ably edited by Cameron Nish: The French 
Regime ("Canadian Historical Documents Series," Vol. I [Scarborough, 
Ontario, 1965]). 
Two good surveys of Canadian history are: Gustave Lanctot, From- the 
Royal Regime to the Treaty of Utrecht (A History of Canada, Vol. II 
[Cambridge, Mass., 1964]); and W. J. Eccles, Canada under Louis XIV, 
1663-1 jo 1 (Toronto, 1964). The latter is especially strong in institutional 
history and is written with perception and elegance. Highly recommended, 
too, is W. J. Eccles' very fine biography, Frontenac: The Courtier Gov­
ernor (Toronto, 1959). Standard is F. H. Hammang, The Marquis de 
Vaudreuil (Bruges, 1938). Of the biographies of Iberville two can be 
recommended: Guy Fregault, Iberville le conquerant (Montreal, 1944), 
and Nellis Crouse, Lemoyne Iberville, Soldier of New France (Ithaca, 
N. Y., 1954). Also of interest are Thomas Chapais, Jean Talon, intendant 
de la Nouvelle France (1665-1672) (Quebec, 1904), and Lilianne and 
Guy Fregault (eds.), Frontenac: Textes choisis et annotes (Montreal and 
Paris, 1956). 
For administrative history see Gustave Lanctot, L'Administration de la 
Nouvelle France (Paris, 1929), a succinct account; and Raymond Cahall's 
older but balanced The Sovereign Council of New France (New York, 
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An admirable introduction to church history is J. H. Kennedy, Jesuit 
and Savage in New France (New Haven, Conn., 1950). 
For economic and social history see particularly two recent works: 
Jacques Henripin, La Population canadienne au debut du XVIII6 si&cle 
(Paris, 1954); and Jean Hamelin's admirable short study, Economie et 
societe en Nouvelle-France (Montreal, 1955). Still useful is H. A. Innis, 
The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy (Toronto, 
1940), and his The Fur Trade in Canada (rev. ed.; New Haven, 
Conn., 1956). 
Louisiana.—The monumental work in this field is Marcel Giraud, 
Le Regne de Louis XIV (Histoire de la Louisiane, Vol. I [3 vols.; Paris, 
1953-65]). This work is meticulously documented from French sources, 
but does not probe Spanish archival materials. Charles E. O'Neill's work 
on Church and State in French Colonial Louisiana: Policy and Politics to 
iy$i (New Haven, Conn., and London, 1966), is highly recommended, 
and contains an excellent bibliography. 
IX. Religion 
GENERAL WORKS AND HISTORIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND.—A comprehen­
sive review of religion and religious institutions in the Early Modern 
Era, with extensive bibliographies, is contained in Edmond Preclin and 
Eugene Jarry, Les Luttes politiques et doctrinales aux XVIIe et XVIlle 
siecles (Paris, 1955), Vol. XIX of Histoire de I'Eglise, begun under the 
direction of A. Fliche and V. Martin in 1935. Jean Calvet's La Litterature 
religieuse de Saint Francois de Sales a Fenelon (Paris, 1938), is a well-
balanced introduction to the period by one of France's most distinguished 
scholars of religious history. 
A monumental work and an indispensable guide to the study of the 
Catholic renaissance in France in the seventeenth century is Henri 
Bremond, Histoire litteraire du sentiment religieux en France depuis la fin 
des guerres de religion jusqu'a nos jours (12 vols.; Paris, 1924-33). Two 
important works for understanding the religious climate of opinion before 
1685 are Henri Busson's La Pensee religieuse francaise de Charron a 
Pascal (Paris, 1933) and La Religion des classiques (1660-1685) (Paris, 
1948). A notable achievement of scholarship is Fortunat Joseph Strowski's 
Saint Frangois de Sales; introduction a Vhistoire du sentiment religieux 
en France au dix-septieme siecle (new ed.; Paris, 1928). Several recent 
articles of importance both as bibliographical guides and historiographical 
assessments are Pierre Chaunu's "Le XVIIe siecle religieux. Reflexions 
pr^ables," Annales E.—S.—C, XXII (1967), 179-302. Chaunu com­
B I B L I O G R A P H I C A L I N T R O D U C T I O N 447 
ments on the work of E.-G. Leonard in an article entitled "Les Crises au 
XVIIe siecle de l'Europe reforme'e," Revue historique, CCXXXIII (1965), 
23-60. 
FRANCE AND THE PAPACY.—An old but thorough account of Franco-papal 
relations may be found in Charles G6rin's Louis XIV et le Saint-Siege (2 
vols.; Paris, 1894). Gerin should be read along with the fundamental 
work by Eugene Michaud on Louis XIV et Innocent XI, d'apres les 
correspondences diplomatiques inedits du ministere des affaires etrangeres 
de France (4 vols.; Paris, 1882-83). Two modern works on Louis XIV's 
relations with the indomitable Pope Innocent XI are basic to under­
standing: Jean Orcibal's Louis XIV contre Innocent XI (Paris, 1949) 
and Louis O'Brien's often overlooked Innocent XI and the Revocation of 
the Edict of Nantes (Berkeley, 1930), which contains an extensive 
bibliography. Four important specialized works that treat of Louis XIV's 
relations with the papacy in the 1650's and 6o's are: Francois Regis de 
Chantelauze, Le Cardinal de Retz et ses missions diplomatiques a Rome 
(Paris, 1879); Charles de Moiiy, Louis XIV et le Saint-Siege, Vambassade 
du due de Crequi (1662-1665) (2 vols.; Paris, 1893); A. Bozon, Le 
Cardinal de Retz a Rome (Paris, 1878); and Paul Sonnino, Louis XIV's 
View of the Papacy (1661-166'/) (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966). 
GALLICANISM.—Victor Martin's two works, Le Gallicanisme et la reforme 
catholique, essai historique sur Vintroduction en France des decrets du 
concile de Trente (Paris, 1919) and Le Gallicanisme politique et le clerge 
de France (Paris, 1929), serve as the best introductions to the question. 
An unusually able account is also provided in Aime-Georges Martimort, 
Le Gallicanisme de Bossuet (Paris, 1953), which contains an excellent 
bibliography. Martimort's work should be read in conjunction with a 
more conventional interpretation by A. Gazier, Bossuet et Louis XIV, 
1662,-1704. Etude historique sur le caractere de Bossuet . . . (Paris, 
1914). An invaluable documentary collection concerning the Gallican 
problem is contained in A. Duranthon, Collection des proces verhaux des 
Assemblies du Clerge de France depuis 1560 jusqu'd present (5 vols.; 
Paris, 1953-60). The background to the Gallican articles of 1682 is 
studied by Charles Gerin, Recherches historiques sur VAssemblee du 
clerge de France de 1682 (2d ed.; Paris, 1870); and more recently, in the 
notable work of Pierre Blet, Le clerge de France et la monarchie, etude 
sur les Assemblies generales du clerge de 1615 a 1666 (2 vols.; Rome, 
1959). Jean Meuvret treats the repercussions of the papal-Gallican quarrel 
in his important article "Les Aspects politiques de la liquidation du conflit 
gallican, (juillet 1691-sep. 1693)," Revue d'historie de VEglise de France, 
XXXIII (1947), 257-70. An interesting study of the extensions of Galli­
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canism to the colonies may be found in Canon Lionel Groulx's article, 
"Le Gallicanisme au Canada sous Louis XIV," Revue d'histoire de 
VAmerique franqaise, No. i (June, 1947) pp. 54-91. 
JANSENISM.—One of the most divisive and colorful chapters in the 
religious history of Louis XIV's reign concerns the question of Jansenism. 
A brilliant, sympathetic interpretation of Jansenism is rendered by the 
great French nineteenth-century critic C.-A. Sainte-Beuve in Port-Royal 
(7 vols.; Paris, 1867-1913), containing an alphabetical and analytical 
table of names and subject matter compiled by Anatole de Montaigion. 
A far more concise but no less insightful and sympathetic account is 
Ronald A. Knox's Enthusiasm: A Chapter in the History of Religion with 
Special Reference to the XVII and XVIII Centuries (Oxford, 1950), pp. 
176-230. Nigel Abercrombie in The Origins of Jansenism (Oxford, 1936) 
provides us with a profoundly penetrating analysis of the early years of 
the Jansenists. Augustin Gazier's Histoire generale du viouvement jan­
seniste depuis ses origines jusqu'a nos jours . .  . (2 vols.; Paris, 1922), 
is the standard survey of the Jansenist movement (a movement that he 
denies existed in an organized sense). Gazier's conclusions should be read 
along with the corrections and additions offered by Cognet and Orcibal; 
a brief but brilliant summary of Cognet's views are contained in his 
Le Jansenisme (Paris, 1961). Jean Orcibal is the master of those who 
have interpreted the so-called Jansenist movement; a few of his works 
on this topic are: Saint-Cyran et le Jansenisme (Paris, 1961); Port-Royal 
entre le miracle et Vobeissance: Flavie Passart et Angelique de Saint Jean 
Arnauld d'Andilly (Paris, 1957); ha Spiritualite de Saint-Cyran, avec 
ses ecrits de piete inedits (Paris, 1962). Another excellent introduction to 
the understanding of the Jansenist position are two studies by Jean 
Laporte: "Le Jansenisme" in Etudes d'histoire de la philosophie franqaise 
au XVIIe siecle (Paris, 1951), pp. 88-105, and his La Doctrine de Port-
Royal (4 vols.; Paris, 1923-52). A study in depth of provincial Jansenism is 
the large work by Rene Taveneaux, Le Jansenisme en Lorraine (Paris, 
i960). Pierre Chaunu has a cogent comment on Taveneaux's work in an 
article titled "Jansenisme et frontiere de catholicite . . . ," Revue his­
torique, CCXXVIII (1962). Jacques-Francois Thomas, in a carefully docu­
mented monograph, has studied the last chapter of Jansenism in Louis 
XIV's reign: La Querelle de I'Unigenitus (Paris, 1950). 
The Defender of Jansenism.—Blaise Pascal, at once the defender and 
interpreter of the Jansenist movement, has excited the interest of many 
biographers. Among the best of these biographies published since World 
War II are: Leon Brunschvieg, Blaise Pascal (Paris, 1953); Ernest 
Mortimer, Blaise Pascal: The Life and Work of a Realist (London, 1959); 
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Jeanne Russier, La Foi selon Pascal (2 vols.; Paris, 1965); Jean Mesnard, 
Pascal et les Roannez (Paris, 1965). Older but discriminating and instruc­
tive is Fortunat Strowski, Histoire du sentiment religieux en France au 
XVIIe siecle. Pascal et son temps (3 vols.; Paris, 1907-8). An insightful 
sociological study of Jansenism is Lucien Goldman, Le Dieu cache (Paris, 
1955)­
THE PROTESTANTS.—Four important surveys of French Protestantism are: 
Emile-G. Leonard, Le Protestant frangais (Paris, 1955); John Vienot, 
Histoire de la Reforme frangaise, de VEdit de Nantes d sa revocation 
(1598-1685) (Paris, 1934); Burdette Poland, French Protestantism and 
the French Revolution. A Study in Church and State, Thought and 
Religion, 1685-1815 (Princeton, N. J., 1957); Samuel Mours, Le Protes­
tantisme en France au XVUe siecle, 1598-1685 (Paris, 1967). A more 
specialized work is Victor-Louis Bourrilly Les Protestants frangais de 
Provence aux XVIIe et XVIlIe siecles (Gap, 1956). A useful biblio­
graphical review is found in Emile-G. Leonard, "Le Protestantisme 
frangais au XVIIe siecle," Revue historique, CC (1948), 153-79. With 
his usual careful and sensitive appraisals Jean Orcibal introduces the 
reader to the topic of Louis XIV et les protestants (Paris, 1951). A far 
more detailed but no less important modern work on Protestantism (with 
special reference to economics) is Warren Scoville, The Persecution of 
the Huguenots and French Economic Development, 1680-1720 (Berkeley, 
i960). Scoville corrects our view of the extent of the emigration of the 
Huguenots; the older view of the consequences of the revocation (more 
obviously sympathetic to the Huguenots) are held by: Charles Weiss, 
Histoire des refugies protestants de France depuis la revocation de VEdit 
de Nantes jusqu'd nos jours (2 vols.; Paris, 1853); Henry Baird, The 
Huguenots and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (2 vols.; New York, 
1895); Frank Puaux and A. Sabatier, Etudes sur la revocation de VEdit de 
Nantes (Paris, 1886). A more balanced view is held by Joseph Dedieu, Le 
Role politique des protestants frangais (1685-1715) (Paris, 1920) (particu­
larly important for his remarks on Jurieu, the Camisards, and the Treaty of 
Ryswick). Interesting background material to the revocation is contained 
in Charles Benoist's Condition juridique des protestants sous le regime de 
VEdit de Nantes et apres sa revocation (Paris, 1900). An older, more 
Protestant view of the revocation is represented by F. Puaux, "La 
Responsibilite de la revocation de l'Edit de Nantes," Revue historique, 
XXIX (1885), 24I-79- Three of the persons often accused of having 
influenced Louis XIV in his decision to revoke the Edict, Mme de 
Maintenon, the marquis de Louvois, and the intendant, Foucault, are 
studied by Marcel Pin in Madame de Maintenon et les protestants: 
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contribution a VEtude de la revocation de I'Edit de Nantes (Uzes, 1944), 
and by L. L. Bernard in "Foucault, Louvois, and the Revocation of the 
Edict of Nantes," Church History, XXV (1956), 27-40. The last eruption 
of Protestant religious strife during Louis XIV's reign was the so-called 
War of the Camisards (1702-8), which broke out in the rocky wastes of 
the Cevennes Mountains. The Huguenot side of this conflict is brilliantly 
argued by Antoine Court in Histoire des troubles des Cevennes on de la 
guerre des Camisards sous le regne de Louis-Le-Grand (3 vols.; Ville­
franche, 1760). Three important works have appeared on the same subject: 
Agnes de La Gorce, Camisards et dragons du roi (Paris, 1950); Charles 
Almeras, La Revoke des Camsiards (Paris, i960); and Andre Ducasse, 
La Guerre des Camisards, la resistance huguenote sous Louis XIV (Paris, 
1946). 
QUIETISM.—One of the best introductions to quietism may be found in 
R. A. Knox's Enthusiasm . . . (Oxford, 1950), pp. 231-87. Louis 
Cognet presents a brilliant reappraisal of the struggle in Crepuscule 
des mystiques: le conflit Fenelon-Bossuet (Tournai, 1958). Another im­
portant addition to our knowledge of the Bossuet-Fenelon quarrel of the 
1690's is R. Schmittlein, L'Aspect politique du differend Bossuet-Fenelon 
(Baden, 1954). The reader will wish, too, to consult the important article 
by Jean Orcibal, "Fenelon et le Quietisme," in XVIIe siecle, Nos. 12-14 
(1951-52), pp. 215-53. 
SPECIALIZED STUDIES.—Two specialized studies related tangentially to 
the great religious problems of the reign are, first, a detailed account of 
Cure Meslier, whom the author terms a militant atheist and crypto­
revolutionary: Maurice Dommangst, Le Cure Meslier, athee, communiste 
et revolutionnaire sous Louis XIV (Paris, 1965) (well documented). At 
the opposite end of the spectrum is the figure portrayed by Georges 
Guitton, S.J., in Le Pere de la Chaize: confesseur de Louis XIV (2 vols.; 
Paris, 1959). 
X. Literature and Ideas 
GENERAL WORKS, INCLUDING BIBLIOGRAPHICAL GUIDES, MANUALS, AND 
GENERAL HISTORIES OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.—Cardinal Georges 
Grente and his associates provide the reader with an indispensable 
bibliographical guide: Dictionnaire des lettres francaises (Paris, 1951), 
published under the direction of Georges Grente et al. A concise, accur­
ate, and well-annotated bibliographical guide to the literature of the 
period can be found in Pierre Langlois and Andr6 Mareuil, Guide 
bibliographique des etudes litteraires (3d ed.; Paris, 1965). P. Castex and 
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P. Surer's XVlle siecle (Manuel des etudes litteraires frangaises, Vol. Ill 
[Paris, 1947]) has assembled a brief but reliable compendium of facts. 
An important introduction to the bibliography of French literature in the 
period is Nathan Edelman (ed.), The Seventeenth Century (A Critical 
Bibliography of French Literature, ed. David Cabeen and Jules Brody, 
Vol. Ill [Syracuse, N. Y., 1961]). Detailed, recent compilations are R. W. 
Baldner, Bibliography of Sevententh-Century French Prose Fiction (New 
York, 1967), and Alexandre Cioranescu, Bibliographie de la litterature 
frangaise du iye siecle (3 vols.; Paris, 1965-[67]). 
One of the great masters of French literary history in the late nineteenth 
century, Gustave Lanson, wrote a guide to French literature that is still 
valuable for its trenchant insights and comments: Histoire de la litterature 
frangaise (Paris, 1898). Henri Peyre has collected many of Lanson's most 
valuable essays, including "L'Influence de la philosophic cartesienne sur 
la Htterature frangaise" and "Le Role d'experience dans la formation de la 
philosophic du XVIIP siecle en France," in Gustave Lanson, Essais de 
methode, de critique et d'histoire litteraire, ed. Henri Peyre (Paris, 1965). 
A student of Lanson, Daniel Mornet, presents a lucidly written synthesis 
of the literature of the Grand Siecle in Histoire de la Htterature frangaise 
classique, 1660-1 yoo, ses caracteres veritables, ses aspects inconnus (3d 
ed., Paris, 1940). 
A recent, well-documented survey of French letters, by an authority 
on the seventeenth century, is Rene Jasinski's Histoire de la Htterature 
frangaise (2 vols.; Paris, 1947). Antoine Adam presents a masterful, 
detailed, and indispensable study of French thought in his Histoire de la 
Htterature frangaise au XVlIe siecle (5 vols.; Paris, 1948-56). Broader in 
scope than that of Adam, but no less penetrating in its comments, is 
Pierre Barriere's survey of the intellectual history of France (in the 
tradition of the history of ideas): La Vie intellectuelle en France: du 
XVI6 siecle a I'epoque contemporaine (Paris, 1961). Lucidly and learn­
edly reasoned (and broader in scope than its title indicates) is J. S. Spink's 
French Free-Thought from Gassendi to Voltaire (London, i960). Another 
Englishman's guide to France, built around a close reading of twenty-one 
of France's great seventeenth-century writers from Malherbe to Fenelon, 
is W. D. Howarth's Life and Letters in France: The Seventeenth 
Century (London and Edinburgh, 1965). A brief, highly schematic 
approach can be found in V.-L. Saulnier's La Litterature du siecle 
classique (4th ed.; Paris, 1955) (excellent for periodization). Paul 
Benichou presents a brilliant essay on the Morales du Grand Siecle 
(Paris, 1948). 
An important background study of the age of Louis XIV is Jean 
Rousset's La Litterature de Vdge baroque en France: Circe et le paon 
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(new ed.; Paris, 1954. Rousset can be supplemented by the collaborative 
work edited by Jean-Jacques Demorest. Studies in Seventeenth-Century 
French Literature (Ithaca, N. Y., 1962), which includes essays by Nathan 
Edelman, Philip Wadsworth, Alain Seznec, Henri Peyre, and Hugh 
Davidson. As an introduction to the poetry of the age, R. Winegarten's 
French Lyric Poetry in the Age of Malherhe (Manchester, England, 
1954) illuminates the development of poetical style in the seventeenth 
century. 
In a general account of the fin de siecle, Arthur A. Tilley describes 
the last years of Louis XIV's reign as a period of literary deterioration: 
The Decline of the Age of Louis XIV: Or, French Literature 1687-1715 
(Cambridge, England, 1929). His work should be compared with Paul 
Hazard's La Crise de la conscience europeenne (1680—1715) (3 vols.; 
Paris, 1934-35). Hazard posits the thesis that in the years 1685-1715 
France was transformed from the age of Bossuet to the age of Voltaire. 
(The third volume contains an excellent bibliography "raisonnee".) 
THE BAROQUE AND CLASSICISM.—Useful as an introduction to the 
baroque is Imbrie Buffum, Studies in the Baroque from Montaigne to 
Rotrou (New Haven, 1957). A more detailed guide to the concepts of both 
the baroque and of classicism may be found in the recent work of V.-L. 
Tapie, Baroque et Classicisme (Paris, 1957), with an excellent bibliog­
raphy. Tapie's work has been rendered into English in a handsome edition: 
The Age of Grandeur: Baroque Art and Architecture, trans. A. Ross 
Williamson (New York, i960). Also useful in Tapie's brief discussion, 
Le Baroque ("Que sais-je1?", No. 923 [Paris, 1961]); see particularly his 
first chapter on "Definition et histoire du Mot Baroque." Of value too 
is Gonzague de Reynold, Le XVIIe siecle. Le classique et le baroque 
(Montreal, 1944), which studies the conflict between the classical and 
baroque ideals. Rene Wellek's chapter, 'The Concept of Baroque in 
Literary Scholarship," in Concepts of Criticism (New Haven and London, 
1963), pp. 69-127, sees two main streams in evolution of baroque thought: 
one flowing from Renaissance mysticism and the other from rhetorical 
humanism and Petrarchism. A number of learned controversies have 
arisen over the definition of the baroque; some useful articles in making 
distinctions clearer are Helmut Hatzfeld, "Use and Misuse of 'Baroque' 
as a Critical Term in Literary History," University of Toronto Quarterly, 
No. 31 (1962), pp. 180-200; and Henri Peyre's lightly veiled attack on 
the baroque, "Common-Sense Remarks on the French Baroque," in 
Jean-Jacques Demorest (ed.), Studies in Seventeenth Century French 
Literature, pp. 1-19. More detailed studies are by Marcel Raymond, 
"Du baroquisme et de la litterature en France aux XVIe et XVIIP siecles," 
in La Profondeur et le rhythme (Grenoble, 1948); Vaclav Cerny, "Le 
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Baroque et la literature francaise," Critique, XII (June, 1956), 517-33, 
continued in XII (July, 1956), 617-35; Franco Simone, "Per la definizione 
di un baroco francese/' Rivista di letteratura moderne, XVII (July-
September, 1954), 165-92; and a collection of articles entitled "Du 
baroque au classicisme," XVIIe Siecle, No. 20 (1955), pp. 249-318. 
Odette de Mourgues analyzes the many facets of baroque poetry in 
Metaphysical, Baroque, and Precieux Poetry (Oxford, 1953). The student 
of preciosite may also wish to compare her approaches to that of Daniel 
Mornet in "La Signification et revolution de Tidee de preciosite en 
France au XVIIe siecle," Journal of the History of Ideas, I (1940), 
225-31. 
Two elegantly written and sensibly argued guides to French classicism 
are: Henri Peyre, Le Classicisme francais, retitled Qu'est-ce que le classi­
cisme? in the revised edition (Paris, 1965); and Will G. Moore, French 
Classical Literature—An Essay (London, 1961). E. B. O. BorgerhofFs 
thesis is that French classicism, far from being inhibiting, was actually 
a liberating factor in French seventeenth-century literature (The Freedom 
of French Classicism [Princeton, N. J., 1950]). Excellent for background 
material is Rene Bray's La Formation de la doctrine classique en France 
(Paris, 1951). The impact of classicism on the theater is well treated by 
Jean Scherer in La Dramaturgie classique en France (Paris, 1950). 
THE GROWTH OF IDEAS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.—In the last 
decades of the seventeenth century the seeds of the Enlightenment were 
being sown by the first of the philosophes. 
The Evolution of a New "Climate of Opinion" and Development of the 
Philosophical Spirit in France.—One of the most important problems 
facing the historian of ideas is the isolation of strands of thought that 
constitute the so-called climate of opinion, the elusive Zeitgeist of an era. 
For an understanding—both historical and historiographical—of the 
climate of opinion during the last decades of Louis XIV's reign, an 
appropriate point of departure is the work of the distinguished scholar 
Gustave Lanson and one of his intellectual successor, Paul Hazard. 
Lanson's most seminal work concerning the growth of the philosophic 
spirit is contained in a series of articles written in the early twentieth 
century. Two of the most important are "L'lnfluence de la philosophic 
cartesienne sur la litterature franchise," in Essais de methode de critique 
et d'histoire litteraire, ed. Henri Peyre (Paris, 1965), and "Origines et 
premieres manifestations de l'esprit philosophique dans la litterature 
francaise de 1675 a 1744," Revue des cours et conferences, (1907-9). 
Paul Hazard then carried on Lanson's theme of the growth of the new 
climate of opinion in his La Crise de la conscience europeenne (1680­
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I7I5) (3 vols.; Paris, 1935) (discussed previously). Hazard credited the 
transformation of the spirit of the age to the role played by exotic literature, 
to the new trends in scholarship, and to philosophical innovations. A 
general work treating of the same topic is Georges Pages's lectures of 
1939 at the Sorbonne, reproduced under the title Les Origines du 
XVllle siecle au temps de Louis XIV (1680 a 1715) (Paris, reprinted 
1961). Special studies of exotic literature (travelogues, descriptions of 
voyages, etc.) have been written by Geoffroy Atkinson in his Les 
Relations de voyages du XVlle siecle et Involution des idees; contribution 
a I'etude de la formation de Vesprit du XVIIIe siecle (Paris, 1924); and 
Extraordinary Voyage in French Literature hefore 1700 (1920). An in­
teresting sequel—although marred by numerous factual errors—is Atkin­
son's The Sentimental Revolution: French Writers of 1690-1740, ed. 
Abraham C. Keller (Seattle, 1965). Other important studies of exotica 
are V. Pinot's La Chine et la formation de I'esprit philosophique en 
France, 1640-1740 (Paris, 1932); and Gilbert Chinard's pioneering effort 
L'Exotisme americain dans la litterature frangaise au dix-seizieme siecle 
(Paris, 1911). 
A. J. Krailsheimer's Studies in Self-Interest from Descartes to La 
Bruyere (Oxford, 1962) traces the varying reactions of selected seven­
teenth century authors to the concepts of moi, gloire, and honnetete. 
Diffusion of Ideas.—How philosophic ideas are diffused among the 
intellengentsia of Europe is discussed in a model work of its kind— 
certainly the best introduction to the subject, if in itself a bit diffuse. 
Ira O. Wade's The Clandestine Organization and Diffusion of Philosophic 
Ideas in France from 1700 to 1750 (Princeton, N. J., 1938). Ancillary 
studies, derivative both of the Lanson-Hazard school and the Arthur 
Lovejoy-Ira Wade history-of-ideas approach, are W. H. Barber's Leibniz 
in France: From Arnauld to Voltaire (Oxford, 1955); Paul Vemiere's 
Spinoza et la pensee frangaise avant la Revolution (2 vols.; Paris, 1954); 
Gabriel Bonno's meticulous Les Relations intellectuelles de Locke avec 
la France, d'apres des documents inedits (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
1955); and Alfred R. Desautels's more monographic Les Memoires de 
Trevoux et le mouvement des idees au XVllle siecle, 1701-1734 (Rome, 
1956). Among several specialized studies is the excellent commentary 
offered by Aram Vartanian in his Diderot and Descartes: A Study of 
Scientific Naturalism in the Enlightenment (Princeton, N. J., 1953), 
depicting the clash of Cartesian and Newtonian ideas on science. In the 
same vein is Heikki Kirkinen's Les Origines de la conception moderne de 
Vhomme-viachine. Le probleme de I'dme en France a la fin du regne de 
Louis XIV {1670-171$): Etude sur Vhistoire des idees (Helsinki, i960). 
Kirkinen appends an extensive bibliography. 
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Of interest, too, is Lionel Rothkrug's Opposition to Louis XIV: The 
Political and Social Origins of the French Enlightenment (Princeton, N. 
J., 1965) (cited also under Social History). Rothkrug, whose work has also 
been cited under studies in mercantilism, propounds a thesis that in­
tellectual life was being transformed by "conditions external to the 
[formal] history of ideas," i.e., by the growth of bureaucracy, of deperson­
alization of government, of Christian agrarianism. Rothkrug's work con­
tains an excellent bibliography. For the growth of the so-called bourgeois 
spirit, a significant, oft-neglected work is Bernhard Groethuysen's Die 
Entstehung der hurgerlichen Welt-mid Lebensanschauung in Frankreich 
(2 vols.; Halle, 1927-30). A study of the diffusion of seventeenth-century 
ideas during the Enlightenment is Albert Cherel's Fenelon au XVlIle 
siecle en France (Paris, 1917). An uneven but a pioneering effort is D. T. 
Pottinger, The French Book Trade in the Ancien Regime, 1500-1789 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1958). 
Free Thought.—Closely connected with the growth of the philosophic 
spirit is the development of libertinage, or free thought. A pioneering effort 
is Frederic Lachevre's Le Libertinage au XVlle siecle (2 vols.; Paris, 
1909). More thorough than Lachevre is Rene Pintard's Le Libertinage 
erudit dans la premiere moitie du XVlle siecle (2 vols.; Paris, 1943), with 
an extensive bibliography. More discriminating than Pintard and covering 
a later period in the history of free thought is J. S. Spink, French Free 
Thought from Gassendi to Voltaire (London, i960). 
Salons.—The best general work on the influence of the salons is Roger 
Picard's Les Salons litteraires et la societe francaise, 1610-1789 (New 
York, 1943). 
Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns.—The best work on this subject 
remains H. Gillot's La Querelle des anciens et des modernes en France. 
De la defense et illustration de la langue francaise aux parallelles des 
anciens et des modernes (Paris, 1914). Still useful is the older study by H. 
Rigault, Histoire de la querelle des anciens et des modernes (Paris, 1859), 
in which he sees the quarrel as a struggle between the supporters of con­
servatism and those of liberalism. 
The Theater and its Public.—A monumental work on French dramatic 
literature is H. C. Lancaster's A History of French Dramatic Literature 
in the Seventeenth Century (9 vols.; Baltimore, 1929-42). John Lough's 
Paris Theatre Audiences in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 
(London, 1957) is a needed corrective to Lancaster's work. Lough asserts 
that playwrights of the classical period wrote for audiences that were at 
once smaller and more aristocratic than Lancaster estimated. Pierre 
Melese's Le Theatre et le public a Paris sous Louis XIV, 1659-1715 
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(Paris, 1934) is immensely learned, and buttressed by extensive bibliog­
raphies. The problem of censorship is dealt with in a useful survey by 
Victor Hallays-Dabot, Histoire de la censure thedtrale en France (Paris, 
1862). Harriet Dorothea MacPherson deals with the same topic in 
Censorship under Louis XIV, 1661-1715. Some Aspects of Its Influence 
(New York, 1929); although largely based on secondary works and 
marred by numerous errors, MacPherson's study is still the only brief 
survey of the subject in English. 
"EUROPE LOOKS AT FRANCE."—Relatively neglected is the study of Euro­
pean public opinion and its reaction to the image of Louis XIV's France. 
A recent survey of the emergence of the idea of Europe provides some 
guide lines for a more comprehensive study: J. B. Duroselle, L'ldee 
d'Europe dans I'histoire (Paris, 1965). The author devotes Chapter IV to 
"De la Chretiente a l'Europe (XVIe-XVIIe siecles)"; he believes the 
idea of "Europe" emerged in the 1660's and was fully recognized by 
"Europeans" at the time of the War of the Spanish Succession. There 
are three other major works in this area that should be mentioned: 
Georges Ascoli, La Grande-Bretagne devant Vopinion franqaise au XVlle 
siecle (2 vols.; Paris, 1930); Hubert Gillot, Le Regne de Louis XIV et 
Vopinion publique en Allemagne (Paris, 1914); and P. J. W. Van 
Malssen, Louis XIV d'apres les pamphlets repandus en Hollande 
(Amsterdam, 1936). 
XI. Science 
GENERAL WORKS ON THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE.—Herbert Butterfield's 
challenging work on The Origins of Modern Science (London, 1949) 
is of especial interest to students of Louis XIV's France because of the 
importance he gives to the "transition to the philosophe movement" in 
Chapter IX. More balanced, and essentially more reliable in its judgments, 
is A. Rupert Hall's survey From Galileo to JSewton 1630-1720 ("Rise of 
Modern Science," Vol. Ill [New York, 1963]), with extensive bibliog­
raphies, and his The Scientific Revolution 1500-1800 (Boston, 1956; 
London, 1954). For an excellent introduction to the scientific revolution 
of the seventeenth century, particularly the Galilean prelude, read A. 
Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore, 1957). 
An encyclopedic introduction to the subject, with special emphasis on 
technology, is A. Wolf, A History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy 
in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (London, 1935). Roland 
Mousnier begins his work Progres scientiflque et technique au XVlIle 
siecle (Paris, 1958) with an important chapter entitled "Aristotelisme, 
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Carte'sianisme, Newtonianisme," which is a useful review for students of 
Louis XIV's reign. Mousnier mentions the work of B. Hessen, whose 
neo-Marxist interpretation of science in the seventeenth century is refuted 
by G. N. Clark in his essay Science and Social Welfare in the Age of 
Newton (2d ed.; Oxford, 1948). 
AN INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH SCIENCE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.— 
Excellent guides to French contributions to science can be found in 
Maurice Caullery, La Science franqaise depuis le XVII6 siecle . . . (2d 
ed., revised and corrected; Paris, 1948). More specialized are H. Metzger, 
Les Doctrines chimiques en France du debut iye a la fin du i8e siecles 
(Paris, 1923); the monumental work of Jacques Roger, Les Sciences de la 
vie dans la pensee franqaise du XVIIIe siecle (Paris, 1963), with a de­
tailed bibliography; and Maurice Caullery, "La Biologie au XVIIe siecle/' 
XVIIe Siecle, No. 30 (1956), pp. 25-45. Brief but suggestive of avenues 
for further study in the realm of sciences influence on letters is John 
Stephenson Spink's Literature and the Sciences in the Age of Moliere. 
An Inaugural Lecture at Bedford College, London (London, 1953). 
THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE.—One of the great achievements of 
France in the age of Louis XIV was the emergence of the great academies, 
of which the scientific academies were among the most important. A 
useful general introduction to the subject may be found in Martha 
Ornstein, The Role of Scientific Societies in the Seventeenth Century 
(Chicago, 1938). The pre-Colbertian scientific societies are studied by 
Bigourdan in Les premieres societes savantes de Paris au XVIIe siecle 
(Paris, 1918). Still the most detailed and one of the most reliable guides 
to the academies and societies is Harcourt Brown's Scientific Organiza­
tions in Seventeenth Century France (1620-1680) (Baltimore, 1934). 
The work of the royal academy of science itself is detailed by J. Bertand 
in L'Academie des sciences et les academiciens de 1666 a 1793 (Paris, 
1869); and by P. Gauja, L'Academie des sciences (Paris, 1934), aug­
mented by his later article "L'Academie royale des sciences (1666-1793)," 
Revue d'histoire des sciences, 2 (1949). Coeval with the rise of the scien­
tific academies is the emergence of learned journals. Betty Trebell Morgan 
investigates the earliest of these periodic publications in her thesis Histoire 
du Journal des Scavans, 1665-1700 (Paris, 1929). One of the first foreign 
appointees of J. B. Colbert to the Academie Royale des Sciences was 
Christiaan Huygens, whose GEuvres completes (22 vols.; The Hague, 
1888-1950) provides us with an invaluable picture of French science in 
the 1660's and 1670's. (Huygens' correspondence is published in the 
first nine volumes.) Two other works of note on Huygens are H. L. 
Brugmans, Le Sejour de Christian Huygens a Paris (Paris, 1935), and 
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A. E. Bell, Christian Huygens and the Development of Science in the 
Seventeenth Century (London, 1947), which serves as well as a general 
guide to science in the period. 
CARTESIANISM AND THE RISE OF MODERN SCIENCE.—One of the greatest 
of all scientific speculators of the day was Ren£ Descartes. The literature 
concerned with his achievements is so vast that we can only mention a 
few of the most important works: A. G. A. Balz, Cartesian Studies (New 
York, 1951); A. Koyre, Entretiens sur Descartes (New York and Paris, 
1944); J. F. Scott, The Scientific Works of Rene Descartes (London, 
1962). L. J. Beck presents a detailed examination of Descartes's famous 
deductive method in his book, The Method of Descartes, a Study of the 
Regulae (Oxford, 1952). A more general treatment of Cartesianism and 
of Cartesian physics and its influence to the end of Louis XIV's reign 
can be found in P. Moiiy, Le Developpement de la physique cartesienne, 
1646-1712. (Paris, 1934). One of the greatest popularizers of Cartesianism 
was Bernard de Fontenelle. A careful analysis of Fontenelle's two greatest 
works is contributed by Robert Shackelton in his edition of Fontenelle: 
"Entretiens sur la pluralite des mondes: Digression sur les anciens et les 
modernes (Oxford, 1955). J.-R. Carre, who sees Fontenelle in the main 
stream of the Enlightenment, has contributed a standard work in the 
field: La Philosophic de Fontenelle; ou, le sourire de la raison (Paris, 
1932). F. Gregoire presents: Fontenelle: une philosophic desahusee 
(Nancy, 1947), a searching study of Fontenelle's interest in science. 
GASSENDI AND THE ATOMISTS AND MERSENNE AND MECHANICS.—Des­
cartes's colleagues and successors have likewise had their chroniclers. Two 
of the most important seventeenth-century scientists were Gassendi and 
Mersenne, who have been ably studied by Bernard Rochot et al., Pierre 
Gassendi (1592-1655), sa vie et son ceuvre (Paris, 1955); Henri Berr, 
Du Scepticisme de Gassendi, ed. B. Rochot, originally a thesis defended 
at the Sorbonne in 1898. Also of importance: Comite du tricentenaire de 
Gassendi, Actes du congres du tricentenaire de Pierre Gassendi (4-7 aout 
1955) (Paris, 1957); R. Lenoble, Mersenne, ou, la naissance du mecanisme 
(Paris, 1943). Pascal's contributions to French science have been honored 
by a symposium on the tricentenary of his death: R. Taton (ed.), 
L'CEuvre scientifique de Pascal (Paris, 1964). 
NEWTON AND NEWTONIANISM : A COUNTERVAILING FORCE.—Justly 
praised as the best available introductions to this field, at once detailed 
and discriminating, are: P. Brunet's L'Introduction des theories de Newton 
en France au XVUIe sik.de (Paris, 1931); and his Les Physiciens hollandais 
et la methode experhnentale en France au i8e Siecle (Paris, 1926). Also 
of interest are the perceptive and challenging essays by Alexandre Koyre 
in Newtonian Studies (Cambridge, Mass., 1965). 
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XII. Education 
GENERAL WORKS.—Two fundamental general works on French education 
are Geraldine Hodgson's Studies in Trench Education (Cambridge, Eng., 
1908) and Stephen D'Irsay's outstanding Du XVIe siecle a i860 (Histoire 
des universites frangaises et etrangeres, Vol. II [2 vols.; Paris, 1935]). 
THE ANCIEN REGIME.—The most recent and perhaps most important 
work on education during this period is Georges Snyders, La Pedagogie 
en France aux XVIIe et XVlll6 siecles (Paris, 1965). Older but still useful 
works are C. Jourdain, Histoire de Vuniversite de Paris au XVlIe et au 
XVllle siecles (2 vols.; Paris, 1862-66), and H. Lantoine, Histoire de 
Venseignement secondaire en France au XVIle siecle (Paris, 1874). 
SPECIAL WORKS.—Two significant studies of technical education are 
Frederick B. Artz, The Development of Technical Education in France 
1500-1800 (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), and Rene Taton, Enseignement 
et diffusion des sciences en France au XVIIIe siecle (Paris, 1964). For 
perceptive accounts of the Jesuits, see Fr. de Dainville, Les Jesuites et 
Veducation de la societe frangaise; la naissance de Vhumanisme moderne 
(Paris, 1940) and Les Jesuites et I'education de la societe frangaise; la 
geographie des humanistes (Paris, 1940). 
Two of the members of Louis XIV's court, Mme de Maintenon and 
Archbishop Fenelon, were especially interested in education. An adequate 
introduction to Maintenon's ideas on education is presented by H. C. 
Barnard in Madame de Maintenon and Saint-Cyr (London, 1934). Studies 
of Fenelon as an educator include Gaston Bizos, Fenelon educateur (Paris, 
1886) and Gabriel Compayre, Fenelon et Veducation attrayante (Paris, 
1910). 
XIII. Art and Architecture 
GENERAL WORKS.—Three sources may help the student to better under­
stand Louis XIV's interest in the arts. The first is Jules Guiffrey's selection 
from among the plethora of records kept by the king's superintendent of 
buildings, titled Comptes des hdtiments du roi, sous le regne de Louis 
XIV (5 vols.; Paris, 1881-1901). The second is Sieur de Chantelou's 
detailed account of Bernini's visit to Paris in 1665-66 and the report of 
the conversations between king and artist, published as Freart de Chante­
lou, journal du voyage en France du cavalier Bernin. . . . With a 
Preface by G. Charensol (Paris, 1930). Sieur de Chantelou's Journal 
should be read along with Rudolf Wittkower's delightful lecture Bernini's 
Bust of Louis XIV (The Charlton Lectures on Art; London, 1951). The 
third source is entitled Maniere de montrer les jardins de Versailles, with 
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a modern preface by Raoul Girardet and text by Louis XIV himself 
(Paris, 1951); it is an elegant guidebook to the gardens of Versailles. 
There are numerous introductions to the art and architecture of the 
Ludovican period. Three works can be particularly recommended: 
Sir Anthony Blunt, Art and Architecture in France, 1500-1700 (Balti­
more, 1954), with a good select bibliography; V.-L. Tapie, The Age of 
Grandeur, translated from the French original, Baroque et classicisme 
(Paris, 1957) by A. Ross Williamson (London and New York, i960); 
Roger A. Weigert, L'Epoque Louis XIV (Paris, 1962). Other surveys 
of value are: Rene Schneider, L'Art frangais: XVlle siecle, 1610-1690 
(Paris, 1925), and its sequel, L'Art francais: XVIIIe siecle, 1690-1789 
(Paris, 1926); L'Art frangais au temps de Louis XIV (Paris, 1911). 
Far more inclusive than the title indicates is Fiske Kimball's The 
Creation of the Rococo (Paris, 1964), which not only deals with the 
rise of the ornamentalists but reviews the progress of art and architecture 
throughout the reign and treats in detail the transition in styles from the 
age of Louis XIV to that of Louis XV. The diffusion of French artistic 
ideals is reviewed by Louis R£au in L'Europe frangaise au siecle des 
lumieres (Paris, 1938). 
More detailed and specialized works on the period are L. Hautecoeur's 
encyclopedic work of reference, Histoire de Varchitecture classique en 
France . .  . (7 vols. in 9; Paris, 1943-57); and three important works 
that treat French painting in particular: Louis Dimier, Histoire de la 
peinture frangaise du retour de Vouet a la viort de Lehrun, 1627 a 1690 
(2 vols.; Paris and Brussels, 1926-27); P. Marcel, La Peinture frangaise 
au debut du dix-huitieme siecle, 1690—1721 (Paris, 1906); and Sir 
Anthony Blunt, Nicolas Poussin (2 vols.; New York, 1967) (also 
Blunt's earlier work on the development of architectural modes of the 
period, Frangois Mansart and the Origins of French Classical Architecture 
[London, 1941]). The work by Rene Crozet is a brilliant and indispens­
able guide to social background: La Vie artistique en France au XVII6 
siecle, 1598-1661. Les artistes et la societe (Paris, 1954). The royal 
academies are adequately treated in L. Vitet, L'Academie royale de 
peinture et de sculpture (2d ed.; Paris, 1880) and in H. Lapauze, Histoire 
de Vacademie de France a Rome (2 vols.; Paris, 1924). 
THE IDYLL OF VERSAILLES.—One of Louis XIV's great passions was the 
creation of the palace of Versailles. Many works have been written about 
this great palace; a few of the best are Pierre de Nolhac's, La Creation 
de Versailles d'apres les sources inedites; etude sur les origines et les 
premieres transformations du chateau et des jar dins (Versailles, 1901); 
Versailles et la cour de France: Versailles, residence de Louis XIV (Paris, 
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1925); Versailles et la cour de France: Vart de Versailles (Paris, 1930), 
and Les Jardins de Versailles (Paris, 1906). The life of Louis XIV's 
famous gardener, Le Notre, is treated by Ernest de Ganay in Andre Le 
Nostre (Paris, 1962). L. Hautecoeur, Louis XIV, roi-soleil (Paris, 1954), 
is an excellent guide to the symbolism manifested in the sculpture and 
architectural devices of Versailles. Pierre Francastel, "Versailles et Tarchi­
tecture urbaine au XVIIe siecle," Annales: E.—S.—C, X (1955), 465-79, 
is an interesting article, in which Francastel offers the reader a sweeping 
reinterpretation of the palace in social history and in the history of archi­
tecture. He traces its development through three phases: 1661-68, a 
period he designates as les fetes; 1668-74, t n  e Palace created for family 
living; and after 1674, the city of Versailles, the capital. Other books of 
importance are the detailed study of Louis Dussieux, Le Chateau de Ver­
sailles (2 vols.; Versailles, 1885); Pierre Bourget and Georges Catlaui, 
Jules Hardouin-Mansart (Paris, n.d.); and Edouard Guillou, Versailles: 
Le Palais du Soleil (Paris, 1963). 
XIV, Music 
GENERAL WORKS.—A comprehensive introduction to the music of the 
Baroque is provided by Suzanne Clercx in her elegantly written Le 
Baroque et la musique, essai d'esthetique musicale (Brussels, 1948). Indis­
pensable, too, is M. F. Bukofzer, Music in the Baroque Era (New York, 
1947); especially interesting is the discussion in the last chapter of the 
"Sociology of Baroque Music," i.e., the patronage of music, both private 
and collective. 
IN FRANCE.—Two treatments serve as a preface to the understanding of 
musical taste in France: Georges Snyders, "L'Evolution du gout musical 
en France aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siecles," Revue des science humaines 
(J955)> 32-5—50; and the collection of articles entitled, "Aspects de la 
musique francaise au XVIP siecle," XVlIe siecle, Nos. 21-22 (1954), 
pp. 377-505. Important relevant studies by Henry Prunieres on music and 
the ballet are: Le Ballet de cour en France avant Benserade et Lully, suivi 
du ballet de la delivrance de Renaud (Paris, 1914); L'Opera italien en 
France avant Lulli (Paris, 1913). Special studies of note are: Th. Gerold, 
L'Art du chant en France au XVlIe siecle (Strasbourg, 1921); J. Ecorche­
ville, De Lulli a Rameau, Vesthetique musicale (Paris, 1906). 
Since World War II the study of music during the Ancien Regime 
has greatly benefited by the publication of La Vie Musicale en France sous 
les rois Bourbons, under the direction of Norbert Dufourcq. Ten volumes 
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have thus far appeared; the most valuable to historians are: Vol. Ill: 
Norbert Dufourcq (ed.), Michel-Richard Delalande: notes et references 
pour servir a son histoire (Paris, 1957); Vol. IV: Maurice Barthelemy, 
Andre Campra, sa vie et son cenvre (Paris, 1957)' Vol. VII: Shlomo 
Hofman, L'OEuvre de clavecin de Frangois Couperin le Grand (Paris, 
1961) (highly technical); Vol. VIII: Norbert Dufourcq (ed.), J--B. de 
Boesset. . . . maitre de la musique des reines Anne d'Autriche et Marie-
Therese (Paris, 1962); and Vol. X: Michel Antoine, Henry Desmarets 
(1661-1741) (Paris, 1965). 
Add to these studies two biographies in English. Diligently researched, 
if a bit weighty in style, is Wilfrid Mellers' Frangois Couperin and the 
French Classical Tradition (London, 1950). Cutherbert Girdlestone, in 
Jean-Philippe Rameau (London, 1957), provides an admirable introduc­
tion to the ages of Louis XIV and Louis XV that shows how the "rococo" 
style of the eighteenth century impeded the complete realization of 
Rameau's talents. Two works of importance on Lully should be noted: 
Lionel de La Laurencie, Lulli Qid ed.; Paris, 1919), and Henri Prunieres, 
Lully (Paris, 1910). A brief but significant work is Claude Crussard's 
Un Musicien frangais oublie: Marc-Antoine Charpentier (1634-1J04) 
(Paris, 1945). Also "Versailles et la musique francaise," XVlIe siecle, No. 
34 (1957); and Bernard Champigneulle's brilliant L'Age classique de la 
mtisique francaise (Paris, 1946). 
For the popular music of the period there is the well-annotated collec­
tion of Pierre Barbier and Francois Vernillat, Histoire de France par les 
chansons (3 vols.; Paris, 1956-57). 
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Anne of Austria, 3, 5, n  , 17, 19, 21, 43, 
89, 103, n o  , 113, 115-17, 119, 126-27, 
129 n.17, 132, 140, 143, 294-95, 345; 
in correspondence with Mazarin, 120; 
death of (1666), 60, 347; supposed 
secret marriage of, 7, 11 
Antwerp, 6, 61 
Aquin, Antoine d' (premier physician to 
Louis XIV), 147, 150, 151 
Aragon: kingdom of, 337; laws of, 338 
Argenson, d', family of, 9 
Argenson, Marc Rene" de Voyer, Marquis 
d* (lieutenant of Paris police), 271, 
273, 275, 282, 283, 373 
Arnauld, Antoine (Jansenist leader), 98 
n.147, 122 
Arras, 5, 6, 19, 20, 51, 60 
Arriere-Ban (feudal levy), 51 
Art poetique (Boileau-Despreaux), 47 
Artois, province of, 5, 19, 61, 356 
Asher, Eugene (American historian), 
184, 230 
Asiento de Negros, 55, 84, 88 
Assembly of the French clergy, 247, 377 
Aubery, Antoine (French publicist), 
384-85; Des justes fretentions du Roi 
sur VEtnpire, 384 
Augsburg: League of, 76; War of League 
of, 56, 78-79, 157, 160, 165-66, 169, 
171, 176, 182, 332, 335, 386, 389, 393 
Augustus II (elector of Saxony): elected 
king of Polish Commonwealth, 159, 
171 
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Austria: house of, 13, 50, 58, 67, 76; 
archives of, 172. See also Charles VI; 
Hapsburg, house of Austria; Emperor, 
Holy Roman; Joseph I; Leopold I 
Avaux, Claude de Mesme, Comte d' 
(French ambassador), 12, 79 
Avaux, Jean Antoine de Mesme, Comte 
d' (French ambassador), 66, 79, 161, 
181, 342 n.6 
Avis au Roi apres le Siege de La 
Rochelle, see Richelieu, Cardinal 
Ban, see Arriere-han 
Bar, Duke of, 195 n.173 
Barbary States, the, 171 
Barbezieux, Louis Francois le Tellier, 
Marquis de (son of Louvois), 24, 27, 
72, 212, 216 
Barcelona: city of, 338, 340; rebellion 
against Philip V in, 340 
Baroque style: artistic concept of, 7, 288; 
as seen in the church of Val-de-Grace, 
110; classical, 286; in gardens, 289; 
Italian, 39, 44, 45; in rhetoric, 358. 
See also Classicism, baroque 
Bastille, the, 18, 140, 385 
Basville, Nicolas de Lamoignon de (in­
tendant of Languedoc), 374 
Bavaria: electors of, 89, 165, 339, 403 
n.59 (as the king of Rome, 165). See 
also Max-Emmanuel 
Bayle, Pierre, 75, 398; Philosophical 
Commentary on the Words of Jesus-
Christ: Compel Them to Come in, 75 
Beachy Head, battle of (1690), 34 
Beaufort, Francois de Vendome, Due de, 
104, 113 
Beauvais, Catherine-Henriette Bellier de 
(first lady of Anne of Austria), 143 
Beauvillier, Paul, Comte de Saint-Aignan 
and Due de, 27, 72, 87, 321, 334 
Belfort Gap, 4, 6, 7, 90 
Belgrade, 76 
Bergues, 61, 144, 145 
Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, 5, 6 
Bernini, Gianlorenzo (Italian architect), 
31, 38, 40, 95 n.79, 277-78; bust of 
Louis XIV by, 40; and Colbert, 31; 
and the Louvre, 39 
Berry, Charles de France, Due de, 90, 
338 
Berwick James Fitz James Stuart, Duke 
of (Marshal of France), 85, 217, 218 
Besancon: Courts of Reunion of, 68 
Beverning, Jerome (Dutch statesman), 
Blenheim, battle of, 85, 210, 212, 222 
n.28 
Bodin, Jean, 365, 399; Methodus Ad 
Facilem Historiarum Cognitionem(1566), 365; Six Livres de La Re­
publique (1576) 
Boileau-Despreaux, Nicolas, 36, 47 
Bonrepaus, Francois, Dusson de (French 
ambassador), 77, 7Q 
Bordeaux, 48; uprising in, 66 
Bossuet, Jacques Benigne (Bishop of 
Meaux), 23, 73, 121, 122, 224, 243, 
249, 250, 255, 260, 263 n.74, 310, 311, 
323, 33i, 369, 371, 399; Defensio Dec­
larationis Cleri Gallicani, 252; Poli­
tique Tiree des Propres Paroles de 
I'Ecriture Sainte, 311 
Bouchain, 52, 329 
Boufflers, Louis Francois, Due de (Mar­
shal of France), 52, 85, 88, 209, 210, 
211, 217, 220 
Bourbon: house of, 8, 82, 118, 172, 173, 
177, 325, 339, 381, 389, 39i, 393, 397; 
in alliance with Spain, 90, 178; waters 
of, 149 
Bourbonisme, see Bourbon, in alliance 
with Spain 
Bourbon-Wittelsbach Entente, 90 
Bouthillier, Claude le (secretary of state 
to Louis XIII), 9, 10 
Bouthillier, Leon le, 9 
Bouvard, Charles (premier physician of 
Louis XIII), 139-40 
Brabant: borders of, 53; county of, 61; 
estates of, 61; local law of, 61, 173 
Brandenburg-Prussia: elector of Branden­
burg becomes king in, 157, 181; elec­
tors of, 58, 65, 165, 170, 180, 181 
Braubach, Max (German historian), 
167-68 
Breisach: Courts of Reunion of, 68; Su­
perior Council of, 389; town of, 5, 6, 
7, 13, 51, 66, 67, 213. See also Neuf-
Breisach 
Bremen, 169, 180 
Brienne, Henri Auguste de Lomenie, 
Comte de, 27, 353 
Brienne, Louis Henri de Lomenie, Comte 
de, 27 
Brittany: province of, 66; uprising in, 
66 
Brussels: bombardment of, 223 n.41; 
Max-Emmanuel, resident in, 82 
Buda (capital of Hungary), 76 
Burgundy, 4, 6; circle of, 13, 61, 77 \ 
house of, 103; inheritance of, 6, 8; 
lands of, 6, 8, 13-14, 59, 63, 339. See 
also Franche-Comte 
66 
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Burgundy, Louis de France, Due de, 
72, 90, 203, 209, 210, 213, 395, 405 
n.106 
Cabale des Importants (1643), 14, 93 
n.19 
Caesar, Julius: Commentaries, 105; Gallic 
Wars, 53, 128 n.8 
Calais, 51, 145 
Callieres, Francois de, 88, 163; On the 
Manner of Negotiating with Princes, 
55 
Cambrai, 52, 61, 66, 293; F£nelon's exile 
to, 70. See also Cambresis, the 
Cambre'sis, the, 57, 90 
Camisards, revolt of (1702-5), 243. See 
also Cevennes, revolt in. 
Cantons, Swiss, see Switzerland 
Capitation, the (Head Tax of 1695), 79, 
375, 377 
Carlos II (king of Spain), 24, 58, 61, 
63, 70, 76, 83, 174, 175, 176, 178, 189 
n.74, 328, 336, 337, 343 n.22, 390, 391; 
death of, 342 n.6; German wife of, 177 
Cartesians, the, 38, 47, 239 n.38, 260, 317 
Cassel, battle of, 205, 206 
Castile: laws of, 19, 337; provinces of 
Old and New, 298 
Castilianization, 338 
Catalonia: estates of, 298; province of, 
5, 12 
Catherine de' Medici, 266 
Catinat, Nicolas de (Marshal of France), 
85, 204, 206, 207, 208, 211, 217; dis­
patches of, 209 
Cerdagne, province of, 19, 174, 194 n.145 
CeVennes, revolt in, 75, 162, 183, 243 
Chamillart, Michel de (French secretary 
of state for war), 24, 27, 70, 72, 85, 
86, 87, 88, 216; study of career of, 
100 n.177 
Chamlay, Jules-Louis Bole, Marquis de 
(military adviser to Louis XIV), 7, 28, 
52, 67, 81, 159, 160, 212, 213, 214, 215, 
219, 220; Memoires of, 215 
Chapelain, Jean, 37, 299 n.17 
Charleroi, 62, 208 
Charles I (king of England), 105, 298 
Charles II (king of England), 57, 59, 62, 
67, 77, 163, 171, 174, 180, 354 
Charles IV (duke of Lorraine), 386 
Charles V of Hapsburg (Holy Roman 
Emperor), 103, 172, 220, 329; empire 
of, 178, 179, 306 
Charles V (duke of Lorraine), 170 
Charles V of Valois (king of France), 
266, 271 
Charles VI (Holy Roman Emperor), 82­
83, 168, 169, 177, 181, 182, 184, 336 
Charles XII (king of Sweden), 58, 76, 
160, 161, 163, 164, 180, 183 
Charpentier, Marc-Antoine, 43, 44, 45; 
Epithalamium, 43 
Chevreuse, Charles Honore d'Albert de 
Luynes, Due de, 27, 334 
Christina (queen of Sweden), 12, 132 
Clark, Sir George (British historian), n  o 
Classicism, baroque, 292, 300 n.21, 300 
n.26 
Clement IX (Giulio Rospigliosi), 245; 
Clementine Peace of, 247, 256 
Clement XI (Giovanni Francesco Al-
bani), 257, 326 
Clerville, Louis Nicolas, Chevalier de 
(Louis XIV's chief engineer), 7, 51-52 
Codes of French law: Civil (1667), 376; 
Code Noir (1685), 33, 227, 235, Code 
Savary (1673), 33; Commercial (1673), 
33, 37^', Criminal (1670), 227, 376; 
Forest (1669), 231 
Colbert, family of, 9, 27, 68, 71, 309 
Colbert, Jean-Baptiste, 3, 25-27, 32-34, 
36, 37, 40, 41, 48, 49, 50, 52, 55, 61, 
62, 86, 90, 121, 225, 231, 232, 233, 235, 
236, 249, 250, 268, 271, 277-82, 288, 
291, 310, 319, 321, 323, 329, 347, 348, 
350, 37%, 379, 387, 388; death of, 270; 
literature concerning, 94 n.52; mercan­
tilism of, 304; notes of, 343 n.24, 352; 
policies concerning the Marine of, 35; 
reforms of, 33, 47; schemes for recruit­
ing seaman of, 33~34, 95 n-63 
Colbert, Jean-Baptiste, Marquis de Torcy 
(French minister of foreign affairs), 
27, 31, 55, 56, 57, 72, 81, 82, 83, 84, 
86, 87, 88, 90, 164, 213, 320, 321, 323, 
324, 336, 337, 340; Jojirnal of, 319, 322, 
335; wife of, 334 
Colbert, Nicholas (father of Jean-
Baptiste), 31 
Cologne: archdiocese of, 17, 18, 77, 78, 
399; elector of, 62; Wittelsbacn elec­
tors of, 89 
Commedia dell'arte, 44, 45 
Concordat of 1516, 252, 253, 377 
Conde, Louis II de Bourbon, Prince de, 
16-19, 22-23, 52, 63, 104-5, 112-13, 
115, 197, 199, 201-2, 213, 217, 345; 
family of, 103, 339; letter of congratu­
lations to, 205; military tactics of, 206, 
221 n.6 
Conti, Armand, Prince of (brother of 
Louis II Cond6), 17, 345 
Controller-General of Finances in France, 
office of, 27, 31, 48 
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Copemican Universe, idea of, 289 
Corneille, Pierre, 44, 108; Horace (1640), 
45; Le Cid (1637), 45; Oedipe, 45 
Corneille, Thomas: Timocrate, 45, 107 
Councils of Louis XIV: de Conscience, 
no, 248; des Depeches, 29; des Fi­
nances, 29; d'en Haut, 26-27, 54> 58, 
71, 81, 83-84, 85, 87, 150^  319, 321, 
333, 334, 37&, Etroit, 26; d'Etat Prive 
ou des Parties, 28, 29, 30, 376; des 
Trots, 26, 31 
Couperin, Francois, 43, 44; "La Stein­
querque," 43, 78 
Cours de Aides (of the Parlement of 
Paris), 48 
Court of Rome, see Holy See, the 
Courtrai, 53, 62 
Cousinot, Jacques (premier physician to 
Louis XIV), 139, 140, 141 
Cretan Expedition of 1669, 326 
Croissy, Charles Colbert, Marquis de 
(French secretary of state), 27, 55, 
66-68, 86, 164, 253, 321-22, 330, 331, 
332, 333, 336; death of, (1696), 81; 
style of, 343 n.26 
Cromwell, Oliver, 19, 151, 157, 180; fac­
tion of, 337 
Cum Ad Aures, Papal Bull of, 247 
Curia, the, see Holy See, the 
Dangeau, Philippe de Courcillon, Mar­
quis de (French diarist), 152, 295 
Danube, Valley of the, 172, 214 
Dauphin, Le Grand, see Louis de France 
Decapole, the (ten imperial cities in 
Alsace), 13, 68, 169, 172 
Delbriick, Hans (German historian), 201 
Desmaretz, Nicolas (French controller-
general), 27, 72, 87, 90, 321, 323 
Devolution, see War of Devolution 
Dixieme, the (French income tax of 
1710), 327, 375, 377 
Douai, 51, 62 
Dover, Treaty of, 62, 63, 194 n.146 
Devots, the, 46, 72 
Dragonnades, the, 74, 75, 242 
Dunes, Battle of the (1658), 19 
Dunkirk, town of, 19, 34, 51, 57, 60, 
144, 174, 192 n.121, 346; fortification 
of, 96 n.107; sale of, 97 n.115, 357 
Dunn, 7, 20 
Duras, Jacques Henri de Durfort, Due 
de (Marshal of France), 52, 199 
Dutch Republic, the, 4, 8, 12, 24, 56, 
58-59, 60, 62, 64, 77-78, 81, 84, 87, 
156, 165, 166, 173, 182-83, !98, 202, 
311, 330, 357; barrier of, 176, 184, 193 
n.130; and Portugal, 89; regent or rul­
ing classes of, 64; states-general of, 
157, 174, 175, 176, 185 n.7, 193 n.134; 
states of, 195 n.167 
Dutch War of 1672-78, 56, 67, 174, 175, 
202, 219, 386, 393, 395, 397, 405 n.105 
Duquesene, Abraham (admiral in French 
navy), 34 
Emery, Particelli d' (superintendant of 
finances), 15 
Emperor, Holy Roman, 13, 14, 57, 65, 
81. See also Charles VI; Ferdinand II; 
Ferdinand III; Germany, Holy Roman 
Emperor of; Joseph I; Leopold I. 
Encyclopedic (Diderot), 274, 275 
England, 8, 48, 58, 59, 67, 81, 82, 84, 89, 
156, 339; and Atlantic Powers, 56, 59; 
kings of, 158; government in 1710 of, 
179; royal house of, see Stuarts. See 
also Anglo-Dutch relations. 
English Succession, War of, see Augs­
burg, War of League of 
Escorial, 119 
Estrades, Godefroi, Comte d', 66, 383 
Estrees, Cesar d' (Cardinal), 249, 344 
n.30 
Estrdes, Jean, Abbe d' (nephew of Cardi­
nal d'Estrees), 344 n.30 
Eugene	 of Savoy, Prince, 67, 168, 208, 
210, 212, 214, 217 
Fagon, Guy-Crescent (premier physician 
to Louis XIV), 151, 152 
"Family compacts" between France and 
Spain, 90, 184 
Famine of 1708-9, 79, 282 
Felibien, Andre (royal historiographer), 
287, 288, 290 
Fenelon, Francois de Salignac de la 
Mothe (Archbishop of Cambrai), 72, 
112, 248, 254-56, 264 n.77, 334, 394­
98, 405 n.106; Les Maximes Des Saints, 
255> 344  n -3 2 - See also Cambrai. 
Ferdinand II (Holy Roman Emperor), 4 
Ferdinand III (Holy Roman Emperor), 
12, 170 
Feudalism, 239 n.38, 364; bastard, 313; 
discarded, 314; pageantry of, 269 
Feuillade, Louis d'Aubusson, Due de la 
(Marshal of France), 270, 353 
Flanders, provinces of, 5, 49, 53, 63, 66, 
79, 85, 201, 204, 208, 211, 214, 215 
Fleurus, Battle of (1690), 209, 344 n.31 
Florence, city of, 7; house of, 103 
Fontainebleau: edict of (1685), 75, 402 
n.45; palace of, 57, 83, 88, 91, 265, 
267, 268 
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Ford, Franklin (American historian), 
167, 229; thesis concerning the Robe 
nobility of, 231 
Fouquet, Nicolas, Marquis de Belle-Isle 
(French superintendant of finances), 
18, 25, 26, 27, 32, 115, 268; arrest of, 
29; disgrace of, 25; palace (Vaux-le-
Vicomte) of, 38; trial of, 376 
France d'Outre mer, see French overseas 
empire 
Franche-Comte, 6, 56, 57, 59, 66, 90, 170, 
171, 172, 174, 178, 197, 269, 356, 357 
Francis I (king of France), 7, 220 
Frederick II (king of Prussia), 120, 220 
Frederick-William I (king in Prussia), 
181 
Freiburg-im-Breisgau, 66 
French overseas empire, 34, 35, 36, 62, 
81, 88 
French Revolution, 225, 306, 309, 372 
FreVille, Henri (French historian), 234; 
thesis of, 231 
Fronde(s), the, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 
20, 22, 30, 91, 105, 108, 113, 114, 115, 
125, 196, 225, 232, 233, 244, 265, 266, 
277, 295, 296, 313, 325, 345, 351, 356, 
367, 375, 378; of Conde, 16; and Jan­
senism, 244; spirit of, 47; war of, 295 
Frondeurs, 23, 25 
Frontenac, Louis de Buade, Comte de 
(Governor-General of Canada), 80 
Frontiers: de fer, 53, 90; natural, 6, 8, 
166, 168; in north, northeast, and east 
of France, 6, 8, 53, 67, 89, 92 n.4, 173, 
184, 330 
Fiirstenberg, Guillaume-Egon, Cardinal 
de, 77; and the prince of Fiirstenberg, 
159 
Gallicanism, 73-75, 245, 247, 249-58, 260; 
as seen in Gallican Articles of 1682, 
73; as seen in the Gallican church, 
245, 257, 355; as seen in the Six 
Articles, 247; and concept of Cujus 
regio, ejus religio, 75; and the parle­
ments, 245, 249, 259; principles of, 
377, 37&, royal, 246, 255, 329; and the 
Sorbonne, 245, 246, 259 
Gassendi (Gassend), Pierre (French phi­
losopher), 36 
Gaul, boundaries of, 7 
Gauls, the, 19 
Gazette de France, 4, 206 
Gazette de Holland, 54 
Genoa: bombardments of, 215; city of, 
156, 333; Doge of, 158 
George I (king of England, Scotland, 
and Ireland, and elector of Hanover), 
181, 182 
Germany, 5, 8, 50, 54, 68, 78; borders 
of, 53; gate to, 53, 69; Holy Roman 
Empire of, 155, 335; liberties of, 18, 
170, 181; Princes of, 78, 181; Swedish 
invasion of, 12 
Gertruydenberg, Conference of (1710), 
88, 101 n.184 
Geyl, Pieter (Dutch historian), 166, 182 
Gibraltar, 88, 180 
Giraud, Marcel (French historian), 85 
Girardon, Frangois (French sculptor), 
270, 290 
Gloire, la: concept of, 11, 22, 39, 52, 64, 
65, 108, 125, 126, 127, 159, 160, 161, 
165, 178, 183, 184, 186 n.30, 196, 211, 
271, 272, 275, 279, 381, 393, 406 n.117; 
Militaire, 60, 220 
Glorious Revolution, see Revolution of 
1688 (England) 
Gobelins (royal manufacturer of tapes­
tries), 38, 279 
Godolphin, Sidney, Earl of (lord treas­
urer of England), 88, 168 
Gohring, Martin (German historian), 308 
Gondi, Paul, see Retz, Cardinal de 
Governors of French provinces, 28, 342 
n . n 
Grand Alliance, the, 79, 89, 165; fol­
lowed in 1701, 179; of 1689, 176; War 
of, see Augsburg, War of League of 
Grands, les, 8, 14, 17, 272, 274, 313 
Gravelines: battle of (1644), 12; town 
of, 4, 19-20, 51 
Great Britain, see England 
Great nobles, see Grands, les 
Great Northern War (1700-1721), 168, 
169; peace treaties of (1719-21), 180 
Grenoble, 51; Cardinal de Camus at, 252 
Grotius, Hugo (Dutch jurist), 121, 132 
Guenault, Francois (leading Paris physi­
cian), 142 
Guyon du Chesnoy, Jeanne-Marie Bou­
vier de la Motte (a leading Quietist), 
254, 255, 263 n.74 
Haarlem, 64 
Hague, The: conference of 1709, 172, 
173; Dutch city of, 4, 54, 64, 79, 84, 
87, 168, 182; Grand Alliance of August 
30, 1673, of, 65, 67; Grand Alliance of 
September 9, 1701, of, 84; prelimi­
naries of, 87 
Haley, K. H. D. (British historian), 63 
Hapsburg, house of (Austria), 13, 56, 
61, 83, 103, 155, 168, 171, 177, 179, 
191 n.90, 331, 336, 340, 357, 384; 
armies of, 4, 7, 56; borders of posses­
sions of, 331. See also Austria, house 
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Hapsburg (Continued) 
of; Charles VI; Ferdinand II, Ferdi­
nand III, Joseph I, Leopold I. 
Hapsburg, house of (Spain), 54, 77, 82, 
103, 156, 167, 171, 172, 173, 179, 326, 
328, 331, 336, 344 n.30, 357, 387- See 
also Carlos II, Philip IV; Spain, em­
pire of; Spanish succession. 
Hapsburg-Valois rivalry, 103 
Harcourt, Henri, Due d' (Marshal of 
France and soldier and diplomat), 27, 
28, 52, 70, 81, 85 
Hardouin-Mansart, Jules, 39, 40, 42; as 
supervisor of building of Versailles, 74, 
269, 289, 290, 297, 298 
Harlay de Champvallon, Frangois de 
(Archbishop of Paris), 73, 247-51, 260, 
263 n.74, 323 
Haro, Luis de (principal minister of 
Philip IV), 19 
Harvey, William: on the doctrine of the 
circulation of blood, 136 
Heinsius, Anthonie (Grand Pensionary 
of province of Holland), 84, 160, 163, 
177, 178, 179, 183; in correspondence 
with William III, 193 n.135 
Henri II (king of France), 266 
Henri III (king of France), 265 
Henri IV (king of France), 4, 20, 21, 39, 
74, 103, 104, 107, 119, 129 n.17, 138, 
229, 241, 242, 268, 313, 345, 366. See 
also Perefixe, Hardouin de 
Henriette (queen of England and aunt 
of Louis XIV), 105, 113 
Hobbes, Thomas, 121 
Holland: fortress of, 64, 65; province of, 
12, 174, 197. See also Dutch. Republic, 
the 
"Holy Pretence": concept of, 307 
Holy Roman Empire of German nation, 
155, 335; electors of, 157; princes of, 
12, 157, 169, 180; Turkish invasion 
of, 73, 158 
Holy See, the, 155, 246, 247, 253-60, 332, 
346, 35i, 355, 367 
Honnetes hommes; concept of, 53, 54, 
116, 127 
Hotels des Invalides, 33, 51 
Hoynck, Paul (German historian), 167 
Hudson Bay, country of, 80, 88, 194 
n.147 
Huguenots, 8, 23, 47, 75, 165, 182, 224, 
241, 242, 243, 252, 260, 261 n.161, 328, 
354, 366, 373; affairs of, 323; problem 
of, 74; and the "Reputedly Reformed 
Religion," 225; in Savoy, 182 
Humieres, Louis de Crevant (Marshal of 
France), 205 
Hundred Years' War, the, 265 
Huxelles, Nicolas de Laye du Bid, Mar­
quis d' (Marshal of France), 52, 88 
Huygens, Christiaan, 37, 38 
Iberville, Pierre Lemoyne d' (founder of 
Louisiana), 80, 81 
Innocent XI, Pope (Benedetto Odes­
calchi), 73, 74, 77, 249, 252, 331, 332, 
333, 336 
Innocent XII, Pope (Antonio Pignatelli), 
253, 255, 336 
Intendants, French royal provincial, 15, 
28, 30, 36, 113, 225, 231, 234, 342 n . n  , 
372-74, 380, 402 n.33; de l'arme'e, 5, 
49; as inspecteurs delegues, 49; as 
maitres de requites, 30, 277; on mis­
sion, 113; as subdelegates, 30 
Invalides, see Hotel des Invalides 
Ireland, 89 
Italy, 7, 49, 54, 59, 180, 211, 294, 335, 
338; the Alps in, 51; Spanish posses­
sions in, 179 
Jacobitism, 167 
James I (King of England), 121, 311 
James II (King of England; formerly 
Duke of York), 77, 78, 84, 85, 161, 
163, 178, 333, 342 n.6; son of, 162 
James Edward Stuart (James III, the Old 
Pretender), 162, 180, 326 
Jansen, Bishop, 245 
Jansenism, 47, 68, 243, 244, 323, 335, 
354, 402 n.38; ruin of, 256. See also 
Arnauld, Antoine; Jansen, Bishop; 
Jansenists; Port Royal 
Jansenists, 8, 27, 47, 244, 253, 254, 255, 
256, 257, 258, 260, 328, 334, 346 
Jardin de Plantes (royal botanical gar­
dens), 139 
Jardin d'intelligence, see Versailles, gar­
dens of 
Jesuits, 8, 23, 47, 58, 186 n.24, 242, 257, 
258; plot of, 259 
John III Sobieski (king of Polish Com­
monwealth), 163 
Joly, Claude, 122 
Joseph I (Holy Roman Emperor), 168, 
169, 193 n.129 
Joseph, Father (Francois le Clerc du 
Tremblay), 5; death of, 10, 367 
Journal de la Sante du Roi (Louis XIV), 
141, 142, 143, 144, 152, 154 
Jura Mountains, 6 
Jus Devolutionis, 60, 61 
King, James E. (American historian), 
235 
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King William's War, see Augsburg, War 
of League of 
Kinsley, Franz Ulrich, Count (Austrian 
statesman), 66 
Kossmann, Ernst (Dutch historian), 63, 
181 
La Bruyere, Jean de, 273, 275, 282; Les 
Caracteres, 273 
La Chaize, Francois d'Aix de (confessor 
of Louis XIV), 73, 248, 249, 323 
Lacour-Gayet, G. (French his tor ian) , 
117, 3i8 
La Fontaine, Jean de, 273, 286-88 
La Hougue, naval battle of, 34 
Lalande, M. R. de (French musician), 
43 
Lamoignon, Guillaume I de: family of, 
9; as first President, 230, 235 
Landrecies, 19, 20 
La Porte (valet to Louis XIV), 124 
La Porte, de, family of, 9 
La Reynie, Gabriel Nicolas de (Lt. Gen­
eral of Paris police), 235, 282, 373, 
379 
La Rochefoucauld, see Maxims 
Latona Fountain at Versailles, 23, 288, 
296, 299 
La Valliere, Louise de la Baume Le 
Blanc, Duchesse de (mistress of Louis 
XIV), i n  , 346, 348, 358 
Lavisse, Ernest (French historian), 224, 
3i8 
La Vrillieres, Louis II Phelypeaux, Mar­
quis de (secretary of state), 27 
Le Brun, Charles (French painter and 
architect), 25, 38, 39, 40 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 38, 121, 170, 
185 n.8, 394, 395, 405 n.106 
Le Notre, Andre (gardener of Louis 
XIV), 25, 41; gardens of, 290 
Lens, battle of (1648), 12, 16 
Leopold I (Holy Roman Emperor), 57­
59, 64, 82-84, 129 n.21, 156, 157, 159, 
162, 165, 166, 168, 169, 172, 175-78, 
180, 181, 187 n.40, 194 n.144; account 
of, 97 n.118; Maria Antonia, daughter 
of, 82, 193 n.129; and his Jesuit advis­
ers, 182, 186 n.24 
Leopold Joseph (duke of Lorraine), 170 
Le Peletier, Claude (controller-general 
and chancellor of France), 24, 27, 52, 
Le Tellier, Charles Maurice (Archbishop 
of Rheims), 52, 250; nickname of, 52 
Le Tellier, family of, 3, 9, 27, 50, 51, 68, 
71, 309. See also Louvois, Francois 
Le Tellier, Michel de (secretary of state 
and chancellor of France), 18, 26, 27, 
31, 48, 49, 60, 72, 75, 120, 197, 212, 
221 n.6, 250, 268, 321, 323 
Le Tellier, Pere Michel (confessor of 
Louis XIV), 52 
Lettres de Cachet, 28, 225, 227, 234, 236, 
259, 376, 402 n.38 
Le Vau, Louis (French architect), 25, 
39, 40, 269, 289, 290 
Liege, 6, 62; bishopric of, 63 
Lille: city of, 52, 62, 90, 210; siege of, 
210 
Lillieroot, Nils (Swedish mediator), 182 
Lionne, Hugues de (French foreign min­
ister), 9, 18, 26, 27, 29, 33, 54, 61, 62, 
93 n.29, 97 n.109, 309, 321, 322, 329; 
diplomacy of, 97 n.109 
Lisbon, ambassadors in, 57 
Lisola, Baron Franz Paul, 165, 184, 385; 
Bouclier d'Etat et de Justice, 385 
Livet, Georges (French hitsorian), 234 
Locke, John, 121, 122, 311 
London, city of, 81, 89, 182, 346, 350; 
ambassadors in, 57; parliament in, 8, 
15 
Longueville, Henri II, Due de, 12, 17 
Lope de Vega Carpio, Filipe, 109 
Lorge (Lorges) Guy de Durfort, Due de 
(Marshal of France), 52, 206, 215, 217 
Lorraine (and Bar), duchy of, 4, 6, 7, 
12, 20, 58, 59, 65, 68, 74, 82, 167, 171, 
175, 177, 178, 183, 184, 346, 386, 395; 
borders of, 53; dukes of, 120, 170, 171, 
173, 175? 195 n.173; "Marches of," 19 
Lossky, Andrew (American historian), 
167 
Louis, Dauphin of France, 71, 82, 90, 
165, 177, 287; Bossuet as tutor to, 73 
Louis XI, 271 
Louis XIII, 34, 57; brother of, 104; death 
of (1643), n  , 14, 21, 39, 103, 108, 109, 
n o , 113, 115, 119, 132, 140, 229, 230, 
268, 269, 289, 295, 314; minority of, 
265; vow of, 128 n . n , 129 n.17 
Louis XIV: and affaire des poisons, 69; 
and Anne of Austria, 3, 5, n  , 17, 19, 
21, 43, 60, 89, 103, n o  , 115—17, 119, 
126-27, 294-95; as Apollonian image 
of kingship, 291, 292, 294; bastard chil­
dren of, 69; birth of, 3, 4, 132; and 
Bernini, 38, 40; and Boileau, 47; and 
Bossuet, 73, 121, 122, 252, 311; as 
bureaucratic king, 23, 30, 31, 43, 71, 
72, 73, 81, 84, 85, 87, 90, 309-10, 372­
73; and Capetian traditions, 180, 339; 
character and personal traits of, 22, 
23, 38, 43, 9i, 102-27, 157-61, 183­
84, 202-7, 211, 218-20, 259, 267-69, 
317-18, 324-26, 332-33, 335, 387, 
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Louis XIV (Continued) 
396; and Charles II, 57, 59, 62, 
67, 163, 171, 174; children of, 28, 69, 
82, 83, 90, 165, 177, 287, 296; as 
Christian king, 250, 326, 394; and 
"The Christian Turk," 187 n.50; and 
Colbert, 25-27, 32-34, 36, 40-41, 48­
50, 61-62, 121, 230-33, 235-36, 277­
82, 288, 291; and councils of ministers, 
26-27, 28, 29, 30-31, 54, 58, 71, 81, 
83-84, 85, 87, n o  , 150, 248, 319, 321, 
333-34, 37^, and cult of the God-King, 
240; death of, 90, 91, 153, 154, Dieu­
donne, 3, 5, 109, 132; and divine 
providence, 324-25, 328-29; and divine 
right doctrine, 21, 121, 122, 123, 124, 
288, 304, 310-n; and Duke of Bur­
gundy, 72, 90, 203, 209, 213; educa­
tion of, 20-24, 105-21; as enlightened 
despot, 120; as seen in, "L'Etat, c'est 
moi," 233, 303, 314, 371; foreign pol­
icy of, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 63, 65, 68, 
77, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88-89, 
163, 164, 166, 170, 171, 180, 181, 356­
57, 380-93; and Fouquet's fall, 25, 29; 
and the Frondes, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23, 25, 
47, 108, 113, 114, 115, 125, 244, 265, 
266, 295, 296, 313, 356, 378; and Gal­
licanism, 73~75, 245~47, 249-58; gloire 
of, 39, 52, 64-65, 108, 125-27, 159-61, 
178, 183-84; as grand monarque, 224, 
226; health of, 69, 141-53, 166; as 
honnete homme, 53, 54, 116, 127; and 
Huguenots, 74, 165, 224, 241-43, 252, 
328, 373; as an imperialist, 35, 36, 80, 
81; and Innocent XI, 73-74, 77, 249, 
252, 253, 255; and Jansenism, 243, 
253-58, 323, 335, 354; Journal de la 
Sante du Roi, 141-44, 152, 154; and 
La Valliere, i n  , 346, 348, 358; laws 
reformed by, 32, 33, 227, 229, 230, 
231, 376"; and Leopold I, 57"59, 64, 
82-84, 156-57, 175-78; and Le Tellier 
(Michel), 31, 48-49, 60, 72, 75, 120; 
and Lionne, 29, 33, 54, 61-62, 321-22; 
and le Dauphin, 71, 82, 90; and the 
Louvre, 40, 45, 55, 265, 267, 277-78, 
294; and Louvois, 48, 50-53, 55, 62, 
202-5, 330-33; Machiavelli's influence 
on, 329, 342 n.15, 350-56, 359, 362; 
and Maintenon, 69-72, 150-52, 341 
n.5; and tnaison du roi, 203, 323; 
Maniere de montrer les jardins de 
Versailles, 301 n.40; and Maria 
Theresa, 19, 57, 59-6i» 69, 145, 197, 
204; and Marie Mancini, 19, 108, 126­
27; and Mazarin, 10-15, 17-26, 28, 30, 
3i, 39, 103-5, 107, 108, 110-18, 345­
47; Memoires of, 102, 106, 107, 112, 
117, 118, 119, 120, 125, 317-18, 320, 
323, 325, 328, 330, 334, 335, 340, 34°­
61; and metier du (de) roi, 24, 54, 91, 
119, 320, 341, 342 n.9, 393; and Moliere, 
36, 44-45, 47; and Mme Montespan, 
69, i n , 147; nee plurihus impar 
(motto of), 42, 52; as patron of arts, 
36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 
268-83, 272, 273, 286-301; as patron 
of music, 43-45; and peasantry, 379­
80; and "personal state," 303; and 
Philippe, Due d'Orleans, 4, 21, 22, 
40, 63, 71, 104, 204-5, 265, 338; and 
Philip V, 83-84, 90, 163, 181, 320, 
337, 339, 341 n.5, 390-91; and Pom­
ponne, 54-55, 65, 68, 71-72, 333-36, 
342 n.9; and Prince of Conde, 16, 19, 
22-23, 52, 101-5, 112-13, 115; and 
Racine, 36, 46-47, 146; reform of army 
by, 52, 53, 216-18, 357; religious views 
of, 23, 47, 73^ 74, 75,^242-43, 259-60, 
328; as roi d'aujourd'hui, 40, 92; as 
roi faineant, 21, 70, 107, 124; and 
secret du roi, 54; and Spanish Suc­
cession, 19, 20, 59, 60, 82, 83, 172, 
176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 332; as Sun 
King, 224-26, 228, 233-34, 236, 267, 
269, 272, 303, 346, 370, 378; these 
royale of, 271; and Torcy, 72, 82-84, 
86, 87, 88, 90,^213, 321, 323, 33^-37tl 
340; and the "true maxims of state," 
327, 330; and universal monarchy, 165, 
173, 182; and Versailles, 40, 42, 71, 
72, 81, 90, 91, 134, 240, 267-70, 271­
74, 279-80, 286-301, 320, 340, 378; and 
William III, 58, 64-65, 79-82, 175-76, 
178-79, 184, 189 n.74, 194 n.146, 335­
36; youth of, 3, 5, 20-24, 124-27 
Lousse, Emile (Belgian historian), 313 
Louvois, Francois Michel Le Tellier, 
Marquis de, 27, 48, 50-53, 55, 62, 64, 
67, 68, 70, 74, 77, 85, 149, 150, 198, 
202-5, 212, 216, 221 n.5 and n . n  , 270, 
281, 319, 321, 323, 330, 331, 332, 333, 
344 n.27, 373, 380, 404 n.94; death 
of (1691), 72, 213, 218. See also 
Barbezieux; Le Tellier, Michel de 
Louvre, the: palace of, 16, 17, 40, 45, 
55, 267, 277, 278, 294; so-called Per­
rault colonnade of, 40, 278, 281 
Low Countries, see Spanish Netherlands 
Loyseau, Charles (French jurist), 368 
Luc, Charles Francois de Vintimille, 
Comte de (French ambassador), 216 
Lully, Jean-Baptiste, 43, 44, 45; diver­
tissements, masques, comedies, and 
operas of, 44; Plaude laeture Gallia, 43 
Liithy, Herbert (Swiss historian), 182 
Luxembourg: city of, 57, 79; duchy of, 
6, 19, 50, 53, 59, 61, 67, 77, 201; duke 
of, 120; fortress of, 79; palace of, 266; 
siege of (1683), 76 
Luxembourg, Francois Henri de Mont­
morency-Bouteville, Due de (Marshal 
of France), 65, 78, 204-8, 214, 215, 
217, 218, 220; death of, 211 
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Macaulay, Thomas Babington (English 
historian), 73 
Machiavellianism: concept of, 166, 307-8, 
347, 349-50, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 
359, 362, 366; concept of virtu in, 
329; influence on Louis XIV of, 342 
n.15; The Prince and The Discourses 
on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy, 
347 
Mademoiselle, La Grande, see Orleans, 
Anne-Marie Louise d' 
Madrid, 59, 60, 61, 62, 77, 84, 179, 337, 
383 
Maestricht, 65, 66, 199, 200, 202, 203 
Maimbourg, Pere Louis (French his­
torian), 75 
Maine, Louis Auguste de Bourbon, Due 
de (illegitimate son of Louis XIV), 
72, 339 
Maintenon, Francoise d'Aubigne, Mar­
quise de, 69-71, 72, 83, 84, 86, i n  , 
150-52, 212, 218, 242, 254, 263 n.74, 
319, 321; influence of, 341 n.5; letters 
of, 341 n.5 
Mainz, 18, 159 
Malplaquet, battle of, 88, 211 
Mancini, Marie (niece of Mazarin), 19, 
108, 126, 127, 130 n.30, 145 
Maniere de montrer les jardins de Ver­
sailles (Louis XIV), 301 n.40 
Mansart, Francois (French architect), 39 
Mansart, Jules Hardouin-, see Hardouin-
Mansart, Jules 
Mantua, Duchy of, 10 
Marcin, Ferdinand, comte de (Marshal 
of France), 85, 217, 220 
Mardyck, battle of (1645), 12, 144 
Mareschal (de Bievre), Georges (pre­
mier surgeon to Louis XIV), 153 
Maria Theresa (queen of France), 19, 
60, 131 n.54, 145, 148, 197, 204, 267, 
287, 328, 345; death of (1638), 69, 
148; dowry of, 57, 59, 61; renunciation 
of rights of, 174 
Mariana of Hapsburg (Queen Dowager 
of Spain), 60 
Marie de' Medici (queen of France), 
140, 265, 266 
Maritime powers, the, 165, 168, 176, 178, 
179. See also Dutch Republic, the; 
England 
Marlborough, John Churchill, first duke 
of, 67, 85, 88, 120, 168, 201, 210, 212, 
214, 217; Marlborough-Whig Coalition 
of, 88 
Marly, Palace of, 42, 70, 81, 91, 151 
Marseilles, 51, 374 
Marsy, brothers Balthasaer and Gaspard, 
290, 292, 293 
Martinet, Jean (Inspector-General in 
French Army), 51, 52 
Mary of Modena (queen of England), 
162 
Max II Emmanuel (elector of Bavaria), 
43, 82, 175, 176, 209, 210, 339 
Maxims (La Rochefoucauld), 24 
Maximes des Saints, Les, see Fenelon, 
Francois 
Mazarinades (pamphlets directed against 
Cardinal Mazarin), 11, 16, 22, 123 
Mazarin, Jules (Cardinal), 3, 8, 10-15, 
17-26, 28, 30, 31, 39, 45, 52, 91, 103-5, 
107, 108, 110-18, 123, 124, 126, 127, 
128 n.2 and n.7, 141, 145, 173, 180, 
189 n.69, 230, 233, 242, 244, 265, 266, 
295, 315, 329, 345, 346, 347, 367; 
career of, 93 n .n , Cornets, 119, 130 
n.38; death of, 121, 146, 196, 267, 345; 
letters of, 120; ministers and ministries 
of, 54, 366. See also Mazarinades. 
Meinecke, Friedrich (German historian), 
307 
Memoire hy the Reverend Father de la 
Chaize to Prove that Innocent XI is a 
Jansenist, 73 
Memoires pour Vinstruction du dauphin 
(Louis XIV), 102, 106, 107, 112, 117, 
118, 119, 120, 125, 164, 175, 197, 217, 
268, 317-18, 320, 323, 325, 328, 330, 
334, 335, 340, 346-61; Dreyss edition 
of, 349, Grouvelle edition of, 349 
Memoriaux de Conseil de 1661 (edited 
by Jean de Boislisle), 29 
Mercure Galant, 296 
Mesnager, Nicolas (French diplomat), 
55, 86, 88 
Messina, battle of, 34 
Metz: city of, 6, 7, 13, 51, 169, 172; 
Courts of Reunion, 68; parlement of, 
388 
Meuse, valley of, 7, 63, 66 
Milan, city and duchy of, 82, 171, 177 
Milanese, the, 82, 171 
Minorca, island of, 194 n.146. See also 
Port Mahon 
Mississippi River, 80, 81; Carte des En­
virons du Mississipi (1701), 81 
Mittel-Europa, concept of, 78, 89 
Moliere (Jean Baptiste Poquelin), 25, 
36, 44, 45, 47, 107, 134, 143; comedie­
ballets of: George Dandin, 44, Le 
Bourgeois Gentilhotnme, 44, Les Fdch­
eux, 44, Psyche, 44; comedies of; 
Femmes Savantes, 45, Le Medecin 
Malgre Lui, 46, Le Misanthrope, 46; 
Cocu lmaginaire, 45, Manage Ford, 
45, Tartufte, 46; "Instrument of," 136 
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xUolinos, Miguel de (Quietist leader), 
254, 255 
Mons, 78, 344 n.31 
Montecucculi, Raimund (Austrian field 
marshal), 66, 67 
Montespan, Franchise Athenais de 
Rochechouart, Marquise de, 69, i n  , 
147 
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron 
de, 275 
Montmartre, treaty of, 170 
Montpellier (center of medical arts in 
France), 134, 135, 139, 140, 141, 145, 
147, 152 
Montpensier, Anne-Marie Louise d'Orle­
ans, see Orleans, Anne-Marie 
Mont Royal, 7, 67 
Moselle, The, 7, 65 
Motteville, Franchise, Mme de (French 
diarist), 17, 21, 109 
Mouret, J. J. (French musician), 43; 
"Fanfares for the King's Supper," 43 
Mousnier, Roland (French historian), 
226, 229, 232, 308 
Miinster; Bishop of, 62; city of, 12; Con­
gress held at (1648), 12, 18, 54, 68; 
Treaty of, 12, 13, 14, 20, 61, 157, 169, 
388, 389, 395, 404 n.90 and n.91 
Muscovy, Tsars of, 156, 185-86 n.18 
Namur, town of, 61, 78, 79, 344 n.31; 
attempt to recapture (1692), 206 
Nantes, Edict of, 8, 74, 75, 182, 224, 243, 
326, 359; revocation of (Edict of 
Fontainebleau, 1685), 70, 182, 252, 
327, 373, 374, 402 n.45 
Naples: city of, 59, 82, 171, 298; galleys 
of, 165; rebels of, 8 
Neerwinden: battle of (1693), 344 n.31; 
town of, 207, 208 
Netherlands, Spanish, see Spanish Neth­
erlands 
Netherlands, United Provinces of, see 
Dutch Republic, the 
Neuf-Breisach, 81 
Nijmegen: Congress of, 66, 158, 167; 
Peace of, 67, 68, 130 n.42, 158, 167, 
170, 201, 359, 388, 389, 404 n.90 (con­
firmation of, 172; gains of, 171; pleni­
potentiaries at, 387) 
Nine Years' War, the, see Augsburg, 
War of League of 
Noailles, Louis Antoine de (Cardinal), 
256, 257, 258, 259, 264 n.81, 323, 335, 
403 n.6o 
Nordlingen, Battlefield of (1645), 12 
Nordmann, Claude (French historian), 
167 
Northern Heartland of France (ie 
Coeur^), 12 
Observatoire, the (in Paris), 38, 281 
"Old System" of alliances, 89 
Olivier-Martin, Frangois (French his­
torian), 226 
Orange-Nassau, house of, 59, 357. See 
also William III 
Orleans, Anne-Marie Louise d' (Duchesse 
de Montpensier), 18, 104, 106, 115, 
196 
Orleans, Elizabeth-Charlotte of Bavaria, 
duchess of, 71, 78; correspondence of, 
154; rights in the Palatinate of, 390 
Orleans, Gaston, Due d' (uncle of Louis 
XIV), 22, 104, 115 
Orleans: house of, 103, 179; dukes of, 72 
Orleans, Philippe, Due d' (brother of 
Louis XIV), 4, 21, 22, 40, 63, 71, 104, 
141, 205, 206, 265; in battle of Cassel, 
204; command of army of, 205; palace 
at St. Cloud of, 301 n.41 
Orleans, Philippe, Due d' (nephew of 
Louis XIV), 72, 338 
Orleans War, The, see Augsburg, War 
of League of 
Osnabriick, Treaty of, 12, 14, 169 
Ostend, 6, 194 n. 146, 215 
Ottoman Empire, see Turkey 
Oudenarde, 61; battle of (1708), 86, 210 
Ovid, 294, 298; Metamorphoses, 292 
Pages, Georges (French historian), 30, 
226, 403 n.54 
Palais Royal, 265 
Palatinate, the, 78, 183, 333. See also 
Orleans, Elizabeth-Charlotte, rights in 
the Palatinate of 
Palatine War, see Augsburg, War of 
League of 
Papacy, the, see Holy See, the 
Papal States, see Holy See, the 
Paris: city of, 3, 5, 15, 17, 18, 22, 30, 
36, 37, 39, 47, 48, 49, 5i, 89, 114, 134, 
135, 140, 141, 168, 265-85, 336, 373, 
379, 391', as the bonne ville, 277, 282; 
guilds in, 268; liberties of, 295; musee 
Carnavalet in, 108; police of, 373, 379; 
university of, 135; medical facilities of, 
135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 148, 152, 
245, 246. See also Parlement of Paris. 
Parlement of Paris, 14, 15, 17, 23, 30, 
114, 145, 171, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 
247, 295, 338, 351, 355, 375, 391; 
avocat general of, 252, 369; claims of, 
375; the Fronde in, 16, 18; Gallicanism 
in, 245, 249; lit de justice of, 15, 23, 
16 
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121, 229, 233; remonstrance of 1615 of, 
368; Twenty-seven Articles of (1648), 
Partition Treaty, the First (1698), 82, 
171, 176, 193 n.138, 392 
Partition Treaty, the Second (1700), 82, 
83, 171, 177, 178, 180, 187, n.40, 189 
n.78, 193 n.139, 336, 337, 342 n.6, 392 
Partition Treaty, Secret (1668), 59, 97 
n.119, 190-91 n.90 
Pascal, Blaise, 244, 261 n.25 
Patel, Pierre, the Elder, 289 
Patin, Guy (defender of Paris medical 
school), 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 
142 
Paulette (Droit AnnueV), 234, 313 
Paulin, Father Charles, S. J. (confessor 
of Louis XIV), no , i  n 
Pax Gallica (idea of French mission in 
the new world), 81 
Peace, Congress of, see Aix-La-Chapelle 
(1668), Minister (1648), Nijmegen 
(1678-79), Osnabriick (1648), Rys­
wick (1697), Utrecht (1713), and 
Westphalia (1648) 
Peace of the Church (1668), 245 
Pecquet, Antoine (first secretary to the 
French foreign office), 55 
Pellisson, Paul (lecteur of Louis XIV), 
106, 242, 320, 348, 349, 352 
Perefixe, Hardouin de (tutor of Louis 
XIV, later Archbishop of Paris), 21, 
46, 106, 107, 123, 244, 345; L'Histoire 
de Henri le Grand, 106 
Perigny, the president (lecteur of Louis 
XIV), 106, 320, 347, 348, 349, 350, 
351, 352, 356 
Perpignan, 5, 51 
Perrault, Charles (adviser on the arts to 
Louis XIV), 38, 291, 299 n.8, 300 n.17 
Perrault, Claude (architect and physi­
cian), 38 
Peter the Great (tsar of Russia), 58 
Petite Academie, 37, 291 
Phelypeaux, Jerome, Comte de Ponchar­
train (French secretary of state), 27, 
34, 35, 72, 80, 84, 90, 235 
Phelypeaux, Louis II, Comte de Ponchar­
train (French controller-general, then 
Chancellor), 27, 34, 35, 72, 80, 87 
Phelypeaux, family of, 9, 27, 321

Philip II (king of Spain), 20, 39, 103,

109, 119, 320, 329 
Philip III (king of Spain), 109 
Philip IV (king of Spain), 56, 57, 59, 
93 n.32, 155, 157, 163, 174, 197, 343 
n.22, 346, 350; brother of (Cardinal-
Infant), 4; daughters of, 19; death of 
(1665), 60; Margareta Theresa, daugh­
ter of, 176; ministers of, 20 
Philip V (king of Spain), 54, 83, 84, 
90, 163, 176, 181, 193 n.134, 301 n.41, 
320, 337, 339, 341 n.5, 390, 391, 405 
nn.99, 102; demand for abdication of, 
87, 88; palace of, 301 n.41; renuncia­
tion of, 338; second reconquest of 
Spain by, 337. See also Anjou, Due d' 
Philippines, the, 59, 192 n.123 
Philippsburg, 67, 79, 199, 332 
Philisbourg, see Philippsburg 
Philosophes, the, 225, 236, 260, 272 
Pignerol, 7, 51, 92 n.4 
Place des Victoires (in Paris), 183, 270, 
281 
Place Vendome (in Paris), 270, 281 
Poland, 155, 171, 339; kings of, 76, 181 
Polignac, Melchoir de, 55, 88 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, see 
Poland 
Politique party (of the reign of Henri 
IV), 366 
Pomponne, Simon Arnauld, Marquis de 
(French foreign minister), 27, 54, 55, 
65, 68, 72, 79, 81, 82, 86, 164, 309, 
321, 322, 330, 333-3^, Affaire de, 68; 
disgrace of (1679), 71, 249, 333; ideas 
°f, 336; inadequacy of, 342 n.9; min­
istry of, 97 n .no 
Porchnev, Boris (Russian historian), 232 
Porte-de-Bourgogne, see Belfort Gap 
Port Mahon, 82, 88, 180, 194 n.142 
Port-Royal: Jansenism in, 244, 256 
Portugal, 5, 12, 155, 383; Princess Isa­
bella of, 57; War of Independence of, 
57 
Pre Carre, concept of, see Vauban, Mar­
quis de 
Prevot de marchands, 281 
Prior, Matthew (English poet and diplo­
mat), 88 
Protestantism, French, see Huguenots 
Pufendorf, Samuel (German interna­
national lawyer), 38, 121 
Pyrenees, 5, 13, 51, 56; Peace of (1659), 
19, 20, 54, 56, 57, 66, 173, 189 n.74, 
295, 383, 384, 385, 386, 388, 395, 404 
n.90 and n.91 (moyennant or marriage 
clause of, 54) 
Quesnel, Pere Pasquier (Jansenist 
leader), 256; Reflexions morales sur 
le Nouveau Testament, 258 
Quesnoy, 19, 20 
Quietism, 23, 253, 255, 257, 258, 260, 
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Racine, Tean, 23, 36, 46; Jansenism of, 
47; Oae of 1663, 146; plays of: Andro­
maque (1667), 46; Athalie (1691), 
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country seat of, 268; families and 
their clients or creatures of, 8, 9; for­
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(1629), 7; ministries of, 366; phrase, 
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also Carlos II, Philip IV, Philip V 
Srbik, Heinrich Putter von (German his­
torian), 166, 171, 182 
Steinkirke, battle of (1692), 78, 207, 216, 
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secretary of state), 5 
Sweden: kingdom of, 54, 62, 66 156, 
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173, 180, 196, 366 
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de, see Colbert, Jean-Baptiste, Marquis 
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172 
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Admiral), 28, 34 
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4
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3i, 54 
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Triple Alliance of 1668, 62-63, 67, 97 
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201, 202, 203, 204, 214, 217, 242; advice 
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of, 198; death of, 66; tnonnaie de, 217 
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335 
Turkey, 50, 76, 81, 89, 162, 172, 196, 
326, 331, 357, 386, 390; Louis XIV's 
early knowledge of, 106; wars of, 178. 
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Unigenitus, Papal Bull of, 257, 258, 402 
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Ursins, Anne Marie de la Tre"moille, 
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Vauban, Sebastien le Prestre, Marquis 
de (Marshal of France), 7, 20, 52-53, 
65-68, 74, 79-8i, 85, 163, 167, 199, 
200, 202, 204, 205, 212, 213, 214, 215, 
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raphy of Louis XIV's kingship at, 40; 
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208, 211, 212, 218, 220 
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183, 197, 297, 300 n. 34, 357, 383, 387, 
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See also Minister, Treaty of; Osna­
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